UNION OF INDIA v. T. R. RAO — 1970 DIGILAW 41 (KAR)

CHANDRASHEKHAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE three revision petitions under S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), are by the Defence Authorities. They had taken on lease three residential houses in Bangalore for residence of personnel of the Military Engineers Service Organisation of the Defence Department (hereinafter referred to as the MES. ). On the application made by the respective landlords, under S. 21 (1) (h) of the act, for recovery of possession of the respective premises for their (the landlords) bona fide occupation, decrees for eviction were passed. The appeals by the Defence Authorities were dismissed by the District Judge. They have now come up in revision. ( 2 ) THOUGH the Defence Authorities resisted landlords' applications on several grounds, the main ground urged on their behalf in these revision petitions, was that by virtue of the notification dt. 12-9-1952 issued by the Rajapramukh of Mysore exempting all houses taken on lease by the military Engineers Service Organisation of the Defence Department of the government of India, from the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the old Act), applications for eviction of tenants for bonafide personal occupation of landlords, are not maintainable in respect of such houses, even under the provisions of the present Act. ( 3 ) IT may fee stated that the above ground was not taken by the Defence auhorities in any of these three cases in the trial Courts. This contention was taken up for the first time before the District Judge in only two of the cases. However, I have permitted this contention to be raised in all these petitions, as it goes to the root of the matter. As the question whether the exemption granted under the aforesaid notification issued under the old Act, continues to operate even under the present Act also, is an important question, a notice was issued in one of the petitions, to the Advocate-general. The learned Additional Government advocate entered appearance on behalf of the Advocate General and addressed arguments. ( 4 ) THE respondents supported the view taken by the learned District judge that the exemption granted under the said notification ceased to operate after the present Act came into force. The learned Additional Government advocate entered appearance on behalf of the Advocate General and addressed arguments. ( 4 ) THE respondents supported the view taken by the learned District judge that the exemption granted under the said notification ceased to operate after the present Act came into force. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the old Act and the present Act. Sec. 1 of the old Act which stated the extent of application of that act, provided, inter aha, that that Act shall not apply to houses belonging to the State Government and the Central Government or to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the State Government in respect of houses taken on lease or requisitioned by the State Govt. The relevant portion of S. 8 (3) of the old Act read:"s. 8 (3) (a): A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Cl. (d), apply to the Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house- (i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of a member of his family and if he or such member, as the case may be, is not occupying a residential bulding of his own in the City, town or village concerned; x x x x x x" ( 5 ) SECTION 20 of the old Act read: "notwithstanding anythuig contained in this Act, the State government may, by notincation in the Mysore Gazette, exempt any class of houses from all or any of the provisions of this Act" in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 20 of the old Act, the rajapramukh of Mysore issued Notification No. 3287 CTS 162. 2 dt. 12th september, 1952, which reads:"in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 20 of the Mysore house Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore Act XXX of 1951), His Highness the Manaraja of Mysore is pleased to exempt all houses taken on lease by the Military Engineer Services Organisation of the Defence Department of the Government of India from the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 8 of the said Act. " ( 6 ) THE old Act was repealed by S. 62 of the present Act. (3) of S. 8 of the said Act. " ( 6 ) THE old Act was repealed by S. 62 of the present Act. The proviso to that section reads: "provided that the provisions of S. 6 of the Mysore General clauses Act, 1899, shall be applicable in respect of the repeal of the said enactment and Ss. 8 and 24 of the said Act shall be applicable as if the said enactments were permanent Mysore Acts and had been repealed and re-enacted by this Act. Sec. 2 of the Act sets out the application of the Act. Sub-sec. (7) of s. 2 exempts premises belonging to the State Government, the Central government, public bodies and certain religious and charitable institutions.- Clause (h) of S. 21 (1) of the Act reads:. . . . "21. Protection of tenants against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order of decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant: provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely- (h) that the premises are reasonably and bonafide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; " ( 7 ) IN the present Act, there is no provision corresponding to S. 20 of the old Act, empowering the Government to exempt any class of building from all or any of the provisions of the Act. The learned Central Government Pleader who appeared for the petitioners in all these three petitions, contended that though the old Act has been repealed, the proviso to S. 62 of the present Act, read with S. 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, saves the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under the old Act and that under the said proviso read with Ss. 8 and 24 of the General Clauses Act, the said notification dated 12-9-1952 (hereinafter referred to as the notification) issued under the old Act, continues to be in force and must be deemed to have been issued under the provisions of the present Act. ( 8 ) THE learned Central Government Pleader cited several decisions of the Supreme Court in which the effect of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act has been explained. It is sufficient to refer to three of them. In Jindas Oil Mill v. Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. , AIR. 1969 SC. 1225. this is what hegde, J. who spoke for the Court, said at page 1232:"it is true that when an existing Statute or Regulation is repealed and the same is replaced by fresh Statute or Regulation unless the new Statute or Regulation specifically or by necessary implication affects rights created under the old law those rights must be held to continue in force even after the new Statute or Regulation comes into force. " ( 9 ) IN Balaiah, v. Rangachary, AIR. 1969 SC. 701. the Supreme Court said at page 705:"whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid town in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says a different intention appears in the repealing statute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . When the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. S. 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. S. 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In other words, the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous re- enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute. " ( 10 ) IN State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Court, said at page 88:"when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, we would have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive the old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests any intention to destroy them. "when the learned Central Government Pleader relied on S. 6 of the general Clauses Act, he had evidently in mind Clause (c) of that section which reads:"s. 6. Where this Act or any Mysore Act made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter be made, then, unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not: (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred in any enactment so repealed; or " ( 11 ) IN order to invoke clause (c) of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, it must be shown that any right, privilege, obligation or liability had accrued, or had been acquired or incurred under the old Act. The learned Central government Pleader argued that under the Notification the MES. The learned Central government Pleader argued that under the Notification the MES. had acquired the right or privilege not to be evicted by the landlord under s. 8 (3) of the old Act and correspondingly the landlord had incurred a disability from making an application for eviction of the tenant under s. 8 (3) of the old Act. It was also argued by the learned Central government Pleader that such right and privilege acquired by the tenant and such disability incurred by such landlord under the Notification issued under the old Act, remained unaffected by the repeal of the old Act and the coming into force of the present Act. ( 12 ) THE learned Central Government Pleader relied also on S. 8 of the general Clauses Act. That section reads:"s. 8. Construction of the references to repealed enactments- (1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the learned Central Government Pleader argued that the Notification must be regarded as an instrument for the purpose of S. 8 of the general Clauses Act, that the reference in the Notification to S. 8 (3) of the old Act, must be construed as reference to S. 21 (1) (h) of the present act, that if the Notification is so read, buildings leased to the MES. , would be exempted from the application of S. 21 (1) (h) of the present Act and that the landlords of such buildings would be precluded from making applications under S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act for eviction of the'mes. , where such buildings are required for their bonafide occupation. Reliance was also placed by the learned Central Government Pleader on S. 24 of the General Clauses Act which reads:"s. 24 Continuation, of orders, etc. , where such buildings are required for their bonafide occupation. Reliance was also placed by the learned Central Government Pleader on S. 24 of the General Clauses Act which reads:"s. 24 Continuation, of orders, etc. issued under enactments revealed and re-enacted:-Where any Central Act or Regulation is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or by-law, made or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it, is superseded by any appointment, notification order, scheme, rule form or by-law, made or issued under the provisioions so re-enacted and when any Central Act or Regulation, which, bv a notification under S. 5 or 5a of the Sch District Act 1874 (XIV of 1874), or any like law, has been extended to any local area has, by a subseouent notification been withdrawn from and re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section. " ( 13 ) THE learned Central Government Pleader argued that under S. 24 of the General Clauses Act, the Notfin. issued under the provisions of the old act must be deemed to have been issued under the provisions of the present act as the Notification is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. The learned Additional Government Advocate who appeared for the advocate-General, adopted the arguments of the learned Central government Pleader except in regard to one point. According to the learned Central Government Pleader, the Notification bars a landlord of the premises leased to the MES. , from making an application for eviction under S. 8 (2) of the old Act, but does not preclude the landlord from brin0ng a suit for eviction of the tenant, namely, the MES. According to the learned Central Government Pleader, the Notification bars a landlord of the premises leased to the MES. , from making an application for eviction under S. 8 (2) of the old Act, but does not preclude the landlord from brin0ng a suit for eviction of the tenant, namely, the MES. But, according to the learned additional Government Advocate, the Notification did not lift the bar imposed by S. 8 of the old Act, on a suit being filed for eviction of a tenant however, for the purpose of the present petitions, it is not necessary to go into the question which of the said two views, is correct. ( 14 ) MR. T. Krishna Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent in CRP. No. 1198 of 1968, contended that when the old Act was repealed, the notification which was issued under that Act, ceased to exist as if the Notification had not been issued at all. In support of his contention, Mr. Krishna Rao referred to the following passage in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edn.) at page 334:"if the statute under which by-laws are made is repealed, those by-laws are impliedly repealed and cease to have any validity unless the repealing statute contains some provision preserving the validity of by-laws notwithstanding the repeal. This follows from the rule stated below that when an Act of Parliament is repealed it must be considered (except as to transactions passed and closed) as if it had never existed. There is nothing in the Interpretation Act, 1889, to keep alive by-laws after the repeal of the statute under which they are made. "again at page 413 of the same book, it is stated :"when a statute is repealed, any by-law or statutory instrument made thereunder ceases to be operative unless there is a saving clause in the new statute preserving the old bye-law or statutory instrument. " ( 15 ) MR. Krishna Rao next referred to the following distinction between the old Act and the present Act. S. 20 of the old Act empowered the government to exempt any class of houses from all or any of the provisions of that Act; but there is no corresponding provision in the present act which empowers the Government to so exempt any class of buildings. Mr. S. 20 of the old Act empowered the government to exempt any class of houses from all or any of the provisions of that Act; but there is no corresponding provision in the present act which empowers the Government to so exempt any class of buildings. Mr. Krishna Rao argued that the Notification which exempts certain class of buildings from certain provisions of the old Act, is inconsistent with the scheme of the present Act which does not provide for any such exemption by the Government and hence it must be held that the present Act manifests an intention not to keep alive the Notification. ( 16 ) MR. Krishna Rao said that both Ss. 6 and 8 of the General Clauses act contain a reservation that the rules enunciated in those sections shall apply unless a different intention appears. Mr. Krishna Rao added that such different intention does appear from the scheme of the present Act which does not provide for the Government exempting any class of buildings from the provisions of the present Act. It was also argued by Mr. Krishna Rao that under S. 24 of the General clauses Act the Notification will continue only if it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted enactment, namely, the present Act and that as the Notification is inconsistent with the provisions of the act, S. 24 of the General Clauses Act does not preserve the Notification issued under the repealed Act. ( 17 ) IT was next argued by Mr. Krishna Rao that it is not every right, privilege, liability or obligation that is saved by S. 6 of the General Clauses act and that it is only a right, privilege, obligation or liability which has been acquired or accrued or incurred that is saved by that section. Mr. Krishna Rao added that the exemption granted under the Notification did not result in acquiring or accrual of any right by the tenant nor in incurring any liability or obligation by the landlord. In support of this contention, Mr. Krishna Rao referred to the following passage in Maxwell interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) at page 17:"paragraph (c) (of S. 38 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which corresponds to Clause (c) of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act) was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Hamilton Gell v. White. In support of this contention, Mr. Krishna Rao referred to the following passage in Maxwell interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) at page 17:"paragraph (c) (of S. 38 (2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which corresponds to Clause (c) of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act) was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Hamilton Gell v. White. Atkin, L. J. said (at p. 431) that the provision was not intended to preserve abstract rights conferred by the repealed Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It only applies to specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or the other of the events specified in the statute'. Thus a tenant's general right to compensation for disturbance would not survive the repeal of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908; if it were so, the 'repealing' would in fact be ineffective. " ( 18 ) MR. S. G. Sundaraswamv, learned Counsel for the respondent in crp. No. 1914 of 1969. submitted that the immunity from eviction under the Notification cannot be understood as any right conferred on the tenant namely, MES. and that much less can anv such right be construed as a right acquired or accrued In support of his contention, mr. Sundaraswamv referred to what this Court stated in S G. Narananapna. and Bros. v. A. N. Narasimhaiah, 1962 Mys. L. J. 760. in regard to the provisions of S 8 (3) of the old Act. Ahmed Ali Khan, J. , said at page 762: "after a careful consideration of the arguments advanced before me, I am of the opinion that the provision of the Act on the strength of which a tenant may resist the landlord's claim to evict him cannot be described as a right to possession, but only as a statutory immunity from eviction as observed by the Federal Court in the case kai Khush rao v. Bai Jerbai (AIR. 1949 FC 124 (128 ). ( 19 ) IT appears that his Lordship in the Madras cape distinguished the said observations in the said case of the Federal Court bv statins that a statutory immuniiy is not inconsistent with the right to possession and that such immunity may itself create a right. The right to immunity from eviction involves a negative element in it. ( 19 ) IT appears that his Lordship in the Madras cape distinguished the said observations in the said case of the Federal Court bv statins that a statutory immuniiy is not inconsistent with the right to possession and that such immunity may itself create a right. The right to immunity from eviction involves a negative element in it. In other words, it restricts the right of possession of the landlord. Hence, it cannot be construed to have an effect of creating a right of possession to a tenant. Though the statutory immunitv from eviction mav not be consistent with the right to possession, the fact remains in view of the inherent element involved in both the rights that the immunity from eviction cannot be equated to the right to possession. ( 20 ) THE above view of his Lordship was approved by the Suprtme Court in Padmanabha Setty v. Papiah Setty, AIR. 1966 SC. 1824 The Supreme Court added that it is difficult to equate a tenant's right to stay in the premises till he is evicted, to an entitlement of possession of the premises. Mr. Sundaraswamv next contended that even if the Notification can be regarded as having conferred anv right on tenants of the class of premises stated in the Notification, such right cannot be said to be a right accrued or acquired. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Judicial committee of the Privy Council in Abbott v. Minister for Lands, 1895 AC. 425. There, the appellant had obtained a grant in fee simple of certain lands under the crown Lands Alienation Act, 1861. By virtue of the original grant he would have been entitled to claim settlement of additional areas, if he satisfied certain conditions laid down in the relevant provisions of the statute. The original settled had the right to claim additional settlements if he desired, on fulfilment of those conditions. He had those rights to acquire those additional lands under the provisions of the Crown Lands alienation Act, 1861. But the Crown Lands Act of 1884 repealed the previous act subject to a saving provision to the effect that all rights accrued by virtue of the repealed enactment shall, subject to any express provisions of the repealing Act in relation thereto, remain unaffected by such repeal. But the Crown Lands Act of 1884 repealed the previous act subject to a saving provision to the effect that all rights accrued by virtue of the repealed enactment shall, subject to any express provisions of the repealing Act in relation thereto, remain unaffected by such repeal. The appellant contended that under the repealed enactment he had a right to make additional conditional purchases and that such right was preserved by virtue of the saving clause in the repealing Act of 1884, eepelling that contention, the Lord Chancellor, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, said at page 431: "it may be, as Windeyer, J. observes, that the power to take advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed a 'right'. But the question is whether it is a 'right accrued' within the meaning of the enactment which has to be construed. ( 21 ) THEIR Lordships think, not, and they are confirmed in this opinion by the fact that the words relied on are found in conjunction with the words 'obligations incurred or imposed'. They think that the mere night (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in the members of the community or any class of them to take advantage of an enactment, without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right, cannot properly be deemed a 'right accrued' within the meaning of the enactment. ( 22 ) EVEN if the appellant could establish that the language of S. 2 (b) was insufficient to reserve to him the right for which he contends, he would have to overcome further difficulties. That enactment only renders 'rights accrued' unaffected by the repeal 'subject to any express provisions of this Act in relation thereto. As the present Act contains no provision corresponding to S. 20 of the eld Act empowering the Government to exempt any class of premises from the provisions of the present Act, the present Act must be held to manifest a 'different intention' as referred to in Ss. 6 and 8 of the General Clauses Act. The Notification cannot survive the repeal of the old Act as the notification is inconsistent with the present Act, there being no corresponding provision in the present Act empowering the Government to exempt any class of buildings from any of the provisions of the present Act. 6 and 8 of the General Clauses Act. The Notification cannot survive the repeal of the old Act as the notification is inconsistent with the present Act, there being no corresponding provision in the present Act empowering the Government to exempt any class of buildings from any of the provisions of the present Act. The exemption from eviction from premises leased to the MES. , granted under the Notification, ceased to operate on the repeal of the old act, and is not available when the landlords of such premises seek eviction under clause (h) of S. 21 (1) of the present Act. ( 23 ) IT was faintly urged by the learned Central Government Pleader that it would be very difficult for the MES. , to secure alternative accommodation and hence decrees for eviction should be refused on the ground that greater hardship would be caused by passing the decrees than by refusing to pass them. In Bangalore a large number of houses are being built in extensions. I do not find it possible to accept the plea that it is difficult for the MES. Authorities to find alternative accommodation. It may be, that higher rents than the rents now paid for the premises in question, have to be paid for such alternative accommodation. But that is not sufficient to outweigh the hardship caused to the landlords by refusing decrees in their favour, when they want to occupy their own premises. Hence, there is no good ground under sub-sec. (4) of S. 21 of the Act to refuse decrees for eviction. ( 24 ) BEFORE concluding, I shall advert to the contention of Mr. Sundaraswamy that CRP. No. 1914 of 1969 should be dismissed as being barred by time. Neither the Act nor the rules thereunder have prescribed the time limit within which a revision petition under S. 50 of the Act should be filed. In exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 225 of the Constitution and S. 19 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1884, and all other powers thereto enabling, the High Court of Mysore, with the previous approval of the government of Mysore, made rules called the High Court of Mysore Rules, 1959. Chapter VII of these Rules deals with petitions presented to the high Court. Chapter VII of these Rules deals with petitions presented to the high Court. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of this Chapter provides that a petition to revise the order or proctedmgs of any Court, for which no period of limitation is prescribed by any law applicable to it, shall be presented to the High Court within a period of 90 days from the date of order complained of, in computing which period, provisions of S. 12 of the Indian limitation Act shall apply. Sub-rule (2) of this Rule reads:"6 (2 ). Such petitions presented after the period prescribed by sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the grounds on which the petitioner relies to get the delay condoned and the petition entertained by Court. The court may, if it is satisfied that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the petition within the period prescribed, excuse the delay and entertain the petition with or without issuing the notice of the application to the respondent. " ( 25 ) IN CRP. No. 1914 of 1969, the order sought to be revised was pronounced by the District Judge on 4-7-1969. The revision petition was presented in this Court on 20-11-1969. Even after excluding the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the said order, there was a delay of 19 days in presenting the revision petition. Along with the revision petition the petitioers had filed an application praying for condonation of delay in presenting the petition. By its order dt. 21-11-1969 this Court condoned the delay in presenting the revision petition. That order was made without issuing notice to the respondent. On 21-1-1970 the respondent made an application praying that the revision petition might be dismissed as being barred by time. Mr. Sundaraswamy contended that as the delay in presenting the revision petition was condoned ex-parte, i. e. , without notice to the respondent and without hearing her objections, such condonation should be re-opened and reconsidered at the instance of the respondent. ( 26 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Sundaraswamy relied on the decision of the privy Council in Krishnaswamy Panikondar v. Ramaswamy chettiar, AIR. 1917 PC. 179. There, the High Court of Madras had condoned the delay in preferring the appeal, before the notice of the appeal was served on the respondent. ( 26 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Sundaraswamy relied on the decision of the privy Council in Krishnaswamy Panikondar v. Ramaswamy chettiar, AIR. 1917 PC. 179. There, the High Court of Madras had condoned the delay in preferring the appeal, before the notice of the appeal was served on the respondent. At the hearing of the appeal the respondent raised an objection that the appeal was barred by time. The High Court re-opened and re-considered the matter and dismissed the appeal as being barred by time. In the appeal before the Privy Council, it was contened that the High court had no jurisdiction, at the hearing of the appeal, to reconsider the question whether the delay was excusable. Repelling that contention, sir Lawrence Jenkins who delivered the judgment of the Board, said that it must, in common fairness, be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the one in that case, though unqualified in expression, that it should be open to reconsider at the instance of the party prejudicially affected and that that view was sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India. ( 27 ) THE above decision was followed by a Bench of this Court in State of mysore v. Laxman Sharanappa Shiraguppa, (1964) 1 Mys. L. J. 302. wherein it was held that when the delay in filing an appeal is condoned without notice to the respondent, it is open to the respondent to raise the question of limitation at the time of final hearing of the appeal. However, learned Cenral Government Pleader submitted that no period of limitation for presenting a revision petition (under S. 50 of the act) was prescribed etiher under the Act or under the Limitation Act, that Rule 6 of Chapter VII of the High Court Rules must be regarded as a complete code not only as to the time limit for presenting a revision but also as to condonation of delay in presenting such petition and that that Rule empowers the High Court to condone such delay without issuing notice to the respondent. The learned Central Government Pleader said that the aforesaid two decisions have no application to the present case. The learned Central Government Pleader said that the aforesaid two decisions have no application to the present case. It was also argued by the learned Central Government Pleader that a revision unlike an appeal, is not a right of a party but the power of the court, that the Court can exercise its revisional power even without an application being made by any of the parties, that a respondent in a revision petition, unlike in an appeal, does not get any valuable right on the expiry of the time limit for presenting a revision petition, and hence the high Court has absolute discretion to excuse the delay in presenting the revision petition, even without notice to the respondent. ( 28 ) ACCORDING to the learned Central Government Pleader the order of this Court condoning the delay in presenting the revision petition, cannot be re-opened and reconsidered at the instance of the respondent. Mr. Sundaraswamy next referred to the affidavit of the petitioners in support of their application for condonation of such delay and contended that even if all the avermets in the affidavit are believed, they do not show that the petitioners were prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the revision petition within the prescribed period of 90 days and that the petitioners have not explained delay of each day after the expiry of 90 days. ( 29 ) SINCE I have held that all the three revision petitions should fail on merits, it is not necessary in these petitions to pronounce on the rival contentions of learned Central Government Pleader and Mr. Sundaraswamy as to whether the ex-parte order of this Court condoning the delay can be re-opend and reconsidered and whether the petitioners (in CRP. No. 1914 of 1969) have shown sufficient grounds to condone such delay. ( 30 ) IN the result, all these revision petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of these petitions, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in all these petitions. The petitioners are given five months time from this date to vacate the respective premises and to put the respective respondents in possession of the same. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the learned Central Government Pleader within one week from this day. --- *** --- .