JUDGMENT Jagmohan Lal, J. - This revision is directed against an order dated 31-7-1961 passed by a Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the order dated 10-4-1968 passed by the Civil and Sessions Judge Lucknow, dismissing a revision against that order. 2. The relevant facts of the case were that the police submitted a report that with regard to the possession of a piece of land there was an apprehension of breach of peace between the petitioner Bhagwati Singh and the opposite party Harihar Bux Singh. The Magistrate on being satisfied that there was such an apprehension of breach of peace passed a preliminary order under Sec.' 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure attaching the land and calling upon both the parties to file written statements of their claim. Hariliar Bux Singh contended that the land was lying Banjar and it was in possession of the Gaon Sabha and that he as a member of the Gaon Sabha was interested in seeing that no encroachment is made on it by the other party. Bhagwati Single on the other hand alleged that this land was in his own possession and that the Gaon Sabha had no concern with this land. The parties filed affidavits in support of their respective claims. The learned Magistrate on a perusal of those affidavits was unable to decide as to which of the parties was in possession and therefore made a reference to the Civil Court under Section 146 (1) of the Code. In the reference the Magistrate had requested the Civil Court to decide which of these parties including the Gaon Sabha was in possession of the disputed land. 3. The learned Munsif after considering the evidence produced by the parties found that none of these parties was in possession of the land in dispute on the (late of preliminary order. 4. In view of this finding returned by the Civil Court, the learned Magistrate was not in a position to release the property. in favour of one or the other party though he was of the opinion that there was still an apprehension of breach of peace with regard to the possession of the said land. He accordingly directed that the land shall continue under attachment till one or the other party obtained a declaration in his favour from a competent court of law. He accordingly directed that the land shall continue under attachment till one or the other party obtained a declaration in his favour from a competent court of law. It is against this order that the petitioner had filed a revision before the Sessions Judge and when the same was dismissed, he filed the present revision. 5. I heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the opposite party raised a preliminary objection that since the-Magistrate had decided a case in accordance with the finding returned by the Civil Court, no revision is maintainable against that order in view of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1-D) of Section 146 of the Code as interpreted by this Court in the Full Bench decision in Ferzand All v. Shaukat Ali, 1970 A.L.J. 789. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on other hand, contended that in this case he is not challenging the finding of the Civil Court but his contention is that in view of that finding the Magistrate should have simply withdrawn the attachment. According to him, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to keep the property under attachment after the termination of the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code because under the amended Section 146 no such power was given to the Magistrate as was specifically conferred on him under this Sec. as it stood prior to its amendment in 1955. He relied on a decision of this Court which was cited by him before the learned Civil and Sessions judge also and which is Raj Deo Singh v. Emperor, 49 Criminal Law Journal 714 The facts of that case were entirely different. In that case the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started on a complaint filed by one Sadloo Bhar. After a preliminary order had been passed and the parties had put in appearance and filed written statements of their claims, a date was fixed for enquiry. On that (late the applicant Sadloo Bhar was found absent. The Magistrate passed an order dismissing the application and releasing the property from attachment without specifying in whose favour the property was to be released. Subsequently, both the parties put in their applications requesting the Magistrate to clarify ill his order that the property was to be released in favour of that pars. The Magistrate passed an order dismissing the application and releasing the property from attachment without specifying in whose favour the property was to be released. Subsequently, both the parties put in their applications requesting the Magistrate to clarify ill his order that the property was to be released in favour of that pars. The learned Magistrate again fixed up a date for disposal of those applications. On that date the opposite party Rajdeo Singh was found absent and then an order was passed that the property shall be released in favour of the first party, namely, Sadloo. It was against this order that a revision was filed before the Sessions judge who made a reference that both these orders passed by the Magistrate were unwarranted. The reference was accepted by this Court and the case was sent back to the Magistrate to be tried according to law. While dealing the reference, the Court observed at page 716 as follows : "To my mind when proceedings are dropped under sub-sec. (5), on the ground that there never existed a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace the Magistrate's jurisdiction to act under the provisions of Section 145, altogether ends, and as such he can only pass an incidental order relating to the attached property. If he enters into a minute examination as to the claims of the respective parties regarding the fact of actual possession on the (late of the initial order he will be doing precisely what he is not empowered to do. Therefore, proceedings having been dropped there is no question of his taking any evidence as to who was in possession on the (late of the preliminary order. If the record. shows that the property was attached from the possession of a certain party, the Magistrate must be deemed to have inherent jurisdiction to restore possession of the property to that party. By doing so he will be restoring the status quo ante. If, however the record does not show this, then the only alternative for him is to pass an order that the attachment of the property should be lifted without saying in whose favour the release was to be effected. If the lifting of the attachment creates a danger to the breach of the peace, the Magistrate can start fresh proceedings under Section 145 (1) . If the lifting of the attachment creates a danger to the breach of the peace, the Magistrate can start fresh proceedings under Section 145 (1) . It is only in the case of sale proceeds of crops, in deposit in Court, that the Magistrate will direct that they will so remain in deposit till the claim of any party is declared by a.competent Civil Court." . 7. These observations have no application to the facts of the present case, because the Magistrate did not record any finding that there was no longer all apprehension of breach of peace between the parties. The very object of initiating proceedings under Section 145 is to prevent a breach of peace relating to possession of land. For this purpose the Magistrate has been empowered to pass a preliminary order and attach the property, if he was of the opinion that such course was necessary and expedient. After making an enquiry, if lie comes to the conclusions that one of these parties is in possession he is required.to restore the property to the possession of that party and direct the other party not to interfere with his possession till lie was evicted by a competent court of law. If the Magistrate himself is unable to decide the question as to which of the pal- ties was in possession he has been authorised to make a reference to the Civil Court under Section 146 and then to decide the case in conformity with the finding returned by the Civil Court. 8. In the present case the finding of the Civil Court was that none of these contending parties was in possession. Obviously in view of this finding it was not possible for the Magistrate to release the property in favour of one or the other party. He could at best withdraw his order of attachment and thereby impliedly restore the status quo ante that existed prior to his preliminary order of attachment. This could be clone by him if lie was satisfied that there was no loner any apprehension of a breach of peace between the parties. He could at best withdraw his order of attachment and thereby impliedly restore the status quo ante that existed prior to his preliminary order of attachment. This could be clone by him if lie was satisfied that there was no loner any apprehension of a breach of peace between the parties. But so long as he apprehended a breach of peace between the parties, he was justified in keeping the property under attachment in order to prevent that breach of peace till one or the other party was able to, secure a decision in his favour from a competent Court of law. Prior to the amendment of 1955, Section 146 specifically em- powered the Magistrate to adopt such a course when he was unable to find as to which of the contending parties was in possession of the property. The amended section does not make any specific provision to this effect. In my opinion it is implied in the very proceedings under Section 145 that the Magistrate can order the property to continue under attachment if there is still an apprehension of breach of peace though neither he nor the Civil Court is in a position to decide affirmatively that one or the other of the contending parties was in possession on the (late of preliminary order or within two months prior to that order and as such lie is entitled to the possession being restored to him. A simple order of withdrawal of attachment in these circumstances without giving any further direction would defect the very object of those proceedings. I am therefore of the opinion that there is no illegality in the order passed by the Magistrate and dismiss the revision accordingly.