ORDER M.N. Shukla, J. - This is a Defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for perpetual injunction restraining the Appellants from interfering with the Respondent's possession over the gher in dispute. The suit was dismissed by the trial court but decreed by the lower appellate court and hence the Defendants have come in second appeal to this Court. 2. A perusal of the plaint in the present case indicates that the suit was brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent on the basis of title long user i.e. exercising certain acts of possession of miscellaneous nature. It may also be possible to spell out a case of possessory title. The averments in the plaint were that the Plaintiff was the owner of the gher and had been using it for tethering of cattle and keeping ghoor gani and bhitauras. In these circumstances the three main points on which the decision in the case must depend are as follows: 1. Whether the Plaintiff succeeded in proving his title? 2. Whether the use of the suit land for miscellaneous purposes would confer any title on the Plaintiff in case such user is establised? 3. Whether the Plaintiff can succeed on the basis of possessory title i.e. long prior possession in the instant case where the Defendants asserted their own title? 3. On the question of title the trial court framed a specific issue: Whether the Plaintiff is the owner of the Gher in suit and trees existing thereon as alleged ? The Plaintiff's title was clearly negatived by the trial court which came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the land in suit or the trees standing thereon. That finding was not reversed by the lower appellate court and consequently it must be held that the Plaintiff failed to prove his title i.e. he was not the owner of the property in suit. 4. The lower appellate court decided the case in the Plaintiff's favour on the basis that the disputed land had been in his possession and user as alleged in the plaint. In other words, the court below believed the Plaintiff's case that he had been using the disputed land for miscellaneous purposes i.e. keeping of ghoor gani and bhitauras and also tethering of cattle. 5. In other words, the court below believed the Plaintiff's case that he had been using the disputed land for miscellaneous purposes i.e. keeping of ghoor gani and bhitauras and also tethering of cattle. 5. The question, therefore, arises as to whether this kind of miscellaneous user can confer any title or can amount to adverse possession. In Framji Cruestji v. Goculdas Madhowji ILR 26 Bom 338 the party claiming to have established a right in the land by adverse possession had proved to have erected on the land in dispute privy and sheds for cows, goats, fowls etc. and a hut for ghariwala, all, however, structures of a flimsy and purely temporary character. It has held that such user of the land by itself was insufficient to support a title therein by adverse possession. It was observed: User of this sort under similar circumstances is common in this country and excites no particular attention. It is neither intended to denote, or understood as denoting--on the one side or the other--a claim to the ownership of the land and where this and no more, is the case it would be wrong to hold that a claim by adverse possession has been made out. The above decision was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Asa Ram v. Ram Chandra 1939 AWR (HC) 11. Thom, J. Lald down the rule as follows: The mere tethering of cattle and storing of logs and the construction of foundations of a house began many years back but, not visible on the surface on a piece of waste land, is no indication of possession which is intended to be adverse to the title of the proprietor of the land. The Bombay case was also followed by the Oudh Chief Court in Iqbal Ali v. Humayun Qadar 1941 AWR (Rev.) 289 wherein it was observed: Where after the falling of a house into rains for a long time the land presents the appearance of a mere ahata with a dalan bounded on all sides by the houses of the neighbours, such acts of possession by the adverse possession, (members of the real owner's family), as tethering of cattle, using the land as a playground, cooking food on ceremonial occasions and even planting trees cannot possibly arouse the notice of the real owner even if he be living in the same town, much less would they constitute adverse possession against him for he has been living away from the land since a long time. Thus, it is clear that the Plaintiff could not acquire title by adverse possession merely by proving user for miscellaneous purposes i.e. tethering of cattle and keeping of ghoor gani and bithauras and the court below fell into an error by regarding these sundry acts of user as sufficient to confer a title on the Plaintiff so as to entitle him to a decree for injunction against the Defendants. Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to prove that he acquired any title by adverse possession in the present case. 6. The only other ground on which the suit was based was possessory title i.e. Plaintiff's long possession over the disputed property which began 12 years prior to the suit. The question arises whether a suit based on prior possession alone can be maintained by a person without asserting his legal title. One of the contentions raised in this behalf is that a regular suit based on prior possession without proof of title is not maintainable. 7. The same proposition is sometimes stated by asserting that a suit by a trespasser does not lie for ejectment of another trespasser only on the basis of prior possession and that such a suit for ejectment or injunction, as the case may be must be based on title. In my opinion long possession by itself is sufficient to entitle a Plaintiff to ask for possession or injunction against the Defendant, who does not prove his own title. In other words, possessory title is good against everybody except the true owner. In my opinion long possession by itself is sufficient to entitle a Plaintiff to ask for possession or injunction against the Defendant, who does not prove his own title. In other words, possessory title is good against everybody except the true owner. The only requirement of such a suit would be that the Plaintiff should be able to prove his own exclusive possession over the property and the suit must be brought within 12 years from his dispossession of the same. It has been the considered view of jurists that long and continuous possession itself gives rise to certain rights. Salmond on Torts ( 13th Ed. p. 172) stated the rule in these words: The mere de facto and wrongful possession of land is a valid title of right against all persons who cannot show a better title in themselves and is, therefore, sufficient to support an action of trespass against such persons. Pollock and Wright while expressing themselves on possession (in their "Essay on Possession" p. 19) remark: Possession in law is a substantive right or interest which exists and has legal incidents and advantages apart from the true owner's title. The principle that possession is good against all but the true owner was recognised by the Privy Council in 1907 AG 73 where it was summed up as follows: It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. The same principle has been accepted in a number of decisions by this Court. The point came up for consideration before a Division Bench in Ganesh and Another Vs. Dasso and Another, AIR 1927 All 669 and Iqbal Ahmad, J. observed: It is well settled that possessory title is good against everybody except the true owner and in the case of wrongful ouster, a Plaintiff is entitled to succeed upon the strength of previous possession, if the Defendant fails to prove a better title. Dasso and Another, AIR 1927 All 669 and Iqbal Ahmad, J. observed: It is well settled that possessory title is good against everybody except the true owner and in the case of wrongful ouster, a Plaintiff is entitled to succeed upon the strength of previous possession, if the Defendant fails to prove a better title. Against a mere trespasser prior possession is itself a title inasmuch as possession raises a presumption of title. Possession in law is a subsisting right which the law protects and which can be enforced against any person who does not prove a better title. Accordingly in a suit for ejectment against a trespasser based on the Plaintiff's title, if the Plaintiff fails in proving title in himself but proves that he was in peaceful possession of the property in suit at the time of his wrongful ouster by the Defendant, he is entitled to a decree for possession as against the trespasser. In short, in a suit for possession if the Plaintiff proves that he was in peaceful possession at the time of dispossession by the Defendant, the Defendant can only resist the claim for possession on proving title in himself. If he fails to prove title, the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the basis of his possessory title notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff did not frame his suit as a suit u/s 9, Specific Relief Act and did not sue the Defendant within a period of six months from the date of his dispossession. A distinction is to be drawn in cases u/s 9, Specific Relief Act and cases in which courts grant the Plaintiff a decree in suits filed after six months of the date of dispossession on the basis of the Plaintiffs possessory title. There can be no doubt about the correctness of this proposition after the decision of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1165 wherein Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court remarked: We cannot subscribe to the view that after the period of six months is over a suit based on prior possession alone is not possible. The contention of Sri Nambiar that in a suit for possession u/s 8 of the Specific Relief Act title must be proved by the Plaintiff was repelled. The contention of Sri Nambiar that in a suit for possession u/s 8 of the Specific Relief Act title must be proved by the Plaintiff was repelled. Such suits based on prior possession alone i.e. based on possessory title will be decreed if possession is proved and it is not necessary that the Plaintiff should prove his title provided the Defendant does not himself asserted his title. If however, the Defendant claims title, it would be necessary of the Plaintiff to prove a better title. Thus, the position of law and the rule with regard to the burden of proof on the Plaintiff in a suit based on possessory title was summed up in para. 14 of the reports as follows: When however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be raised by the Defendant and if he does so, the Plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the Defendant can prove one. The present amended Arts. 64 and 65 bring out this difference. Article 64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the Plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. Article 65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Thus, a suit for possession or injunction on the basis of long possession within 12 years would be competent and the Plaintiff need not assert his title but the question of title can be raised in such suit and if it is raised by the Defendant, it is imperative for the Plaintiff to prove a better title. 8. It is true that the case of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander (supra) dealt with a situation wherein the Plaintiff had claimed the relief of possession but the same principle would also be applicable to a suit for injunction. It is open to a person relying on his possession to claim injunction against another person who threatens to oust him unless the latter shows a better title. It is open to a person relying on his possession to claim injunction against another person who threatens to oust him unless the latter shows a better title. In Fakirbhai v. Maganlal AIR 1051 Bom 380 it was held that in order to entitle the Plaintiffs to obtain the relief of injunction against Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 it was not necessary for them to prove their title to the suit land, because u/s 54 of the Specific Relief Act even if they proved that the Defendants invaded or threatened to invade their enjoyment of property, the Court would grant a perpetual injunction in the cases therein mentioned. Bhagwati, J. relied on the observations of the Privy Council in Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous 20 Cal. 834, wherein it was held that lawful possession of land was sufficient evidence of right as owner, as against a person who had no title whatever and who was a mere trespasser and that the former could obtain a declaratory decree and injunction restraining the wrong doer. The following-passage containing the ratio of the judgment of the Privy Council was extracted at page 384 of the reports: It appears to their Lordships that there is here a misapprehension of the nature of the Plaintiff's case upon the facts stated in the judgment. The possession of the Plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the Defendant. By Section 9, Specific Relief Act, ((1) of 1877) if the Plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, ha could by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. By Section 9, Specific Relief Act, ((1) of 1877) if the Plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, ha could by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrong doer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner and an injunction to restrain the wrong doer from interfering with his possession." The underlying principle seems to be that if the policy of law is that in a suit like the one u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act a Plaintiff dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law can, within six months recover possession from a person notwithstanding that the latter may prove title, it is all the more reasonable that after the expiry of the period of six months a person on the basis of long possession may successfully sue for recovery of possession or for injunction within the period of limitation, the Defendant who has no title in himself. 9. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case it appears that the lower appellate court took an erroneous view of law by decreeing the Plaintiffs suit on the basis of possessory title. As I have already indicated in the earlier part of the judgment, the Defendants had specifically pleaded title relying on the sale-deed executed by the Zamindar. There was no finding that the sale-deed was invalid or illegal or that it did not convey any title to the Defendants nor was there any finding to the effect that the Plaintiff had matured his title by adverse possession. The trial court had found that the Plaintiff had not succeeded in proving his title. That finding was not reversed by the lower appellate court. In these circumstances it was incumbent on the Plaintiff to prove his better title and then alone he could have succeeded in obtaining an injunction against the Defendants who claimed title in themselves. The trial court had found that the Plaintiff had not succeeded in proving his title. That finding was not reversed by the lower appellate court. In these circumstances it was incumbent on the Plaintiff to prove his better title and then alone he could have succeeded in obtaining an injunction against the Defendants who claimed title in themselves. It is true that the lower appellate court was of the view that the vendors of the Defendants i.e. the erstwhile Zamindars were not in actual possession but that by itself does not mean that they had lost their title at the time of executing the sale-deed. There was no finding to that effect nor, as I have already observed, did the lower appellate court find that the Plaintiff had matured title by adverse possession. In these circumstances in my opinion the Plaintiff's suit based on prior possession alone, which ground may somehow be spelt out from the averments in the plaint, could not succeed and a decree for injunction could not be passed against the Defendant Appellants. 10. Thus, I allow this appeal and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit but I direct the parties to bear their own costs.