JUDGMENT A.B.N. Sinha & Bahadur, JJ. The petitioner claiming to be the lessor in respect of stall no. 5 on municipal survey plot no. 424/4 of the Patna Municipal Corporation, having granted a lease for a period of two years beginning from 1st of July, 1967, filed an application purporting to be under Section 12(3) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the opposite party, the lessee, on 5th of July 1969, praying for a direction on the opposite party to deliver vacant possession of the said stall and also to pay the compensation for the period after the expiry of the lease on the ground of the expiry of the specified period of the lease. A notice of the application filed by the petitioner as aforesaid was served on the opposite party on 1st of August, 1969 and the date fixed for his appearance was 16th of August, 1969. The opposite party however, did not enter appearance was 16th of August, 1969. The learned Munsif passed an order on that date holding, that, in view of General Letter No. 3 of 1958, dated 3rd of November, 1958 issued from this Court, the petitioners application will be registered as a title suit, It is against this order that the petitioner has come up to this Court in revision. 2. It appears that when this case was placed before a learned single judge of this Court, the question whether the application was filed by the petitioner purporting to be under Section 12(3) of the Act was maintainable or not was debated at length, and it was for a decision of that question that the case was referred to a Division Bench. In our opinion, however, the question of the maintainability of the petitioner's application purporting to have been filed under Section 12(3) of the Act does not arise at the present stage; if and when the opposite party raises that question formally before the court below, the matter will have to be gone into. Accordingly, though the question was sought to be agitated before us as well, we do not think that a decision on that question is called for at the present stage. 3. Accordingly, though the question was sought to be agitated before us as well, we do not think that a decision on that question is called for at the present stage. 3. In our opinion, however, in passing the impugned order, the learned Mansif has lost sight of the provisions of Section 2 (3) of the Act, and has thus misdirected himself in holding that the application filed by the petitioner has to be registered as a title suit. General Letter No. 3 of 1958 dated 3rd of November, 1958 may have been issued by this Court for statistical purposes. But it is clear that the said General Letter cannot override the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 12 reads as under : "If the tenant fails to vacate the building - on the termination of the lease or as the case may be on the expiry of the period fixed by the Court under Sub-section (2), the Court shall, on an application by the landlord, pass an order for ejectment, which shall be executed as a decree and may further order that the tenant shall pay to the landlord such amount as may be determined by it as daily compensation." It is quite clear that the above provision contemplates an application by the landlord for an order for ejectment, and it is that order which has to be executed as a decree. On the scheme of Section 12 of the Act as a whole the reason for providing a summary remedy for eviction of a tenant is obvious. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 the tenant has to take the initiative of giving a notice to the landlord at least one month before the expiry of the period limited by the lease, of his intention for an extension of the period of the lease, subject to a maximum of one year. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides a remedy to the landlord who has received a notice to the above effect from the tenant and enables him to file an objection to the extension demanded by the tenant on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act or, for any other good and sufficient cause, to pray for terminating the lease on the expiry of the period limited thereby. In either case he has to file an application to the court within 15 days of the delivery of the notice from the tenant as contemplated by Sub-section (1) of Section 12. Thereupon, Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides that the court, after hearing the parties, may either terminate the lease or extend the same for such period as it might deem proper in the circumstances of the case. Under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 12, the extension even if approved of by the court, cannot be beyond the period permissible under Sub-section (1) namely, cannot be beyond one year. After an order either terminating the lease or extending the same for such period as the court may deem proper has been passed, as is contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 12, the landlord has been afforded a rather summary remedy to get the premises vacated by the tenant under Sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act. And, that summary remedy" is by way of an application to the court. It is quite clear upon the aforesaid scheme of the section that the application by the landlord, if otherwise maintainable in law, must be treated as an application and not as a plaint, and it is not open to the court to register the application as a title suit, as has been done by the learned Munsif in this case. 4. In the result and for the reasons stated above, the impugned order must be set aside and this application allowed; the rule is made absolute. There will, however be no order as to costs. Needless to point out that any expression of opinion in this judgment will not prejudice either party in determination of the question whether the petitioner's application under Section 12 (3) of the Act was maintainable in law or not. Application allowed.