JUDGMENT O.P. Trivedi, J - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri reversing the decree of Munsif Kheri and thereby dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's suit for ejectment. 2. The appellant Ram Bhushan and his mother Smt. Vishnu Daya Gupta are the landlords of the respondent Kalu Ram Chakravarty in a certain house. The plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment against him on the allegation that he was in arrears, that his tenancy had bee terminated and he was asked to vacate the premises but despite service of notice neither the rent was paid nor was the house vacated. The suit was contested on a variety of grounds including the ground that the notice was invalid. The trial Court held that valid notice was served upon the defendant respondent and that he had committed default in the payment of rent and upon these two findings in the main the suit for ejectment and arrears of rent was decreed. The defendant appealed. The lower appellate Court held that the notice (Ext.1) did not terminate the tenancy of the respondent and no that account did not comply with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and was invalid. The notice was held by the lower appellate Court to be invalid on a second count also. It was held that the notice was signed by only one of the plaintiff-landlords and not by both of them and on this ground it was held to be invalid. In the result the appeal was allowed and the decree for ejectment passed by the trial Court was set aside. The suit was dismissed completely. 3. Before me it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants in the first place, that the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the notice was invalid because it was signed by only one of the plaintiffs. This is to my mind valid submission because a perusal of the notice shows that it purported to have been given by the lawyer of both the plaintiff appellants on behalf of both the plaintiffs and it was signed not only by the lawyer but also by one of the plaintiffs. That being so, the notice must be found to have been given at the instance of both the plaintiffs. That being so, the notice must be found to have been given at the instance of both the plaintiffs. A part from this in the plaint both the plaintiffs had joined and both of them had jointly alleged that they had given a notice to the respondent terminating his tenancy. In the case of Misri Lal v. Ram Gopal, 1965 A.W.R. (H.C.) 753 it was held that where a notice of termination, though signed by one of the joint owners, says that it was being sent on behalf of all them, and subsequently all of them state, in the plaint of a suit for ejectment, that they sent a notice of termination, it will be presumed that the statement in the notice is correct, and the onus will be on the tenant to prove that the notice was not on behalf of all the joint owners. I respectfully agree with the view expressed there and hold that the notice cannot be found to be invalid on this ground. 4. The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the notice (Ext.1) which was served by the appellants upon the defendant respondent was valid and it was wrongly held by the lower appellate Court to be invalid in view of the provision contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portion of the notice (Ext.1) which was served by the plaintiff appellant upon the defendant-respondent reads as follows on being translated into English : "You are required to deposit Rs. 195/- arrears of rent within one month of receipt of the notice, failing which you should vacate the portions of the premises which are in your tenancy on expiry of 30 days from receipt of the notice otherwise on expiry of the said period necessary legal proceedings will be taken against you." This notice was interpreted by the lower appellate Court as not terminating the tenancy as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that although the notice did not in terms say that the tenancy had been terminated all the same it demanded vacation of the premises by the defendant respondent on failure to deposit the arrears of Rs. 195/- within 30 days of receipt of the notice. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that although the notice did not in terms say that the tenancy had been terminated all the same it demanded vacation of the premises by the defendant respondent on failure to deposit the arrears of Rs. 195/- within 30 days of receipt of the notice. In other words, it is submitted, the notice asked for delivery of possession which was sufficient to convey to the defendant intention to terminate his tenancy and to evict him from the premises. Reliance for this is placed by the learned counsel on a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangi Lal v. Sugan Chand, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 101. In that case the landlord had given an notice to the defendant tenant requiring him to pay the rental arrears due up to there end of March, 1959 within one month from the date of service of the notice and proceeded to say : 'failing which suit for ejectment will be filed". In that case also the notice did not in express terms terminate the tenancy and yet it is submitted for the appellants that the Supreme Court interpreted these recitals of the notice as indicating intention of the landlord to terminate tenancy of the tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This authority of the Supreme Court is to my mind distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of this case because in that case the notice clearly expressed the intention of file a suit for ejectment against the tenant if he failed to pay the arrears of rent by the stipulated time. In the present case the notice (Ex.1) did not say that upon the respondent's failure to pay the arrears within a month and his failure to vacate the premises a suit for ejectment shall be filed against him. On the other hand, it is said merely that proper legal proceedings shall be taken against him which expression was so vague as to imply that proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent shall be taken. There is yet another ground on which the notice is open to challenge and why it cannot be interpreted as terminating the respondent's tenancy unequivocally. There is yet another ground on which the notice is open to challenge and why it cannot be interpreted as terminating the respondent's tenancy unequivocally. It is well settled that a notice to be valid under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act must definitely and unequivocal terminate the tenancy of the tenant on the expiry of the notice. In the present case the notice cannot be interpreted to terminate the tenancy in an unequivocal manner. On the other hand, it offered an option the tenant respondent to continue in occupation of the house as a tenant if he made payment of the rent demanded viz Rs. 195/- and demanded vacation of the premises only upon failure to pay the said amount. In other words, it provided to the tenant an option or an alternative either to continue the tenancy or to discontinue the tenancy by vacating the premises. This is another ground on which the notice must be found to be invalid and as not fulfilling the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the case of Chidda Ram v. Naru Mal, 1964 A.L.J. 1105, the notice contained an intention on the part of the landlord to continue the tenancy if the tenant agreed to pay enhanced rent and it was observed that the notice was invalid under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as the notice terminating the tenancy must be unconditional, unequivocal and clear, that is to say a tenant whose tenant whose tenancy is intended to be terminated and who is asked to quit has no power left to arrest the effect of it and a tenancy must stand terminated on the expiry of the notice period. It was further observed : "But in a case where before the expiry of the notice period and before the tenancy actually comes to an end the tenant is offered some alternative or some condition on the compliance of which the existing tenancy continues even though on modified terms such a notice would not be unequivocal, unambiguous and clear notice to quit." 5. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in that case and on parity of reasoning hold that the notice (Ext.1) which was served by the appellants on the defendant was not unconditional unequivocal and clear in so far as the intention to terminate the tenancy was concerned. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in that case and on parity of reasoning hold that the notice (Ext.1) which was served by the appellants on the defendant was not unconditional unequivocal and clear in so far as the intention to terminate the tenancy was concerned. Therefore this notice held by the lower appellate Court as not expressing an intention to terminate the respondent's tenancy and was rightly round to be invalid under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reference may here he made in passing to full bench decision of this Court in Bradley v. Atkinson, ILR 7 Allahabad 899, which was also referred in arguments. In that case the landlord had served upon the tenant a notice which reads as follows : "If the rooms you occupy in this house No. 5, Thornhill Road are not vacated within a month from this date, 1 will file a suit against you for ejectment, as well as for recovery of rent due at the enhanced rate". It was held by the Full Bench that the notice to quit was not in accordance with the requirement of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it was not a notice of the lessor's intention to terminate the contract at the end of a month of the tenancy. This view appears to have been over ruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangi Lal v. Sugan Chand (supra). Having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in that case it will appear that the proposition laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the above case was somewhat to large. In the case which came up before the Supreme Court and in the case of Mangi Lal also the notice did not contain any words to the effect that the tenancy had been terminated and yet the Supreme Court interpreted the recitals of the notice as indicating intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy simply because the notice expressed the intention to file a suit for ejectment against the tenant if he failed to pay the arrears demanded in the notice. This was in accordance with the settled view of The Court that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should be interpreted liberally and not in a pedantic manner. This was in accordance with the settled view of The Court that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should be interpreted liberally and not in a pedantic manner. But even so, for reason which I have already stated the notice (Ext.1) must be found on account of its peculiar terms to be invalid being not in accordance with the provision contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention that on this point the view of the lower appellate Court was erroneous does not appear to be correct. These were the only points raised in the appeal which must therefore fail. 6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are affirmed. The appellants shall pay costs of this appeal to the respondent.