JUDGMENT : B.P. SINHA, J. This revision application has arisen under the following circumstances. On getting some confidential information that one Ram Narain Mistry, an employee of the petitioners, was coming by Assam Mail with foreign gold, a party consisting of Central Excise Officers headed by Shri B.B. Saran, Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, visited Dinapur Railway station and intercepted Ram Narain Mistry. He was found carrying foreign gold bars in his shoes. It was revealed by him that he used to carry foreign gold from Bombay to Patna on behalf of the firms, M/S Munshi Lal and Brothers and for each trip he was paid Rs. 100/, exclusive of cost incurred on journey. Eleven gold bars were seized and Ram Narain Mistry was arrested and thereafter a raid was made in the shop, Munshi Lal and Brothers, Bakerganj, wherefrom some documents were seized. After completing investigation a complaint was filed on behalf of the Union of India through Shri K. P. Mazumdar, I.R.S., Assistant Collector, Central Excise on 12th of May, 1965 against Ram Narain Mistry and the petitioners for violation of Rules 126-F 126-R and 126-I of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The Sub divisional Magistrate took cognizance and transferred the case to the Court of Shri D.N. Pradhan, Munsif Magistrate, 1st Class, for disposal. 2. Before the trial court, the prosecution examined to witnesses. The witnesses were cross-examined before charge. Charges were framed against all the three accused under the Defence of India Rules. The petitioners did not plead guilty of the charges. Ram Narain Mistry, however, pleaded guilty of all the charges. Thereupon the trial court convicted accused Ram Narayan Mistry under Rule 126-P(2) of the Defence of India Rules and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and also to Pay a fine of rupees two thousand and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months by his order dated 27th April, 1968, which is Annexure - A' to the petition. 3. On 23.6.1968, which was the date fixed in the case, an application was made on behalf of the prosecution for permission to examine Ram Narain Mistry as a prosecution witness. The prayer was objected to by the defence contending that Ram Narain Mistry was not a competent witness and he could not be examined as a prosecution witness. 3. On 23.6.1968, which was the date fixed in the case, an application was made on behalf of the prosecution for permission to examine Ram Narain Mistry as a prosecution witness. The prayer was objected to by the defence contending that Ram Narain Mistry was not a competent witness and he could not be examined as a prosecution witness. After bearing the parties, the learned Magistrate, before whom the case was pending, held that Ram Narain Mistry, who was no longer an accused in this case, was a competent witness to depose for the prosecution and hence he allowed the prayer of the prosecution to Examine him as a prosecution witness, by his order dated 28th May, 1968. It is against this order that this revision application has been filed by the petitioners. 4. The point that arises for consideration in this case is as to whether having been convicted and sentenced, Ram Narain Mistry could be a competent witness for the prosecution against the petitioners in the same trial. Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, all persons are competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them; or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of• the same kind. Witnesses have to be administered oath under Section 5 of the Indian Oaths Act. It is, however, provided under that section that no oath can be administered to the accused unless he is examined as a witness for the defence which is now permissible under Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is, perhaps, because of this that-a person cannot be examined as a witness in the trial in which he is an accused, except under Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. When a number of persons is involved in commission of an offence, as a rule each accused can be tried separately. If the trial of different accused persons are separate, there cannot be any doubt that an accused of one case can be a witness in a case against another accused. This position in law is not disputed. 5. When a number of persons is involved in commission of an offence, as a rule each accused can be tried separately. If the trial of different accused persons are separate, there cannot be any doubt that an accused of one case can be a witness in a case against another accused. This position in law is not disputed. Complication arises when trial of different persons is joint In joint trial one accused cannot be examined as a witness even against the co-accused, as he himself is still an accused in that trial and he cannot be administered oath except when he is examined as a defence witness under Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Now the trial against a person who is being jointly tried with other persons can be terminated by the withdrawal of the case against him or by his conviction or acquittal as the case may be. If it is so terminated, can it be said that still he is an accused in the trial which has now to continue against the other co-accused. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the person against whom the case has been withdrawn still continues to be an accused in the joint trial. So also when one of the accused persons is discharged or he is convicted and punished on the basis of plea of guilt, the trial against him completely ends. It can never be said that he still continues to be a person charged for commission of some offences. In the above mentioned circumstances the accused ceased ipso facto to be an accused person. In this connection reference can be made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in (1) Mohammad Yusuf V. Emperor (I.L.R. 58 Calcutta 1214). On a review of various decisions it was held: - :"After a plea of guilt there is nothing in issue to be tried between the Crown and the prisoner at the bar, a fortiori, after his plea of guilt has been accepted; Khudiram Bose V. Emperor (10). And the reason is stronger still if he has been convicted upon his own confession, that is to say, upon his plea of guilt. When a prisoner has pleaded guilty, he ceases ipso facto to be an accused person. And the reason is stronger still if he has been convicted upon his own confession, that is to say, upon his plea of guilt. When a prisoner has pleaded guilty, he ceases ipso facto to be an accused person. There would be no sense in continuing to accuse him of or charge him with committing an offence, after he had pleaded guilty to having done it. Still more certain is it that the ceases to be an accused person when he has been convicted.. ..." With regard to the cases in which it was decided that the trial of an accused does not necessarily end with his plea of guilt, it was observed that all those cases were distinguishable because in those cases order of conviction had not followed the plea of guilt. It has, therefore, been held in the case of Mohammad Yusuf that Panna Lal, who was convicted on plea of guilt, was a competent witness for the prosecution in the trial which continued against the remaining accused persons. It appears that in that case Palma Lal was convicted and order to be detained in Borstal institution was passed though the actual term of his detention had not been fixed. It was left to be fixed later after he was examined medically. It is in that connection that it was observed as follows: "It is, however, always desirable to pass sentence completely before calling one accused in a joint trial to give evidence against his co-accused so that the witness may give his evidence with a mind free of all corrupt influence which the fear of impending punishment, and the desire to obtain immunity to himself at the expenses of the prisoner might otherwise produce. .. ...". In the instant case, Ram Narain Mistry was not only convicted but sentenced as well before the order to examine him as prosecution witness was passed. The aforesaid decision is being distinguished by the learned counsel for the petitioners by raising a point that a distinction has to be made when the plea of guilt is made during the trial and when it is made before the trial commences. That is to say it bas been submitted that once the trial started, the disqualification to' be a competent witness in that trial continues against an accused though be bas been convicted on such plea. That is to say it bas been submitted that once the trial started, the disqualification to' be a competent witness in that trial continues against an accused though be bas been convicted on such plea. In this connection it has been urged that in the Calcutta case, Panna Lal had pleaded guilty and was convicted before trial in the court of sessions actually proceeded, but in the instant case the trial, which was being conducted as a warrant trial, had started earlier and Ram Narain Mistry pleaded guilty and was convicted during the course of the trial. True it is that according to the decision of this Court in (2) Sita Raut and others V. The State (1965 B.L.J.R. 169) it bas to be held that the proceeding before framing of the charge was also a part of the trial. But nevertheless I do not see any logic in the contention that there is distinction between a conviction on plea of guilt made before the joint trial commenced or made during the trial. The fact remains that by Such conviction and sentence Ram Narain Mistry ipso facto ceased to be an accused in the case and it cannot be said that he continues to be an accused simply because of the fact that the joint trial had started before he pleaded guilty even though his plea was I accepted and he was convicted and sentenced completely. 6. In this connection, I would like to quote a passage from Section 1357 of Taylor on Evidence, wherein the circumstance in which an accused can be called as a witness against the co-accused have been indicated ;- "...... whenever, therefore, it becomes necessary to obtain the testimony of a defendant in a criminal as against his co-defendants, the proper course-unless he has pleaded guilty on his arraignment and is, therefore, not given in charge to the jury-in either to enter a nolle prosequi or to apply for a verdict of acquittal before opening the case, though the court, in its discretion, ' will direct an acquittal either during the progress or at the termination of the inquiry if no evidence has been given inculpating the party who is sought to be made a witness. Nothing short of a formal judgment or a plea of guilt can, however, be considered as, for this purpose, an end of the matter. Nothing short of a formal judgment or a plea of guilt can, however, be considered as, for this purpose, an end of the matter. For instance, in general separate trials being ordered will not suffice. As soon, however, as an end has been legally and effectually put to the case against him, a prisoner becomes competent to testify, either for the Crown, or for his former codefendants... ..." It is useful to refer to a Fun Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in (3) Harihar Sinha and ors. V. The Emperor (40 Calcutta Weekly Notes 876). The question referred to the Full Bench was "whether the court may consent to the Public Prosecutor withdrawing from the prosecution of any person under the provision of Section 494(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of obtaining that person's evidence in that case". That was a trial of warrant case by the Magistrate. It was before framing of the charge that the Public Prosecutor applied for the discharge of an accused under Section 494, so that he might give evidence in the case. On a review of various decisions, the court expressed opinion that the answer to the question should be in affirmative. Among the decisions which were relied upon was one in Babu Singh V. Emperor (I.L.R. 33 Calcutta 1353) where it was held that the possibility to examine a witness on oath against the persons who are brought before the court on the same indictment may cease on the withdrawal of the indictment against him. 7. Hence, I am of the opinion, that when the case against a person who is being prosecuted jointly with other person is put to an end either by withdrawal of the case as against him or by his discharge, or conviction or acquittal, he becomes competent to be a witness for I the prosecution in the trial against his Co-accused. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the case against Ram Narain Mistry has not terminated completely, inasmuch as an appeal against his conviction and sentence is pending, and as such till the disposal of that appeal, in no case he can be examined as a witness in the trial. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the case against Ram Narain Mistry has not terminated completely, inasmuch as an appeal against his conviction and sentence is pending, and as such till the disposal of that appeal, in no case he can be examined as a witness in the trial. In this connection he has cited a decision in (4) Queen-Empress V. Subbayya (I.L.R. 12 Madras 451) wherein it has been held that an appeal is a continuation of the case. It is not necessary to consider this aspect of the argument, inasmuch as there is nothing in the brief to show that any such appeal is pending. Further, appeal is considered as a continuation of the case for particular purposes. It has not the effect of making the convicted person an accused in the joint trial when he has ceased to be so on account of his conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. 9. The result is that the revision fails and the same is dismissed. Petition rejected.