ORDER : K.V. Asthana, J.—One Ganga Ram was run over by a bus of the UP Roadways on 16-12-1967. As a result of the injuries received in the unfortunate accident he died. His dependents, that is his widow, mother, sons and daughters then served a notice u/s 80, CPC dated 7-3-1968 on the State Government and then instituted a regular suit in the court of the Civil judge, Farrukhabad on 9-7-1968 for recovery of damages. They also filed an application to sue in forma pauperis. During the pendency of the proceedings in the court of the Civil Judge Farrukhabad it came to light on 26-10-1968 that Claims Tribunal had been constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the district of Farrukhabad appointing the District Judge as the sole member of the said tribunal. Thereupon the pending claim was ordered to be returned for presentation to the Claims Tribunal by an order of the court dated 28-10-1968. The plaint was taken back and in the form of a claim petition was presented before the Tribunal on 4-11-1968. Since the claim petition was presented more than sixty days after the date of accident, an application was made before the Tribunal for condonation of the delay supported by an affidavit stating facts in explanation of the delay. It was said that claimants had taken legal advice but due to the ignorance of the counsel of the fact that Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act had been constituted, formalities for filling a suit in the civil court were taken first and then in the bona fide belief that the only forum for recovery of damages being the civil court the suit was prosecuted in the civil court. It was then said that as soon as it was discovered that the Claims Tribunal had been constituted in the district of Farrukhabad, without any further delay the claim was presented before it. 2. No counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. The Tribunal after hearing the parties refused to condone the delay having taken the view that the ignorance of the counsel of the notification constituting the Tribunal being on account of his negligence and not on account of any bona fide mistake, would not serve as an excuse. 2. No counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. The Tribunal after hearing the parties refused to condone the delay having taken the view that the ignorance of the counsel of the notification constituting the Tribunal being on account of his negligence and not on account of any bona fide mistake, would not serve as an excuse. The result was that the application for condoning the delay was rejected and the claim petition was also rejected as barred by limitation. 3. Against the above said order of the Tribunal. the sons, daughters, widow and mother of Ganga Ram filed an application purporting to be u/s 115, CPC before this Court impleading the State of UP through the Collector of Farrukhabad as opposite party. 4. A preliminary objection was raised by the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the opposite party that the Claims Tribunal was not a civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hence the revision was incompetent. Learned Counsel for the Applicants contended in reply to the preliminary objection that the District Judge as such having been appointed as the sole member of the Tribunal, he will continue to have jurisdiction as a court under the CPC while entertaining a claim petition, the Tribunal being the court of the District Judge, any order passed on the claim petition would be an order passed by the District Judge as a civil court, hence liable to revision by the High Court u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chatur Mohan v. Ram Bihari Dixit. I do not think the learned Counsel for the Applicants can derive any assistance from the ratio decidendi of the Full Bench decision cited. There the decision turned on the language of Section 8-E of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Under the said section the Munsiff having jurisdiction was constituted as the authority to receive applications. That is to say, that all applications u/s 8-E of the Act were to be filed before the court of the Munsif having jurisdiction. There the decision turned on the language of Section 8-E of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Under the said section the Munsiff having jurisdiction was constituted as the authority to receive applications. That is to say, that all applications u/s 8-E of the Act were to be filed before the court of the Munsif having jurisdiction. The Full Bench decided that the Munsif was not a 'persona designata' under the scheme of the said section and as a civil court a special jurisdiction was conferred upon him for deciding applications under the said section. Here the scheme u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is entirely different. The State Government by notification in the official gazette constitutes Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for specified area for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. It is permissible under the scheme of the said section to constitute a one member Tribunal. Persons qualified for appointment as member of a Claims Tribunal are (a) who is or has been a judge of the High Court ,or (b) who is or has been a District Judge or (c) who is qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court. It is clear from the scheme that being a District Judge is a mere qualification. It is open to the State Govt, to appoint a person who is a District Judge in district of Farrukhabad to be member of the Claims Tribunal for any specified area even outside Farrukhabad. Under the scheme it does not automatically follow that all claims petitions arising out of accidents within limits of the district of Farrukhabad must be filed before the District Judge of Farrukhabad. The State Government could appoint the District Judge of Agra to receive claims petitions out of the accidents arising within the limits of district Farrukhabad. The ratio of Full Bench decision in the case of Chatur Mohan v. Ram Bihari Dixit supra does not apply. I have no hesitation in holding that a Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil procedure Code. The Preliminary objection has force. 5. I have no hesitation in holding that a Claims Tribunal constituted u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not a civil court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil procedure Code. The Preliminary objection has force. 5. The learned Counsel for the Applicants then made an application for permission to convert the civil revision into a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. After hearing the learned Standing Counsel I accepted the prayer and directed the learned Counsel to make good the deficiency in the court-fees. A question then arose: What would be the court-fee payable ? On 7-11-1969 when the Application in revision was admitted by the High Court the court-fee leviable on petitions under-Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution was Rs. 50/-. After amendment now the court-fee has been raised to Rs. 100/-. Since I am inclined to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under-Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution 1 convert the application in revision as one under the said provisions of the Constitution. I think I would be justified in directing that Rs. 50/- be paid as court-fee which would have been paid had the application on 7-11-1969 been filed under the said provisions of the Constitution. The Applicants had already paid Rs. 10/- on the application in revision, hence Rs. 40/- will be the deficiency which has been made up by the learned Counsel; thus Rs. 50/- as court-fee having been paid the application in revision is formally converted into a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Since the original record is before this Court having been already summoned, I dispense with the formalities of filing of affidavits. 6. At this stage it will be convenient to dispose of an objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel that this Court ought not to entertain the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution as the Applicants have an alternative remedy available by filing an appeal before the High Court u/s 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act. I think there is no substance in this objection. u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act a right of appeal is conferred on a person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal. I think there is no substance in this objection. u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act a right of appeal is conferred on a person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal. I have grave doubts that an order refusing to condone the delay and rejecting the claim as time barred, amounts to an award on a claim. The provisions of Section 110-D would not be attracted. In my judgment an award will be an adjudication by the Claims Tribunal after hearing and considering the case on merits. An order refusing to condone the delay or rejecting the claims petition on any technical ground, would not be an award, as it does not involve adjudication of the claim on merits. The impugned order not being an appealable order, the only remedy open to the aggrieved claimant would be by way of invoking the jurisdiction of this Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. 7. The only question that falls for determination in this petition is that the Tribunal in refusing to condone the delay and rejecting the claim petition as time-barred fell into an error apparent. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act no application for compensation can be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident. The Claims Tribunal, however, may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the Applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. In the instant case the accident occurred on 16.12.1967. The application for compensation would have been within time up to 16.2.1968. The notification constituting the Claims Tribunal for the area of Farrukhabad was published in the Government gazette on 18.3. 1967. The Tribunal was already constituted and in existence when the accident occurred. The Applicants alleged that they consulted Mr. Prakash Chandra Chaturvedi, Advocate of Farrukhabad, in the beginning of February 1968 who after a study of the law and facts advised in good faith that a notice u/s 80 CPC be first served on the State Government and then a suit for recovery of Rs. 48,000/- as compensation be instituted on the expiry of two months from the date of service of notice. 48,000/- as compensation be instituted on the expiry of two months from the date of service of notice. Accordingly a notice u/s 80 was served and the suit was filed in the court of the Civil Judge of Farrukhabad for recovery of compensation of Rs. 48,000/- against the State of U.P. It was said that the Applicants were prosecuting the suit in good faith and acted bonafide on the advice received from the counsel. When the learned Civil Judge in whose court the suit and the application for permission to file the suit in forma pauperis was pending pointed out on 26-10-1968 that the application for compensation should have been filed before the Claims Tribunal a search was made by the counsel who then discovered a notification dated 18-3-1967 constituting the Claims Tribunal for the area of Farrukhabad. The Applicants thus in justification of the delay in presenting the application for compensation before the Tribunal pleaded (1) that they had taken legal advice and acted bonafide in good faith on that advice and (2) that their counsel Mr. Prakash Chandra Chaturvedi was ignorant of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal for the area of Farrukhabad till the end of October 1968 when the notification was discovered. 8. The Tribunal took the view that as the Applicants and their counsel did not act with care and skill having remained ignorant of a notification issued nine months before, did not deserve any indulgence inasmuch as the mistake of the counsel in such circumstances would not be justified and it would not amount to sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The Tribunal then took into consideration the delay caused by giving notice u/s 80 of the CPC and also the delay in filing the suit. The Tribunal concluded that the counsel was careless and negligent. It is obvious from the view taken by the Tribunal that the Applicants have suffered due to fault of their counsel. On the facts as stated in the affidavit which remained uncontroverted there cannot be any doubt that the Applicants acted in good faith having put reliance on the counsel. I am not aware of any rule of law that a party or litigant must be punished for the mistake or fault of the counsel. A counsel only represents the party before a court or a tribunal. I am not aware of any rule of law that a party or litigant must be punished for the mistake or fault of the counsel. A counsel only represents the party before a court or a tribunal. The right or authority to represent extends to the doing of all bonafide and legal acts. If a counsel is negligent in carrying out his duties or commits mistakes why should a party or the litigant whom he represents be penalised for it ? A counsel when committing a mistake cannot be said to be representing the party as the party engaging him cannot be said to authorise that counsel to commit the mistake or be negligent. I am unable to extend the doctrine of representation of a party by a counsel to the mistaken acts or the negligent acts of the counsel. I think the learned Judge of the court below did not make a correct approach to the question which arose before him. I, for one, have no hesitation in holding that greater the blunder of the counsel the stronger is the case for the party whom he represents to get redress from the courts or Judicial tribunals unless on facts it is established that the party itself connived for some ulterior purpose with the counsel's action. In the absence of any such evidence I do not discern any principle on the basis of which the party or the litigant should be deprived of his due under the law. This Court in the case of Hanuman Dass v. Prithvi Nath 1956 A.W.R. 455 held that the negligence of a district lawyer or of his counsel may be enough to constitute sufficient cause for the failure to initiate proceedings within the prescribed period and in each case the question is one of degree the overriding consideration being the doing of substantial justice. Learned Counsel cited before me the case of AIR 1944 135 (Oudh) . I do not think the observations in that case militate against the view which I have taken. Each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances. The Applicants in the instant case have not been negligent. They have been diligently pursuing their cause acting on legal advice. There is no material on record to show that Mr. Om Prakash Chaturvedi, Advocate, whom they consulted was not a qualified lawyer or was inexperienced. Each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances. The Applicants in the instant case have not been negligent. They have been diligently pursuing their cause acting on legal advice. There is no material on record to show that Mr. Om Prakash Chaturvedi, Advocate, whom they consulted was not a qualified lawyer or was inexperienced. I have full sympathy with Mr. Chaturvedi in the circumstances in which he was placed. It is notorious that notifications issued by the Government and published in their official gazettes are not readily available. It is also an unfortunate phenomena of the present times that sufficient number of copies of the Government Gazette are not printed so as to be readily available in the open market. Even in Government offices it is sometimes difficult to find the relevant copies of the gazettes. Moreover, for the law libraries in every district Bar though the copies are subscribed but the delivery is very irregular. Even in our High Court we often experience that the members of the Bar who are very diligent are not able to discover the notification in the gazettes as copies are not available. The Tribunal seems to have proceeded on the doctrine that ignorance of law is no excuse. The rules and regulations which are contained in a notification are a piece of delegated legislation and cannot be equated with the laws enacted by the legislature which receive full publicity and are discussed and deliberated in the legislature and then everybody knows when such law comes into force. But same thing cannot be said of delegated legislation. Every day rules are changed though duly notified but it is sometimes humanly not practicable by even most competent lawyers to keep pace with such legislation which affect the rights of ordinary citizens. Moreover, under the Motor Vehicles Act the constitution of Claims Tribunals is a new scheme adopted by the State Government of UP. I cannot blame a lawyer in the district that he remained ignorant of the constitution of the Tribunal u/s 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the area of Furrukhabad for a period of nine months. There is no material on record to show that in any other manner constitution of the Tribunal was publicised from which it could be inferred that the fact could be readily known. On oath a statement was made in an affidavit that Mr. There is no material on record to show that in any other manner constitution of the Tribunal was publicised from which it could be inferred that the fact could be readily known. On oath a statement was made in an affidavit that Mr. Prakash Chandra Chaturvedi was ignorant of the notification constituting the Claims Tribunals and he actually discovered it in the end of October 1968. This averment on oath remained uncontroverted .As observed above I cannot attribute any kind of negligence on the part of Mr. Prakash Chandra Chaturvedi if he remained ignorant of the constitution of the Tribunal. In that view of the matter no question of mistake or negligence at all arose. What the Tribunal should have taken into consideration was the bonafide conduct of the Applicants and the acting in good faith of Mr. Prakash Chandra Chaturvedi. Thus the Tribunal fell into an error apparent in making an approach based on negligence and mistake. The case pleaded before it was one based on bonafide action of the party concerned and the acting in good faith of the counsel. 9. As a result of the discussion above I hold that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of the delay. This petition is allowed. The delay is hereby condoned. The Tribunal is directed to entertain the application for compensation and proceed to hear and decide it in accordance with law. The Applicants shall be entitled to their costs.