JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a defendants' appeal from the concurrent decree of the two courts below declaring that the plaintiff was the owner of the construction, in suit along with the land appurtenant thereto demarcated in the Commissioner's map and defendants had no concern with it. The Commissioner's map has been made a part of the decree. 2. Admittedly the first plaintiff, who is the first respondent in this appeal was the Zamindar and the land on which the structures in dispute stood belonged to him. The second plaintiff who is the second respondent in this appeal was his Mukhtar-e-Am. It is said that a market used to be held in the area of which the land below the disputed structure, forms a part and on the vesting of they estate in the State of Uttar Pradesh under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) on 1-7-1959 the market vested in the State and under Section 117 of the Act on the publication of the notification the said market came to be vested in the Gram Sabha who is now the first appellant in this appeal. The second appellant is the Gram Samaj which since then has become extinct under the law. A dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the defendant Gram Sabha as to the ownership of the structures standing on the land in plot No. 742 on which the market used to be held. The plaintiffs claimed that the said structures having been constructed prior to 1-7-1952 under Section 9 of the Act the first plaintiff would retain the ownership thereof and the land below it and the land appurtenant thereto would be deemed to be settled with him, hence the Gaon Sabha will have no right or title to claim its owner ship. The defendant Gaon Sabha claimed the title and right over the structures on the basis that the market having vested in it under the Act and the structures in dispute not being `buildings' within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act as also having been constructed after 1-7-1952 by the plaintiffs, the land below it will not be deemed to have been settled with the plaintiffs and they cannot claim any right or title in the land and in the construction. The controversy led to the suit which has given rise to this appeal. 3. The controversy led to the suit which has given rise to this appeal. 3. The first plaintiff sought a declaration of his ownership of the structures and the land below it and appurtenant to it. The Gaon Sabha as well as the Gram Samaj, which existed then, both contested the suit. A large number of pleas, factual and legal, were raised. I am not concerned in this appeal with the technical pleas raised on the validity of the notices under Section 80, the suit being barred by limitation and so on, as all those pleas have been answered against the defendants by the learned Civil judge who tried the suit and no controversy was raised in regard to those pleas in the lower appellate court. The learned Civil judge on the material issues with which I am concerned in this appeal, found that the structures were raised by the plaintiffs prior to 1-7-1952 and they were in existence on the day of vesting under the Act. He also found that on the facts established the structures in dispute would be building within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act and the first plaintiff would retain the ownership thereof and the land below it and appurtenant would be deemed to have been settled with him. On the findings recorded the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 4. On appeal by the defendants the only points which were pressed before the lower appellate court were that the finding that the structures were raised prior to 1-7-1952 was erroneous and that the structures as such would not constitute a building within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. The learned judge of the lower appellate court affirmed the findings of the learned Civil judge and dismissed the appeal. 5. In support of this appeal the learned counsel for the defendant appellant raised two grounds : (1) that the finding of fact that the structures were raised by the plaintiffs prior to 1-7-1952 was vitiated and not binding in second appeal inasmuch as the courts below took into consideration inadmissible documentary evidence and (2) that on the established facts on record the structures in suit cannot constitute a building for the purposes of Section 9 of the Act. 6. As regards the first ground, I do not find there is any merit in it. 6. As regards the first ground, I do not find there is any merit in it. It was submitted that the three documents relied upon by the courts below which were letters written by persons who were alive were not admissible in evidence as the authors of those letters were not produced as witnesses. I agree with the reasoning of the learned judge of the lower appellate court in repelling this submission. There is a statement on record in the trial court made by the learned counsel of the parties that all documents filed shall be admitted in evidence without formal proof. The plaintiffs thus were under no duty to produce the authors of these letters to prove their signatures. Once the formal proof was dispensed with and the letters were admitted to have been written by the persons who signed them, their contents could be used by the plaintiffs as a circumstance in their favour. It was for the defendants then to produce evidence explaining the contents of those letters or to controvert it. No question would arise as to the admissibility of those letters in such circumstance. The finding of fact recorded by the courts below cannot be said to be vitiated. It is binding in second appeal. 7. Now coming to the second ground, I think I must clear a sort of confusion which seems to have been created on the arguments raised in the courts below and discussed by them. An attempt seems to have been made on behalf of the defendants to show that the estate of the intermediary having vested in the State under Section 6 of the Act no right of any kind was left in the plaintiffs. As I understand the argument, it proceeded as if Section 6 superceded Section 9 of the Act and once a Bazar or a Hat vested in the State, then even the buildings standing on that land where that Bazar or Hat was held of which the intermediary or any person else was the owner would vest in the State. There was in the arguments involved a certain confusion which is revealed by some-what lengthy discussion in the able judgment of the learned Civil judge who tried the suit that what kind of right would vest in the State under Section 6 of the Act. There was in the arguments involved a certain confusion which is revealed by some-what lengthy discussion in the able judgment of the learned Civil judge who tried the suit that what kind of right would vest in the State under Section 6 of the Act. His answer was clear but I do not think the point really arose in the suit. I must make it clear that in this suit the right, if any, of the Gaon Sabha to manage the market was not in dispute. That dispute if arises would form altogether a different chapter and be resolved by some other suit. Here in the instant suit the only question that arose was assuming the market in suit vested in the State under Section 6 of the Act and then under Section 117 of the Act after the notification in the Gram Sabha, thereby the Gram Sabha becomes the owner of the structures. In my judgment there is no conflict between Secs. 6 and 9 of the Act. While Section 6 vests the rights and titles mentioned therein in the State, Sec. 9 deals with what the State will give back or return to the intermediary, tenants and other persons. It is only when the right and title of the intermediary in the estate has vested in the State that the latter will have the power to settle what has been vested in it with others. That is what Section 9 of the Act deals with. It says that the buildings will continue to belong to the intermediary or the tenant or any other person, as the case may be, and the site thereof with the land appurtenant thereto be deemed to be settled with such person. There is no exception of any kind in Section 9 of the Act. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that when a market vests in the State under Section 6 of the Act the former owner thereof would not retain the ownership of any building and the site thereof and the appurtenant land would not be deemed to be settled with him. It is possible to conceive that a market managed by a Gram Sabha or the State wholly or partly be held in buildings belonging to others. It is possible to conceive that a market managed by a Gram Sabha or the State wholly or partly be held in buildings belonging to others. Merely because some-body else is the owner of the building in which the market wholly or partly is held would not derogate from the right of the State or the Gram Sabha from managing or regulating that market if it has a right otherwise under the law. I do not find any inherent inconsistency or difficulty in holding that even in a plot where a market is held which vests in the State if a structure stands belonging to the intermediary that structure will be covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. 8. The main question which remains to be determined is whether the structure in suit would be a building within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. The learned Civil judge in his judgment has given a detailed description of the structures. I need not repeat the same. There is no dispute on the description of the structures as given in the judgment of the learned Civil judge based on the report of the Commissioner. From the plan prepared by the commissioner it appears that pucca foundation had been dug and brick-work. laid in the shape of a platform, ten inches or so high from the ground level. On this platform on three sides structures have been raised in the shapes of sheds resting on bamboo poles fixed in the ground and covered by tin or iron sheets rivetted to the crossbeams. In the shed so constructed sixteen compartments have been made all round some of which have pucca floors and some not. The sixteen compartments are used as shops by the sellers. In the open space there is a Pipal tree with a pucca Chabutra below it. I think the courts below were right in holding that such a structure would be a `building' within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the building contemplated in Section 9 of the Act will be a structure in the nature of a house enclosed by walls. I do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the building contemplated in Section 9 of the Act will be a structure in the nature of a house enclosed by walls. Though the meaning of the word `building' given in the English Dictionary may be of some help but considering the beneficial object underlying the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, I think a liberal construction must be given to the said provisions. It could never have been the intention of the legislature that constructions like Chaupal, cattle-shed, will not continue to be owned by the persons who constructed them and the site below it would not be settled with such persons. If a narrow meaning is given to the word `building' as canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant by far a large number of persons in the villages for whose benefit avowedly the provision was enacted would stand deprived of the benefit. Most of the cattle-sheds, Chaupals and so on in the villages do not have wills all around and they cannot be said to be houses. The legislature while enacting the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would be presumed to be aware of the conditions in the villages in Uttar Pradesh and the types of buildings or constructions existing in the villages. One of the English dictionary gives a kind of meaning to the word `building' which would completely throw out almost all the constructions in the village abadis outside the purview of Section 9 of the Act. It is well known that most of the constructions in the villages are Kutcha having mud walls with tile covering or thatch covering. If the idea of a building is a construction of brick and stone joined by mortar as given in English dictionary the result would be obvious that persons for whose benefit Section 9 of the Act was enacted would stand deprived of it. The narrower meaning of the building in construing the provisions of Section 9 of the Act does no commend itself to me. The narrower meaning of the building in construing the provisions of Section 9 of the Act does no commend itself to me. Sec. 9 contemplates that buildings belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other persons shall continue to belong to or to he held by such intermediary, tenant or person, and the site of the building and the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. Rule 26 framed under the Act lays down some terms and conditions which makes the interest in the site so settled habitable and transferable. It affords absolute protection to the person in whose favour the site is settled from ejectment and gives such person a right to use the site for any purpose whatsoever. It is only when the building is abandoned or in the event when the owner dies without any heir entitled to succeed, that the site escheats to the State. All this shows that the building contemplated under Section 9 of the Act would be a kind of structure which could be used for his benefit by the owner somewhat permanently, that is, before the day of vesting he was using it either for residence or for other purposes like tethering of cattle, carrying on some cottage industry. In that view of the matter even a structure of the kind of a shed without any walls around it raised with the intention of making use of it in a permanent way or quasi permanent way would be a building within the meaning of Section 9 of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghan shiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 A.L.J. 536, while considering the meaning to be given to the word `building' in Section 9 of the Act quoted from Websters New International Dictionary thus showing its preference as to the meaning of that word. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghan shiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 A.L.J. 536, while considering the meaning to be given to the word `building' in Section 9 of the Act quoted from Websters New International Dictionary thus showing its preference as to the meaning of that word. Websters New International English Dictionary defines the meaning of the word `building' as follows : "That which is built specify : (a) as now generally used a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less permanently and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, store-house, factory, shelter for beasts or some other useful purpose." The learned judges further observed : "The question as to what is a building under Section 9 of the Act. must always be a question of decree a question depending on the facts and circumstances of each case." The view which has been taken on the facts and circumstances of this case by the courts below with which I agree, is fortified by the observations of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court quoted above in Ghan Shiam Das v. Debi Prasad, 1966 A.L.J. 536. There cannot be any doubt that the structure which has been raised by the plaintiffs on the land indispute is a building within the meaning of Sec. 9. All the land covered by the structure and appurtenant thereto would be deemed to have been settled with the first plaintiff and the structure standing thereon would continue to belong to the first plaintiff. The findings recorded by the two courts below on this crucial question is a good finding which is affirmed. 9. No other point arises or has been argued in this appeal. 10. As a result of the discussion above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.