JUDGMENT H.C.P. Tripathi, J. - Samthar was formerly the capital of an Indian State which merged with the Union in January, 1950. It appears, before merger the town of Samthar had some sort of a Municipal Board for rendering service to its residents. After the merger the town of Samthar was declared a Notified Area and its administration was taken over by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Moth (District Jhansi) , who was appointed as an Administrator under Section 333 of the U.P. Municipalities Act as applied to Notified Areas. As the Notified Area Committee had till then not been constituted, he continued to exercise powers of the Notified Area Committee pending its establishment presumably under the aforesaid section of the Municipalities Act. 2. From the averments made by the parties in their affidavits, it appears that there is a large strip of open land belonging to the Notified Area which was formerly held by the Samthar Municipal Board in which a market is held for the sale and purchase of grains. This market is managed by the Notified Area which regulates the transactions of sale and purchase in accordance with its bye-laws framed in the year 1952 (Annexure A to the writ petition) . These bye-laws, inter alia, provide for charging weighment dues at the rate of Rs. 119/- per cent on the sales to be realised in equal proportions from the seller and the buyer. It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the Notified Area has been realising such clues since the promulgation of the bye-laws in the year 1952. 3. The validity of the aforesaid bye-laws and the authority of the sub-divisional Magistrate acting for the Notified Area to charge such dues was challenged by the respondent by filing a writ petition, inter alia. in the assertion that the bye-laws had not been promulgated in accordance with law, that they had not been sanctioned by the Prescribed Authority namely, the Commissioner and that they were in the nature of a tax which the Notified Area was wholly incompetent to levy. The learned single judge, who heard the petition, reached the conclusion that the impugned bye-laws authorising the levy of the dues as referred to above had not been confirmed by the Prescribed Authority as envisage under Section 301 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and as such they were wholly illegal. The learned single judge, who heard the petition, reached the conclusion that the impugned bye-laws authorising the levy of the dues as referred to above had not been confirmed by the Prescribed Authority as envisage under Section 301 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and as such they were wholly illegal. The learned judge was of the opinion that the District Magistrate had no authority to sanction those bye-laws and. therefore, "the realisation of any fee or tax on the basis of such a bye-law is not warranted." Accordingly he allowed the Writ petition with costs. The present appeal is directed against the aforesaid order. 4. Shri V.N. Khare, learned counsel for the appellants, has argued that the imposition of this levy was not in the nature of a tax but a fee under Section 293 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, as applicable to the Notified Areas, that the bye law authorising imposition of such a fee was valid inasmuch as it had been sanctioned by the District Magistrate, who had been appointed as the Prescribed Authority by the State Government in exercise of its powers under clause (ii) of sub-sec. (17) of Section 2 of the said Act and that the contrary finding arrived at by the learned single judge was erroneous in law. The learned counsel in this connection has invited our attention to the provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 293 as applicable to the Notified Areas. He has urged that the bye-laws in terms indicate that while framing them the authority had in view not only Section 293 (i) but also Section 293 (ii) in view inasmuch as it has been provided therein that the aforesaid dues shall be realisable in the manner provided by Chapter VI of the U.P. Municipalities Act as applied to the Notified Areas learned counsel contends that by using the land of the Notified Area for the purposes of transacting their business both the seller and the buyer are liable to pay the aforesaid dues as provided in the bye-laws. 5. 5. Shri S.N. Kacker learned counsel for the respondents has, however, strenuously contended that the notification issued by the State Government on January 18, 1952 appointing the District Magistrate as the Prescribed Authority for the aforesaid Notified Area is only for specified purposes and it does not confer on him the powers to frame bye-laws for the purpose of realising weightment dues. Learned counsel has argued that in view of the provisions of Section 2 (7) (ii) of the said Act the words "Prescribed Authority" in the instant case must mean the Commissioner as the District Magistrate has not been appointed on all purpose Prescribed Authority within the meaning of the Act. Only certain specific powers have been delegated to him. The other contention raised by the learned counsel is that the aforesaid weighment dues are in the nature of a tax as they have no co-relation with the service rendered by the Notified Area to those who transact their business on its land and as the Notified Area is not competent to impose any tax within its area without its having been notified in the Government Gazette and as no such notification had admittedly been issued, the levy is wholly illegal. 6. Having given our consideration to the respective contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the appointment of the District Magistrate as the Prescribed Authority for Samthar Notified Area by the Notification dated June 18, 1952 is valid and he can exercise all those powers which a Prescribed Authority could exercise under the aforesaid notification. 7. Sub-section (17) of Section 2 reads : "Prescribed Authority means an officer or a body corporate appointed by the State Government in this behalf by notification in the Official Gazette, and, if no such officer or body corporate is appointed, the Commissioner." In terms, therefore, Sec. 2 (17) provides that the Commissioner shall be the Prescribed Authority only in the event of an officer or a body corporate not having been appointed as such by the State Government. It is significant to note that in the definition of the Prescribed Authority the article `an' has been used before the word `officer' and `A' before "body corporate" which, we think, indicate the intention of the legislature that there could be only one Prescribed Authority for the Notified Area. It is significant to note that in the definition of the Prescribed Authority the article `an' has been used before the word `officer' and `A' before "body corporate" which, we think, indicate the intention of the legislature that there could be only one Prescribed Authority for the Notified Area. The presence of more than one Prescribed Authority may create mutual conflicts, disputes about over-lapping powers and consequent inconvenience to all concerned. Accordingly we are of opinion that there can be only one Prescribed Authority. 8. In the light of this construction we shall now read the Government notification dated June 18, 1952, It reads :- "In supersession of the notification mentioned in the margin and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 327 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, as applied to Notified Area in U.P. under Notification No. UO 350/XI-118-N. 50 dated April 17, 1952, the Governor is pleased to delegate to the Prescribed Authority, the powers mentioned below, and to appoint in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (ii) of sub-sec. (17) of Section 2 of the said Act as applied to Notified Areas under the said Notification dated April 17, 1952, the District Magistrate as the Prescribed Authority for the purposes of exercising these powers in respect of notified areas within his jurisdiction. (1) Power to apply or adapt under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 33 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 to any notified area the provisions of any section of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 or of any Act which may be applied to any Municipality or part of such section subject to such restrictions and modifications if any as he may think fit. (2) Power under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 338 of the said Municipalities Act to impose tax which might be imposed therein if the said area were a municipality; (3) Power under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 338 of the said Municipalities Act to apply or adapt to any notified area any rule in force or which can be imposed in a municipality under the provisions of the said Act or of any Act which may be applied to any municipality subject to such restrictions and modifications, if any as he may think fit." 9. The notification is drawn up in a slovenly manner without any regard for sequence and elegance. The notification is drawn up in a slovenly manner without any regard for sequence and elegance. While powers are delegated to the Prescribed Authority by the first part of the notification, the Prescribed Authority is designated by the second part of it. Accordingly it is necessary to carefully scan the language of the notification to discover its true stress and sense. 10. The first part of the notification delegates the three powers mentioned in the notification to the Prescribed Authority. The second part constitutes the District Magistrate as the Prescribed Authority. As the District Magistrate exercises powers in a limited territorial area, the end phrase `for the purposes of exercising these powers in respect of notified area, within his jurisdiction' is intended to define his territorial jurisdiction as the Prescribed Authority. It is not a limitation on his powers as the Prescribed Authority. The stress is not, on qualification but on the geography of powers. This sense accords with the provisions of Section 2 (17) as construed by us. 11. The bye-laws were framed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate as the Administrator of the Notified Area and approved by the District Magistrate as the Prescribed Authority. Accordingly they are valid. 12. The question remains whether the dues charged under the aforesaid bye-laws are in the nature of a tax or fee. There can be no doubt that by maintaining a strip of land for being used by the whole sale dealers and customers for entering into transactions of sale and purchase of grain, and by providing for the purpose licensed weighment and other Municipal services, the Notified Area is entitled to charge a fee for the same. In case the aforesaid dealers and customers are not satisfied with the services rendered by the Notified Area, it is open to them to discontinue going there and using its land for the aforesaid purpose. Section 293 provides :- "The Board may charge fees to be fixed by bye-law or by public auction or by agreement, for the use or occupation of any immovable property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Board . ........................" It is admitted that the land which is used by the respondent vests in the Notified Area. It is also undisputed that the respondent uses it for commercial transactions of sale and purchase. ........................" It is admitted that the land which is used by the respondent vests in the Notified Area. It is also undisputed that the respondent uses it for commercial transactions of sale and purchase. He will therefore, be deemed to use it by an agreement with the Notified Area and in this view of the matter also he is liable to pay the fee imposed under the bye-laws. The service-fee corelation does not, in our judgment, qualify Section 293, for the fee may be settled not only by a bye-law but also by agreement, and more importantly by public auction. 13. For imposition of a fee a notification in the Government Gazette is not necessary. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate acting for the Notified Area was quite competent to frame the bye-laws and to enforce them with the approval of the District Magistrate who was the Prescribed Authority. 14. In this view of the matter. we are of opinion that the challenge raised to the validity of the bye-laws by the respondent has no force. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs, the judgment of the learned single judge is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed.