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1970 DIGILAW 399 (ALL)

Dharampal v. State of U. P.

1970-10-06

M.H.BEG

body1970
JUDGMENT M.H. Beg, J. - There are three connected revision application before me, arising out of convictions of three different persons under Section 9 of the U.P. (Regulations of Buildings Operations) Act, 1958 (herein after referred to as `the Act') . In each of the three cases an unauthorised construction was alleged to have been made by the accused in a plot of land situated in Kichha, a village which had been duly declared a regulated area under the provisions of the Act. Dharampal applicant was alleged to have constructed a second storey on a room occupied by him in plot No. 665 after having started the constructions in the month of July, 1967, which were said to be continuing at the time when the prosecution was launched. In this case, the prosecution began with a report made by Sri Bharadwaj, P. W. 2, an Overseer of the regulated area Nainital, to the Prescribed Authority under the Act. The District Magistrate of Nainital, as the Prescribed Authority, to whom the report was sent, accorded the sanction as required by section 12 of the Act, and then directed that the report of the unauthorised construction be forwarded to the Magistrate who tried the case. In the cast of Augan Lal applicant, a similar report was made by the same Overseer of the regulated area, Sri Bharadwaj, P. W. 2. The allegation here was that the construction. of the house commenced over an area of 9 feet x 12 feet in the same plot, No. 665 in village Kichha in the month of February and continued in the month of March, 1967, without obtaining the permission of the prescribed Authority. On this report, made to the Prescribed Authority by the Overseer, the District Magistrate, as Prescribed, Authority passed an order directing that the case be sent to the Magistrate who tried it. There was a similar report, made by the Naib Tahsildar, for an unauthorised construction made by the applicant Chaudhari Ram in field no. 660, south of the old Kichha Abadi, which was described as a new construction lying within the regulated area. In this case also, the District Magistrate, as Prescribed Authority of the regulated area, sanctioned the prosecution on the report which was forwarded to a Magistrate for trial for an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Act. 660, south of the old Kichha Abadi, which was described as a new construction lying within the regulated area. In this case also, the District Magistrate, as Prescribed Authority of the regulated area, sanctioned the prosecution on the report which was forwarded to a Magistrate for trial for an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Act. Thus, in each case, the Magistrate signed under the typed form showing that he had, after going through the report, sanctioned and directed a prosecution of the accused for an offence punishable under Section 9 of the Act. 2. In each of the three cases, the trying Magistrate had found that the unauthorised construction in question was made by the accused who was in possession of the land and of the building constructed on it. In each of the three cases, the Lekhpal of the village and the officer making the report had appeared as witnesses. In two of the cases the officer making the complaint was an Overseer and in the third case the officer was a Naib-Tahsildar. The questions of law which were raised in these revision applications were two: firstly, whether the report sent to the Prescribed Authority on which sanction was accorded and an order, directing that the case be tried by the Magistrate, concerned, passed by the Prescribed Authority, constituted a complaint of which cognizance could be taken under section 190 (1) (a) Cr. P. C.; and, secondly, whether the trial of the applicant was not vitiated by violation of section 247 Cr. P. C. 3. So far as the first point is concerned, I may say, at the outset, that the report made to the Prescribed Authority on which sanction was accorded, although containing the particulars of the alleged offence, such as the time and place and the manner of the commission of the offence in respect of the construction mentioned there as well as the name of the alleged offender, does not, on the face of it, appear to be a complaint to the trying Magistrate. The report, treated as a complaint and forwarded to the trying Magistrate, was really made to the Prescribed Authority for the purposes of obtaining the sanction required, by Section 12 of the Act for a prosecution. The report, treated as a complaint and forwarded to the trying Magistrate, was really made to the Prescribed Authority for the purposes of obtaining the sanction required, by Section 12 of the Act for a prosecution. Nevertheless, I am unable to find any error in the view taken by the lower appellate court that the documents and actions taken on them, viewed as a whole, could be treated as complaints made to the Magistrate concerned. Sec. -4 (1) (h) , Cr. P. C. makes it clear that a complaint is only an "allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a Police-Officer." There is no prescribed form for a complaint. In the cases before me, the document containing the necessary information against the accused person was not addressed to the trying Magistrate. It would have been much better if a proper complaint had been drawn up by the complaining officer who had made the report to the Prescribed Authority. Nevertheless, as the court below has held, the applicants had not shown to have been prejudiced by the absence of a separate formal complaint addressed to the trying Magistrate. In the absence of any proof that this unusual and irregular manner of making the complaint to the court of the trying Magistrate had misled the accused or prejudically affected the trial, I am unable to hold that trials were vitiated. The irregularity, which is there, is cured, in my opinion, by Section 537 Cr.P.C. 4. To support the second contention, learned counsel for the applicants relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in State v. Rewa Chand, A.I.R. 1961 Alld. 352, where it was held that the provisions of Section 247 are mandatory. This section reads as follows :- "Non-appearance of complainants : If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Provided that where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case." 5. In order to decide whether the provisions set out above have been contravened or not, there has to be a finding whether the complainant had or had not appeared on the various dates. This question had to be raised before the trying Magistrate so that he might give his finding upon it with regard to particular dates. The trying Magistrate has, in Angan Lal's case, where the point was raised before him, observed that there is no material on the record to show that the complainant was absent. In each case, although the prosecution was initiated at the instance of the Prescribed Authority, the complainant was really the officer who had made the report. I have gone through the record and I find no evidence to justify the contention that the complainant was really absent on any date. If the question had been raised before the trying Magistrate in each case, appropriate orders would have been passed upon it or a finding given. In the absence of a finding on the question, it is not possible to hold that Section 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whether mandatory or not, was contravened at all. 6. The last contention put forward by the learned counsel for the applicant was that, in a subsequent decision relating to construction made by Dharampal on plot No. 665, the lower appellate court had given a finding that Dharampal had bought the property under construction on plot No. 665 after construction had begun. It appears that plot No. 665 is a large plot. It is not possible to come to any conclusion from the certified copy of the judgment shown to me whether the question of ownership of the construction involved in the case of Dharampal now before me was involved in a previous case. Moreover, no application was made for filing this document, which was merely placed before me and returned to the learned counsel for the applicant after looking through it. The plea of res judicata cannot be raised without laying a sufficient foundation for it. This objection is, therefore, overruled. 7. Moreover, no application was made for filing this document, which was merely placed before me and returned to the learned counsel for the applicant after looking through it. The plea of res judicata cannot be raised without laying a sufficient foundation for it. This objection is, therefore, overruled. 7. Coming to the question of sentence, I find that in each case the fine imposed by the trial court was initially Rs. 1,000/-. It was, however, reduced to Rs. 500/- in the case of Angan Lal. I see no ground for distinguishing the three cases. I, therefore, reduce the fine imposed upon Dharampal and Chaudhari Ram applicants also to Rs. 500/- each.,Subject to this modification in the cases of Dharampal and Chaudhari Ram, these revision applications are dismissed. This order will govern all the connected revisions.