JUDGMENT O. P. Trivedi, J. - This writ petition has been filed by Sukhdeo Prasad Misra under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and concerns service matter. The petitioner's contention is that he entered service in the then East Indian Railways as a Porter on December 6, 1930. In May, 1930 he passed the Vernacular Final Examination and the date of birth in the certificate issued on passing the said examination was recorded as July 11, 1913. Subsequently, the petitioner passed the High School Examination also and in the certificate obtained for passing the said examination also his date of birth was mentioned as stated above. At the time the petitioner joined service there were no rules in force nor was there any practice in the East Indian Railways about compulsory minimum age for recruitment. The petitioner had not made a formal application to the said Railways before being appointed to the post of a porter and there was no occasion on which he may have given out his age as 21 years. Even a person of 16 years was then eligible for appointment to the said post. At the time of commencement of petitioner's service no service book concerning him was maintained and in the year 1940 for the first time he came to know that his date of birth in his service record was incorrectly entered as 9th December, 1909; whereupon the petitioner made a representation against it to the authorities to the effect that his date of birth was incorrectly and arbitrarily entered in the service book and prayed for its correction to 11th July, 1913. It is an admitted fact that this representation was made by the petitioner to the General Manager, East Indian Railways, on 5th July 1940, vide `Annexure-A' to the counter-affidavit. Again the petitioner made a representation for correction of his date of birth in the service record to the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad, on 16-5-1953. This representation was also rejected as appears from the letter of the Divisional Personnel Officer dated 9-6-1953 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) on the ground that his request for altering the recorded date of birth had been earlier rejected by the Deputy General Manager, Ex-East Indian Railways, Calcutta, in 1940 and it was decided that his age should be accepted as 21 years on 9-12-1930. He seems to have represented again to the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad on 5-8-1957 for the correction of his date of birth, which request was again turned down as appears from the letter of the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad dated 18-10-1957 (Annexure-5 of the Writ Petition) . This letter read : "You have already been replied through the S.M./C.H. vide this office letter of even no. dated 28-6-1957 that you have purposely `declared your age as 21 years on 9-12-1930 to obtain advantage of employment which would otherwise have been inadmissible had you declared your date of birth as 11-7-1913. No alteration is, therefore, permissible at this stage." 2. On 9-3-1961 the petitioner filed an appeal before the General Manager, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi (Annexure 6 of the Writ Petition) against the rejection by the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad, of his representation for correction of age by orders dated 9-6-1953, 1-10-1953 and 18-10-1957. Not having heard anything in his appeal the petitioner addressed a representation to the Chief Personnel Officer, Northern Railway, on 19th July, 1962 (Annexure 7 of the writ petition) for correction of his date of birth. Another letter dated 1-3-1963 was thereafter addressed by the petitioner to the Chief Personnel Officer, Northern Railway (Annexure 8 of the Writ Petition) enclosing therewith certain documents in support of his representation. Some original certificates which appear to have been demanded by the Senior Commercial Officer, Northern Railway, meanwhile were also sent by the petitioner through another letter addressed to the same officer on 11th January, 1963 (Annexure 9 of the writ petition) and on 25th January, 1966 another communication was addressed by the petitioner to the General Manager, Northern Railway, by way of reminder to his representation. His representation for change of date of birth was finally rejected by the General Manager, Northern Railway, vide letter of the Senior Commercial Officer, dated 24-3-1967 (Annexure 11 of the writ petition) . As this is one of the annexures for the quashing of which the petition contains a prayer it may be produced as under : "As advised by General Manager (P) Northern Railway, Headquarters Office, Baroda House, New Delhi vide his letter No. 936/808 (EVA) dated 9-3-1967 your case has been examined and it is regretted that your request for alteration of recorded date from 9-12-1909 to 11-7-1913 cannot be acceded to." 3. Thereafter the petitioner made representation by way of appeal to the Chairman, Railway Board, praying for change in his date of birth (vide Annexure 12 of the writ petition). This appeal was also rejected by the Railway Board as appears from Annexure 13 of the writ petition dated 23-8-1967 in the following terms : "The appeal of Shri S.D. Misra was duly considered by C. P. O. and rejected. There is no provision in the rules for an appeal to the Railway Board against the orders of the authority competent to permit alteration in date of birth." On 19-8-1967 the petitioner was intimated by the Senior Commercial Officer (vide Annexure 14 of the writ petition) that he is due to retire from service with effect from 8-12-1967 on attaining the age of superannuation and he was required to apply for leave preparatory to retirement if he so desired. The petitioner therefore prays for a writ of certiorari quashing Annexures 13 and 14 and for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite party, General Manager, Northern Railway, to forbear from giving effect to the impugned order of retirement and directing him to treat the petitioner as in service till he reached the age of superannuation and to allow him consequential emoluments and benefits of this service. It is also prayed that such other writ, direction or order may also be issued as in the circumstances of the case may be considered fit and proper by this Court. The ground of attack against the impugned orders is that they were issued in breach of rule 145 of the Railway Establishment Code; that there was breach of rules of natural justice because no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before issuing the order of retirement and the order was arbitrary and unreasonable. In the writ petition there was also a ground to the effect that the order of retirement was ultra vires having been issued by an authority who possessed no such power. 4. The petition is contested by the opposite-party. I have seen the affidavit accompanying the petition, counter-affidavit of the opposite-party as also the rejoinder affidavit. In the writ petition there was also a ground to the effect that the order of retirement was ultra vires having been issued by an authority who possessed no such power. 4. The petition is contested by the opposite-party. I have seen the affidavit accompanying the petition, counter-affidavit of the opposite-party as also the rejoinder affidavit. It is averred in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner had declared his age as 21 years on 9-12-1930 and therefore it was so entered in the service card and it is further averred that the petitioner had also affixed his thumb mark on the service card. In para 3 of the rejoinder affidavit no doubt the petitioner has contested having made any declaration to the effect that his age on 9-12-1930 was 21 years but it is not specifically denied that his service card, of which a true copy Annexure B was filed with the counter-affidavit, did not bear his thumb mark. The petitioner places reliance in the main on the provision contained in rule 145 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I. Rule145 (3) reads : "The date of birth as recorded in accordance with these rules shall be held to be binding and no alteration of such date shall ordinarily be permitted subsequently. The petitioner places reliance in the main on the provision contained in rule 145 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I. Rule145 (3) reads : "The date of birth as recorded in accordance with these rules shall be held to be binding and no alteration of such date shall ordinarily be permitted subsequently. It shall, however, be open to the President in the case of gazetted railway servant, and a General Manager in the case of a non-gazetted railway servant to cause the date of birth to be altered :- (i) where in his opinion it had been falsely stated by the railway servant to obtain an advantage otherwise in-admissible, provided that such alteration shall not result in the railway servant being retained in service longer than if the alteration had not been made, or (ii) where, in the case of illiterate staff, the General Manager is satisfied that a clerical error has occurred, or (iii) where a satisfactory explanation (which should ordinarily be submitted within a reasonable time after joining service) of the circumstances in which the wrong date came to be entered is furnished by the railway servant concerned, together with the statement of any previous attempts made to have the records amended, or (iv) where the request for an alteration of the recorded date of birth supported by a copy of school register and transfer certificate is made near the date of retirement, in which case the railway servant concerned till a decision is taken, may be given the benefit of doubt even if his recorded age is beyond 55 years, subject to the conditions that his work is satisfactory and he is physically fit to continue in service and that in the case of workshop or shed staff and staff on train passing, etc. they will be subject to periodical medical examination for physical fitness." It is clear on a reading of Rule 145 (3) that the date of birth as recorded in accordance with Rule 145 shall be held to be binding and no alteration of such date shall ordinarily be permitted. 5. The first submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the date of birth of the petitioner as entered in the service card, of which Annexure B of the counter affidavit is a copy, is not binding on him as the same was not recorded in accordance with the rules. 5. The first submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the date of birth of the petitioner as entered in the service card, of which Annexure B of the counter affidavit is a copy, is not binding on him as the same was not recorded in accordance with the rules. Under Rule 145 every person on entering railway service shall declare his date of birth which shall not differ from any declaration express or implied for any public purpose before entering railway service. There is a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that official acts were done regularly. This presumption is supported by the proved fact that the service card of the petitioner, of which Annexure B is a copy, was thumb marked by the petitioner, the petitioner having failed to refute the fact in an unqualified manner in the rejoinder affidavit. It follows therefore in view of clause (3) of Rule 145 that the date of birth of the petitioner recorded in the service card is binding and cannot ordinarily be altered unless the General Manager in the case of the petitioner, who is a non-gazetted railway servant, in his discretion liked to cause a change. It follows therefore that alteration in his date of birth could not be claimed by the petitioner as a matter of right and the General Manager was under no statutory or legal duty or obligation to accept his demand for alteration of age. A petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution lies only (1) where the petitioner has a clear and specific legal right to the relief demanded by him; (2) where there is duty imposed by law on the respondent, and (3) where such duty is of an imperative ministerial character and involved no judgment or discretion on the part of the respondent. In the case of Garlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. H. M. Jagtiani, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 315 it was observed that the grant of an order or writ of mandamus is, as a general rule, a matter for the discretion of the Court. In the case of Garlsbad Mineral Water Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. H. M. Jagtiani, A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta 315 it was observed that the grant of an order or writ of mandamus is, as a general rule, a matter for the discretion of the Court. Some of the conditions precedent to the issue of mandamus are (i) the applicant for a writ of mandamus must show that there resides in him a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party, against him the mandamus is sought and (ii) that there is no alternative specific remedy at law. Apart from this aspect of the matter, namely, that the petitioner had no legal right to secure an alteration in his date of birth from the opposite party, the same resting in his discretion, there is also another aspect which also shows that the petitioner has no case for certiorari or mandamus. He had first applied for alteration of his date of birth admittedly in 1940 before the General Manager, the then East Indian Railway. That representation was rejected by the General Manager. The petitioner then represented to the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad, for change of his date of birth and he also rejected the representation. He then applied to the General Manager, Northern Railway, who also rejected his prayer. It will appear that his representations for change of date of birth was made to the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad and to the General Manager, Northern Railway, after rejection of his earlier representation on this subject by the General Manager, the then East Indian Railway. After rejection of his first representation by the proper authority he had no right under the rules to make a second representation on the same subject before the Divisional Superintendent, or the General Manager, Northern Railway, and they were entitled to reject his second representation summarily on the ground that it was not maintainable after rejection of his earlier representation. The second representation could only be viewed as representation for review of the earlier representation by the General Manager,East Indian Railway, but the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad, or the General Manager, Northern Railway, could not review the order passed on the petitioner's representation by the General Manager, East Indian Railway as the latter had no power of review given to them by the rules. No court and muchless any authority has any power to review and set aside the order passed earlier by a competent authority unless such a power is expressly conferred by the Statute. In the case of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 641, the question arose before the Supreme Court whether the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act could review his previous order dismissing an application under Section 42 of the said Act. They answered this question in the negative and in that connection quoted with approval the observations of Lord Esher, M. R. in Drew v. Willis, 1891-1 Q.B. 450, in the following words : "No court (and I would add `no authority') has ........ a power of setting aside an order which has been properly made, unless it is given by statute." In Hessian v. Jones, 1914 2 K.B. 421, Bankes, J. pointed out that the court, under the statute, has no power to review an order deliberately made after argument and to entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view, to ultimately confirming or reversing it. In the case of Anantharaju Shetty v. Appu Hegade, A.I.R. 1919 Madras 244, Seshagiri Aiyar J. observed : "It is settled law that a case is not open to appeal unless the statute gives such a right. The power to review must also be given by the statute ....... There is at least as good reason for saying that such power should not be exercised unless the statute gives it, as for saying that another tribunal should not hear an appeal from the Trial Court unless such a power is given to it by statute." This being the position of law, the second representation of the petitioner was not maintainable and that is another reason why the petitioner has no basis in law for maintaining that he had a legal right to receive hearing of the representation by the General Manager and the Railway Board. In so far as the Railway Board is concerned it seems to have rightly rejected the petitioner's appeal on the ground that no appeal was maintainable before it from an order passed by the General Manager. In so far as the Railway Board is concerned it seems to have rightly rejected the petitioner's appeal on the ground that no appeal was maintainable before it from an order passed by the General Manager. In the circumstances the petitioner could not claim as a matter of right the hearing of his representation on alteration of age either by the General Manager, Northern Railway or by the Railway Board on merits. 6. As regards the plea that there was breach of principles of natural justice, there was no question of the petitioner being given an opportunity of hearing before passing of the impugned order on his representation by the Divisional Superintendent, Moradabad; the General Manager, Northern Railway or by the Railway Board because his point of view had already been placed before them by the petitioner in his representation and there was no question of any further opportunity being granted to him. In this connection a submission was also made to the effect that the order of the General Manager communicated in Annexure 11 was also violative of the principles of natural justice because it was not a speaking order. This submission also is lacking in merit in view of the circumstance that the second representation of the petitioner before the General Manager, Northern Railway, was not maintainable and was therefore liable to be summarily rejected in view of rejection of his earlier representation before the General Manager, the then East Indian Railway. In the circumstances it was not necessary for the General Manager, Northern Railway, to deal with the representation on merits and to state any reasons for rejecting the representation by Annexure 11. This ground also therefore fails. Nothing was shown in arguments to support the contention that the order of retirement was passed by a person who did not possess the necessary authority. The order of retirement cannot also be characterised as arbitrary in view of the rejection of the petitioner's representation for change of date of birth as recorded in his service card. 7. For the above reasons I find that there is no force in this petition. The petitioner is not entitled either to the issue of a writ of certiorari or mandamus or to any other relief. The petition is therefore dismissed with costs.