JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Appellant is the landlord and the Respondent the tenant under him in respect of a house located in the town of Cuttack. 2. House Rent Control Case No. 8 of 1965 was filed by the Appellant before the House Rent Controller of Cuttack for eviction as provided u/s 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 and the said case was allowed ex parte on 27-7-1965 and an order for eviction was made. u/s 13 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) an execution case was filed in the Court of the First Munsif, Cuttack being Execution Case No. 159 of 1965. On 19-9-1965, possession was delivered to the Appellant in the said execution case. On 25-10-1965, an application was made by the Respondent before the House Rent Controller purporting to he under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. On 5-3-1966, to which date the said case stood posted, the Appellant applied for an adjournment. The House Rent Controller, however, rejected the said application and proceeded to record ex parte evidence in the enquiry relating to reopening of the matter under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. An appeal was filed being House Rent Control Appeal No. 5 of 1966 before the learned Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack, on the self same day against the order of the learned Controller refusing to grant adjournment and proceeding to record ex parte evidence. On 9-3-1966, the learned House Rent Controller recalled the ex parte order of eviction and restored the case for disposal in accordance with law. In April 1966 another appeal was filed by the Appellant before the learned Additional District Magistrate being House Rent Control Appeal No. 6 of 1966 against the order of the learned Controller dated 9.3.1966. On 16.3-1966, an application was made by the Respondent purporting to be u/s 144, CPC in Execution Case No. 159 of 1965, for restitution and asking for redelivery of possession of the premises on the ground that the ex parte order of eviction had in the meantime been vacated and there was no order on the hasis of which the Appellant was entitled to possession. During the pendency of that application before the executing Court, on 23.5.1966 the two House Rent Control Appeals were disposed of by the learned Additional District Magistrate. During the pendency of that application before the executing Court, on 23.5.1966 the two House Rent Control Appeals were disposed of by the learned Additional District Magistrate. The Appellate Authority stated the submissions of either party and came to hold, I have carefully gone through the records and considered the arguments levelled by both the parties before me. I find that there has been miscarriage of justice for lack of opportunities to the parties. The notices were not properly served 808 it appears from the endorsements on them. The Appellant should have been given time which he prayed for on 5-3-1966. Under the circumstances I remand the case for fresh trial and disposal according to law giving full opportunities to both the parties. This order will apply to both the Appeal No. 5 and No. 6 of 1966. On 29-6-1966, the executing Court allowed the application u/s 144, CPC and directed redelivery of possession to the Respondent. We are told at the Bar that such possession was delivered on 6-9-1966 and the Respondent is now in possession after such delivery was effected. 3. An appeal was carried to the learned District Judge being Miscellaneous Appeal No. 83 of 1966 against the order of the executing Court granting restitution. The learned District Judge went into the matter at a considerable length and negatived the contention raised before him on behalf of the Appellant that the learned Controller or the Appellate Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to review the ex parte order or set it aside applying the principles of Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Mr. M.N. Das contended before us that the view of the learned Appellate Judge that the House Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority has jurisdiction to vacate the ex parte order of eviction and restore the House Rent Control case for II fresh disposal was wrong. According to him the Respondent having not gone in appeal against the ex parte order it was not open to the learned Additional District Magistrate to vacate the ex parte order. The only matter which came before the learned Additional District Magistrate was as to whether the refusal of adjournment on 5-3-1966 by the learned Controller was justified. The other appeal questioned the propriety of the order of the learned Controller in vacating the ex parte order. The only matter which came before the learned Additional District Magistrate was as to whether the refusal of adjournment on 5-3-1966 by the learned Controller was justified. The other appeal questioned the propriety of the order of the learned Controller in vacating the ex parte order. If the Appellate Authority found that the refusal of adjournment on 5.3.1966 was improper, the subsequent order of the Controller dated 9.3.1966 recalling the earlier order of eviction could not be justified. The order of the Appellate Authority is indeed not very clear. But the learned District Judge has interpreted it to mean that the main case was restored to the file of the Controller for disposal afresh. The view taken by the learned District Judge seems to be justified. He has clearly indicated that "the notices were not property served as it appears from the endorsements on them". These notices must only be with reference to the allegation of the Respondent that he had not been properly served in the case. Non-service of notice with reference to the Respondent was not the case before the appellate Authority. In view of the statement in the appellate order of the learned Additional District Magistrate we are of the view that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the effect of the order of the Appellate Authority was to restore the main case for eviction to the me of the Controller for a fresh disposal in accordance with law Since in Appeal No. 6 of 1966 the Appellant was questioning the propriety of the order of the House Rent Controller in the matter of recalling the ex parte order, it was open to the learned Additional District Magistrate in appeal to bold that the order of the Controller was right and both the parties should be given an opportunity of being heard again before the final order in the case was made. 5. Mr. Das next contends that is was not open to the House Rent Controller to review his order, review being a statutory remedy and not having been specifically provided under the Act. There is no dispute at the Bar that in the absence of a power of review, the jurisdiction for review cannot be exercised. A Bench of this Court in Binode Bihari Sahu v. Satchidananda Rout and Anr. 22 C.L.T. 156 1, has also clearly taken that view. There is no dispute at the Bar that in the absence of a power of review, the jurisdiction for review cannot be exercised. A Bench of this Court in Binode Bihari Sahu v. Satchidananda Rout and Anr. 22 C.L.T. 156 1, has also clearly taken that view. The proceeding before this Court in the aforesaid case arose out of 80 matter under the Orissa Rouse Rent Control Act. It was stated that the power of review is a oration of statute and is not within the inherent power of an officer or Court. 6. Panigrahi, J., as he then was in Nimai Charan Kamila v. Sham Mohan Nandi 18 C.L.T. 279, had, however, held that in the absence of any provision corresponding to Order 9 of the CPC to enable the House Rent Controller to restore petition or set aside an order already passed by him, and in the absence of specific rules under the Act as to the procedure to be adopted in such cases, it may be assumed in the absence of any special direction to the contrary that the rules of natural justice which are embodied in the CPC should apply. In that case the House Rent Controller had taken the view that he had no jurisdiction to decide an application for revival of a proceeding which had been dismissed for default. The Appellate Authority took a contrary view and held that the Controller had jurisdiction to restore the matter and remanded the proceeding to the learned Controller for hearing of the parties. Panigrahi, J. upon examination of the matter took the view that the principles of natural justice as embodied in the CPC were applicable and the Controller had jurisdiction to apply the principles of Order 9 of the CPC to a proceeding under the Act. The case before the Division Bench which has been referred to above was decided by Panigrahi, C.J. and Mohapatra, J. Before the Division Bench the earlier Single Judge decision of Panigrahi, J. was cited. Referring to that decision the Division Bench stated: Mr. Rao, however, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, places before us a decision of this Court Nimai Charan Kamila v. Sham Mohan Nandi 18 C.L.T. 279. Referring to that decision the Division Bench stated: Mr. Rao, however, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, places before us a decision of this Court Nimai Charan Kamila v. Sham Mohan Nandi 18 C.L.T. 279. In our opinion, the decision has absolutely no bearing so far as the present case is concerned inasmuch as My Lord the Chief Justice bad come to a decision allowing restoration of the case which had been dismissed without bearing and in default relying on the principles of natural justice. In the present case, no question of natural justice arises. The parties were heard at length, a decision was arrived at which, according to the very provisions of the statute, had become final. In our opinion, the order of review therefore is without jurisdiction and is quashed. Therefore, it is clear that the Division Bench neither indicated its approval nor disapproval of the earlier decision. 7. The Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 or the Rules framed thereunder do not contain any provision for meeting such eventualities. Indisputably relief in relation to eviction is a civil right and until the special forum was created suits in ordinary civil Courts were being maintained for the purpose. While the special forum was created for adjudication of claims for eviction the order was treated as a decree and jurisdiction was conferred on the Civil Court for execution of such decree. Section 13 of the Act clearly provided: The order of the Controller made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed, to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. There is no dispute that the proceeding under the Act is a civil proceeding. If the tests indicated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.A.L. Narayan Row and Another Vs. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas and Another are applied, it is manifest that the proceedings before the Controller are clearly civil proceedings. 8. A matter akin to the point now raises was examined by Das, J. in Sahadat Khan Vs. Mohammad Hossain. The learned Judge relied upon some earlier decisions of his Court and also quoted with approval the observations of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1948 12 (Privy Council) . 8. A matter akin to the point now raises was examined by Das, J. in Sahadat Khan Vs. Mohammad Hossain. The learned Judge relied upon some earlier decisions of his Court and also quoted with approval the observations of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1948 12 (Privy Council) . Their Lordships had observed, The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute, the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. It is true, the point that was being examined by the Privy Council was from another angle, but the principles as indicated in the decision of the Judicial Committee and the decisions of the Calcutta High Court clearly support the proposition that if a civil right was being adjudicated and the procedure was not clearly indicated the ordinary procedure applicable for adjudication of such civil rights can also be applied. In such a view of the matter we are of the opinion that the provisions of the CPC as rules of natural justice can be applied to a proceeding under the Act unless there is any particular indication in the statute or the rules made thereunder for non-application or by implication it can be held that an alternate procedure is indicated. In our opinion, the view expressed by Panigrahi, J. in the decision referred to above is correct and lays down the law properly. 9. Once it is held that the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13, CPC are applicable to a proceeding under the Act, the subsequent direction for restoration of the case for a fresh disposal cannot be questioned at present. Admittedly the appeal arise out of a collateral matter and Mr. Das fairly concedes that if jurisdiction in the Controller for restoration of the proceeding is found, his contention in the appeal is found to fail. Admittedly the appeal arise out of a collateral matter and Mr. Das fairly concedes that if jurisdiction in the Controller for restoration of the proceeding is found, his contention in the appeal is found to fail. The learned District Judge has recorded in his order: Therefore, when an order is made to put the Petitioner in a House Rent Control Act case into possession as against a tenant and the same has been executed by the Civil Court as an executing Court under the Act and the Petitioner has been put in possession but subsequently the order of the House Rent Controller is set aside either by the Appellate Court or an ex parte order is set aside by the same Court, the provisions of the CPC will apply and u/s 144, CPC the other party will be entitled to claim restitution. This position is not disputed by either side. Before us also Mr. Das did not attempt to question the correctness of the aforesaid proposition. 1a Therefore, on the aforesaid analysis, once it is held that the House Rent Controller bad jurisdiction to restore the case fur a fresh disposal by vacating the ex parte order of eviction the direction of the executing Court for restitution is not open to dispute. That apart the Respondent has already been put in possession and the case before the Controller is now proceeding. In such circumstances, there can be no equity in favour of the Appellant to have that position disturbed. In the circumstances, this appeal fails and is dismissed. We, however, do not propose to make any direction as to costs of this appeal. S.K. Ray, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed