Order.- This Criminal Revision case is directed against an order of the learned Special Judge for Anti-Corruption Cases, Hyderabad, refusing to direct a reinvestigation by the Police into certain offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner, a Sub-Inspector of Prohibition, is alleged to have demanded a bribe of Rs.1,000 from Kotta Ramappa, a sweet-toddy contractor for allowing sale of toddy without restriction. Ramappa is said to have reported to the Anti-Corruption Bureau whereupon, on 6th November, 1964 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, laid a trap against the petitioner. The trap is said to have ended successfully in the petitioner being caught redhanded. On the same day the Deputy Superintendent of Police examined two witnesses and on 7th November, 1964 he authorised the Circle Inspector to further investigate into the matter. The Circle Inspector pursued the investigation and examined eight witnesses. Three out of the eight witnesses examined by the Inspector spoke to other instances of receipt of bribe by the petitioner. At that stage the Deputy Superintendent of Police appears to have realised that investigation by the Circle Inspector without the permission of a Magistrate was not in accordance with law. Therefore, on 17th January, 1967 the Deputy Superintendent of Police made an application to the Judicial First-Class Magistrate, Anantapur, to permit the Circle Inspector to investigate into the case. Along with the application a copy of the First Information Report was also placed before the learned Magistrate. The fact that the Circle Inspector had already examined some witnesses does not appear to have been disclosed to the Magistrate. On 27th March, 1967 the learned Magistrate passed an order authorising the Inspector of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, to investigate into the case. The order of the learned Magistrate is in the following terms: “Whereas it is alleged that the respondent Shri B. Sanjeeva Reddy, Excise and Prohibition Sub-Inspector, Kanekal, Anantapur District, was successfully trapped on 6th November, 1964 night in room No. 13 of the Grand Retiring Rooms at Anantapur by Sri J. Madhava Rao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool Range, Kurnool, when he (respondent) demanded and accepted an illegal gratification of Rs. 1,000 from Sri K. Ramappa, a sweet-toddy contractor, resident of Nagireddipalle of Anantapur District and that the respondent thereby committed criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duties and the said allegation constitutes offences punishable under section 5(2) of the Act II of 1947 and 161, Indian Penal Code. And whereas I am satisfied that the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool, is engaged otherwise and is not in a position to take up investigation himself, as per the petitions of the Deputy Superintendent of Police. And whereas, I, J. Rajashekhara Reddy, First-Class Magistrate, Anantapur, am satisfied on a perusal of the petition of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool, dated 17th January, 1967 to the Munsiff-Magistrate, Anantapur, the F.I.R. in Crime No. 2 of 1964 of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool, and after hearing Inspector Sri D Venkataramanappa, who knows the facts of the case that there are good, sufficient and reasonable grounds to authorise investigation of the above-mentioned allegations falling under the above-mentioned sections and any other offences that may come to light in the course of investigation against the above-mentioned respondent and others connected therewith. I do hereby authorise Shri D. Venkataramanappa, Inspector of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Kurnool Range, under section 5-A of Act II of 1947 and 155(2), Criminal Procedure Code, to investigate into the case.” Subsequent to this authorisation the Inspector of Police investigated into the case, re-examined the witnesses previously examined by him, examined more witnesses and finally filed a charge-sheet on 16th June, 1968 in which apart from the receipt of Rs.1,000 from Kotta Ramappa which constituted an offence under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d), five other instances of demand and receipt of bribe were also mentioned so as to constitute an offence under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. On 9th October, 1968 the learned Special Judge framed charges and on 16th April, 1970 the petitioner filed an application before the Special Judge requesting deletion of charges other than that relating to the trap incident and a direction for reinvestigation into those charges. The application was rejected and hence this revision. 2. Sri K. Venkataramaiah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the investigation by the Inspector into charges other than that relating to the trap incident was unauthorised. The application was rejected and hence this revision. 2. Sri K. Venkataramaiah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the investigation by the Inspector into charges other than that relating to the trap incident was unauthorised. According to him the permission granted by the learned Magistrate related only to the trap incident and the offences arising from that incident. The only document produced before the learned Magistrate was the First Information Report and that referred only to the trap incident. The permission granted by the learned Magistrate referred only to Crime No. 2 which was the crime registered, or the basis of the First Information Report relating to the trap incident. When the Deputy Superintendent of Police applied to the Magistrate to grant permission to the Inspector to investigate, information regarding some of the other incidents was already available and yet was not disclosed to the Magistrate and his permission was not sought. Sri K. Venkataramaiah, therefore, contended that it was not open to the prosecution to now say that the permission granted by the learned Magistrate covered the other incidents also. 3. I do not think that there has been any illegality in investigation. It is true that the initial investigation by the Inspector was unauthorised but matters were set right and there was a complete re-investigation after obtaining the permission of the Magistrate. In the present case the permission granted by the Magistrate was wide enough to enable the Inspector to investigate into all offences which came to light in the course of investigation into-Crime No. 2 of 1964. It was not necessary that the offences coming to light should be connected with Crime No. 2 of 1964. In my view once permission is granted under section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the investigating officer need not repeatedly ask for permission if more offences come to light in the course of the investigation. It should be remembered that offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are now cognizable offences and so permission of a Magistrate is not necessary to investigate those offences. But a safeguard against undue harassment of public officials is provided by the requirement that a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent alone is competent to investigate into the offences. But a safeguard against undue harassment of public officials is provided by the requirement that a police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent alone is competent to investigate into the offences. The high rank of the police officer is obviously thought by the Legislature to be a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. In the exigencies of administrative convenience, a Deputy Superintendent may not always be available to investigate. In such cases an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent may investigate if he obtains the permission of a Magistrate of the First Class. The requirement regarding the Magistrate’s permission is expected to provide the necessary safeguard in such cases. Thus no permission is required if a Deputy Superintendent investigates, but permission of Magistrate is necessary if an officer lower in rank than a Deputy Superintendent is to investigate. When permission of a Magistrate is sought the Magistrate must satisfy himself that there is information justifying an investigation and that there is good reason for the non-availability of of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. Once permission is granted the bar against investigation by the officer whose rank is below that of a Deputy Superintendent of Police is raised and he is free to investigate into the offence as he would investigate any other cognizable offence. He need not shut his eyes to other offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act which come to light in the course of his investigation; nor need he rush to the Magistrate for permission every time an offence other than that for which permission was initially granted comes to light in the course of his investigation. Once the bar of rank is raised his freedom to investigate is unhampered. In this view I do not think that there has been any illegality in the investigation in the present case. It is true that while seeking permission to investigate no reference was made to the three instances of receipt of bribe which had come to light in the course of the unauthorised investigation. As they had come to light in the course of an unauthorised investigation the police obviously thought that they should be ignored and a re-investigation made. 4. Assuming that there has been some irregularity or illegality it is not shown how the accused has been prejudiced. As they had come to light in the course of an unauthorised investigation the police obviously thought that they should be ignored and a re-investigation made. 4. Assuming that there has been some irregularity or illegality it is not shown how the accused has been prejudiced. The charge-sheet was filed on 16th June, 1968 and the charges were framed on 9th October, 1968. The present application was filed on 16th April, 1970. The belated nature of the present application raised a compulsive inference that there was no prejudice to the accused. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment of this Court in M.V.N. Ramanujachari v. The State1, and urged that an objection regarding the illegality of investigation might be taken at any time before the completion of the trial and if the objection was sound the Court was bound to order are-investigation. I do not think that the learned Judges laid down any such broad proposition. In Public Prosecutor v. Kanaka Rao1, referring to the decision in Ramanujachari’s case2 I had observed as follows: ‘I may at this stage refer to a recent judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ramanujachari, In re2. In that case, after some witnesses had been examined at the trial the accused filed a petition in the High Court seeking to have the proceedings against him quashed. Kumarayya and Sharfuddin Ahmed, JJ. who heard the petition were satisfied that the investigation was illegal and that in the particular circumstances of the case it could not be said that the objection to the legality of the investigation had not been taken at any early stage. This case is not an authority for saying that an objection regarding legality of investigation may be raised at any stage of the trial, as for example, at the stage of argument, or at the stage of entering upon the defence or after a substantial part of the prosecution evidence has been adduced. Each case must, of course, necessarily depend on the facts of that case, but it is clear that after the commencement of the trial there is no provision of law under which the trial Court can itself cancel ts proceedings and direct a fresh or further investigation. Each case must, of course, necessarily depend on the facts of that case, but it is clear that after the commencement of the trial there is no provision of law under which the trial Court can itself cancel ts proceedings and direct a fresh or further investigation. So much was conceded by the Counsel for the petitioner in Ramanujachari’s case.2 It is of course always open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers and in exercise of its power under section 561-A to quash the proceedings before a subordinate Court and direct the subordinate Court to order such fresh or further investigagation as may be desirable in the circumstances of the case. In dealing with applications for quashing of proceedings based on the ground of illegal investigation, the High Court will naturally take into consideration the stage at which objection to legality of investigation is raised and consider whether there is any likelihood of real prejudice to the accused. The accused must tell the Court how he is likely to be prejudiced or as Bose, J., very expressively stated in Mathew’s case,3 the Court must be told ‘just where the shoe pinches." In Ramamjachari’s case2 on the fact and circumstances of the case, the learned Judges, appear to have been satisfied that there was likelihood of real prejudice and therefore they quashed the proceedings before the Special Judge 10 the extent that they related to the evidence gathered during the course of illegal investigation and directed the Special Judge ‘to take necessary steps for curing this illegality or rectifying the defect by ordering such investigation as the circumstances of the case warrant, keeping the case on file’. It does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges that the operative portion of their judgment would lead to the anomalous position that there would be simultaneous tiral and investigation, a situation unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the view taken by the learned Judges, the more appropriate course would have been to quash the proceedings before the lower Court in entirety and cause a fresh investigation to be made. On the view taken by the learned Judges, the more appropriate course would have been to quash the proceedings before the lower Court in entirety and cause a fresh investigation to be made. I have no doubt that had the attention of the learned Judges been drawn to the anomaly of a simultaneous investigation and trial they would not have allowed their order to create a situation where there would be such simultaneous trial and investigation. In the present case I have not been shown how the accused has been prejudiced. On the other hand the very belated nature of the objection, as stated by me already, raises a compulsive inference that no prejudice has been caused. 5. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. A.B.K. ----- Revision dismissed.