JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Dr. S.N. Prasad, Reader in Zoology, Allahabad University, with the prayer that the order passed by the Chancellor of the Allahabad University respondent No. 1, on the representation of Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4. be quashed and the resolution passed by the Executive Council of the University of Allahabad in its meeting held on 19-8-1969 appointing Dr. U.S. Srivastava as Professor and Head of the Zoology Department in the University of Allahabad, be also quashed and the original resolution No. 92 passed on 26th of April, 1969, be restored. At the same time a request was made for a writ of Quo warranto against Dr. U.S. Srivastava to show cause by what authority he was acting as Professor of Zoology, Allahabad University. In the Writ Petition the order of the Chancellor has been referred to as annexure `2', but it has, been reproduced in annexture `III' to the Writ Petition which is the fifth supplementary agenda of the meeting of the Executive Council to be held on 12-7-1969. A copy of the order of the Chancellor has, however, been annexed to the counter affidavit of Sheo Raj Narain filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. It is annexure `I' to this counter affidavit. The two resolutions passed by the Executive Council are annexures `I' and `II' to the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad. 2. In his writ petition the petitioner had made allegations of mala fide against numerous persons including Professor A.B. Lal, Vice-Chancellor, but during the hearing of the Writ Petition the petitioner gave up such allegations and confined himself to the material facts and the validity of the order of the Chancellor and the second resolution of the Executive Council. These allegations of mala fide cannot also be taken into consideration for the reason that none of the persons complained of were impleaded by name. It shall be found that only Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4. has been made a party by name. 3. These allegations of mala fide cannot also be taken into consideration for the reason that none of the persons complained of were impleaded by name. It shall be found that only Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4. has been made a party by name. 3. Considering that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not usurp the functions of a Court of appeal and it can interfere only if the subordinate authorities had committed some illegality of error in the exercise of jurisdiction, it is not necessary to reproduce in this judgment the pleadings of the parties on the respective merits of the various candidates for appointment to the post of Professor of Zoology. 4. The material facts of the case are virtually not in dispute. Wherever there exists some minor conflict in the version of the parties, this shall be made clear while giving the narrative of the case. 5. The post of the Professor of Zoology, Allahabad University, fell vacant in July 1967 on the retirement of Dr. M.D.L. Srivastava. The University advertised for filling this vacancy under annexure `1' to the Writ Petition and the advertisement was published in the Newspapers of two dates in the month of March, 1967. The last date for submission of the application in the prescribed form was April 15, 1967. The petitioner along with others applied on the prescribed form obtainable on payment of the prescribed fee of Rs. 5/-. Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4, made no such application on the prescribed form but sent a letter dated April 4, 1967, to the Vice-Chancellor requesting to consider him for appointment to the post. Three of the other applicants, for the post were Dr. H.S. Chaudhary, Professor of Zoology in Gorakhpur University, Dr. H.B. Tewari, Professor of Zoology, Udaipur University, and Dr. D.N. Varma, who was then acting as Head of the Department i.e. Professor of Zoology in the Allahabad University. The candidates were called for interview before the Selection Committee in the meeting fixed for July 15, 1967, but the meeting was cancelled. It may here be mentioned that this was not to show favour to any of the candidates. After the revision of grades in 1968 all the pending vacant posts in the University were re-advertised with the direction that those who had applied earlier need not apply again. According to Dr. It may here be mentioned that this was not to show favour to any of the candidates. After the revision of grades in 1968 all the pending vacant posts in the University were re-advertised with the direction that those who had applied earlier need not apply again. According to Dr. A.B. Lal such candidates had simply to inform the Registrar of their desire to be considered for appointment adding additional particulars, if any. Accordingly, the post of the Professor of Zoology was re-advertised on April 19, 1968, and the last date for submission of the application was May 25, 1968. Annexture `2' to the Writ Petition is the said advertisement. At this occasion also Dr. U.S. Srivastava did not make an application in the prescribed form. He, however, wrote from U.S.A. to the Registrar saying that he desired to be considered for the appointment. The letter is dated 12-5-1968 and was received by the Registrar on 22-5-1968. The prescribed application form was issued as a special case on 27-11-1968 when a request was made on behalf of Dr. U.S. Srivastava. The form was filled in the office and it was attached to the original letter of Dr. U.S. Srivastava. The form did not contain the particulars but only the name of Dr. U.S. Srivastava and the name of the post for which it was meant were noted in the form. The petitioner says that when interview letters were issued for December 11, 1968, no letter was issued to Dr. U.S. Srivastava. The Selection Committee did not meet that day and it was called to meet on April 1, 1969, when all the candidates and also Dr. U.S. Srivastava were called for interview before the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee included three Experts one of whom was Dr. D.S. Srivastava, former Professor of Zoology, Sauger University. The petitioner's case is that Dr. D.S. Srivastava "is a very near relation of Dr. D.N. Varma one of the candidates for the post who was then officiating as Head of the Department of Zoology." It is further alleged that Dr. D.S. Srivastava sometimes stays with him for weeks together and was always very much interested in Dr. D.N. Varma. It is said that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was thus unqualified to act as an expert of the Selection Committee. Dr. D.S. Srivastava sometimes stays with him for weeks together and was always very much interested in Dr. D.N. Varma. It is said that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was thus unqualified to act as an expert of the Selection Committee. Dr. D.S. Srivastava was not made a party to the Writ Petition and his version has not come on the record. However, in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents the allegations of relationship have been denied. It is also denied that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was interested in Dr. D.N. Varma. 6. Under Statute 137 of the Allahabad University the Selection Committee has to recommend three persons for each appointment arranging the names in order of preference; but the Selection Committee sent two names only : Dr. U.S. Srivastava as No. I and the petitioner as No. 2. 7. The recommendation of the Selection Committee was placed before the Executive Council in the meeting held on April 26, 1969. The Council passed the resolution contained in annexure `1' to the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal. The resolution passed by the Executive Council was as below:- "The Executive Council having considered the recommendations of the Selection Committee for appointment to the post of Professor of Zoology, and not finding its recommendations acceptable, because the Selection Committee failed to comply with the requirement of statute 137 in spite of being in a position to do so and further because one of the experts also failed to reply to the Vice-Chancellor's query as to whether he was related to one of the candidates mentioned in the precise, the Executive Council directs that the post be re-advertised and the procedure following such advertisement take effect." 8. On 28-4-1969 Dr. U.S. Srivastava made a representation to the Chancellor under Section 42 of the Allahabad University Act (to be referred hereinafter as the Act) . The Chancellor after making an enquiry from the Vice-Chancellor, without giving any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner nor to the Executive Council of the University, allowed the representation and quashed the resolution, annexure `1' to the counter affidavit, and directed the Executive Council to proceed in accordance with the Statutes of the University. The order of the Chancellor is contained in annexure `I' to the counter affidavit of Sheo Raj Narain filed on his behalf. The order of the Chancellor is contained in annexure `I' to the counter affidavit of Sheo Raj Narain filed on his behalf. The matter was then placed before the Executive Council of the Allahabad University on August 19, 1969. The Council now decided with the majority of nine votes against five, the others remaining neutral, that the recommendation of the Selection Committee be accepted and Dr. U.S. Srivastava, appointed Professor of Zoology substantively in the grade of Rs. 1100-50-1300-60-1600, on a starting salary of Rs. 1300/- per month, on probation for a period of two years. This resolution is annexure 'II' to the counter Affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal. 9. In pursuance of this resolution of the Executive Council Dr. U.S. Srivastava took over charge as Professor of Zoology on August 20, 1969. It was then that the petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 with the allegations that the order of the chancellor and also the second resolution dated 19-2-1969 of the Executive Council, appointing Dr. U.S. Srivastava, as Professor, are illegal. The resolution of the Executive Council is also said to be against the decision of the Chancellor. 10. It has been strongly contended on behalf of the petitioner that under Section 42 of the Act the Chancellor has the jurisdiction to interfere and to quash the resolution of the Executive Council only if it is not in conformity with the Act, the Statutes and Ordinances, and because the resolution of the Executive Council passed in the meeting of 26-4-1969 directing that the post shall be readvertised and the procedure following such advertisement take effect, was within its competence and was not contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinance, the Chancellor had no jurisdiction and was not competent to quash the resolution, and therefore, in the eye of law, the impugned order of the Chancellor being illegal was ineffective and the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council accepting the recommendation of the Selection Committee was inoperative and Dr. U.S. Srivastava cannot be deemed to have been validly appointed as Professor of the Department of Zoology of the Allahabad University. In this connection it is also urged that the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council passed in the meeting of August 19, 1969, is not in accordance with the decision of the Chancellor and on this ground also it deserves to be quashed. In this connection it is also urged that the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council passed in the meeting of August 19, 1969, is not in accordance with the decision of the Chancellor and on this ground also it deserves to be quashed. The order of the Chancellor is also challenged on the ground that he had not applied his mind to the second part of the resolution of the Executive Council and the decision was given without giving a hearing to Executive Council and to the petitioner. It is thus pleaded that the order of the Chancellor is in violation of the principles of natural justice and is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. My attention was also drawn to the fact that the application of Dr. U.S. Srivastava for the post was not in the prescribed form and, consequently, he could not be considered for appointment to the post of the Professor. Stress is also laid on the fact that the recommendation of the Selection Committee is a secret document to be placed directly before the Executive Council and, therefore, the representation of Dr. U.S. Srivastava, made to the Chancellor, based on a secret document, was not to be entertained. 11. The learned Advocate for Dr. U.S. Srivastava raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground that an alternative remedy by way of representation to the Chancellor was available to the petitioner, and when he did not avail of this remedy this Court should refuse to hear him. Considering that the petitioner is also challenging the order passed by the Chancellor under Section 42 of the Act, on the representation of Dr. U.S. Srivastava, the above objection can have no force. If the order of the Chancellor is quashed, the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council shall automatically become ineffective. It would have been necessary for the petitioner to make a representation to the Chancellor under Section 42 of the Act, if he was not challenging the order of the Chancellor but was merely challenging the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council. It is evident that the petitioner as not accepting the decision of the Chancellor and for this reason as also challenging the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council. It is evident that the petitioner as not accepting the decision of the Chancellor and for this reason as also challenging the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council. Therefore, he could move the High Court directly without first of all disputing the validity of the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council before the Chancellor in a representation under Section 42 of the Act. 12. As already indicated above, the petitioner has not even now indicated or suggested the relationship between the Expert, Dr. D.S. Srivastava, and Dr. D.N. Varma, one of the candidates for the post of the Professor. In paragraph 20 of the Writ Petition he merely says that Dr. D.S. Srivastava is a very near relation of Dr. D.N. Varma. The relationship between the two cannot be assumed from the mere fact that Dr. D.S. Srivastava used to stay with Dr. D.N. Varma. Even friends or acquaintances or unknown Professors or teachers of other Universities, could stay with Dr. D.N. Varma. Both Dr. D.S. Srivastava and Dr. D.N. Varma have not been made parties to the Writ Petition and consequently their version could not come on the record. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dr. D.S. Srivastava, used to stay for weeks together with Dr. D.N. Varma. 13. With regard to this allegation of relationship, Professor A. B. Lal, says in paragraph 11 of his counter affidavit that when he received an anonymous complaint after the meeting of the Selection Committee, he wrote to Dr. D.S. Srivastava and after some delay Dr. D.S. Srivastava replied that he was not related to any of the candidates, that apart from vague suggestions about the matter in the meeting of the Executive Council there was no material to ascertain the precise relationship between Dr. D.N. Varma and Dr. D.S. Srivastava; and that as far as he could see there was, at any rate, no direct relationship between the two in nature and nearness to that envisaged and provided for by Statute 162 (reference is evidently to Statute 135) . The information of Dr. U.S. Srivastava on the alleged relationship is based upon information received from the Registrar. He has no personal knowledge about it. Consequently, his denial of relationship cannot have much value. 14. The information of Dr. U.S. Srivastava on the alleged relationship is based upon information received from the Registrar. He has no personal knowledge about it. Consequently, his denial of relationship cannot have much value. 14. The anonymous complaint received by Professor A. B. Lal has not been placed on the record but the nature of the complaint as to the relationship between the two can be easily judged from paragraph 11 of his counter affidavit. which has remained rebutted and also from the resolution of the Executive Council passed in the meeting of April 26, 1969. What the petitioner says in his rejoinder affidavit about paragraph I I of the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal, "... the resolution No. 92 dated 26-4-1969 of the Executive Council clearly indicates that there was a valid discussion about the relationship of Dr. D.S. Srivastava, an expert, with Dr. D.N. Varma, a candidate and the Executive Council passed the resolution after due deliberations. It is not admitted that Dr. D.S. Srivastava, was not related to Dr. D.N. Varma." In spite of the assertion contained in paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal, the petitioner has not indicated or suggested the alleged relationship between the two. 15. The resolution of the Executive Council of April 26, 1969, material on this point, is "... one of the experts also failed to reply to the Vice-Chancellor's query as to whether he was related to one of the candidates mentioned in the precis". The resolution does not also indicate what the relationship was and whether the relationship fell within the purview of statute 135. In the circumstances, paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal can be accepted namely, that during the discussion before the Executive Council in the meeting of April 26, 1969, the relationship between the two was not indicated and the suggestions made were vague. 16. The Selection Committee had met on April 4, 1969, and the Executive Council passed the resolution in its meeting of April 26, 1969. The anonymous complaint must have reached the Vice-Chancellor a few days after the meeting of the Selection Committee, and the Vice-Chancellor may have taken a day or two in despatching the letter to Dr. D.S. Srivastava to obtain his version about the relationship, if any. Instances of letters being lost in transit are not rare. The anonymous complaint must have reached the Vice-Chancellor a few days after the meeting of the Selection Committee, and the Vice-Chancellor may have taken a day or two in despatching the letter to Dr. D.S. Srivastava to obtain his version about the relationship, if any. Instances of letters being lost in transit are not rare. It is also not necessary that Dr. D.S. Srivastava must have been at his residence during this period. When he was appointed an Expert for appointment of a Professor of Zoology in the Allahabad University, he could easily be appointed by other Universities to act as an Expert or as an Examiner. In other words, it could not be assumed that-the letter addressed to Dr. D.S. Srivastava was delivered to him in time to send a reply so as to reach the Vice-Chancellor on or before April 26, 1969. In the circumstances, the Executive Council could not assume in the meeting held on April 26, 1969, that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was evading to send a reply. Consequently, it could not be assumed that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was related to Dr. D.N. Varma. 17. Even where a person evades to answer a question every possible inference cannot be drawn against him. What the Courts of law can assume is that if what was suggested in the question was not true, the person would have given a reply and, therefore, the suggestion made in the question is true. What the Executive Council could assume, on the supposition that the letter of the Vice Chancellor had been delivered to Dr. D.S. Srivastava in time, was that the relationship as indicated in the letter of the Vice-Chancellor, i.e., in the anonymous complaint, was true. The resolution of the Executive Council of April 26, 1969, and also paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit of Professor A. B. Lal, make it clear that only a vague suggestion of relationship had been made in the anonymous complaint and there was merely a vague discussion as to relationship in the meeting. How could an inference adverse to Dr. D.S. Srivastava, as to relationship, be drawn from the vague suggestion or vague discussions. The Executive Council could, to the most, assume that there existed some distant relationship between Dr. D.S. Srivastava and Dr. D.N. Varma, and not that they were such near relations as to disqualify Dr. How could an inference adverse to Dr. D.S. Srivastava, as to relationship, be drawn from the vague suggestion or vague discussions. The Executive Council could, to the most, assume that there existed some distant relationship between Dr. D.S. Srivastava and Dr. D.N. Varma, and not that they were such near relations as to disqualify Dr. D.S. Srivastava to act as an Expert for appointment to a post to which Dr. D.N. Varma was one of the candidates. 18. To avoid repetition comments may now be made on the scope of Statute 135. The Statute runs as below :- "A member of the Selection Committee or the Executive Council having any personal interest either because his own position may be affected by the appointment or because one of the candidates is related to him, shall withdraw from the meeting when the appointment is under consideration." A member of the Selection Committee must, therefore, withdraw from the meeting when the appointment is under consideration in case one of the candidates is related to him. It was suggested by the learned Advocate for Dr. U.S. Srivastava, that a member can participate in the deliberations of the Selection Committee while other candidates are being interviewed for appointment to the post and he must withdraw only when the candidate related to him, appears before the Selection Committee. This contention can easily be repelled. Where the decision of the Committee does not depend upon the comparative merits of the candidates, as in the case of examination, each candidate has to be judged separately and, therefore, a member related to one of the candidates can take part in the deliberations while other candidates are being examined. The members have to consider, in the case of each candidate, whether that candidate comes to the mark and can be declared successful and if so, how many marks be awarded to him and in which division or grade he be placed. Even when the member is interested in one of the candidates, he will take a detached view while deciding whether a candidate be declared successful in the examination or not. In such circumstances, the member interested in a candidate can take part in the proceeding while other candidates are being examined and he must with draw when a candidate related to him appears before the Committee. In such circumstances, the member interested in a candidate can take part in the proceeding while other candidates are being examined and he must with draw when a candidate related to him appears before the Committee. This rule cannot, however, be applied where the Committee has to judge the comparative merits of the candidates and to recommend who is the best among them. Similarly, where three names are to be recommended in order of preference, i.e. in the order of merit, the suitability of each candidate for being placed on the list shall depend upon the merits of other candidates including the one related to one of the members. When a member is disqualified to express his opinion on the merits of a candidate related to him, he cannot naturally express an opinion on the comparative merits of others. From the practical point of view also such a member should not at all participate in the proceeding. He may be consciously or unconsciously biased in favour of or against the candidate related to him. In the former case he may under estimate the merits of the other candidates, and in the other to exhibit his unpartiability by acting against the interest of his relation-candidate. In other words, where a member of the Selection Committee is related to a candidate for appointment to a post under consideration, he must withdraw from the meeting while such appointment is under consideration, i.e., all the candidates to that post are being interviewed. 19. The next question is which relations are envisaged by Statute 135. The word `relation' or `related' has different meaning in different areas and countries. In western countries a distant relation is not treated as a relation while in India some call a very distant relation also as a relation. The relationship can sometimes be so remote that one may not know what the relationship is. In fact, relations with friends may at occasions be more intimate than with distant relations. In other words, a person may be more biased in favour of a friend than a distant relation. 20. Considered in this light, Statute 135 without the explanation, is very vague and it shall always be a matter of controversy, whether, a relationship as contemplated by Statute 135 does or does not exist. It appears to me that the explanation was incorporated in this Statute to resolve this controversy. 20. Considered in this light, Statute 135 without the explanation, is very vague and it shall always be a matter of controversy, whether, a relationship as contemplated by Statute 135 does or does not exist. It appears to me that the explanation was incorporated in this Statute to resolve this controversy. The explanation lays down who shall be considered to be related for purposes of this Statute. The explanation does not say that those persons shall be deemed to be related. If the word `deemed' was used, it could be said with some force that the explanation was not exhaustive but illustrative. The words "shall be considered to be related", however, make it clear that for purposes of Statute 135 only the relationship detailed there in shall be considered and not others. When the wordings of the explanation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning and the scope of the explanation cannot be extended. 21. It is suggested that if the explanation is strictly construed, it shall be permissible for the son to act as member of the Selection Committee even though one of the candidates for the post is his father.. Relationship is not an unilateral affair : Where A is related to B, B is also related to A. The father is as much related to his son as a son to his father. Consequently, when the father is one of the candidates, his son, if a member of the Selection Committee, shall be one related to one of the candidates and he must withdraw from the meeting when appointment is under consideration. 22. In case the relationship between the member and the candidate is remote, and is not covered by the explanation to Statute 135, the member shall not be disqualified under Statute 135; but on the application of the general Principles he must withdraw if he is personally interested in any candidate or he has some bias in favour of or against any candidate. Further comments on this point in relation to the facts of this case shall be made while commenting upon the competence of the Executive Council and the validity of the resolution passed in its meeting held on 26-4-1969. 23. It has been suggested that Dr. Further comments on this point in relation to the facts of this case shall be made while commenting upon the competence of the Executive Council and the validity of the resolution passed in its meeting held on 26-4-1969. 23. It has been suggested that Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent, could not be appointed the Professor because he had not applied for the post in the prescribed form and his application, being not in accordance with the rules, could not be entertained. Under Statute 132 every vacancy likely to last for six months or more shall be filled up after advertisement in at least two newspapers having large circulation and the candidates shall be allowed at least three weeks from the date of the publication of the advertisement to apply for the post. Under Statute 134 the Selection Committee shall not consider the name of a person for appointment as Reader or Lecturer unless he applies for it; but in the case of the appointment of a Professor the Committee may, with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, consider the names of persons who have not applied. 24. Applications for the post of Professor, Reader and Lecturer are to be made to the Registrar in the prescribed form to be obtainable on payment of Rs. 5/-, vide Ordinance 8 Chapter XI. At the first occasion Dr. U.S. Srivastava had not made the application in the prescribed form, nor was the form obtained on payment of the prescribed sum of Rs. 5/-. He merely sent a letter to the Vice-Chancellor indicating that he may be considered for appointment as Professor. The respondent was then holding a substantive post of Professor in another University. At the second occasion also he merely sent a letter and long after the last date for receipt of the application; one of his friends purchased the prescribed form from the Registrar and attached it to his letter evidently because Dr. U.S. Srivastava was then in the United States of America. As the form was purchased long after the expiry of the period indicated in the advertisement for the receipt of the application, the application in the prescribed form cannot be said to have been made within the period prescribed. 25. In case the appointment was to the post of Reader or Lecturer Dr. As the form was purchased long after the expiry of the period indicated in the advertisement for the receipt of the application, the application in the prescribed form cannot be said to have been made within the period prescribed. 25. In case the appointment was to the post of Reader or Lecturer Dr. U.S. Srivastava could not he considered for appointment and if he was recommended by the Selection Committee and the recommendation was accepted by the Executive Council, his appointment as Reader or Lecturer would be invalid, but this rule does not apply to the appointment of a Professor. Statute 134 empowers the Selection Committee to consider the names of persons who have not applied. This can be done with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. Under Statute 126 the Selection Committee consists of the Vice-Chancellor who acts as the Chairman and many other persons including, in the case of appointment of Professor, three experts. Statute 134 does not lay down that the approval of the Vice Chancellor must be obtained in writing before the meeting. The Vice-Chancellor can, therefore, give his approval orally in the meeting itself. When the Selection Committee considered the claims of Dr. U.S. Srivastava in a meeting which was attended by the Vice-Chancellor also, it can be presumed that the Vice-Chancellor had given his approval to the name of Dr. U.S. Srivastava being considered by the Selection Committee. The presumption is a rebutable one. There is, however, nothing on the record, to suggest that the Vice-Chancellor was not a consenting party to the recommendation made by the Selection Committee or that he had opposed the appointment of Dr. U.S. Srivastava or had in any manner indicated that he was not according his approval to the consideration of the name of Dr. U.S. Srivastava for the post of Professor of Zoology. In the circumstances, the Selection Committee could have considered the name of Dr. U.S. Srivastava and if he was considered to be most suitable for appointment as Professor his name could be recommended as number one. 26. The most important point for consideration in this case is, was the Executive Council competent not to accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee and to direct that the "post be re advertised and the procedure following such advertisement take effect" ? 26. The most important point for consideration in this case is, was the Executive Council competent not to accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee and to direct that the "post be re advertised and the procedure following such advertisement take effect" ? The Executive Council passed such a resolution on finding that the Selection Committee had failed to comply with the requirement of Statute 137 in spite of being in a position to do so, and also because one of the experts had failed to reply to the Vice-Chancellor's query as to whether he was related to one of the candidates mentioned in the precis. 27. It has been contended before me that under Section 21 (1) (f) of the Act the Executive Council has the power to appoint the teachers including Professors of the University and consequently if the Selection Committee was not properly constituted and did not have the power to consider the appointment and to make the recommendation, the Executive Council could direct that applications for the post shall be invited afresh after re advertisement, in accordance with the Statute. It was also contended that one of the experts was related to a candidate, Dr. D.N. Varma, and consequently was disqualified to take part in the deliberations of the Selection Committee and for this reason the Selection. Committee as constituted, which made the recommendation, was disqualified to act as such and, in the eye of law, there was no recommendation of the Selection Committee. It is also contended that when the Selection Committee recommended the names of only two, and not three, its recommendation was without jurisdiction. The contention, in substance, is that where the Selection Committee as constituted is disqualified to act and its recommendations are without jurisdiction, the Executive Council can, in exercise of the power to make appointment, pass a suitable resolution, and, therefore, its decision to call for fresh applications after re-advertisement of the post was not without jurisdiction; and further that when the decision of the Executive Council is not without jurisdiction, i.e., is within its competence, it cannot be successfully challenged under Section 43 of the Act and the Chancellor is not competent to interfere with the decision of the Executive Council. Comments on the second part of the above submission shall be made later. Comments on the second part of the above submission shall be made later. At present comments may be made on the powers of the Executive Council and also whether the Executive Council could have, in the circumstances of the case, arrived at the decision taken in the meeting held on April 26, 1969. 28. The authorities of the University are detailed in Section 16 of the Act. Two of these authorities are the Executive Council and Selection Committees for the appointment of teachers. The constitution of the Execution Council is detailed in Section 20 of the Act. Under Section 12 (1) of the Act the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive and academic officer of the University. He is an ex-officio member and Chairman of the Executive Council. He cannot, therefore, be deemed to be the sole representative of the Executive Council. 29. The powers and duties of the Executive Council are detailed in Sec. 21(1) of the Act. The opening words of the sub-sec. (1) make it clear that the Executive Council does not have unlimited powers. Its powers are subject to the provisions of the Act and the statutes. The power of the Executive Council to appoint teachers shall also, be subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. It cannot, consequently, be said that the Excecutive Council has an unlimited power to appoint the teachers. The Executive Council can take any decision provided that it does not infringe the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. 30. The Selection Committee is, as already mentioned above, one of the authorities of the University. It is an independent body not subordinate to the Executive Council. This shall be evident from the provisions of the Act and also of the statutes. Provision for the constitution, powers and functions of the Selection Committee has been made in Section 29 (5) of the Act which lays down that-"There shall be a Selection Committee for appointment of teachers in each subject of study. The constitution, powers and functions of the Selection Committee and the procedure to be followed in making appointments shall be prescribed by the Statutes". The constitution, powers and functions of the Selection Committee and the procedure to be followed in making appointments shall be prescribed by the Statutes". Under Statute 125, teachers of the University shall be appointed by the Executive Council on the recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted in the manner provided in the Statutes 126 and 132 and this power of the Executive Council is subject to the provisions of the Act and, therefore, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. This is also because Section 21 (1) by itself lays down that the power of the Executive Council to appoint teachers shall be subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes. 31. Under Statute 137 a Selection Committee has, "subject to candidates of requisite merit being available'", to recommend three persons for each appointment arranging their names in order of preference. The recommendation of the Selection Committee is strictly confidential and is submitted by the Registrar to the Executive Council (Statute 139). Statute 138 lays down the powers of the Executive Council subsequent to the receipt of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Statute 138 is as below :- "138. If the Executive Council does not accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee for appointment to the post of the teachers mentioned in clause 125, it shall, with its reasons refer the case back to the Selection Committee for reconsideration. The Selection Committee thereupon shall review its recommendation in the light of the reasons given by the Executive Council. Where the Selection Committee reiterates its original recommendation and the Executive Council again disagrees, the case shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision in the matter shall be final. A fresh recommendation of the Selection Committee shall be treated as original recommendation." It shall be found that if the Executive Council does not accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee for appointment to the post of the teacher, it has, with its reasons, to refer the case back to the Selection Committee for reconsideration. Thereafter, the Selection Committee can review its recommendation in the light of the reasons given by the Executive Council and where the Selection Committee reiterates its original recommendation and the Executive Council again disagrees, the case shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision in the matter shall be final. Thereafter, the Selection Committee can review its recommendation in the light of the reasons given by the Executive Council and where the Selection Committee reiterates its original recommendation and the Executive Council again disagrees, the case shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision in the matter shall be final. Any fresh recommendation of the Selection Committee is, within the meaning of the Statutes, an original recommendation. In other words, if the Executive Council agrees with the recommendation of the Selection Committee, it must appoint the first person placed in order of preference to the post, and if that person refuses to accept, the Executive Council must appoint the second person on the list and on his refusal the third person. But where the Executive Council is of the opinion that the first person on the list be not appointed, or that the names in order of preference be different, the Executive Council is not free to make the appointment in any manner it likes: it must give its reasons for disagreeing with the recommendation and refer the case back to the Selection Committee for reconsideration. The Selection Committee can review its earlier decision. After the decision is reviewed, it shall be treated as an original recommendation and the Executive Council has no option except to comply again with the provisions of Statute 138; but if the Selection Committee does not reconsider its decision, either the Executive Council must act on the recommendation or refer the matter to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final. Statute 138 does not empower the Executive Council to set aside the recommendation and to order that applications for the post shall be invited afresh. 32. Even assuming that the Executive Council could take such a decision in special circumstances, it shall have to be considered, whether the Executive Council could, in the circumstances of the present case, decide to call for fresh applications after advertisement of the post ? 33. While recording a finding on this point we must not overlook the provisions of the Section 42 of the Act and also the Statutes. Sec. 42 clearly lays down that if any question arises whether any decision of any authority of the University is in conformity with the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final. 34. Sec. 42 clearly lays down that if any question arises whether any decision of any authority of the University is in conformity with the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor whose decision shall be final. 34. The Selection Committee consists of persons detailed in Statute 126, three of whom are experts selected by the Chancellor out of the relevant panel. Once the Chancellor selects the experts and two members of the Selection Committee are elected under clause (iv) of Statute 126, the Selection Committee shall stand constituted for that appointment; in the language of Section 29 (5) "for appointment of teachers in each subject of study"; though under Statute 135 a member must with draw from the meeting while an appointment to a post is under consideration in cases where he has any personal interest, either because his own position may be affected by the appointment of because one of the candidates is related to him. Statute 135 does not lay down that is such circumstances the Selection Committee shall be constituted, i.e., the Chancellor must select another member or expert in place of one who cannot take part in the deliberations of the Selection Committee. The maximum that can be said is that where a member disqualified to take part in the proceeding, had not withdrawn from the meeting when the appointment was under consideration, the recommendation of the Selection Committee is illegal and not in accordance with the Statutes. 35. In view of the fact that the Selection Committee is an authority of the University, its decision can he challenged before the Chancellor under Section 42 of the Act. Sec. 42 has been worded generally and does not lay down who can move the Chancellor to give a decision. Consequently, the illegality can brought to the notice of the Chancellor by any one, by the Executive Council also. The Executive Council, therefore, could not depart from the provisions of Statute 138 though it could, in the first instance, refer the matter to the Chancellor for his decision. After the matter is decided by the Chancellor, the Executive Council can act under Statute 138 in case the Chancellor decide that the recommendation of the Selection Committee is in conformity with the Act and the Statutes. Otherwise the matter would go back to the same Selection Committee. After the matter is decided by the Chancellor, the Executive Council can act under Statute 138 in case the Chancellor decide that the recommendation of the Selection Committee is in conformity with the Act and the Statutes. Otherwise the matter would go back to the same Selection Committee. The Executive Council cannot usurp the powers of the Chancellor, and, therefore, cannot, on its own, decide that the recommendation of the Selection Committee is void. 36. Even if it be assumed that the Executive Council can form an opinion on its own, and not refer the matter to the Chancellor, it shall be necessary for the Council to refer the case back to the same Selection Committee for reconsideration after giving its reasons in writing why the recommendation was being deemed not to be in conformity with the Act and Statutes. The Selection Committee would then reconsider the matter on merits, if necessary, after the member withdraws from the meeting. In case on reconsideration the Selection Committee makes the same recommendation, the Executive Council has no option except to accept the recommendation or to refer the case to the Chancellor for his decision. If the Selection Committee departs from the original recommendation, the fresh recommendation shall be treated as the original recommendation and the Executive Council must again act under and in accordance with Statute 138. In other words, if a member not competent to take part in the deliberations of the Selection Committee does participate in the meeting, its recommendation cannot be disregarded by the Executive Council though it can refer the matter to the Chancellor under Section 42 of the Act or refer the case back to the same Selection Committee. 37. The same view must be taken in respect of the Selection Committee recommending only two names for the appointment and not three. 38. The opening words of Statute 137 are "subject to candidates of requisite merit being available" and consequently they must have reference to the opinion formed by the Selection Committee while making recommendation for appointment to the post. The authority which recommends the names is the Selection Committee and whether in its opinion there are or not other candidates of requisite merits, must be on the objective consideration of the Selection Committee. The words quoted above can have no reference to any opinion which the Executive Council may form. The authority which recommends the names is the Selection Committee and whether in its opinion there are or not other candidates of requisite merits, must be on the objective consideration of the Selection Committee. The words quoted above can have no reference to any opinion which the Executive Council may form. If the Executive Council is of opinion that there is another candidate of requisite merit available, all that it can do is to send the case back to the Selection Committee giving its reasons why it is of opinion that the third name could also be suggested. 39. Keeping in mind the provisions of Statute 138, not sending the name of the third person cannot invalidate the recommendation of the selection Committee. The Executive Council has no option except to refer the case to the same Selection Committee or to accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee, i.e., to make appointment in order of preference given by it. Difficulty will arise only when the Executive Council accepts the recommendation and both the persons recommended by the Selection Committee are not willing or are not available to accept the appointment. In the instant case both the persons recommended were available. Dr. U.S. Srivastava has accepted the post and is Working as Professor and the petitioner is over enthusiastic to be offered this post. In the circumstances the Executive Council would not have been faced with any difficulty on account of the Selection Committee not recommending the third name. 40. In case the Executive Council had the power to appoint any one out of the three persons recommended by the Selection Committee, it could. be said that the Selection Committee must recommend the three names if so desired by the Council. Statute 138, on the other hand, clearly lays down that the Executive Council cannot depart from the recommendation of the Selection Committee. All that it can do is either to appoint to the post the first person recommended by the Selection Committee and on his refusal to appoint the second, or to refer the case back to the Selection Committee for reconsideration and if it adheres to its original opinion to refer the case to the Chancellor for his decision. The Executive Council could not have acted over the head of the Selection Committee by ordering that applications shall he invited afresh after readvertisement. 41. The Executive Council could not have acted over the head of the Selection Committee by ordering that applications shall he invited afresh after readvertisement. 41. Even on merits, the decision of the Executive Council taken in the meeting held on 26-4-1969 is illegal and beyond its competence. The Executive Council has given two reasons for arriving at its decision, one of which is that the Selection Committee had recommended only two names and not three for the appointment. On this point no further comments are necessary. As indicated earlier the Executive Council could not order readvertisement of the post. It could to the most refer the case to the Selection Committee for reconsideration after duly considering the claims of all the candidates, or refer the matter to the Chancellor. 42. The resolution of the Executive Council passed in the meeting of April 26, 1969, makes it clear that the precis of candidates not recommended by the Selection Committee was also before it. It cannot, therefore, be said that on account of the Selection Committee not recommending three names the Executive Council was handicapped in exercising its powers. When the merits and qualifications of all the candidates were before the Executive Council, it could decide whether to act on the recommendation of the Selection Committee or not. Regulation 5 under Ordinance 8, Chapter XI, also shows that it is not obligatory for the Selection Committee to recommend three names. Clause (b) thereof lays down that the Committee shall ordinarily select at least three persons. Under clause (d) the Committee can report that no person can be found with the qualifications required to fill the vacant post. The decision of the Selection Committee to recommend only two names cannot, therefore, be said to be illegal. 43. In other words, the Executive Council had no power to order readvertisement of the post simply because the Selection Committee had recommended two names and not three. 44. Comments on the alleged relationship between Dr. D.S. Srivastava, and Dr. D.N. Varma, have already been made. It may here be simply observed that prior to the consideration of the matter by the Executive Council, on 26-4-1969, there was only a vague suggestion that the expert Dr. D.S. Srivastava, was related to one of the candidates, namely Dr. D.N. Varma. Comments on the alleged relationship between Dr. D.S. Srivastava, and Dr. D.N. Varma, have already been made. It may here be simply observed that prior to the consideration of the matter by the Executive Council, on 26-4-1969, there was only a vague suggestion that the expert Dr. D.S. Srivastava, was related to one of the candidates, namely Dr. D.N. Varma. When there was only a vague suggestion of relationship, how could it be assumed by any reasonable person that the two were related to each other within the meaning of Statute 135. Where no reply is received, the facts as alleged can be presumed to be correct. There can be no presumption beyond the suggestion or the allegation. The Executive Council could, therefore, merely presume that there may be some distant relationship between Dr. D.S. Srivastava and Dr. D.N. Varma, and not that the two were related within the meaning of Statute 135. When no presumption could be made, the Executive Council had no power to regard the recommendation of the Selection Committee to be illegal or the Selection Committee not to have been properly constituted. The Executive Council should also have taken notice of the fact that Dr. D.S. Srivastava may not have received the letter of the Vice-Chancellor in time and had no opportunity to admit of deny the alleged relationship with Dr. D.N. Varma. The Executive Council could, not therefore, take the decision on 26-4-1969 and it was necessary for the Council to postpone consideration of the matter till a reasonable time was given to Dr. D.S. Srivastava to give his version on the vague suggestion contained in the complaint. On this ground also the decision dated 26-4-1969 of the Executive Council shall be illegal and without jurisdiction. 45. This leads us to the consideration whether the recommendation of the Selection Committee including Dr. D.S. Srivastava as an expert, can be regarded to be biased and its recommendations can be overlooked on this ground. 46. The principles governing the doctrine of bias are well-settled and it shall be appropriate to reproduce hereinbelow the principles as enunciated by the Supreme Court on this points. D.S. Srivastava as an expert, can be regarded to be biased and its recommendations can be overlooked on this ground. 46. The principles governing the doctrine of bias are well-settled and it shall be appropriate to reproduce hereinbelow the principles as enunciated by the Supreme Court on this points. The principles were laid clown in Gullapalli Nageswararao v. State of Andhara Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 Supreme Court 1376, as below :- "The principles governing the "doctrine of bias" vis-a-vis judicial tribunals are well-settled and they are : (i) no man shall be a judge in his own cause; (ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. The two maxims yield the result that if a member of a judicial body is subject to a bias (whether financial or other) in favour of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is in such a position that a bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not to take part in the decision or sit on the tribunal"; and that "any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a judge, and any interest, though not pecuniary will have the same effect, if it be sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias". The said principles are equally applicable to authorities, though they are not courts of justice of judicial tribunals, who have to act judicially in deciding the rights of others, i.e., authorities who are empowered to discharge quasi-judicial functions." 47. In William Dines v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, III N.L. Cas. 759, the decree was held to be voidable and was consequently reversed on the ground that the Lord Chancellor had an interest in the company and was disqualified to hear the case. It is of significance that the decree was not regarded to be ab mitio void. The decision of the Judge can be reversed at the instance of the aggrieved party and if the party against whom the order has been passed does not challenge the order, that order shall be as effective as an order passed by a Tribunal or authority qualified to decide the case. 48. The decision of the Judge can be reversed at the instance of the aggrieved party and if the party against whom the order has been passed does not challenge the order, that order shall be as effective as an order passed by a Tribunal or authority qualified to decide the case. 48. What is "real likelihood of bias" has been considered in judicial Review of Administrative Action by S. A. de Smith at pages 244 to 246 of the Second Edition and the material comments are as below:- "A" real likelihood" of bias means at least a substantial possibility of bias. The Court, it has been said, will judge of the matter "as a reasonable man would judge of any matter in the conduct of his own business'. The test of real likelihood of bias, ...................... is based on the reasonable apprehensions of a reasonable than fully apprised of the facts. "......The Courts have often quashed decisions on the strength of the reasonable suspicious of the party aggrieved, without having made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed ........................ Whether a real likelihood of bias existed was to be "determined on the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances, not upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at large." In so far as the "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" tests are inconsistent with each other, it is submitted that the former is normally to be preferred; the reviewing court should make an objective determination, on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether there was a real likelihood that the inferior tribunal would be biased ........................................ .Nevertheless, there is a case for leaving the courts with, a discretion to apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in relation to criminal proceedings and proceedings analogous to the criminal, where the impression created on the defendant's mind may be regarded as being of paramount importance." 49. In case the objection was raised before the Selection Committee had made the recommendation the `real likelihood of bias' or `reasonable suspicion of bias' could be determined on the basis of the facts as might have been in the knowledge of a party; but after the recommendation was made, the real likelihood of bias" or "reasonable suspicion of bias" would largely depend upon the nature of the recommendation. How can a person be said to be biased when he had acted impartially without showing any favour to any one. After the recommendation anyone who could have a cause of grievance was Dr. D.N. Varma, whose name was not recommended by the Selection Committee, all the more, when two names were recommended and not three as is generally done by virtue of Statute 137. It is not unknown that a person, in an attempt to act fairly, exercises discretion against the party in whom he may be nominally interested, to show to all that he is a person not inclined to show favour to a person of his acquaintance. In case Dr. D. N. Varna was challenging the recommendation of the Selection Committee, he could be heard to say that on account of bias that one of the experts had, the recommendation of the Selection Committee be not used to disentitle him from being considered for appointment to the post. The petitioner whose name was placed at number two can have no such cause of grievance. The Selection Committee evidently compared his merits with the merits of Dr. U.S. Srivastava. It is not the petitioner's case that any member of the Selection Committee was interested in Dr. U.S. Srivastava. To make the record against it may be mentioned that the petitioner had made diverse allegations of mala fide against the Vice-Chancellor and a few other persons but these allegations were given up during the hearing of the writ Petition. For purposes of the Writ Petition we shall have, to proceed with the assumption that, according to the petitioner's case, none of the members of the Selection Committee were biased in favour of Dr. U.S. Srivastava or had a bias against the petitioner. When none of the members of the Selection Committee were biased in so far as the petitioner and Dr. U.S. Srivastava are concerned, any opinion formed by them as to the merits of these two candidates shall not be invalid. I am thus of opinion that whatever distant relationship may have existed between Dr. D.N. Varna and Dr. D.S. Srivastava that cannot affect the validity of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. No reasonable persons can say that while judging the comparative merits, of the petitioner and Dr. U.S. Srivastava the Selection Committee was biased or had not acted fairly. I am thus of opinion that whatever distant relationship may have existed between Dr. D.N. Varna and Dr. D.S. Srivastava that cannot affect the validity of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. No reasonable persons can say that while judging the comparative merits, of the petitioner and Dr. U.S. Srivastava the Selection Committee was biased or had not acted fairly. Consequently, the opinion formed by the Executive Council on the point is erroneous and that could not justify the Council to completely disregard the recommendation and to direct at applications for he post shall be invited afresh after readvertisement. 50. The power of the Chancellor is governed by the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. He can interfere with the decision of the Executive Council only if it is not in conformity with the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinance. This power is akin to the power of the High Court under Section 100 C.P.C., governing Second Appeals. A Second Appeal against the decision of an appellate court is maintainable only if the decision is not according to law, i.e., is not in conformity with the law. The High Court hearing a Second Appeal can, entertain the Appeal only on the ground of illegality, i.e., on a question of law. Where a finding of fact recorded is perverse such that no reasonable person could have taken that view, that also amounts to an illegality. 51. As already held above, no reasonable body could have formed an opinion that Dr. D.S. Srivastava was disqualified to act as a member of the Selection Committee for an appointment to which Dr. D.N. Varma was one of the candidates, nor could be a reasonable authority declare the recommendation of the Selection Committee to be biased and hence invalid at the instance of the petitioner. The Executive Council clearly acted without jurisdiction by disregarding the recommendation of the Selection Committee on the ground that the Selection Committee had recommended the names of only two and not three persons. The Chancellor, therefore, had the power to entertain the representation and to set aside the decision of the Executive Council taken in the meeting of April 26, 1969. The Chancellor could entertain the representation of Dr U.S. Srivastava even though the recommendation of the Selection Committee was a secret document. After the meeting of the Executive Council Dr. The Chancellor, therefore, had the power to entertain the representation and to set aside the decision of the Executive Council taken in the meeting of April 26, 1969. The Chancellor could entertain the representation of Dr U.S. Srivastava even though the recommendation of the Selection Committee was a secret document. After the meeting of the Executive Council Dr. U.S Srivastava could know that the post shall be readvertised and the application already made or to be made shall be freshly considered by another Selection Committee. He could, therefore, make a representation even though he could not legally be said to be aware of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. In any case, on receipt of the representation the Chancellor could for the papers and pass suitable orders. 52. The order of the Chancellor is challenged on two other grounds also firstly, that he made no comments on one of the grounds which prevailed upon the Executive Council to direct the readvertisement of the post, namely, that the expert Dr. D.S. Srivastava, had not sent a reply and had not challenged the alleged relationship with Dr. D. N. Varma; and secondly, that the Chancellor passed the order without giving notice to and without hearing the Executive Council and also the petitioner. 53. From the counter affidavit of Professor A.B. Lal, it appears that the Chancellor had merely obtained information from the Vice-Chancellor and no notice was given to the Executive Council nor to the petitioner. The Vice Chancellor could not represent the Executive Council and any comments read by him could not be deemed to be the reply of the Executive Council. When the decision of the Executive Council was being challenged, it would have be proper of the Chancellor to give notice to the Executive Council also so that the council may make such representation as may be considered necessary. There has thus been violation of the principles of natural justice to this extent. However, it cannot be lost sight of that even though the Executive Council was impleaded as respondent No. 3 it has not filed a counter affidavit to support the petitioner. When the Executive Council is not challenging the order of the Chancellor the order cannot be set aside at the instance of the third party. 54. To hold that for purposes of the representation, the petitioner was an interested party shall lead to unnecessary difficulty. When the Executive Council is not challenging the order of the Chancellor the order cannot be set aside at the instance of the third party. 54. To hold that for purposes of the representation, the petitioner was an interested party shall lead to unnecessary difficulty. The petitioner shall stand in the same category, as other persons who may later apply for the post. Who shall apply after the readvertisement would be a matter unknown to any one at the time the representation was made ? It would, have been impossible for the Chancellor to give notice of the representation to unknown persons. Further, the petitioner had not acquired any rights under the resolution of the Executive Council and when the decision of the Council was being challenged it cannot he said that for purposes of the representation the petitioner was, in any way, a proper party. 55. The learned Advocate for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in B.K. Gupta v. The Chancellor, Lucknow, University, Lucknow, 1962 A.L.J. 289. This case can be distinguished on facts. Therein the Chancellor had declared the appointment of the petitioner as Professor of Law null and void. He was thus being divested of a legal right which would have accrued to him by his appointment as Professor. In the instant case, the Executive Council had not decided to appoint anyone and it was a matter of speculation who may eventually be appointed to the post. The Bench decided the case had quoted with approval a few English decisions which clearly lay down that the person aggrieved is not "a person who is disappointed or annoyed at the decision', nor is he "a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made." The person aggrieved is "a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something". The petitioner does not fall in this category. He is merely a person who is disappointed or annoyed at the decision. He cannot, therefore, be treated a person aggrieved and, therefore, it was not necessary for the Chancellor to give him a hearing before deciding the representation. 56. The petitioner does not fall in this category. He is merely a person who is disappointed or annoyed at the decision. He cannot, therefore, be treated a person aggrieved and, therefore, it was not necessary for the Chancellor to give him a hearing before deciding the representation. 56. The other factor which must be kept in mind is that the decision of the executive Council taken in the meeting of April 26, 1969, is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction. No two opinions are possible on this point. No party can say that the High Court must exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 in each and every case where some illegality has been committed. In suitable circumstances the High Court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 even though the impugned order is illegal or is without jurisdiction. The present is one of those cases where the High Court need not exercise such jurisdiction. It is only where two views are possible and it is not known which view the Chancellor may later take, that the High Court must quash the order of the Chancellor leaving it open to him to reconsider the matter and record such a finding as he may consider proper. 57. My attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in Dr. S.N. Shukla v. Chancellor, Lucknow University, Government House, Lucknow, Special Appeal No. 63 of 1960 decided on 21.11.1961. That was case where the dispute was not free from difficulty such that the Chancellor was bound to come to the same decision on rehearing. In this connection the Bench observed as below :- "As I pointed out, the dispute was not so free from difficulty and the issue between the parties was not so clear that the Chancellor was bound to come to the same decision on rehearing in the presence of the appellant." 58. In the instant case, however, the legal position is so clear that no one can hold that the decision of the Executive Council in its meeting of April 26, 1969, was within its power. This decision is clearly illegal and beyond jurisdiction and on rehearing the Chancellor shall be bound to take the same view. In the instant case, however, the legal position is so clear that no one can hold that the decision of the Executive Council in its meeting of April 26, 1969, was within its power. This decision is clearly illegal and beyond jurisdiction and on rehearing the Chancellor shall be bound to take the same view. It is, therefore, not necessary to quash the order of the Chancellor and to refer the matter back to him for re-hearing after notice to the Executive Council and, if necessary, to the petitioner. 59. It is true that the Chancellor made no comments on one of the points which prevailed upon the Executive Council to direct the applications shall be invited afresh after readvertisement; but as held above, the facts of the case are such as can lead to no other inference except that the decision of the Executive Council in its meeting of April 26, 1969, is beyond its powers. Therefore, it is not necessary to remand the matter to the Chancellor for according an opinion on this point also. 60. The last point urged before me is that the subsequent resolution of the Executive Council passed in its meeting held on August 19, 1969, is beyond the directions of the Chancellor. It is suggested that by virtue of this order it was necessary for the Executive Council to refer the case back to the Selection Committee and not to take the decision to accept the recommendation and to make the appointment accordingly. This contention is not supported by the impugned order passed by the Chancellor. In the first paragraph of the order the Chancellor has given the nature of the representation and the action taken by him. In the second paragraph he gave his reasons why in his opinion there was no contravention of Statute 137. In the third paragraph he explained the legal position as to the power of the Executive Council. In the first paragraph of the order the Chancellor has given the nature of the representation and the action taken by him. In the second paragraph he gave his reasons why in his opinion there was no contravention of Statute 137. In the third paragraph he explained the legal position as to the power of the Executive Council. The operative part of the order is contained in the last paragraph which is as below : "For the above I hold that the direction of the Executive Council mentioned above was violative of the provisions of the Statutes of the Allahabad University, and accordingly, I hereby quash the impugned resolution of the Executive Council, dated April 26, 1969 and direct the Executive Council to dispose the recommendation of the Selection Committee in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statutes of the Allahabad University." 61. The direction given by the Chancellor was that the Executive Council should dispose of the recommendation of the Selection Committee in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes. There was no direction that the Executive Council should refer the case back to the Selection Committee. The matter was left completely in the discretion of the Executive Council, either to accept the recommendation and make the appointment or to refer the case to the Selection Committee for reconsideration after giving its reasons in writing. Consequently, when the Executive Council decided to accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee, it cannot be said to have acted against the provisions of the Statutes or contrary to the directions of the Chancellor. 62. To sum up, the decision of the Executive Council in its 'meeting of April 26, 1969, was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction and the order of the Chancellor quashing this decision and directing the Council to act in accordance with the Statutes, cannot be interfered with in the present proceeding. The order of the Chancellor is not improper nor can it be said that when the Executive Council reconsidered the matter it acted beyond the directions of the Chancellor is not improper nor can it be said that when the Executive Council reconsidered the matter it acted beyond the directions of the Chancellor. The appointment of Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4, as Professor of the Zoology Department of the Allahabad University, cannot, therefore, be successfully challenged and he can continue to function as such. 63. The appointment of Dr. U.S. Srivastava, respondent No. 4, as Professor of the Zoology Department of the Allahabad University, cannot, therefore, be successfully challenged and he can continue to function as such. 63. The Writ Petition has thus no force and it is hereby dismissed with costs.