JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal which arises out of a suit for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from. preventing the plaintiffs from taking part in the management of a temple and its properties in terms of the award dated 1.6.1929. The suit was decreed by both the courts below and aggrieved by the same the defendant has come up in the second appeal to this Court. 2. The suit was brought on the allegations that Hakim Amba Prasad, ancestor of the parties died in 1925 leaving considerable movable and immovable property in Farrukhabad including a temple of Sri Ganesh Ji Maharaj, that after his death there was a dispute between the sons and grandsons of the deceased regarding the division of the properties and also the management of the temple and consequently the dispute was referred to arbitration of one Lalman who gave his award on 1-6-1929 which was accepted and acted upon by the parties, that in terms of the award the management of the temple vested in the three parties to the award and their heirs generation after generation and each of the parties was given a right to manage the temple and the property for five years in turn as Mutwalli, that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 resided in Kanpur and the plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 6 mere minors and hence the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 permitted the appellant to manage the temple and its property that the said plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 had now shifted to Delhi and had decided to manage the affairs of the temple themselves in terms of the award but the appellant was not prepared to allow the plaintiffs to do so and hence the suit. 3. 1 to 3 permitted the appellant to manage the temple and its property that the said plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 had now shifted to Delhi and had decided to manage the affairs of the temple themselves in terms of the award but the appellant was not prepared to allow the plaintiffs to do so and hence the suit. 3. The defence was that the appellant was managing the affairs of the temple in his own right under the will of Hakim Amba Prasad made in 1921 and was holding the office of the managership since his death, that lie was managing the affairs without the help of the plaintiffs for the last more than 39 years adversely to the exclusion of the plaintiffs and as such he had prescribed for the office of managership of adverse possession and it vested in him alone, that the plaintiffs were out of possession for more than 12 years and the suit was barred by time, that the appellant never managed the affairs with the permission of the plaintiffs and as a matter of fact he did not allow the plaintiffs to act as managers or helpers in managing the affairs, that this amounted to a total ouster of the plaintiffs who always resided outside Farrukhabad since 1925, that they were not fit to look after the affairs of the temple and hold the office of managership and hence the relief of injunction should be refused to them. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Two points were canvassed before me on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, the point which looms large in the memo of appeal and which alone seems to have been expressly raised in the ground as also in the courts below was that of adverse possession, The sole ground on the basis of which the appellant seems to have contested the plaintiffs' suit in the lower appellate court was that he had been in adverse possession of the management of the temple and holding of the mela, that despite the award he continued to manage and act as manager to the exclusion of the other members of the family including the plaintiffs and consequently he had acquired a title to the shebaitship by adverse possession. This plea did not find favour with the courts below and they came to the conclusion that the appellant had not acquired, the right of managership by adverse possession. That finding appears to be well founded. In the plaint there was a clear averment that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 had admitted the defendant to manage the affairs of the temple as the latter was the eldest person on the spot and the aforesaid plaintiffs lived outside Farrukhabad. In fact, in the written statement itself it is pleaded that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 always lived outside since 1925. The defendant in his deposition admitted that the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 lived in Kashmir and later on in Delhi since 1912 and that the other plaintiffs were still minors hardly capable of acting for themselves. No doubt, the appellant asserted in his statement that Suraj Prakash father of plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5 had once come to Farrukhabad from Delhi about 16 years ago and had requested the appellant to permit him to manage the affairs of the temple but the appellant did not allow him to do so. That evidence was disbelieved by both courts and the testimony of the appellant was found to be not worthy of reliance. The court below further held, and I am in agreement with it, that the possession of management by the appellant since after the passing of the award could also not extinguish the rights of the plaintiffs or confer any rights on the appellant. It was provided in the award itself that if a party remained outside it could entrust some other party with the affairs of management. In the circumstances mentioned above since the plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 remained outside for over, until shortly prior to the suit, the appellant was allowed to manage the affairs of the temple. The effect of this could only be that the parties were co-sharers managing the affairs turn by turn and the rights of the plaintiffs could not be extinguished as the appellant shall be deemed to be acting on behalf of those plaintiffs who were not present on the spot. It, therefore, follows that the plaintiffs were at liberty to take their turn and resume management whenever they liked. It, therefore, follows that the plaintiffs were at liberty to take their turn and resume management whenever they liked. The parties secured possession and ownership of the temple and its properties as heirs by inheritance through their ancestors and until something was done which amounted to an ouster of one of the heirs the possession of one must be considered to be the possession of all and where the right of management of the family idol descends, as in the present case; by inheritance the fact that the representative of the eldest branch (appellant) was allowed to manage the affairs, is not a proof of ouster and, therefore, his possession is not adverse to the other members. In the instant case the appellant was the eldest member present on the spot and if he managed the affairs he could not be in adverse possession to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. The rule applicable to adverse possession was laid down by Sir George Rankin in Lachhmi Sewak v. Ram Rup, A.I.R. 1944 Privy Council 25 in the following words :- "untill something is done which amounts to an ouster of the heirs the possession of one is considered to be the possession of all. Where the right of management of family idol descends by inheritance the fact that the representative of the eldest branch should in fact be allowed to see to the debsheba, to collect the income and to defray the proper expenses is very far from being cogent proof of ouster and therefore his possession is not adverse to the other members." The same point arose for consideration in Ram Gopal Pandey v. Sri Thakurji Asthapit, 1957 A.W.R. 39, and it was held by Gurtu, J. that :- "Until there is a clear renunciation of sabarakarship mere inaction would not destroy the right. Merely because certain sarabarakars have been inactive, for some time or have allowed the other sarabarakars to solely manage the affairs for the time being, would not establish that the sarbarakars who had been active were alone entitled to act. It is not in uncommon feature for some sarabarakars to act while other just allow them to go on acting unless the formal, dispute the latte'r right to act." Thus, there is no substance in the appellant's contention that he acquired the rights of managership of the temple by adverse possession. 5. It is not in uncommon feature for some sarabarakars to act while other just allow them to go on acting unless the formal, dispute the latte'r right to act." Thus, there is no substance in the appellant's contention that he acquired the rights of managership of the temple by adverse possession. 5. The other point, though not clearly traversed in the grounds of appeal, seems to have been raised before the lower appellate court and since it is a pure question of law I have allowed the learned counsel for the appellant to argue the same. It was contended that shebaitship of the temple was fixed by a will executed by Hakim Amba Prasad in the year 1921 and the devolution made by the will could not be altered by the heirs and hence the award was void and could not supersede the will. It is true that according to the terms of the will the appellant was to be shebait for a long time and thereafter his heirs but there is no gain-saying the fact that the appellant himself voluntarily referred the dispute to the arbitration of one Lalman and accepted the award. Consequently a very heavy burden would be cast on the appellant to get rid of the award and avoid its binding effect. Unless the entire proceedings are found to be absolutely void and a nullity I would be most reluctant to allow a party to resile from the award which was given as a result of reference to which the appellant himself was a party. It is significant that the appellant never filed a suit for cancellation of the arbitration award of 1929 in so far as it related to the affairs of the temple. In his deposition also he admitted that he accepted all the terms of the award except so far as it related to the affairs of the temple. He never gave any notice expressing his intention not to abide by the award to any of the plaintiffs. He admitted that all the disputes had been referred to the sole arbitrator who had decided all of them and that he did not ask the arbitrator to desist from giving the award in regard to the affairs of the temple. He never raised any written objection to the award. He admitted that all the disputes had been referred to the sole arbitrator who had decided all of them and that he did not ask the arbitrator to desist from giving the award in regard to the affairs of the temple. He never raised any written objection to the award. The courts below also referred to Exhibit 2 which was a photostat copy of the agreement dated 6-6-1961 executed by the appellant and Smt. Lila Rani, mother of the plaintiffs Nos. 4 and 5. In this agreement also the appellant admitted that he was in possession over his house in terms of the arbitration award dated 1-6-1929 and all the terms of the said award were binding on him and were being acted upon by him. In spite of his clear admissions, he, however, with great tenacity persisted in stating that was palpably false, that the portion in the arbitration agreement Exhibit 2 which related to the management of the temple was not heard by him because the scribe while reading out the document had omitted that portion. Such testimony was rightly disbelieved by the courts below. It is clearly beyond doubt that the appellant knew all the terms of the agreement without any reservation and he was bound by the award but taking advantage of the fact that he had been permitted by the other plaintiffs to manage the affairs of the temple on their behalf he endeavoured to set up an adverse right of shebait ship in himself. 6. In my opinion the appellant cannot succeed even in his plea now argued at the bar, which is a pure proposition of law viz., that the devolution embodied in the will could not be varied that the consensus of the parties and the award could not change the directions in the will. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that at all events the deity was not a party either to the reference or the award, that deity was a juristic person and had a right to be represented by its heir and in its absence it was not open to the other members to refer the matter to the arbitration. It was emphatically urged that the will had to be respected, that the consultation of the deity was essential and that the shebait had a say on behalf of the deity. It was emphatically urged that the will had to be respected, that the consultation of the deity was essential and that the shebait had a say on behalf of the deity. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on several authorities in support of this proposition. He referred to Pramatha Nath v. Pradhyumna Kumar, A.I.R. 1925 Privy Council 139, wherein it was held :- "Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of Law, a "juristic entity". It has a judicial status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the Deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir." Almost to the same effect are the observation of P.B. Mukherji, J. in Shri Mahadeo Jew v. Balkrishna, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 763. They are as under :- "Where certain provisions in respect of sheva of a deity made in the original will are sought to be altered by a subsequent settlement the deity as a beneficiary under the will has a right to be heard in the matter and any settlement altering the original terms to which the deity is not a party is invalid so far as the deity is concerned and is not binding on it. A Hindu deity is a juristic person and has the right to sue or be sued and has the right to be heard on a matter concerning the deity." 7. Having regard to the facts of the present case I am of the opinion that Radhey Shyam appellant who was the shebait appointed by the will was himself a party to the arbitration and therefore the deity was represented through him and consequently it cannot be said that the arbitration which was eventually for the benefit of the deity and aimed at providing for better management of its affairs, could be set at naught on account of the technical absence of the deity as a party. 8. 8. For the central proposition of law raised before me the learned counsel for the appellant relied on certain passages of Tagore Law Lectures on "The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust" by Bijan Kumar Mukherjee. I was referred to the observation occurring at page 208 (1952 Edition) which runs as follows :- "Once the appointment is made and the line of devolution laid down, is it competent for the founder to alter or revoke it arterwards ? On the authorities as they stand the answer has got to be given in the negative, unless the right of revocation or alteration has been reserved at the time when the grant was made." Thus, the question was posed and answered in the manner stated above and it was contended on behalf of the appellant that if the testator had been in possession, he would have had no right to revoke the line of devolution, much less could such right be arrogated by the heirs. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, invited my attention to another observation made at page 230 of the Tagore Law Lectures (supra) wherein the possible exceptions to the general rule were also mentioned. It was observed :- "Though the general proposition laid down in the cases referred to above has never been disputed, yet there are decisions of different High Courts in India, in which the rule against alienation of Shebaiti right has been relaxed to some extent by reason of certain special circumstances. These circumstances may be conveniently grouped under three heads : (1) Where the transfer is not for any pecuniary benefit, and the transferee is the next heir of the transferor or stands in the line of succession of shebaits and suffers from no disqualification regarding the performance of the duties. (2) When the transfer is made in the interests of the deity itself and to meet some pressing necessity. (3) When a valid custom is proved sanctioning alienation of shebaiti right within a limited circle of purchasers, who are actual or potential shebaits of the deity or otherwise connected with the family." 9. Thus, the position of law seems to be that although the alternation in the line of succession to shebaitship is generally irrevocable unless a contrary right has been reserved by the testator, yet in certain circumstances the rule permits of relaxation in the interest of justice. Thus, the position of law seems to be that although the alternation in the line of succession to shebaitship is generally irrevocable unless a contrary right has been reserved by the testator, yet in certain circumstances the rule permits of relaxation in the interest of justice. Sri G.P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondents, strongly relied on the second exception mentioned above and said that it was abundantly clear from the facts of the present case that the change in the devolution of shebaitship was brought by the arbitration, that the award was eminently in the interest of the deity itself and consequently the result achieved by means of the award could not be nullified on the ground that it was in derogation of the provisions of the will. I was taken through the award and I find that there was a clear mention of the fact that the management of the affairs of the deity was not being properly carried on and in order to save it from further deterioration and avoid future maladministration a salutary scheme was being devised which was to the effect that each one of the parties should manage the temple as Mutwalli for five years in turn. The intention was quite plain namely that the best management of the affairs of the deity be ensured and the parties should in fact vie with each other in managing the affairs of the deity to the best of their capacity when called upon to do so. That being the laudable object of the reference to the arbitration and the dispute having been voluntarily referred to arbitration and no steps having been taken to repudiate or challenge the award, surely the courts of law would not lend any aid to the appellant in trying to avoid the rule of the arbitrator and preclude the plaintiffs from managing the affairs of the deity in accordance with the terms of the award. 10. 10. Thus, I come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the original line of succession of shebaitship contained in the will, there is no rule of law which precludes a shebait from not shouldering the responsibility himself and allowing the other heirs to manage the temple properties and if such management is entrusted, it neither amounts to ouster of the other heirs so as to extinguish their rights nor can such entrustment be rendered legally void on account of being inconsistent with the directions of the original will creating an endowment and binding the shebaits. When a shebait voluntarily and without any fraud or coercion chooses to submit a matter relating to the management of the affairs of a deity to arbitration whose paramount object is to ensure adequate management of the affairs of the deity and is therefore conducive to its benefit, law cannot permit such person to go back upon the arbitration agreement and resist the award. In the circumstances, of the instant case I am constrained to hold that the award really superseded the will and the heirs of Hakim Amba Prasad having accepted the award without any reservation, submitted to the supersession of the will by the award. The persons immediately concerned with the dispute were the heirs of the testator and therefore they cannot be allowed to wrigle out of the effect of their voluntary conduct and escape the consequences of a self-imposed award, even though this may be found inconsistent with the directions contained in the original will. The rule about the prohibition of the alternation in the line of shabaits is not absolutely rigid and Inflexible and is subject to exceptions howsoever few and limited. In an appropriate case a balance might be struck between the apparent rigidity of that rule and the binding force of an arbitration award. 11. In the result I find no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with, costs.