Judgment :- 1. Revision petitioners are the defendants in 40 Small Cause Suits on the file of the Additional Munsiff, Trichur. All the suits are by a contractor against cultivators for charges for bailing out water from paddy fields. 2. There are four blocks of paddy fields known as Eastern Karimpadam, Western Karimpadam, Ponnamutha and Thuruthithazam lying contiguous to one another in the Trichur and Chowghat taluks. While Ponnamutha is over 600 acres each of the others is about 200 acres in extent. Paddy can be cultivated in these lands only after bailing out water from them. Bailing out of water from any of these blocks was impossible without the co-operation of the owners of the other blocks. But in 1137 M-E. The inner ridges of one of the blocks, Western Karimpadam, were strengthened and elevated and thereafter water could be bailed out from that block independently, but as regards the other three blocks interdependence still prevailed. 3. It is the block of paddy fields called Eastern Karimpadam that is involved in these Revision Petitions. The cultivators there acted in co-operation. They met and elected a committee and the committee got the work of bailing out water done through the plaintiff. At a stretch the contract was always being given for a period of three years. For the years 1134,1135 and 1136 when the work was entrusted to him the terms were reduced to writing. Ext. P1 is the document evidencing the contract. 4. It is stated in Ext. P1 that water could be bailed out only with the co-operation of the owners of the adjacent blocks of paddy fields. The plaintiff had to repair and maintain the inner and outer ridges of the block and make the lands fit for sowing by the 15th of Makaram. If on any account it was not possible for him to make the land ready by the 15th of Makaram it should in any event -be made ready within five days thereafter. If the work was completed only after the 20th of Makaram it was open to the cultivators either to raise cultivations or not to do so. If any of them raised cultivations he had to pay the plaintiff the charges for bailing out the water. If the work was completed only after the 20th of Makaram it was open to the cultivators either to raise cultivations or not to do so. If any of them raised cultivations he had to pay the plaintiff the charges for bailing out the water. As regards the others the plaintiff would not.only be not entitled to recover the charges for bailing out water from them but he would also be liable to pay them damages. His liability for damages was excluded if the delay in the execution of the work was attributable to any omission on the part of the owners of the neighbouring blocks to do their work. The rate of charges fixed in Ext. P1 was Rs. 23/- per acre. 5. Although no fresh document evidencing the terms of the contract was executed for the succeeding cycle of years 1137,1138 and 1139 the work of bailing out water and maintaining the ridges was done by the plaintiff himself during those years as in the previous years. Except with regard to the rate of charges which was raised to Rs. 34/-per acre there was no change in the terms of contract. 6. According to the plaintiff for the cycle of years 1140,1141 and 1142 also the committee entrusted the work of bailing out water to him. The committee met in the house of the plaintiff and passed resolutions, evidenced by Ext. Dl minutes book, regarding the work to be done by plaintiff in 1140-The rates of charges for bailing out water was raised from Rs. 34/-to Rs. 39/-per acre. It was resolved in that meeting that bailing out of water for the raising of vari had to be done before 15th Dhanu and that if it was not done before that date Eastern Karimpadam may remain fallow. Raising of vari is only to increase fertility of the soil. When vari is raised weeds sprout and they are ploughed back into the land. For some years preceding 1140 vari was not raised on Eastern Karimpadam and that was why resolution was passed that if water was not bailed out before the 15th of Dhanu to enable the cultivators to plant vari the land may remain uncultivated. 7. The allegation in the plaint is that subject to variations that were made from time to time by the Committee the terms of Ext. 7. The allegation in the plaint is that subject to variations that were made from time to time by the Committee the terms of Ext. PI were the terms of the contract for the bailing out of water for 1140,1141 and 1142 also. That has not been specifically denied in the written statements of the defendants. No resolution was passed by the committee that vari had to be raised in 1141. In such circumstances as regards that year the terms of Ext. PI have to prevail regarding the last day before which the land after bailing out water had to be made fit for raising cultivations and the consequences of not doing so. 8. It is clear from the evidence adduced in the case that the bailing out of water in Eastern Karimpadam could be completed in 1141 only by the 30th of Makaram, that thereafter the defendants in these cases cultivated the lands in that block, and that there was failure of crops due to drought. The drought was on account of unexpected non-availability of water from the Peechi Reservoir. 9. Altogether there are 180 cultivators. Of them 82 have fully paid the amounts due from them and some others have made part payments. Besides the present 40 suits 57 more suits have been filed by the plaintiff. Out of them 10 have been compromised. In some of the present suits the defendants have made counter claims for damages. According to them the failure of crops was on account of the delay in bailing out water. 10. S.55 of the Contract Act which deals with the effect of the failure to perform contracts within stipulated periods reads thus: "When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's a failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so." 11. In the light of the provisions of that Section and the facts proved in these cases two questions arise for consideration and they are whether time was the essence of the contract and if so whether the defendants had waived the rights which had accrued to them on account of the plaintiff not performing in time his part of the contract. 12. As to the first it depends upon the intention of the parties and that is gatherable from the terms of the contract, its nature and subject matter and attendant circumstances. Where no time is fixed the rule is that it has to be performed within a reasonable time. Where time is fixed also the rule is not different if parties by fixation of time meant nothing more than securing performance within a reasonable time. Equity in such cases looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. As regards contracts for purchase of land there is a presumption that time is not the essence of the contract. So also with regard to sale of goods. S.11 of the Sale of Goods Act says that unless different intention appears from the terms of the contract stipulations with regard to time of payment are not deemed to be the essence of the contract. But time fixed in solemn agreements cannot always be disregarded. In some cases disregard of stipulation about time would work injustice to parties. That is specially so in the case of mercantile and shipping contracts. Time of delivery is an essential term of contract in such cases. 13. But time fixed in solemn agreements cannot always be disregarded. In some cases disregard of stipulation about time would work injustice to parties. That is specially so in the case of mercantile and shipping contracts. Time of delivery is an essential term of contract in such cases. 13. In Bowes v. Shanti (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455 at p. 463; 36 L. T. 857; 25 W. R.730; 46 LJQB. 561 two contracts were made in London, each for the sale of 300 tons of 'Madras rice to be shipped at Madras or coast, for this port, during the months of March and April, 1874, per Rajah of Cochin". The 600 tons filled 8,200 bags, of which 7,120 bags were put on board and bills of lading signed in February; and for the rest, consisting of 1,030 bags put on board in February, and 50 in March, the bill of lading was signed in March. At the trial of an action by the seller against the buyer for refusing to accept the cargo, evidence was given that rice shipped in February would be the spring crop, and quite as good as rice shipped in March or April. Yet the House of Lords held that the action could not be maintained, because the meaning of the contract, as apparent upon its face, was that all the rice must be put on board in March and April, or in one of those months. Lord Chancellor Cairns said in that case: "It does not appear to me to be a question for your Lordships, or for any court, to consider whether that is a contract which bears upon the face of it some reason, some explanation, why it was made in that form, and why the stipulation is made that the shipment should be during these particular months. It is a mercantile contract, and merchants are not in the habit of placing upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not attach some value and importance. It is a mercantile contract, and merchants are not in the habit of placing upon their contracts stipulations to which they do not attach some value and importance. If it be admitted that the literal meaning would imply that the whole quantity must be put on board during a specified time, it is no answer to that literal meaning; it is no observation which can dispose of or get rid of or displace that literal meaning, to say that it puts an additional burden on the seller, without a corresponding benefit to the purchaser; that is a matter of which the seller and the purchaser are the best judges. Nor is it any reason for saying that ii would be a means by which purchasers, without any real cause, would frequently obtain an excuse for rejecting contracts when prices had dropped. The nonfulfillment of any term in any contract is a means by which a purchaser is able to get rid of the contract when prices have dropped; but that is no reason why a term which is found in a contract should not be fulfilled. It was suggested that even if the construction of the contract be as I have stated, still if the rice was not put on board in the particular months, that would not be a reason which would justify the appellants in having rejected the rice altogether, but that it might afford a ground for a cross action by them if they could show that any particular damage resulted to them from the rice not having been put on board in the months in question. My Lords, I cannot think that there is any foundation whatever for that argument. If the construction of the contract be as I have said, that it bears that the rice is to be put on board in the months in question, that is part of the description of the subject matter of what is sold. What is sold is not 300 tons of rice in gross or in general. It is 300 tons of Madras rice to be put on board at Madras during the particular months. What is sold is not 300 tons of rice in gross or in general. It is 300 tons of Madras rice to be put on board at Madras during the particular months. The plaintiff, who sues upon that contract, has not launched his case until he has shown that he has tendered that thing which has been contracted for, and if he is unable to show that, he cannot claim any damages for the nonfulfillment of the contract. Lord Blackburn said: "If the description of the article tendered is different in any respect, it is not the article bargained for, and the other party is not bound to take it. I think in this case what the parties bargained for was rice, shipped at Madras or the coast of Madras. Equally good rice might have been shipped a little to, the north or a little to the south of the coast of Madras. I do not quite know what the boundary is, and probably equally good rice might have been shipped in February as was shipped in March, or equally as good rice might have been shipped in May as was shipped in April, and I dare say equally good rice might have been put on board another ship as that which was pat on board the Rajah of Cochin. But the parties have chosen, for the reasons best known to themselves, to say: We bargain to take rice shipped in this particular region, at that particular time, on board that particular ship; and before the defendants can be compelled to take anything in fulfilment of that contract it must be shown not merely that it is equally good, but that it is the same article as they have bargained for; otherwise they are not bound to take it." 14. As regards sale of goods subject to rapid fluctuations in market price time is the essence of the contract. In Balaram v. Govinda Chetty AIR. As regards sale of goods subject to rapid fluctuations in market price time is the essence of the contract. In Balaram v. Govinda Chetty AIR. 1925 Madras 1232, Phillips J. said: "The contract being for the purchase of silver, whose price, according to the evidence, varies not only from day to day, but from hour to hour, it would appear that time is of the essence of the contract, for, 'when a time is fixed for the delivery, that time might be very advantageous to one party whereas a day later or earlier might be very disadvantageous-As pointed out in Doloret v. Rothschild, in such contracts time undoubtedly is of the essence of the contract." The same is the rule with regard to sale of goods subject to speedy decay. 15. On principle I find no reason why the rule that stipulation about time is an essential term of the contract should not be applied to contracts regarding agricultural cultivations entered into by cultivators of land. Agriculture is seasonal in character. Each season or division of the year has distinct characteristics of temperature, rainfall and vegetation. For cultivations to be profitable seeds have to be sown, plants have to be allowed to grow, manuring has to be done and crops have to be harvested in good time. If paddy crops become ripe for harvest only in rainy season they would be washed away by rains or floods. The ordinary peasant hopes that if he respects Nature she would smile on him. In spite of his taking all precautions sometimes She frowns on him also. There are risks attendant on the business of agriculture. That is because of dependence on nature. But the risk would be all the more great if the different processes involved in the cultivations on land are not done at the appropriate time. If merchants are not in the habit of placing upon their contracts stipulations about time without attaching some value and importance to them I fail to see why cultivators of land also cannot be considered so. When they say that their lands should be cleared of water or that the same should be made fit for cultivation or ploughed or manure before a particular date they mean what they say they mean business. They expect the performance to be completed before the precise date specified. They always attach very great importance to time. When they say that their lands should be cleared of water or that the same should be made fit for cultivation or ploughed or manure before a particular date they mean what they say they mean business. They expect the performance to be completed before the precise date specified. They always attach very great importance to time. For reasons which I need not elaborate further, I am satisfied that the balance of convenience to cultivators and doing justice to them weigh heavily on the side of the view I take namely that in contracts entered into by them regarding the raising of agricultural crops on lands time fixed for the completion of performance is an essential term of the contract and should be precisely observed. 16. Having said that much, one twins to the instant case. The terms of Ext. P1 shows that the work of-bailing out water had to be completed before the 15th of Markaram. If it could not be done within that time the delay on the part of the plaintiff could be excused only if it was five days. If it was over five days it was open to the cultivators not to raise cultivations on the paddy fields and the plaintiff could not claim from them charges for bailing out water. It is abundantly clear that time was, the essence of the contract. 17. I come finally then, on this part of the case, namely whether the defendants had waived the rights which had accrued to them consequent on the plaintiff not performing the contract within the time specified. As per the terms of the contract between the parties it was open to the defendants not to have raised cultivations on the property. They could have allowed the land to lie fallow and claimed damages. They did not do that. Instead they raised cultivations on the land. That shows that they were prepared to take the risk in raising cultivations late. They were enabled to raise cultivations solely on account of the bailing out of water by the plaintiff and by his making the lands fit for raising cultivations. The subsequent failure of crops was on account of the non-availability of water from the Peechi Reservoir. That shows that they were prepared to take the risk in raising cultivations late. They were enabled to raise cultivations solely on account of the bailing out of water by the plaintiff and by his making the lands fit for raising cultivations. The subsequent failure of crops was on account of the non-availability of water from the Peechi Reservoir. The evidence of dw.1, the Secretary of the committee of the cultivators of Eastern Karimpadam, shows that in the year 1141 till the 25th of Makaram in the neighbouring blocks of paddy fields water had not been bailed out, that on the 25th of Makaram there was three feet of water in the Eastern Karimpadam and that to clear it 15 days was necessary. In spite of all those difficulties the plaintiff completed the work of bailing out water by the end of Makaram. Immediately thereafter the defendants started raising cultivations on the lands also. dw.1 admitted that no cultivator had objected to the delay on the part 'of the plaintiff in bailing out water and that the cultivations were raised fully knowing that the cultivators would have to pay full charges to the plaintiff for bailing out water. It is clear that the defendants had waived the rights that they had consequent on the plaintiff bailing out water and making the lands fit for cultivation late. I hold he is entitled to the charges for bailing out water and they are not entitled to damages. In the result these revision petitions are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.