Ram Agyan Singh v. Murlidhar — 1970 DIGILAW 460 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Dwivedi, J. - We allow the First Appeal and set aside the Judgement and decree of the Civil Judge in so far as he directs the ejectment of the appellant from the premises No. 31 (New) and 27 (Old) Sheocharan Lal Road, Allahabad. The judgement and decree awarding the amounts of Rs. 1,280/- as rent due Rs. 100/-as costs of notice and Rs 4,518/- as Bhumi Bhawan Kar will, however, stand subject to this modification that the first amount of Rs. 1,280/- is decreed by us as rent due by the appellant from the 1st of December, 1967 to 2nd of January, 1968. The judgment and decree awarding damages at the rate of Rs. 1,200/- per month to the plaintiff respondent from the date of the suit till the recovery of actual possession are set aside. The remaining part of the judgment and decree of the trial court stands. But as regards the costs here as well as in the trial court parties shall pay get costs in accordance with their success and failure. 2. We shall give our reasons, later. Dwivedi, J. - We are now giving reasons in support of our order dated October 28, 1970 dismissing the plaintiff's suit for ejectment of the defendant appellant. 4. We are concerned with a building situate at 31 sheocharan Lal Road, Allahabad. Admittedly it is an accommodation under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (herein below called the Act). 5. The former owner of the accommodation was on Ram Swarup Gupta. He let it out to the appellant, Ram Agyan Singh. The lease is a registered document. It was executed on October 13, 1952. The lease was for a term of ten years. The term was to commence from January 1, 1953. 6. Ram Swarup Gupta sold the accommodation to the plaintiffs by a registered sale deed, dated March 26, 1962. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by them. The main relief claimed by them is the ejectment of the appellant from the accommodation. In their plaint they alleged that after the expiry of the term of the lease the appellant is a trespasser' even if he is still a tenant, he is liable to ejectment as he is a defaulter in payment of arrears of rent for more than three months. In their plaint they alleged that after the expiry of the term of the lease the appellant is a trespasser' even if he is still a tenant, he is liable to ejectment as he is a defaulter in payment of arrears of rent for more than three months. The appellants filed a written statement contesting their claim. He alleged that he is a statutory tenant under the Act and cannot be evicted without the permission of District Magistrate. He denied that he has defaulted in payment of rent. He also pleaded that he was holding over after the expiry the expiry of the term of the lease. The plaintiffs then filed a replication. In their replication they alleged that as under clause 20 of the lease-deed the appellant has agreed to waive the benefit of the Act, he cannot now claim to be a statutory tenant. 7. The Civil Judge decreed the suit. He found that the appellant was not holding over after the expiry of the term of the lease. He also found that prima face the appellant is protected by Section 3 of the Act. But he held that he cannot claim protection of Section 3 on account of clause 20 of the lease-deed. He also held that even if clause 20 is void, the entire lease will be void and that the appellant's possession will then be that of a trespasser from the very outset Section 3 will according not apply. In the end, he also held that the order passed under Rule 6 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules for release of the accommodation in favour of the plaintiffs amounts to permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 So the suit should be deemed to have been filed with the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3. 8. Obviously the two nerve-centre issues of the case are : (1) whether the appellant can claim protection of Section 3 of the Act; (2) whether clause 20 of the lease deed bars him from seeking that protection. The other issues on which the civil Judge has recorded findings are appendages to these central issues. Accordingly we will first examine these two issues. 9. The other issues on which the civil Judge has recorded findings are appendages to these central issues. Accordingly we will first examine these two issues. 9. Section 3(1) of the Act, in so far as it is material, reads : "....no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation......" Section 3 gives qualified protection from eviction to a 'tenant'. 'Tenant' is defined in Section 2(g). 'Tenant is the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract, express or implied would be payable for any accommodation". 10. Although the lease-deed was executed after the commencement of the Act, it is admitted by the parties that the appellant never obtained an allotment order in his favour from the District Magistrate under Section 7(2) of the Act. The argument of counsel for the plaintiffs is that as the appellant had not obtained an allotment order, he would not be a tenant under Section 3 on the expiry of the term of the lease. It may be mentioned at this stage that for sometime this court has been taking the view that a lease-deed executed after the commencement of the Act without an allotment order of the District Magistrate under Section 7(2) is void. But in Udho Das v. Prem Prakash, 1963 A.L.J. 406 a Full Bench of our Court has now taken the view that such a lease-deed is not void and that it creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant. Counsel for the plaintiffs has, therefore, conceded that by virtue of the lease-deed the appellant became the tenant of Ram Swarup Gupta and of the Plaintiffs during the term of the lease. But relying on the said Full Bench decision he submits that as the District Magistrate is not bound by the lease and as he can evict the appellant under Section 7-A of the Act, the appellant is not a tenant under Section 3. We are unable to accept this submission. The appellant is a tenant according to the Full Bench decision. As he had been paying rent to Ram Swarup Gupta and, after sale by him, to the plaintiffs, he is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Accordingly he is a tenant under Section 3. We are unable to accept this submission. The appellant is a tenant according to the Full Bench decision. As he had been paying rent to Ram Swarup Gupta and, after sale by him, to the plaintiffs, he is a tenant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Accordingly he is a tenant under Section 3. The landlord and tenant by their agreement cannot bind the District Magistrate and cannot bruze his power under Section 7A. The District Magistrate may treat the accommodation as vacant and evict therefrom the tenant who is in occupation of the accommodation without an allotment order. This is his statutory obligation. But he plaintiffs are estopped from denying that the appellant is their tenant. As against them the appellant is a tenant under Section 3. The Act itself make a distraction between a tenant by virtue of an allotment order and a tenant otherwise than by virtue of an allotment order. In most of the section of the Act the word 'tenant' alone is used. But Section 7-B provides that when any tenant, who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order made under Section 7(2), is in arrears of rent for more than three months the landlord may make an application to the Munsiff for an order of ejectment of the tenant from the accommodation. It will thus appear that the Act applies not only to a tenant who occupies an accommodation under an allotment order under Section 7(2) but also to a tenant who is occupying the accommodation without an allotment order. If the word 'tenant' in Section 3 is construed as 'tenant under a allotment order' then the then the tenants who have been occupying an accommodation without an allotment order will be deprived of several material privileges conferred upon them by the Act. For instance, Section 7-D provides that no landlord shall without just and sufficient cause cut off or withhold any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. The tenant may, if the landlord cuts off or with holds the amenities, make an application to the District Magistrate complaining of such contravention. The District Magistrate shall hold an enquiry. If he is satisfied that there has been a contravention he will direct that the tenant may have such amenities restored and the cost thereof may be deducted from the rent payable to the landlord. The District Magistrate shall hold an enquiry. If he is satisfied that there has been a contravention he will direct that the tenant may have such amenities restored and the cost thereof may be deducted from the rent payable to the landlord. Section 7-E provides that every landlord shall be bound to keep the accommodation in the occupation of a tenant wind-proof and water proof and to carry out other repairs which he is bound by law, contract or custom. If the landlord fails to carry out annual white-washing, recoloring and periodical repair, the tenant may by notice require him to carry out the same. If the landlord fail to do so, the tenant may himself carry out the same at a cost not exceeding one month's rent for the accommodation and deduct the amount from the rent. Section 4 is important. It provides that it shall not be lawful for a landlord to take or receive for admitting a tenant to any accommodation any premium or other additional payment of any sort whatsoever over and above the rent payable therefor under the provisions of the Act. There is no doubt that the word 'tenant' in Section 4 should be construed to include not only a tenant who occupies an accommodation under an allotment order but also a tenant who occupies an accommodation under a lease from the landlord but without an allotment order. If the word 'tenant' in Section 4 is construed as suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs, its purpose will be largely frustrated. 11. In In University of Allahabad v. Smt. Kamla Mehrotra, second Appeal No. 301 of 1966 decided on 10.12.1968, a learned single Judge has taken the view which we are now taking. Having regard to the definition - clause, the scheme and other provisions of the Act, We are of opinion that the appellant is a tenant under Section 3 even though he is occupying the accommodation without an allotment order. He accordingly gets protection under Section 3. The plaintiffs suit for his ejectment will be liable to be dismissed if it is found that it was instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate. 12. Clause 20 of the lease-deed provides : "That his agreement of lease has been made between the parties with the knowledge of the existing Rent Control and Eviction Act. The plaintiffs suit for his ejectment will be liable to be dismissed if it is found that it was instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate. 12. Clause 20 of the lease-deed provides : "That his agreement of lease has been made between the parties with the knowledge of the existing Rent Control and Eviction Act. The parties do hereby agree and declare that no party will ever claim the benefit of said Acts and that the provisions of the said Acts have been agreed by mutual consent to be inapplicable to this deed". Before we examine the legality of clause 20, we shall clear off the two hurdles placed by counsel for the appellant. It is firstly said that clause 20 seeks to bind the parties during the term of the lease only; it does not bind the parties after the expiry of the term. We do not agree with this interpretation of clause 20. Clause 20 expressly states that no party will 'ever' claim the benefit of the Act. It seems to us that the word 'ever' clearly suggests that the parties agreed that they would never claim the benefit of the Act. So if clause 20 is valid, it will estop the appellant from seeking the benefit of Section 3 even after the expiry of the term of the lease. The Act is a temporary Act. In the first instance it was enacted for a period of two years. But its term was extended up to 1952 by an Amending Act in 1948. Its term was again extended up to 1954 by the U.P. Amending Act XXIV of 1952. The term again and again been extended so that on the date of the institution of the suit the Act was in force. Clause 20 uses the word "existing Rent Control and Eviction Acts" in its first sentence. The argument of the appellant is that this phrase means the Act as it stood at the time of the execution of the lease-deed. The parties are bound by that Act only. It is said that when the life of the Act was extended by the U.P. Amending Act XXIV of 1952 after the execution of the lease-deed the Act became a new Act and that the parties are not bound by this new Act. It is an ingenious argument and does not appeal to us at all. It is said that when the life of the Act was extended by the U.P. Amending Act XXIV of 1952 after the execution of the lease-deed the Act became a new Act and that the parties are not bound by this new Act. It is an ingenious argument and does not appeal to us at all. Merely because the life of the Act was extended by the U.P. Amending Act XXIV of 1952 after the execution of the lease-deed, it cannot be held that the Act after this extension is as new Act. 13. We shall now examine the legality of clause 20. Clause 20 contains two stipulations. The first stipulation is that the parties will never claim the benefit of the Act. The second stipulation is that the provisions of the Act will be in applicable to the lease-deed. The Civil Judge has held that having regard to Section 23 of contract Act the second stipulation is clearly void. But he has taken the view that the first stipulation is out of grip of Section 23. We have not been able to appreciate this distinction. The effect of the two stipulations is one and the same. The object of both the stipulations is to defeat the provisions of the Act. 14. According to the preamble the purpose of Act, is inter alia, 'to prevent the edition of tenant' from an accommodation, Section 3(1) is cast in imperative language. It uses the expression 'shall be filed'. Again the language is prohibitive - 'no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court'. If any landlord institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate, he commits an offence and is punishable under Section 15 of the Act. The object of Section 3 is to give protection to a tenant from eviction from an accommodation. The policy of the legislature is that the District Magistrate should consider the claim of the landlord and the needs of the tent before granting permission. Section 3 has been enacted on account of alarming scarcity of accommodation in the State. The legislature has enacted the law with the laudable object of protecting tenants from rack-rent and other kind of exploitation by greedy and grasping landlord. Clause 20 excludes of operation of Section 3. Section 3 has been enacted on account of alarming scarcity of accommodation in the State. The legislature has enacted the law with the laudable object of protecting tenants from rack-rent and other kind of exploitation by greedy and grasping landlord. Clause 20 excludes of operation of Section 3. It is clearly forbidden by the prohibited language of Section 3. In any case, it defeats the object of Section 2. It appears to us that class 20 is void. 15. Courts have held an agreement to be void under Section 23 or a similar rule in three types of cases; (1) a statute may encumber a person with a duty; (2) a Statute may be enacted for protecting the oppressed from the oppressor; (3) a statute may be enacted with the intention of protecting the general public or a section of the general public. In the first class, the person charged with the statutory duty cannot waive the performance of his duty. He may waive right but not duties. Sis Ram v. Asghar Ali, ILR 30 Calcutta 696; Prokash Chandra v. E.E. Adlam, ILR 35 Allahabad 19, Bollapragada Ramurthy v. Thammanca Gapayya, Bhagwati Prasad v. Chatrapal, AIR 1917 Madras 892. In the Second class, the oppressed cannot waive the statutory protection. Browning v.Morris,(1778)2 Cowp. 790. Kearley v.Thomson,(1890) 24 B.D. 742. In the third class also, a member of the protected class cannot waive the statutory protection. Mistry Amar Singh v. Serwan Wofunira Kulubya. (1963)3 W.L.R. 513. KoK Hoong v. Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd. (1964) 2 W.L.R. 150. Sis Ram v. Asghar Ali(Supra), Pirag v. Sital Pershad, AIR 1914 Allahabad 374, Moti Chand v. I kram Ullah Khan, AIR 1916 P.C. 59 , Dupagunata Subramanian v. Govind Petar Satyanadham, AIR 1942 Madras 391. Varada Borgar Raju v. Kirthali Avatharam, AIR 1965 Andhra Pradesh 86, and U.P. Electric Supply Company Limited v. H.V. Bown, AIR 1968 Allahabad 95. 16. Taking up the cases in the first class, in Sis Ram's(supra) case a tenant had agreed to pay his landlord for the use of land rent as well as certain zamindari dues in kind. He failed to pay zamindari dues and the landlord instituted a suit for recovery of those dues. A Division Bench of this Court held that the contract was void as it was intended the object of Section 56 and 86 of Land Revenue Act. He failed to pay zamindari dues and the landlord instituted a suit for recovery of those dues. A Division Bench of this Court held that the contract was void as it was intended the object of Section 56 and 86 of Land Revenue Act. According to the Court the object of these section was to rid the Courts of such claims. In Parkash Chandra Sarkar's (supra) case, the defendant promised to pay the Receiver salary without leave of the Court. He, however, failed to pay the agreed salary. The Receiver then instituted a suit for recovery of the agreed salary. The agreement was held to be void for the Court alone could determine the fee or commission of the Receiver and parties could not by their act add or derogate from the functions of the Court without authority from the court itself. In Ramaurthy's(supra) case the defendant had agreed not to plead the bar of limitation. It was held that the agreement was void. Same view was taken in Bhagwati Prasad's(supra) case. It will thus appear that in each of these cases a duty was cast on the Court. The duty was either not to decide claims barred by Section 56 and 86, Land Revenue Act or suo motu dismiss the suits barred by limitation or fix the fee payable to the Receiver for the performance of his duties. As the Court itself could not waive these duties, it was held that the parties, by agreement, could not create a situation in which the court could be absolved from performing its duties. 17. Section 3 gives power to the District Magistrate to grant or refuse permission in appropriate cases after considering the claim of the landlord and the needs of the tenant. Power is coupled with a duty. The District Magistrate cannot agree to give up performance of this power coupled with duty. What cannot be done directly cannot also be done indirectly. As he himself cannot waive this power coupled with a duty, the parties cannot form an agreement which will deprive the District Magistrate of the power coupled with duty. 18. Again, if the landlord fails to satisfy the Court that he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. The Court is bound to dismiss the suit. Clause 20 cannot be deployed to absolve the court from this duty. 18. Again, if the landlord fails to satisfy the Court that he has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. The Court is bound to dismiss the suit. Clause 20 cannot be deployed to absolve the court from this duty. The effect of clause 20 is the waiver of the duties of the District Magistrate and the court. It is therefore void. 19. In Browinings (supra) case Lord Mansfield said; "But, where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for the sake of protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties are not in pari delicto; and in furtherance of those statutes, the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring his action and defeat the contract." In Kearley's (supra) case; Lord Justice Fry said : "In these cases of oppressor and oppressed or of a class protected by statute, the one may recover from the other, notwithstanding that both have been parties to the illegal contract." In Kulubya's (supra) case Section 2 of the Land Transfer Ordinance provided that no non African shall without the consent in writing of the Governor occupy or enter in to possession of any land of which an African is registered as proprietor or make any contract - to purchaser or to take on lease or accept a gift inter vivos or a bequest of any such land or of any interest there in other than a security for money without the consent in writing of the Governor. Kulubya let out his land to Amar Singh without the permission of the Governor. Thereafter he instituted a suit for recovery of possession. Amar Singh pleaded thee agreement as bar. His was negatived by the Privy Council. It was held that as Kulubya was a member of the protected class of Africans, the agreement will not estop him from claiming possession. The language and scheme of Section 3 of the Act resemble the language and scheme of Section 2 of the Ordinance. The object of clause 20 the forbidden by Section 3 Act any rate, the object of clause 20 is to defeat the provision of Section 3. 20. In Hoongs (supra) case appellant sued the respondent for money. The language and scheme of Section 3 of the Act resemble the language and scheme of Section 2 of the Ordinance. The object of clause 20 the forbidden by Section 3 Act any rate, the object of clause 20 is to defeat the provision of Section 3. 20. In Hoongs (supra) case appellant sued the respondent for money. The respondent pleaded that the appellant was estopped from claiming the amount by virtue of a previous judgment given in an earlier action between them. In other words, the place of res judicata was taken by the respondent. The amount was due under an agreement in writing. The respondent alleged that the appellant was a money lender at the time of the agreement. As the agreement was not registered under the provisions of the Bill of Sale Ordinance, it was void and unenforceable. It was further alleged that the appellant not having furnished any note or memorandum of the agreement as required by the Section 10 of Moneylenders Ordinance to the respondent before making of the loan, the agreement was void. The earlier judgment was there on point. It was against the respondent. At the same time it was found that the agreement was in contravention of Section 10 of the Moneylender Ordinance. The question then arose whether the respondent could get over the bar of res judicata by relying on Moneylenders Ordinance. The Privy Council held that it could. It was held that the agreement was void. Elaborating on this aspect, Viscount Radcliffe said : "In their Lordship's opinion a more direct test to apply in any case such as the Present........is to ask whether the law that confronts the estoppel can be seen to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interests of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of the evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduced or otherwise." It was further said; "General Social policy does from time to time require that denial of legal validity to certain transactions by certain persons. This may be for their own protection, as in the cases of the infant or other category of persons enjoying what is to some extent a protected status, or for the protection of others who may come to be engaged in dealing with them as, for instance, the creditors of a bankrupt. In all such cases there is no room for the application of another general and familiar principle of the law that a man may, it he wishes disclaim a statutory provision enacted for his benefit, for what is for a man's benefits and what is for his protection or not synonymous terms. Nor is it open to the court to give its sanction to departures from any law that reflects such a policy, even though the party concerned has himself behaved in such a way as would otherwise tie his hands." In Sis Ram's(supra) case the Court held that the policy of the Land Revenue Act was to protect tenants from payment of anything which is not rent for use of land. Same view was taken in Parag's case. 21. It is proper to deal with Motichand'S (supra) case at some length. Ikram Ullah agreed to execute a deed of relinquishment of his rights in the Sir Lands when he sold the proprietary interest to Motichand. Later he went back on his agreement and did not execute the relinquishment. Thereupon Motichand instituted a suit for damages for breach of the agreement. The suit was dismissed by our Court. The Privy Council affirmed our decision. It was held that the agreement was unlawful because it was in contravention of Section 10 of the Agra tenancy Act 1901. Later he went back on his agreement and did not execute the relinquishment. Thereupon Motichand instituted a suit for damages for breach of the agreement. The suit was dismissed by our Court. The Privy Council affirmed our decision. It was held that the agreement was unlawful because it was in contravention of Section 10 of the Agra tenancy Act 1901. Refuting the argument based on agreement, Sir John Edge Said: "It appears to their Lordships that it cannot be doubted that the policy of Act No. 11 of 1901 is to secure and preserve to a proprietor whose proprietary rights in a mahal or in any portion of it are transferred otherwise than by gift or by exchange between co-sharers in the mahal a right of occupancy in his "Sir" lands, and in the land which he has cultivated continuously for twelve years at the date of the transfer, and that such right of occupancy is by the Act secured and preserved to the proprietor, who becomes by a transfer the ex-proprietor whether he wishes it to be secured and preserved to him or not and notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary between him and the transferee. The policy of the Act is not to be defeated by any ingenious devices, arrangements, or agreements between a vendor and a vendee for the relinquishment by a vendor of his "Sir" land or land which he has cultivated continuously for twelve year at the date of the transfer...........All such devices, arrangements and agreements are in contravention of the policy of the Act and are contrary to law and are illegal and void and cannot be enforced by the vendee in any civil court or in any Court of Revenue". The concept of compulsory protection expounded by Sir John Edge is a fundamental tenant of the welfare State. On account of his weaker position the tenant is given protection under Section 3. He cannot be evicted without the permission of the District Magistrate even though he may have earlier agreed to give up the benefit of Section 3. 22. Clause 20 falls in the second and third classes also and is void for it seeks to withhold protection from a member of the protected class in contravention of the social policy animating Section 3. The appellant cannot waive the protection of Section 3. 22. Clause 20 falls in the second and third classes also and is void for it seeks to withhold protection from a member of the protected class in contravention of the social policy animating Section 3. The appellant cannot waive the protection of Section 3. We are unable to appreciate how an inference may be drawn from the fact that the appellant may voluntarily vacate the premises on the expiry of the term of his lease that clause 20 is not void. There is a world of difference between the appellant voluntarily vacating the premises on the expiry of the term of the lease and his eviction through Court against his wishes. A tenant may voluntarily vacate the premises on the expiry of the term of his lease. The Act does not prohibit him from doing so. It will be his unilateral action. It does to, however, follow from this that if he had earlier made an executory promise of disclaiming the protection of the Act he cannot resist eviction when he later changes his mind and decides not to vacate the premises. An executory promise will be void and unenforceable. If the tenant later changes his mind and refuses to vacate. In such a contingency the landlord cannot rely on the executory promise to get over the road block of Section 3. Section 3 prohibits him from evicting the tenant against his wishes without the permission of the District Magistrate. 23. In Abhilakh Ram v. Uma Shanker, 1950 A.L.J. 817 a learned single Judge ignore the agreement between the landlord and the tenant. But in Iddom v. Mohan Lal, 1951 A.L.J. 722, Ram Agyan Singh v. District Magistrate,W.P. No. 1198 of 1966, it was held that the tenant could waive the benefit of the Act. These decisions are decisions by a single Judge. There is no discussion in these In Amulya Chandra Butta v. Mst. Bibi Ahmadi Begam, 1954 A.L.J. 120 and L.K. Kanhaiya Lal v. Sri Unraro Singh 1958 A.L.J. 640, the court did not give effect to the agreement between the landlord and the tenant which was in contravention of the Act. These are Division Bench decision. 24. In S. Raja Chetty v. Jagannathdas Govindass AIR 1950 Madras 284 there was an agreement between a landlord and his tenant that the former may evict the tenant if the latter was in arrears of rent for two months. These are Division Bench decision. 24. In S. Raja Chetty v. Jagannathdas Govindass AIR 1950 Madras 284 there was an agreement between a landlord and his tenant that the former may evict the tenant if the latter was in arrears of rent for two months. The Rent Control Act gave the landlord the right to evict a tenant if he was in arrears for one month only. The landlord instituted a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he was in arrears of rent for the month. The tenant pleaded that the landlord was estopped by the agreement from taking the benefit of the Act. The Madras High Court accepted his plea and dismissed the suit. The case is clearly distinguishable because the landlord is not a member of the protected class nor is he oppressed. Again there was no question of waiver of duty. Indeed, Chief Justice Rajamannar conscious of these distinction said : "Even assuring that a plausible argument can be raised that on the grounds of public policy the tenant should not be bound by any term inconsistent with the Act which is to his detriment, we see no offences to public policy in allowing landlord to abridge his rights. Otherwise it comes to this that an Act intended to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants can be used for the perpetration of the very thing sought to be prevented. In Satish Chandra Ray Chaudhury v. Bimalendu Sen, AIR 1951 Assam 27 the Assam High Court took the same view as in Sahab Uddin's (supra) case. But in this case also there is no discussion of the three types of cases already referred to by us. 25. Clause 20 is, we think severable from the rest of the terms of the lease deed. Assuming that clause 20 is, in severable and even then the appellant is the tenant of the plaintiffs. There is ample evidence to show that Ram Swarup Gupta had been accepting rent from the appellant. Indeed he instituted a suit for recovery of rent. That suit has now been decreed by the High Court. There is also evidence to prove that the plaintiffs have also accepted rent from the appellant. In paragraph 9 of the plaint, the plaintiffs claimed payment of rent Rs. 11,032.25 from the appellant for the period between March 26, 1962 and December 31, 1962. That suit has now been decreed by the High Court. There is also evidence to prove that the plaintiffs have also accepted rent from the appellant. In paragraph 9 of the plaint, the plaintiffs claimed payment of rent Rs. 11,032.25 from the appellant for the period between March 26, 1962 and December 31, 1962. It is admitted in paragraph 10 of the plaint that on the March 26, 1963 the appellant paid to the plaintiffs counsel, Shri S.N. Misra the sum of Rs. 11,032.25 through a Bank pay order towards arrears of rent. Thus both Ram Swarup Gupta as well as the plaintiffs have accepted that the appellant was their tenant till December 31, 1962. They have accepted rent from him. Therefore, the appellant will become tenant. Ram Kumar Das v. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 Supreme Court 23 and Asa Ram v. Mst. Ram Kali AIR 1958 Supreme Court 183. 26. Counsel for the plaintiffs has also submitted that release order made in their favour by the District Magistrate under Rule 6 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Rules should be deemed to be the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3. This argument is not correct. A release order under rule 6 is made when an accommodation is vacant; on the other hand the District Magistrate is invited to grant permission under Section 3 when the accommodation is occupied by the tenant. The consideration for release are, therefore, different from the considerations for permission under Section 3. While making an order for release of an accommodation the District Magistrate is required to consider only the needs of the landlord. But while granting permission to the landlord under Section 3 the District Magistrate is required to consider not only his needs but also the needs of the tenant. Accordingly the release order cannot be deemed to be a permission under Section 3. Admittedly there is no express permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3. So the suit for ejectment cannot be entertained. As we are dismissing the plaintiff's suit for eviction on this ground, we do not express any opinion on the argument of the appellant that after the expiry of the term of his lease he was holding over.