JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This is an appeal against a judgment of acquittal passed by a learned Magistrate, First Class, Cut tack, in a case u/s 504, Indian Penal Code. 2. Shortly stated the prosecution case is as follows: The Appellant and the Respondent are residents of the same village and are close neigh bourse Disputes between the parties were long pending on 8-7-1966, two heads of cattle belonging to the Respondent are said to have entered and damaged the six straw stored in the Bari of the Appellant. The Appellant got annoyed and caned upon the Respondent to come and take away his cattle. On hearing the Appellant's shout, the Respondent appeared with a lathi in his hand, abused the Appellant in obscene and abusive language and even rushed towards him with a view to assault him with the lathi. 3. The stand taken by the Respondent was a total denial of the occurrence. It was specifically indicated in the examination u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure that it was a false case concocted against the Respondent on account of previous enmity. 4. Five witnesses for the prosecution were examined and on behalf of the defence one witness also was examined. The learned Magistrate after discussing the evidence of the parties in paragraph 7 of his judgment came to conclude, These discrepancies relate to matters of detail and as such do not strike at the very root of prosecution case. In other words these discrepancies cannot be taken as a basis for suspecting the prosecution case. Having stated thus he continued, Considering the facts discussed above, I am inclined to bold that accused abused the complainant in the language as aforesaid and thereby insulted him. Now 1 would proceed to see if the accused had the requisite intention or knowledge that such insult would provoke the complainant to break the public peace. 5. Mr. Patnaik, learned Counsel for the Appellant, contended that once the learned Magistrate arrived at the aforesaid finding, keeping in view the language used it was not appropriate for the learned Magistrate to find that the abuses were hurled without any intention or knowledge on the part of the Respondent that such abusive language would cause the Appellant to break the public peace. Keeping in view the nature of the abusive language Mr. Keeping in view the nature of the abusive language Mr. Patnaik contends that knowledge should be imputed to the Respondent that the Appellant would have been emerged so as to affect the public peace Section 504, Indian Penal Code provides, Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. The ingredients, therefore, for this offence are: (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) it must be with the intention that such provocation would cause, or knowledge that such provocation was likely to cause, the person so insulted to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mr. Patnaik contends that on the evidence on record the learned Magistrate should have held that all the ingredients of the offence had been established by the prosecution and the order of acquittal is, therefore, wrong. Mr. Patnaik relies upon two decisions of this Court reported in Mrs. E. Smith v. Chandramani Mohanty 20 C.L.T. 180, and in Serei Behera v. Bipin Behari Roy 25 C.L.T. 184, to support his contention that the view adopted by the learned Magistrate as the reasoning for acquittal is erroneous. As already indicated, the learned Magistrate took the view that the abuses hurled at the Appellant by the Respondent were more in return of the initial abuses offered by the Appellant than any criminal intention or knowledge that the abuses were provocative. 6. Mr. Dey for the Respondent takes the stand that the appreciation of the evidence by the learned Magistrate cannot be upheld and the conclusion in paragraph 8 of his judgment which has already been extracted cannot, therefore, be sustained. According to him, there was enough material in the prosecution evidence which should have led the learned Magistrate to discard the prosecution story in its entirety and he should not have come to hold that the prosecution had succeeded to establish that the accused-Respondent had hurled the abuses at the Appellant in the manner indicated. According to him, there was enough material in the prosecution evidence which should have led the learned Magistrate to discard the prosecution story in its entirety and he should not have come to hold that the prosecution had succeeded to establish that the accused-Respondent had hurled the abuses at the Appellant in the manner indicated. He contends that in a case of a simple offence for which the entire evidence consists of oral statements of witnesses the scrutiny should be stricter otherwise injustice is bound to result. Keeping that as the standard he took me through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The learned Magistrate also stated in paragraph 7 of his judgment that there were discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, but he only referred to three. Mr. Dey indicated to me, while the evidence was being placed, several other discrepancies. As to the place of occurrence there seems to have been a lot of confusion. According to some witnesses it was in the backyard of the complainant's house while according to some others it was in the front of the complainant's house. Some other witnesses also stated that it was on a side. As to which of the persons were present at the site there is also considerable discrepancy. P.w. 1 stated, There were no labourers on the roof of my house at the time of occurrence. At the time of occurrence there were only ten people - four labourers, two servants and four outsiders. The four outsiders reached the spot when the accused was already abusing me. P.w. 5 stated, "Except the persons engaged by p.w. 1 for thatching house and myself nobody else was present at the spot." The effect of the statement of p.w. 5 would mean that the four outsiders were not present. P.w. 2 seems to have made prevaricating statements. He said one story in his cross-examination before charge and 80 different story in cross-examination after charge. When his attention was drawn to that fact he stated, In to day's cross-examination you stated 'The accused while coming out of his house started abusing and did not stop till he reached the complainant which one is correct witness replies the latter one is correct. I don't know whether I stated the right or the wrong thing in my first statement shown above. I don't know whether I stated the right or the wrong thing in my first statement shown above. These features in the prosecution evidence do not seem to have entered into the consideration by the learned Magistrate. Having gone through he prosecution evidence I think the criticism advanced by Mr. Dey seems to be well warranted. Mr. Dey also brought to my notice another feature which has not been properly dealt with by the learned Magistrate. The occurrence is dated 8.7-1966. There is 80 station diary entry on the following day, It has been proved as Ext. A. The complaint petition in Court is dated 11.7-1966. Thus there has been a delay of 3 days in approaching the Court and even if it be taken that the Appellant approached the police for his initiating the prosecution, the delay between 9-7-1966 and 11-7-1966 has not been explained. 7. Mr. Dey also placed before me two decisions in support of his stand that in the background of the present case an offence u/s 504, Indian Penal Code cannot be said to have been proved. He relied upon Abraham Vs. State and Another, and Dhruba Charan Khandai v. Dinabandhu Patri 31 C.L.T. 879. As in my view the prosecution has not been able to prove its case properly and the evidence is not so positive as to hold that the case against the accused Respondent has been made out, it is not necessary to discuss the question of law raised on either side. 8. On an analysis of the evidence as indicated above, I am led to believe that though there w s some incident on the date of occurrence it is not in the nature and of the type as indicated by the prosecution witnesses. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the learned Magistrate was right though the reasonings were not. Taking a sum total view of the matter, I uphold the judgment of acquittal and hold that there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed