ORDER R.S. Pathak, J. - The petitioner was employed as a Fireman in the Northern Railway. He applied under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act for the payment of his wages in respect of the period October 24, 1962 to October 6, 1965. The claim was contested by the Railways Administration. The Payment of Wages Authority made an order dated October 6, 1965 directing the Railway Administration to pay a sum of Rs. 6,535.52 as wages along with compensation. Against that order the Railway Administration appealed. The Additional District Judge, Saharanpur by his order dated October 20, 1968 allowed the appeal in part in so far as he directed a sum of Rs. 1,903.70 only to be paid to the petitioner as wages in respect of the period January 28, 1965 to December 31, 1965 along with a sum of Rs. 951.85 as compensation. He held that the claim in respect of the period to January 28, 1965 was barred by time. Against that order the petitioner now prays for a writ in the nature of certiorari. 2. The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no jurisdiction in the Additional District Judge, under Section 17 of the Act to enter into the question whether a part of the claim was barred by time. It is pointed out that the appeal under Section 17 of the Act lay against a direction made under Section 15(3) and, it is said, the question whether an application under Section 15(2) is barred by limitation and the delay should be condoned is a matter disposed of under Section 15(2) and has nothing to do with the jurisdiction under Section 15(3). Reference was made by learned counsel for the petitioner to the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Prem Narain Amritlal Verma v. Divisional Traffic Manager, A.I.R. 1954 Bom 78 and Sitaram Ramcharan v. M. N. Nagrashna, A.I.R. 1954 Bom 537. Reliance was also placed on Mohd. Matin Kidwai v. District Executive Engineer, N. R. Rly., Izatnagar, AIR 1955 Allahabad 180. So far as the last case is concerned, it seems to me that it does not govern the point expressly raised in this case. Reliance was also placed on Mohd. Matin Kidwai v. District Executive Engineer, N. R. Rly., Izatnagar, AIR 1955 Allahabad 180. So far as the last case is concerned, it seems to me that it does not govern the point expressly raised in this case. As regards the decision of the Bombay High Court in Prem Narain Amritlal Verma, A.I.R. 1954 Bom 78 (supra) that case was expressly dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court in Divisional Supdt., Northern Rly., Allahabad v. Hukum Chand Jain, AIR 1967 Allahabad 459. In that case, the Division Bench clearly laid down that the question whether the delay in filing the application under Section 15(2) of the Act should or should not have been condoned was a matter which could be enquired into by the appellate authority in the appeal against the direction under Section 15(3). The decision in Sitaram Ramcharan, A.I.R. 1954 Bom 537 (supra) so far as it assists the contention of the petitioner, would also, for the same reason, have been dissented from if the attention of the Division Bench had been drawn to it. 3. The contention of the petitioner that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to enquire into the question whether the delay in filing the application under Section 15(3) should have been condoned is rejected. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner then attempted to show that the view taken by the Additional District Judge to the effect that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the application under Section 15 (2) is manifestly erroneous. After hearing learned counsel, it seems to me that there is no force in this contention either. The Additional District Judge has considered the matter on the merits and there is no manifest error of law in his consideration of that question. 5. The petition fails and is dismissed; but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.