JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This judgment shall govern Writ Petitions Nos. 1205, 1255 to 1261, 1263 to 1267, 1310 to 1322, 1352 to 1355, 1379, 1389 to 1394, 1418, 464, 1540, 1552, 1636, 1644, 1645, 1747, 1750, 1751, 1778, 1838, 1839, 1850, 1851, 1885, 1889, 2174, 2290, 2321, 2543, 2648, 3021, 3351, 3461, 3619, 4036, 4103, 4104, 4174, 4190, 42I5, 4299, 4473, 4474, and 4651 of 1969 and 193, 372, 555, 826, 1049, 1264, 1620, 1989, 1990, 1527, 3025 and 3026 of 1970, to challenge the orders of eviction passed against the petitioners from subisidized labour colonies. The petitioners can, briefly speaking, be divided into three categories: one, who are rank trespassers and are not making claim through the allottees; the second category is of allottees still in possession though the order at allotment has been cancelled. The third category is of persons to whom the accommodation had not been allotted, but appear to have been put in possession by the original allottees. For the appreciation of the matters in issue it shall be proper to give hereinbelow the past history including the circumstances in which the construction of subsidised labour colonies was taken up. 2. As a result of the deliberations of the Indian Labour Conference, it was decided to formulate a Scheme with two important ingredients, i.e., grant of subsidy and a long-term loan at a reasonable rate of interest for housing the Industrial workers, Accordingly, in September, 1952 the Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial workers was formulated by the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply, Government of India, which envisaged the grant of financial assistance to State Governments, Statutory Housing Boards, Cooperative Housing Associations of Industrial workers and Private Industrial employers. Under this Scheme the Central Government took upon itself the responsibility for providing 100 per cent finances, out of which 50 per cent was outright subsidy and the balance was by way of long-term interest bearing loan to State Government to enable them to build houses for eligible categories of Industrial workers governed by the Factories Act, 1948. 3. The Government of Uttar Pradesh so constructed single room or double room houses in different places in the State under the above Scheme for Industrial workers. 3. The Government of Uttar Pradesh so constructed single room or double room houses in different places in the State under the above Scheme for Industrial workers. For the due administration, control and management of these houses the State Legislature enacted the U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955 (U.P. Act No. XXIII of 1955), to be referred hereinafter as the Act of 1955, giving power to the Housing Commissioner (Labour Commissioner) to manage the houses built under the Industrial Housing Scheme. Under the rule-making power the Government of Uttar Pradesh made the U.P. Industrial Housing Rules, 1959. The houses were to be allotted to Industrial Workers and the allottees could remain in occupation on payment of rent, though, in case of sufficient number of industrial workers not being available for occupation of the houses, they could be allotted to non-industrial workers on a short term basis on payment of economic rent. 4. The petitioners belong to three categories whose possession is now clearly without permission. The first category is of persons who are alleged to have wrongfully occupied the quarters without any right; the second is of those who are no longer entitled to occupy the same and the third of those who have no right to remain in occupation and stand in the same category as trespassers. All the petitioners are thus persons who are in wrongful possession of the houses. 5. The learned Standing Counsel raised a preliminary objection to numerous persons joining as petitioners in the same Writ Petition even though separate notices of eviction were served upon them. Considering that a common question of law has been raised in the Writ Petitions, no useful purpose shall be served by entertaining the Writ Petitions in respect of a few persons only. In case the provisions of the various enactments are declared to he valid or the Court declines to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226, none of the petitioners shall be entitled to any relief; but if the step taken for eviction is declared invalid and the order of eviction is quashed, say, in the case of one petitioner of each case, the others shall be in a position to claim benefit of the finding so recorded. As no useful purpose shall be served by recording a finding on the preliminary objection raised by the Standing Counsel, this Court is leaving this question open to be raised in another proceeding. 6. In all these cases the notice for eviction was even by the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, who is the Competent Authority under Section 7 of the U.P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952. This Act shall hereinafter be referred to as the Act of 1952. The validity of both the Acts has been challenged before me and at the same time it is contended that the Additional District Magistrate had no power to take steps for eviction. The points raised can be better understood by understanding the material provisions of the two Acts and also the changes introduced by the recent Amending Act. 7. The Act of 1952 was meant to apply to all the "Government premises" as defined in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act, that is, to any building or part of the building belonging to, owned, held, requisitioned or taken on lease by the State Government. The Act of 1955 was, however, enacted when it was decided to construct subsidised labour colonies. Provision was made therein for appointment of a Housing Commissioner and also for other steps necessary for the due administration and management of such houses. Sec. 7 of the Act of 1952 empowered the Competent Authority to evict a person from Government premises, while under Section 21 of the Act of 1955 the Housing Commissioner could take such steps for eviction on grounds which are not necessarily the same as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act of 1952. The order of the Competent Authority, is, under Section 8 of the Act of 1952, appealable to the District judge, while under Section 22 of the Act of 1955 an appeal lies to the State Government. 8. When a person wrongfully occupies the house or the allottee does not vacate the accommodation in spite of the cancellation of the order of allotment, the Housing Commissioner starts proceeding under Section 21 of the Act of 1955 for eviction of such person. 8. When a person wrongfully occupies the house or the allottee does not vacate the accommodation in spite of the cancellation of the order of allotment, the Housing Commissioner starts proceeding under Section 21 of the Act of 1955 for eviction of such person. The notice of eviction issued by the Housing Commissioner was, in the past, challenged by many persons; and one of the Writ Petitions No. 2948 of 1960 Ram Gopal Gupta v. Assistant Housing Commissioner, 1968 A.L.J. 339 (decided on September 12, 1967), came up for hearing before a Full Bench of this Court. Sec. 21 of the Act of 1955 was found to contravene Article 14 of the Constitution and was, therefore, declared void. Faced with the difficulty that no action for eviction could be taken under the Act of 1955, the Competent Authority under the Act of 1952, namely, the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, was moved and he issued the present notices under Section 7 of that Act. These notices have again been challenged in the present connected Writ Petitions. 9. During the pendency of these Writ Petitions the State Legislature enacted the U.P. Public Land and Premises Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970, substantially amending three enactments, two of which are the aforementioned Acts of 1952 and 1955. This Act, received the assent of the President on August 14, 1970, and was published in the Extraordinary Gazette of August 19, 1970. Under the U.P. Public Land and Premises Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970, Sec. 7 of the Act of 1952 was substituted by a similar provision, and Sec. 15-A was incorporated to exclude suits for the recovery of arrears of rent eviction from such premises and assessment or recovery of damages for use or occupation of such premises from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Sec. 15-A was so inserted to get over the legal defect pointed out by the Full Bench of this Court, the ground on which Section 21 of the Act of 1955 was declared void. The Act of 1955 was also amended on similar lines. Sec. 21 was substituted by another similar provision and Sec. 21-A was inserted to exclude such suits from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In addition, a validation clause was incorporated in Section 33 of the Amending Act. 10. They were Secs. The Act of 1955 was also amended on similar lines. Sec. 21 was substituted by another similar provision and Sec. 21-A was inserted to exclude such suits from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In addition, a validation clause was incorporated in Section 33 of the Amending Act. 10. They were Secs. 15-A of the Act of 1952 and 24-A of the Act of 1955 which were given a retrospective effect by laying down that these sections shall be deemed always to have been inserted. Substituted Section 7 of the Act of 1952 and substituted Section 21 of the Act of 1952 were not given a retrospective effect. 11. Considering that the legislature has the power to make a law retrospectively, Sec. 15-A of the Act of 1952 and Sec. 24-A of the Act of 1955 shall be within its competence and it can he assumed that even though inserted under the Amending Act of 1970, they existed from the very beginning; but when Section 7 of the Act of 1952 and Section 21 of the Act of 1955 were not given a retrospective effect, the amended sections will apply from August 14, 1970, and the unamended ones during the earlier period. 12. It may, however, be mentioned that there has been no major change in these sections-Sec. 7 of the Act of 1952 and Section 21 of the Act of 1955. Whatever changes were introduced were to clarify the procedure so that there may be no violation of the principles of natural justice. Original Section 7 of the Act of 1952 contemplated a notice of eviction and a final order for eviction after consideration of any objection, if made by the person served with a notice of eviction. Consequently, the Competent Authority could take action under Section 7 on being satisfied that the person was liable to eviction, but the final order of eviction under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 was to be passed after the person in unauthorized occupation had an opportunity to make the objection. Therefore, even though Section 7 of the Act of 1952 had not been worded very clearly, still it could not be said that the section enabled the Competent Authority to violate the principles of natural justice and evict a person without giving him a hearing. 13. Old Section 21 of the Act of 1955 made no provision for a show cause notice. 13. Old Section 21 of the Act of 1955 made no provision for a show cause notice. It is not necessary that the legislature must make an exhaustive provision as to the procedure to be followed by the authority. The actual procedure to be followed can be left at the discretion of that authority. In such circumstances, he shall have to ensure that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and no order is passed without giving a hearing to the person likely to be affected by that order. Keeping these principles in mind it cannot be said that sub-sec. (I) of Section 21 of the Act of 1955 enabled the Housing Commissioner to act arbitrarily or to violate the principles of natural justice. In the circumstances, Sec. 21 (1) shall not be invalid; but if the authority acts arbitrarily, or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice, his order can be quashed. In other words, as a result of the incorporation of Sec. 15-A in the Act of 1952 and Sec. 24-A in the Act of 1955, former Secs. 7 and 21, respectively, became valid, though, as originally drafted, were invalid and ineffective. 14. There was some argument at the Bar as to the validity of the amendments made to Section 7 of the Act of 1952 and Section 21 of the Act of 1955. It is contended that the above amendments were ineffective and can be treated as still born or dead and there can be no amendment of a section which is void or still born. It is further suggested that it was necessary for the legislature to re-enact the law. It is not necessary to go deeper into the question as the matter stands at rest by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Mysore v. D. Achiah Chetty, A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 477. In that case the enactment prior to the commencement of the Validating Act, which was given a retrospective effect, was considered to be discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution; but as a result of the Validating Act, the provision was held to be valid. It was further observed that the discrimination previously existing could be removed by the legislature having power to create a single procedure out of two. The same rule can be applied to the present case. 15. It was further observed that the discrimination previously existing could be removed by the legislature having power to create a single procedure out of two. The same rule can be applied to the present case. 15. The Full Bench of this Court had declared Section 21 of the Act of 1955 to be void because it was open to the authority either to seek relief before the Civil Court, or to take summary steps under this provision. There then existed two procedures for the ejectment of a trespasser or person having no right to remand in occupation. As a result of incorporation of Secs. 15-A and 24-A in the two Acts, one of the two procedures is no longer available and the State can seek relief under the Act of 1952 or the Act of 1955, but not before the Civil Court. Hence the validity of Section 7 of the Act of 1952 and Section 21 of the Act of 1955 shall have to be judged on the basis of the law which shall be deemed to have been in existence from the very beginning, in other words, as if Sec. 15-A of the Act of 1952 and Sec. 24-A of the Act of 1955 existed from the date of commencement of these Acts. 16. On considering the two Acts of 1952 and 1955 separately, both shall be deemed to be valid even though prior to the amendment, both Section 7 of the Act of 1952 and Section 21 of the Act of 1955 were invalid. There is the decision of the Full Bench with regard to Section 21 of the Act of 1955 and on similar grounds Section 7 of the Act of 1952 would have been invalid and ineffective. 17. The effect of the two Acts being in existence at the same time has now to be considered. The Act of 1952 applies to Government premises. The present subsidised labour colonies are owned by the State Government, and consequently would also be Government premises as contemplated by Section 2 (c) of the Act of 1952. Hence persons in occupation of the subsidised labour colonies can be evicted by the Competent Authority under Section 7 of the Act of 1952. They can also be evicted by the Housing Commissioner under Section 21 of the Act of 1955. Hence persons in occupation of the subsidised labour colonies can be evicted by the Competent Authority under Section 7 of the Act of 1952. They can also be evicted by the Housing Commissioner under Section 21 of the Act of 1955. Under amended Section 21 the Labour Commissioner has the jurisdiction to take steps of eviction. Two questions arise for consideration: (1) Does the Act of 1955 repeal by implication the provisions of the Act of 1952 in respect of the houses referred to in Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1955 ? (2) If both the Acts co-exist, will the steps taken under Section 7 of the Act of 1952 be valid ? 18. The expression "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law" has been used not only in Section 16 of the Act of 1952 but also in Section 21 (1) of the Act of 1955. When both the enactments contain a non obstanta clause both can, as observed in Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 1602 be deemed to co-exist. There are, however, certain special features of the Act of 1955 which can suggest that the intention of the legislature was that steps for eviction from the subsidised labour colonies be taken by the Housing Commissioner only. In such a case, the petitioners shall not be liable to eviction under Section 7 of the Act of 1952: they can be ejected on action being taken under Section 21 of the Act of 1955. In all the present cases the notice of eviction was served on the petitioners under Section 7 of the Act of 1952, and not under Section 21 of the Act of 1955. Therefore, the notices of eviction shall be invalid and none of the petitioners shall be liable to ejectment on the basis of such notices. 19. As a similar view can be expressed on consideration of the other allied question, it is not necessary for this Court to record a final opinion as to whether the Act of 1955 impliedly repeals the Act of 1952 in so far as eviction from subsidised labour colonies is concerned. 20. 19. As a similar view can be expressed on consideration of the other allied question, it is not necessary for this Court to record a final opinion as to whether the Act of 1955 impliedly repeals the Act of 1952 in so far as eviction from subsidised labour colonies is concerned. 20. In case both the Acts co-exist it shall be open to the Competent Authority to evict a person under Section 7 of the Act of 1952, and to the Housing Commissioner to evict the same person from the same building under Section 21 of the Act of 1955. Unless the Act of 1955 repeals by implication the Act of 1952, there shall, in substance be no guiding principle to enable the authority to decide whether to take steps under the Act of 1952 or under the Act of 1955. The preamble of the Act of 1952 is "to provide for collection of rents from persons in occupation of Government premises and for eviction from such premises of persons continuing to occupy the same without authority". Sec. 3 makes a provision for cancellation of allotment, Sec. 4 for a notice of demand of rents unpaid, Sec. 6 for recovery of rent, Sec. 7 for steps for eviction and Section 8 gives power to the aggrieved party to appeal to the District judge against any order of the Competent Authority passed under Section 7 (2) of this Act. Under Section 9 the District judge has been given the power to stay the enforcement of the order of eviction issued under Section 7 for such period and on such conditions as he thinks fit. Sec. 12 empowers the Competent Authority to recover damages. 21. The Act of 1955, however, has a simpler preamble laying down that it was expedient "to provide and set up an authority to administer and manage such house." The preamble cannot, in any way, restrict the scope of the enactment. The object of the enactment and the intention of the legislature have to be judged more from the provisions of the enactment than from the preamble. The preamble can to the most, explain the provisions, but cannot cut down or reduce the scope of what has been provided in the Act. Sec. 21 enables the Housing Commissioner to evict persons in wrongful occupation of houses as contemplated by Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1955. The preamble can to the most, explain the provisions, but cannot cut down or reduce the scope of what has been provided in the Act. Sec. 21 enables the Housing Commissioner to evict persons in wrongful occupation of houses as contemplated by Section 3 (1) of the Act of 1955. Eviction of persons not authorised to remain in occupation has thus been treated as a part of the administration or management of the houses. It shall thus be found that both the Acts of 1952 and 1955 cover the made of eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation, whether from the very beginning or after the cancellation of allotment. 22. Even though both the enactments cover one common ground, namely, eviction of unauthorized persons, no guiding principle has been laid down by the legislature when action shall be taken under the Act of 1952, and not under the Act of 1955, and vice versa. If it is found that from the point of view of the person in occupation, remedy under one Act will cause greater hardship to him, that is, is more onerous, action taken under that Act must be declared to be discriminatory. 23. Ordinarily the provision for an appeal to the District Judge, and not to the State Government, is considered to be more beneficial to an aggrieved person, evidently because the District judge, being more experienced and conversant with the law, can adjudicate upon the matters in dispute better than the executive; but the same opinion cannot be formed where the order passed is not purely judicial but is either quasi judicial or is mixed with administrative considerations. When the question of eviction is raised before the District Judge in appeal, he shall merely consider the legality and propriety of the order, and not whether on other considerations the person be or be not evicted from the house. Where the Competent Authority does not commit any illegality and the findings recorded are proper, the District judge shall have no option except to dismiss the appeal; but where allotment to non-industrial workers is possible and the Housing Commissioner or the State Government can make a short term allotment in favour of a non-Industrial worker, both the Housing Commissioner and the State Government may not order immediate eviction but may direct that the non-Industrial worker can remain in occupation for a short period on payment of economic rent. 24. 24. An order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 7 of the Act of 1952 was appealable to the District judge, while an appeal against the order of the Housing Commissioner lay before the State Government. Even after the amendment of the Acts of 1952 and 1955 appeals he before the same authorities, though the order under Section 21 of the Act of 1955 can be passed by the Labour Commissioner. 25. In the recent past the legislature has amended many enactments to provide for an appeal before the District judge or before the Civil Court wherever a question of title was involved. This was evidently to ensure that questions of title are decided by an authority in whom the public has full confidence. Even then the Act of 1955 still retains a provision for appeal to the State Government, while the Act of 1952 provides for an appeal to the District Judge. From this difference it can be assumed that the legislature had in mind the material factor that while deciding the appeal under the Act of 1955, other considerations, not necessarily purely judicial, can be taken into consideration while deciding whether the occupant be evicted or not from the house. 26. In the above circumstances, the provision for the appeal to the District Judge, and not, to the State Government, would be mere onerous to the occupant. In Section 7 of the Act of 1952 there is no provision like Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1955. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 21 enables the occupant to pay the arrears of rent or other charges, or to comply with the terms contravened by him, within a period of one month or such longer time as the Housing Commissioner may allow, to avoid the enforcement of the order of eviction. In a proceeding taken under the Act of 1952 the order of eviction cannot be set aside, or not enforced, on payment of the arrears of rent or other charges, or compliance of the terms contravened by him. A proceeding under the Act of 1955 is thus more beneficial to the occupant than if proceedings for eviction are taken under the Act of 1952. It is true that the benefit of sub-sec. A proceeding under the Act of 1955 is thus more beneficial to the occupant than if proceedings for eviction are taken under the Act of 1952. It is true that the benefit of sub-sec. (3) of Section 21 can be taken only by the allottees whose order of allotment has been cancelled, or who have failed to pay the rent and other charges, or have contravened the terms of allotment; but while recording a finding as to the validity of the enactment one must keep in mind all the cases that may come up under that enactment. It will not be corrent for this Court to say that a suit in respect of a house covered by Section 3 of the Act of 1955 can lie before the Competent Authority under Section 7 of the Act of 1952, if the allottee has sub-let the whole or any part of the house, or has ceased to be an industrial worker, and not if his ejectment was sought for on the ground of non-payment of rent and other charges, or for contravention of the terms of the allotment. 27. Keeping the above factors in mind, I am of opinion that from the point of view of an occupant a proceeding under the Act of 1952 is more drastic than a proceeding under the Act of 1955. The legislature having not laid down any guiding principle in what circumstances action can be taken under the Act or 1952, the proceedings taken under the Act of 1952 in respect of houses covered by Section 3 of the Act of 1955, must be declared to be invalid. It was virtually on this ground that the Supreme Court had declared the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, to be violative of Article 14 see Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1581. 28. To sum up, in the absence of any guiding principle proceedings taken under Section 7 of the U.P. Government Premises (Rent, Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952, for the eviction of persons wrongfully occupying houses in subsidised labour colonies cannot be regarded to be valid. It has, however, to be considered whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should quash the proceedings or refuse to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 29. It has, however, to be considered whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should quash the proceedings or refuse to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. 29. As already indicated above, the petitioners belong to three categories, two being of rank trespassers keeping in mind that the allottees have no power to sub-let the accommodation. None of the petitioners have challenged the order of cancellation of allotment. Consequently, for purposes of these Writ Petitions, they stand in the category of trespassers or persons having no right to remain in occupation. Briefly speaking, therefore, all the petitioners are either trespassers from the very beginning or are persons who have no right to remain in occupation. 30. Whether a person having no right, not even a semblance of right, can be granted any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 685. It was recognised that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 was wider in the sense that a writ or an appropriate order could be issued in favour of a party for any other purpose. However, it was necessary that the party should have a right and the said right was illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right was thus regarded to be the foundation of a petition under Article 226. The right can be a legal one or it may be one which has the semblance of a recognised right to remain in possession. In the instant cases all the petitioners are trespassers or are those who are now in wrongful possession. None of them has any right to remain in possession of the accommodation. As the order of cancellation of allotment has not been challenged, none of them can be said to have any semblance of a right. In the circumstances, they cannot be afforded a relief under Article 226. 31. The question was also considered by this Court in Balbir Singh v. State, Special Appeal No. 1007 of 1969 decided on 19-11-1969, and no relief was granted to a party who had no right to remain in possession after the expiry of the period of lease. In the circumstances, they cannot be afforded a relief under Article 226. 31. The question was also considered by this Court in Balbir Singh v. State, Special Appeal No. 1007 of 1969 decided on 19-11-1969, and no relief was granted to a party who had no right to remain in possession after the expiry of the period of lease. It is true that the facts of this case are somewhat different, but I find no reason to disagree with the proposition of law laid down therein. In other words, the petitioners have no right to a relief under Article 226 even though steps for eviction are not being taken by a proper authority. 32. It is strongly contended on behalf of the petitioners that they had, on the basis of possession, a possessory right and they could easily move the High Court for a relief under Article 226 to enforce this right. It is also contended that the Courts of law should not approve of dispossession of a person except in due course of law and should, therefore, afford relief to a trespasser who is being evicted by an authority having no power to order his eviction. Reliance has been placed upon certain decisions of this Court and of others to which I shall now make a reference. It may, however, be mentioned that all these cases can be distinguished on facts. They are cases where the petitioners had some semblance of a right, and not where he was a rank trespasser having no right to retain possession. 33. Nanak Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 Allahabad 165, is a case where the petitioners had, as alleged, occupied certain land in the district of Rampur with the consent and the authority of the State Government and their representative, the then Collector of Rampur. In Jagjit Singh v. District Magistrate, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad 486 the petitioner was in possession by virtue of the order of allotment dated 6-11-1952 of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In para. 17 Agarwala, J. with whom Mootham, C.J. was in agreement, has observed:- "In order to entitle the petitioner to claim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution .................. it is not necessary that he must show that he is the owner of the property in dispute. In para. 17 Agarwala, J. with whom Mootham, C.J. was in agreement, has observed:- "In order to entitle the petitioner to claim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution .................. it is not necessary that he must show that he is the owner of the property in dispute. It is enough for his purpose to show that he is lawfully in possession and that he is not liable to be evicted therefrom under the orders passed against him which he seeks to be quashed." It was in these circumstances that the possessory title was regarded as a good title for the purpose of enabling the Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Khushal Singh v. Rameshwar Dayal, A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 151 is also a case where the petitioner was in possession of the property under a right. The Privy Council case of Eshugbavi Eleke v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria, A.I.R. 1931 Privy Council 248 is where the appellant was taken into custody. It was in these circumstances that stress was laid on the execution to act in pursuance of the powers given to it by law, that is, it cannot act against or go beyond the law. 34. Both the question of possessory title and executive action being founded on law were considered in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 685, and it was held that long possession may give the person a legal right to protect his possession against third party, but not against the owner. The possessory title may be recognised in cases where the party, if dispossessed, can recover possession under Section 6 of the new Specific Relief Act. Section 6 clearly lays down that no relief can be granted against the Government. When the petitioners could not get a relief under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act in a suit before the Civil Court, they should not ordinarily be granted any relief in a proceeding under Article 226. In para. 13 their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered three reported decisions of the Hyderabad, Pepsu and Assam High Courts, in which stress was laid on the executive action being founded on law, evidently by virtue of Article 31 (1) of the Constitution; and held that this rule could not apply to a case of the present nature. 35. In para. 13 their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered three reported decisions of the Hyderabad, Pepsu and Assam High Courts, in which stress was laid on the executive action being founded on law, evidently by virtue of Article 31 (1) of the Constitution; and held that this rule could not apply to a case of the present nature. 35. The petitioners being trespassers cannot, therefore, be granted any relief, though it shall be open to them to move the Housing Commissioner to grant a short term temporary allotment on payment of economic rent for such period that no industrial worker is forthcoming to occupy the accommodation. 36. All the 86 Writ Petitions are hereby dismissed. Costs easy. Stay orders are vacated.