Judgment :- VENKATARAMAN, J. - This is an appeal against the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, dismissing the petition which the appellants filed under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation of Rs. 1, 50, 000 on account of the death of one Krishnaswami. He was driving the car MSY 3938 in Mount Road at 10-40 A.M. on April 24, 1964. In the opposite direction, the lorry belonging to Smt. R. Hamsavalli (second respondent in the petition and in the appeal before us) came. The case of the appellants was that the lorry was driven by its driver, one Munuswami, in a rash and negligent manner and it dashed against the car MSY 3938, as result of which, Krishnaswami died. The first respondent in the petition is the insurance company, with whom the lorry has been insured. At the outset, we must clear the confusion which has arisen about the directions of the travel of the lorry and the car. According to the arguments addressed to us on the basis of the sketch, exhibit P-1, drawn by the inspector or police (P.W. 1), who arrived at the spot at 11-20 A.M., i.e., after 40 minutes of the accident, the car was travelling from east to west at the particular place of impact and the lorry was travelling from west to east. The petition alleged that the car was travelling from north to south and the lorry was travelling from south to north. That was apparently because the general direction of the Mount Road is from Madras which is in the north to St. Thomas Mount which is in the south. Mount Road takes a curve in some places and it is enough to state that in the particular spot, the road was from west to east. That was apparently because the general direction of the Mount Road is from Madras which is in the north to St. Thomas Mount which is in the south. Mount Road takes a curve in some places and it is enough to state that in the particular spot, the road was from west to east. Thus, the case of the petitioner set out in the petition may be taken to be that the car was travelling from east to west and that the lorry which was coming in the opposite direction was driven in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the car.The written statement of the second respondent which was adopted by the first respondent is to the effect that the lorry was keeping to its proper side of the road and was not driven at a rash speed and that the collision was entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by the deceased, Krishnaswami. It was pointed out that he had obtained the licence only about four months prior to the occurrence (actually the evidence of P.W. 3 shows that he had obtained the licence only in March, 1964, and before that, he had a learner's licence for three months). It was urged that because he was a novice at driving, he was unable to control his car and made a head on collision on the right hand side of the lorry which was keeping to its proper side of the road and was not being driver at any rash speed. The accident could not be avoided in spite of the best attempt made by the lorry driver. The eye witnesses to the occurrence who are put forward on the side of the appellants are P.W. 3 and 4. P.W. 3, P Subramaniam, was a friend of the deceased. He was in the front seat to the left of the driver, Krishnaswami. His evidence in the chief examination is to the effect that the lorry came in the opposite direction to the right side of the car and turned to its left side (left side of the lorry) and the right back side of the lorry his the right front portion of the car. His evidence in the chief examination is to the effect that the lorry came in the opposite direction to the right side of the car and turned to its left side (left side of the lorry) and the right back side of the lorry his the right front portion of the car. He added that the car was going on the left side of the road and that they could not go on the mud portion which was further on the southern portion of the road because there was gravel there. P.W. 4, Susila, is a public health nursing instructor in Andhra Mahila Sabha Nursing Home. She was a friend of P.W. 3. She went with P.W. 3 and Krishnaswami in the car for an interview at Nandambakam (Beyond St. Thomas Mount) at 11 A.M. She was seated in the back side of the car. Her evidence is that the lorry came in the opposite direction very fast. There were two stationary lorries to their right side. The lorry involved in the accident came past both the stationary lorries. It came to the right of the car and then went to its (lorry's) left. Krishnaswami point out that the lorry was coming fast. He swerved 3 to 5 feet to the left. Their car went 3 ft. from the edge of the concrete portion of the road. To a court question, she stated that the car after forging to the left had resumed to its straight position at the time of impact. She added that the car was going at 20 miles per hour. The further evidences of P.Ws. 3 and 4 is that Krishnaswami became unconscious and died soon after when he was being taken to the hospital.P.W. 1 is inspector of police, who went to the spot at about 11-20 A.M. and investigated the accident. He prepared the sketch, exhibit P-1. He saw both the vehicles there. But he adds that the place of impact was marked by the police constable on duty. Actually in the lorry and the car at time of the impact in dotted lines in the middle of the road. This, of course, was on the basis of what the police constable on duty told him. He saw both the vehicles there. But he adds that the place of impact was marked by the police constable on duty. Actually in the lorry and the car at time of the impact in dotted lines in the middle of the road. This, of course, was on the basis of what the police constable on duty told him. When he saw the vehicle, the lorry was on the north of the road facing east and the car was on the extreme south of the road facing east. But they are not relevant for determining the place of impact. The place of impact is further fixed by P.W. 1 in the following manner. The windscreen glass of the car had been smashed and the glass pieces were in the middle and more on the southern side of the road. This evidence of P.W. 1 was meant to show that the place of impact was indicated by the fact that the smashed pieces of the windscreen glass of the car were more on the southern side of the middle line of the road. It was brought out in the cross examination that Ravindran was the constable on duty and was present before the Tribunal, but Ravindran was not examined by the appellants. To that extent the marking of the place of impact by the constable as found in the sketch cannot be substantive evidence. But what the inspector actually saw himself and has deposed to in court is admissible evidence and, according to what he saw, the glass piece were more on the southern side of the road, which means that the lorry had gone to its wrong side. Actually the sketch shows that the tarred portion was 16'3 "at that spot. The concrete portion to the south of the tarred portion was 5' broad and the concrete portion to north of the tarred portion was 6'4". To the south of the southern concrete portion a width of 12'9" is shown as rugged road. Similarly to the north of the northern concrete portion the rugged portion is shown as 5'9" * broad. The concrete portion to the south of the tarred portion was 5' broad and the concrete portion to north of the tarred portion was 6'4". To the south of the southern concrete portion a width of 12'9" is shown as rugged road. Similarly to the north of the northern concrete portion the rugged portion is shown as 5'9" * broad. The actual point to be noted in the evidence of P.W. 1 is that the glass pieces were in the middle line of the tarred portion of the road and more on the southern side of that middle line.The matter is really clinched in favour of the appellants by the admission of the driver of the lorry who was examined in court as R.W. 1 by the respondents. In chief examination he only stated that he was driving the lorry at a distance of four feet from the left edge of the road and that the car came as if hitting the lorry. He, therefore, swerved to the left and the car hit the right back side of the lorry. He came to know of it only after the impact, because the car hit the lorry in the back. He immediately stopped the lorry. In cross examination he would not first admit that lorry came to the middle portion of the right hand side of the road. But after further questioning he admitted that suggestion made to him on behalf of the appellants. Actually the admissions were these : "The impact was on the south side of the road. The place of accident was 10 feet from the right side of the mud portion of the road." The sentence," the impact was on the south side of the road" * could have only one meaning, namely, that the impact was south of the middle line of the tarred portion of the road. That is a clear admission that the lorry was on the wrong side of the road. The reason for that appears, in our opinion, to be the facts stated by P.W. 4 that the lorry driver tried to overtake two stationary lorries and for that purpose had come to the southern side of the road. That is a clear admission that the lorry was on the wrong side of the road. The reason for that appears, in our opinion, to be the facts stated by P.W. 4 that the lorry driver tried to overtake two stationary lorries and for that purpose had come to the southern side of the road. The further sentence in the evidence of P.W. 1, "the place of accident was 10 feet from the right hand side of the mud portion of the road" * makes even clearer what is already clear from the earlier sentence that the impact was on the southern side of the road. If we construe the second sentence on the basis of the plan, exhibit P-1, it would mean literally this, that the place of accident was 10 feet from the southern edge of the mud portion of the road, and since the mud portion of the road was 12'9 "broad, it would mean literally that the collision took place even in the mud portion of the road. We may take it, however, that what the drive meant to say was that the place of accident was 10 feet from the right hand side or the mud portion of the road, that is to say, ten feet from the northern edge of the mud portion. But even so, the place of collision could be only on the southern side on the middle line of the tarred portion of the road, because the concrete portion of the road was there 5' broad and, allowing for another 5' on the tarred portion, that would bring the place of collision 3' 1 1/2"to the south of the middle line of the road the tarred portion being 16'3"(the tarred portion south of the middle line of the road would be 8' 1 1/2" * ). There are thus clear admissions of the driver which fit in win the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 and the evidence of P.W. 1.The picture which emerges from the above admission of the driver and the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 is that the collision took place when the lorry had come south of the middle line of the tarred portion of the road. Evidently it had come south of the middle line of the tarred portion of road, because the driver of the lorry wanted to overtake the two stationary lorries. 1, 3 and 4 is that the collision took place when the lorry had come south of the middle line of the tarred portion of the road. Evidently it had come south of the middle line of the tarred portion of road, because the driver of the lorry wanted to overtake the two stationary lorries. Whatever the reason may be, when once it is proved by the admission that the collision took place on the south of the middle line of the road, it follows that the accident was due to the therefore the respondents would be clearly liable for the death of the deceased. After the arguments were over, we adjourned the case to enable the parties to arrive at a settlement if that was possible and at that stage, Mr. Askar Ali, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, urged that even if the driver of the lorry was the person who was primarily liable for the collision, there was contributory negligence on the part on the part of Krishnaswami, the argument being that Krishnaswami could have swerved left and avoided the collision. But the plea was not raised in this form in the pleadings in the court below, and we are not prepared to allow this plea to be raised at this late stage. We are not satisfied that there was any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. He was going on the proper side of the road and he could not be expected to foresee that the lorry would not get out of his way in time. There was not much time left for him to negligence and swerve his car to the left. We have seen that the admissions of the driver himself are sufficient in this matter to prove his negligence. There is also the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4. Nothing has been brought out in the cross examination of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 to discredit the general picture which emerges from their evidence. So far as P.W. 3 is concerned, if is pointed out that in the criminal court, where the driver was prosecuted, (and acquitted) P.W. 3 stated (exhibit R-2) :"I cannot say how the impact took place". But the sentence cannot be taken in isolation, and cannot detract from the general picture given by the witness. So far as P.W. 3 is concerned, if is pointed out that in the criminal court, where the driver was prosecuted, (and acquitted) P.W. 3 stated (exhibit R-2) :"I cannot say how the impact took place". But the sentence cannot be taken in isolation, and cannot detract from the general picture given by the witness. In the cross examination of P.W. 4 we find the following : "I was examined in the criminal court. I told there that the lorry tried to overtakes the stationary lorries. I did not say there that I remembered it the next day." * The whole deposition in the criminal court has been marked as exhibit R-3. This is irregular. If is was intended to contradict the evidence by the previous statement in the criminal court, her attention should have been drawn under section 145 of the Evidence Act to the portion of her evidence in the criminal court. Actually we find from exhibit R-3 that the witness stated even in the criminal court that the lorry tried to overtake the stationary lorries and it is not in respect of that fact that she deposed that she remembered it the next day. What she remembered the next day after telling the police on the date of the accident was a different point which put in the enquiry before the claims tribunal. The learned counsel, Mr. Askar Ali, commented on the fact that P.W. 3 did not refer to the stationary lorries. But the obvious explanation is that he might not have observed the stationary lorries but it could not disprove the statement of P.W. 4 who claims to have seen the stationary lorries. The Tribunal has really missed the admission made by the driver in his cross-examination and also the observation of P.W. 1, the traffic inspector, which themselves go to show that the impact took place on the south of the middle portion of the tarred road. Regarding the evidence of P.W. 1, the Tribunal observes : "The petitioner relies upon the evidence of the police officer to the effect that one screen glass of the car had been smashed and the glass pieces were strewn in the middle and more on the southern side of the road. This is rather difficult to understand because the road must be running from north to south according to the case of both the parties. This is rather difficult to understand because the road must be running from north to south according to the case of both the parties. At any rate this cannot be taken to mean that the glass pieces were found strewn more towards the left of the car rather than to the right of the car. In any event the policy officer went to the place after an appreciable time after the accident and the place where the glass pieces were found strewn will not be an indication of the place where the impact occurred. It must also be remembered that the vehicles were not found at the place of impact and they have been removed from that place." * Now it is clear from this passage that the Tribunal was not even able to understand the evidence of the inspector that the glass pieces were more on the southern side of the road, because the Tribunal was under the impression that the road there runs north to south. He had evidently not referred to the sketch, exhibit P-1, and if he felt any difficulty on this fundamental point in understanding the evidence of P.W. 1, it was his duty to have questioned P.W. 1 and asked him to clarify it. It is also difficult to define the meaning and significance of the sentence : "At any rate this cannot be taken to mean that the glass pieces were found strewn more towards the left of the car rather than to the right of the car." * The comment that the evidence of the police officer was unless because he went to the place of accident after an appreciable time misses the obvious went to the place of accident after an appreciable time misses the obvious signification of what the police officer actually found, as indicating the place of impact, though the vehicles were not at that spot when the inspector actually went there. Similarly regarding the evidence of the driver what the Tribunal says about it is this : "As against this evidence (of P.Ws. 3 and 4), the driver of the lorry as P.W. 1 states that he drove 4 feet from the left edge of the road, that the car came as if it was hitting the lorry, that he swerved to his left but the car hit the lorry's right back side. 3 and 4), the driver of the lorry as P.W. 1 states that he drove 4 feet from the left edge of the road, that the car came as if it was hitting the lorry, that he swerved to his left but the car hit the lorry's right back side. He denies that the lorry ever came to the middle potion or to the right side of the road and that the impact was in the south side of the road." * Thus the tribunal proceeds on the footing that the driver denied that the impact was on the south side of the road. We have verified the original deposition and there is no such denial at all. On the contrary the driver has clearly admitted this :"The impact was on the south side of the road." He has followed it up by the further sentence : "The place of accident was 10 feet from the right hand side of the mud portion of the road." * Here again the tribunal seems to have missed the significance of the admission that the impact was on the south side of the road, because of the general impression that at that place the road ran north to south and that the lorry was travelling from south to north. These fundamental mistakes have obviously vitiated the judgment and rendered it useless. Again, commenting on the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4, the Tribunal goes to the extent of saying, that their evidence itself shows that the lorry driver was not negligent. The Tribunal's reasoning is that the lorry first came towards the right of the car and then swerved to its (lorry's) left and that the front portion of the lorry was not damaged and only and rear portion was damaged. Upon these facts he observes : "It will thus be clear on the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 4 that the lorry's front portion swerved clear from the path of the car so that the front portion of the lorry did not hit the car. If the front portion of the lorry swerved clear from the car, it is common knowledge that the back wheels of the lorry must have gone further from the route of the car, on the assumption that the car was going straight and did not swerve to the right. If the front portion of the lorry swerved clear from the car, it is common knowledge that the back wheels of the lorry must have gone further from the route of the car, on the assumption that the car was going straight and did not swerve to the right. If this was the case there could never have been a collision on the rear side of the lorry. But as it is an admitted fact that the collision was at the rear portion of the lorry, the probabilities are that the car did not go in a straight path but must have swerved to its right." * It is most unfair to P.Ws. 3 and 4 to say that their evidence itself shows that the lorry driver was not negligent, when their evidence was calculated to show that the lorry driver was negligent Further the comment that because the front portion of the lorry swerved clear from the car the back wheels of the lorry must have gone further from the route of the car and therefore the lorry driver could not have been negligent failed to visualise what happened. The front portion of the lorry did not evidently hit the right side of the car, because the car was still east of the lorry then but when the car moved westwards, the rear portion of the lorry came in contact with the car and hit the car. This is the simple explanation for the fact that the collision was not between the front portion of the lorry and the car, but was between the rear portion of the lorry and the car. That by itself would not be help to decide who was the party who was negligent or rash. That question must be decided on other considerations which we have pointed out above, in particular, the fact that the lorry, according to the admission of the driver himself and the observation of P.W. 1 and the evidence of P.W.s 3 and 4, was going south of the middle line of the tarred portion of the road. The lorry driver had evidently hoped to get out of the way of car, but could not do so. The lorry driver had evidently hoped to get out of the way of car, but could not do so. It was he who was responsible for the accident.With reference to the comment of the Tribunal that, if the front portion of the lorry has swerved clear from the path of the car, the back wheels of the lorry must have gone further from the route of the car. Sri Govind Swaminathan, the learned Advocate General who appeared for the appellant, urged that, if the lorry was going at a high speed and the front wheels swerved to the left, the rear wheels would somewhat project to the right and therefore accelerate the chances of the lorry hitting the car. He submitted that to clear up this point an application (M.P. No. 1972 of 1964) was made before the Tribunal by the appellant to examine an expert witness on the ground that the point about what would happen to the rear wheels was raised for the first time in the arguments by the respondents. That application was opposed and dismissed. The Tribunal observed : "No new point was raised at any time. The question as to how the wheels of a motor vehicle will turn when it swerves is a matter of common knowledge or at the most only a matter for evidence. I see no reason to reopen the case. Petition dismissed with costs." * We find that there was actually no evidence on the point and if the parties differed on that point, justice required that further opportunity should be given to the parties to adduce evidence on the point. We have, however, thought it unnecessary to take fresh evidence on that point, because for the reasons pointed out already even the evidence actually available is sufficient to fix the responsibility for the accident on the driver of the lorry. The Tribunal had commented on the fact that Krishnaswami took the driving licence only in March, 1964, and was a novice in driving and must have got unnerved on seeing the lorry coming in the opposite direction. But this overlooks the actual evidence in the case. The Tribunal also comments on the fact that the foot break of the lorry was 63 per cent. efficient and that the driver of the lorry was acquitted in the criminal court. Those factors are really not relevant. But this overlooks the actual evidence in the case. The Tribunal also comments on the fact that the foot break of the lorry was 63 per cent. efficient and that the driver of the lorry was acquitted in the criminal court. Those factors are really not relevant. At the expense of the repetition it has to be pointed out that the Tribunal's judgment has been vitiated by its failure to appreciate the evidence and overlooking the admissions of the driver of the lorry. We hold, therefore, that the driver of the lorry was responsible for the collision which resulted in the death of Krishnaswami and that consequently the respondents would be liable to pay compensation.The next question is the quantum of compensation. Now the deceased was aged 34 at the time of the accident. He was a contractor in the Public Works Department. P.W. 2, an assistant engineer of the public works department states that the work of the deceased a contractor from 1954 to 1957, when he was there, was satisfactory. The petition itself mentions that he was getting an income of Rs. 6, 500 a year and was an income tax assessee. Exhibit P-3(a), the assessment order for 1962-63 shows that income was Rs. 8, 641 in 1961-62. Exhibit P-2, the assessment order for the year 1963-1964, shows that the income for 1962-63 was Rs. 6, 500 and he paid an income tax of Rs. 415.11. It may, therefore, be taken that he was getting a net income of about Rs. 500 a month. His widow, P.W. 5 states that he used to spend Rs. 250 to Rs. 300 per month on his family consisting of his wife and three children aged 8 years, 6 years and 4 1/2 years at the time of the petition. He had purchased a car for Rs. 10, 000. The question is, on these materials what is the proper amount of compensation to be paid in a lump sum ? In Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami their Lordships of the Supreme Court has laid down the principles governing the award of compensation in such cases. The case arose out of a suit instituted by the defendants, legal representatives of the Rajarathnam, a passenger in a bus, whose driver drove the vehicle rashly and negligently which resulted in fatal injuries to Rajarathnam. The case arose out of a suit instituted by the defendants, legal representatives of the Rajarathnam, a passenger in a bus, whose driver drove the vehicle rashly and negligently which resulted in fatal injuries to Rajarathnam. Compensation was claimed both under sections 1 and 2 of the fatal Accidents Act. Their Lordships pointed out that under section 1 dependents would be entitled to compensation for the loss of pecuniary benefit sustained by them personally and under section 2 the legal representatives would be entitled to loss sustained by the estate on account of the death of Rajarathnam. The two causes of action are different but where the claimants are the same they might overlap and compensation should not be awarded twice over. The same principles apply to the claim under section 110A of the Motor vehicles Act by the legal representatives. Now in this case the legal representatives and the dependents are the same. We can really proceed on the basis of the net loss to the estate. The deceased could be expected to live for about 25 years more and the net loss of income reasonably be taken to be about Rs. 3, 000 per year. In this case, that may represent the loss of pecuniary benefit to the dependents. The total loss would therefore be Rs. 75, 000 but this will have to be reduced on account of the fact that a lump sum payment is to be made. On this basis we hold that a compensation of Rs. 40, 000 (rupees forty thousand only) would be fair and reasonable. Incidentally, it would, if invested at 6 per cent., yield only a return of Rs. 200 per month for the dependants and cannot be considered to be on the higher side.Obviously, the second respondent will be liable to pay the compensation of Rs. 40, 000 to the appellants, because it was the negligent driving of the second respondents driver which caused the death of Krishnaswami. The insurance company, the first respondent, however, contends that under section 95(2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the liability of the insurance company must be limited to a sum of Rs. 20, 000 since the vehicle was a goods vehicle. The appellants, however, urged that this contention cannot prevail in view of the decision of the bench of this court consisting of Srinivasan J. and Sadasivam J. in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan. 20, 000 since the vehicle was a goods vehicle. The appellants, however, urged that this contention cannot prevail in view of the decision of the bench of this court consisting of Srinivasan J. and Sadasivam J. in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan. The insurance company submits that this decision requires re-consideration. After hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties, we are inclined to think that the decision requires further consideration by a Full Bench. We accordingly propose to refer the matter to a Full Bench (vide separate order of reference). After receipt of the opinion of the Full Bench, the appeal will be posted before us for the final decision about the payment of compensation as between the respondents. KAILASAM J. - I agree with the views expressed by my learned brother, Venkataraman J., that a compensation of Rs. 40, 000 is payable to the claimants before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras. I also agree with his conclusion that the question whether liability of the insurer in the case of goods vehicle regarding third parties is limited to Rs. 20, 000 in all, should be referred to a Full Bench. I would state my reasons as follows : The answer to the question raised depends upon the construction of section 95 of the Act which specifies the requirements of the policy and the limit of liability. The section requires that the policy should insure against any liability which may be incurred in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by the use of a vehicle in a public place. This requirement in certain cases of death and bodily injury to persons is exempted under the proviso to section 95(1) (b). Section 95(1) (b) also specifies the extent of liability under sub-section (2) to section 95. The limit of the liability specified under sub-section (2) is subject to the proviso to sub-section (1).The proviso states that a policy shall not be required to cover liability in the following cases : (1) in the case of death or bodily injury sustained by an employee during the course of his employment. (2) In the case of vehicles other than hired vehicles in respect of death or bodily injury to person being carried on or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event. (2) In the case of vehicles other than hired vehicles in respect of death or bodily injury to person being carried on or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event. (3) In the case of any contractual liability. The first proviso excepts from its operation the liability arising out of the Workmen's Compensation act in respect of death or bodily injury to an employee specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the first proviso. The second proviso also excepts from its operations vehicles in which passengers are carried for higher or reward by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. The two exceptions are removed from the scope of the proviso. The effect of the proviso to section 95(1) (b) is that while a compulsory policy under the chapter need not include and cover liability in respect of the death or bodily injury to an employee in the course of employment, a policy is required to cover the liability arising out of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the course of certain employment. So also while a policy is not required to cover liability in respect of the death or bodily injury to persons carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle, a policy is required to be taken regarding passengers who are carried for higher or reward. No policy is required to cover any contractual liability. Section 95(1) also provides that the policy shall be to the extent specified in sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) is specifically stated to be subject to the proviso to sub-section (1). The sub-section provides that the policy of the insurance shall cover any liability in respect of any one accident to the limits specified, namely, (a) in the case of goods vehicle, Rs. 20, 000, (b) in the case of a passenger vehicle, Rs. 20, 000 in respect of persons other than passengers, and, in respect of passengers, another Rs. 20, 000, (c) in the case of a vehicle which is not a vehicle under clause (a) or (b), the amount of the liability incurred. In the case of goods vehicle sub-section 2(a) of section 95 provides the limit of Rs. 20, 000 in respect of persons other than passengers, and, in respect of passengers, another Rs. 20, 000, (c) in the case of a vehicle which is not a vehicle under clause (a) or (b), the amount of the liability incurred. In the case of goods vehicle sub-section 2(a) of section 95 provides the limit of Rs. 20, 000 in all, including the liability, if any, in respect of the death or the bodily injury to employees other than the driver not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle. The sub-section 2(a) includes within the limit of Rs. 20, 000 the liability arising out of the Workmen's Compensation Act which liability is an exception to proviso (i) to section 95(1) (b). Section 95(2) (b) fixes the limit in the case of a passenger vehicle at Rs. 20, 000 in cases other than passengers and a limit of Rs. 20, 000 in respect of passengers. Section 95(1) (b), proviso (ii), excepts passengers carried for higher or reward from its operation. In other words, the liability as against the passengers carried for hire or reward is compulsorily insurable under the Act. This liability under section 95(2) (b) is limited to Rs. 20, 000 in respect of persons other than passengers, that is, third parties, and Rs. 20, 000 in the case of passengers. It is only in the case of vehicles which do not fall under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) to section 95, the liability is fixed as the amount of liability incurred. Thus, it will be seem that in the case of a vehicle which is not a goods vehicle or a passenger vehicle for hire, there is no limit to the liability by the insurance company. In the case of the goods vehicle and passenger vehicle, the limit of liability is fixed.Now it has to be considered how far the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" in section 95(2) would affect the construction put upon the sub-section. As already pointed out, the proviso to sub-section (1) (b) of section 95 is that am policy need not be taken in three cases specified in provisos (i), (ii) and (iii), while it shall be taken in two cases which are excepted from the operation of provisos (i) and (ii), respectively. As already pointed out, the proviso to sub-section (1) (b) of section 95 is that am policy need not be taken in three cases specified in provisos (i), (ii) and (iii), while it shall be taken in two cases which are excepted from the operation of provisos (i) and (ii), respectively. The liability under the case covered by proviso to section 95(1) (b) is independent and it is not compulsorily insurable. In the two cases which are excepted under provisos (i) and (ii) and which are compulsorily insurable, the liability is included in the limits specified in section 95(2) (a) and (b), respectively. It is only on the three instances that are covered by the provisos which are not compulsorily insurable, the liability is not covered by sub-section (2) of section 95. Now, reading the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", the applicability can only be confined to the proviso which exempt compulsory insurance, that is, the liability that may arise out of the three instances which are not compulsorily insurable is excluded from the limit set out in section 95(2) and any liability that may be incurred will be over and above the limits provided for under section 95(2). As those items are not compulsorily insurable, the insurer cannot be held liable for any amount in excess of the amount specified in section 95(2), that is, Rs. 20, 000, in the case of a goods vehicle. In this view, I am unable agree with the decision of the Division bench of this court in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan and, therefore, I agree that the matter should be placed before a Full Bench. VENKATARAMAN J.- In this case, we have found that one Munuswami drove a lorry negligently in Mount Road, Madras and thereby caused the death of one Krishnaswami, who came driving a car in the opposite direction. The owner of the lorry is Srimathi R. Hamsavalli, the second respondent in the appeal. The lorry had been insured against third party liability with the first respondent insurance company under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. We have held that the compensation payable by the second respondent to the appellants who are the legal representatives of the deceased, Krishnaswami, is Rs. 40, 000 (rupees forty thousand only). The lorry had been insured against third party liability with the first respondent insurance company under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. We have held that the compensation payable by the second respondent to the appellants who are the legal representatives of the deceased, Krishnaswami, is Rs. 40, 000 (rupees forty thousand only). The insurance company contends that under section 95(2) (a) of the Motor vehicles Act their liability under the policy is limited to Rs. 20, 000. The appellants this position and rely on a decision of Srinivasan and Sadasivam JJ. in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan, where it was held in a similar case that the liability of a insurance company in respect of injury to a third party is not subject to the limit of Rs. 20, 000 under section 95(2) (a). The insurance company submits that the decision is wrong and required further consideration. After hearing arguments, we are of opinion, with great respect to the learned judges, that the decision requires consideration by a Full Bench. Here are my reasons :Section 94(1) states : "No person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by this person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter (Chapter VIII) ..." * Section 95(1), in so far as it is relevant, may be quoted in full : "95. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which ... (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which ... (b) insures the person or classes of person specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or(iii) to cover any contractual liability. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely :- (a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of twenty thousand rupees in all including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workman's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle; (b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, in respect of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of twenty thousand rupees; and in respect of passengers a limit of twenty thousand rupees in all, and four thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger, if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver or two thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger, if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver; (c) where the vehicle is vehicle of any other class, the amount of the liability incurred." Section 96 has also been referred to and may be quoted : " 96. (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (4) of section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable is respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments." * The contention of the insurance company is that the lorry of the second respondent is a goods vehicle, that under section 95(2) (a) the liability of the insurer of the policy of insurance extends only up to twenty thousand rupees in all and that is the sum payable by the insurance company under section 96. A similar contention was advanced before the Bench in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan. There a lorry belonging to the T.U.C.S. Ltd. was drive negligently by the driver and dashed against a scooter, as a result of which on Gopalakrishnan, travelling on the pillion of the scooter, sustained severe injuries on his left leg, which resulted in the amputation of that leg. The Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs. 57, 000 odd to Gopalakrishnan, only against the driver of the scooter. Gopalakrishnan preferred an appeal praying for an award against the T.U.C.S. Ltd. and the insurance company as well, namely, the company with whom the lorry had been insured. The appeal was allowed. On behalf of the insurance company it was argued that under section 95(2) (a) the liability of the insurance company should be restricted to a sum of Rs. 20, 000. That contention was repelled thus : "One other contention urged by Sri S. Mohan is that the liability of the insurance company is restricted to a sum of Rs. 20, 000 under sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act. 20, 000. That contention was repelled thus : "One other contention urged by Sri S. Mohan is that the liability of the insurance company is restricted to a sum of Rs. 20, 000 under sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act. But in our opinion this contention has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. Sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act clearly governs only the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Act. Thus it is clear from the terms of sub-section (2) to section 95 of that they are subject to the proviso to sub-section (1). Under the proviso (i) to sub-section (1) a policy shall not be required to cover liability of any such employee as is referred to therein who is, (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) is a conductor of the vehicle, or (c) persons carried in a vehicle. Clause (iii) of the proviso excludes contractual liability. Subject to the said three clauses of the above proviso, sub-section (2) of section 95 provides the limits of liability of the insurer to Rs. 20, 000 in all, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to employees, to Rs. 20, 000 in respect of all passengers and Rs. 4, 000 in respect of an individual passenger if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver. In the cases of vehicles of any other class the limit is the amount of the liability incurred. Thus sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act cannot be invoked to restrict the liability of the Co-operative Fire and General Insurance Society Ltd. to Rs. 20, 000 in this case. Sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act can have no application to damages caused to third parties like the claimant in this case as he is not one of the class of persons referred to in the proviso to section 95(1) of the Act." * Before proceeding further, I may make it clear that the arguments before us have proceeded on the footing that the policy in force in this case was what is for convenience termed as an "Act Policy"; that is to say, a policy conforming only to the minimum requirements of the Act. At the outset I may say that in my view section 95(2) imposes the limits of the liability of the insurance company as contemplated in section 95(1) (b) and does it by classifying the vehicle concerned (which may conveniently be termed as the colliding vehicle) into three categories, namely, (a) a goods vehicle; (b) a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment; and (c) a vehicle of any other class. A limit of Rs. 20, 000 is prescribed in all in respect of a vehicle in category (a). The same limit of Rs. 20, 000 is prescribed in respect of a vehicle described in category (b). No such upper limit is fixed in the case of a vehicle in category (c). The decision of the Bench, however, seems to proceed on the basis that section 95(2) only deals with the class of persons referred to in the proviso to section 95(1) of the Act. It seems to me that the classification under section 95(2) is not according to the persons who were killed or injured, but is only according to the class of vehicles. This is my first difficulty in accepting the reasoning of the Bench. The second difficulty which I feel is that the reasoning of the Bench does not give full effects to the words "in all" occurring in section 95(2) (a) which provides an upper limit of the liability of the insurer in the case of a goods vehicle being the colliding vehicle. My third difficulty is that, if the reasoning of the Bench is correct, it would mean that there is no provision at all in section 95(2) for strangers hit by a goods vehicle. Obviously section 95(2)(b) and 95(2)(c) will not apply to a goods vehicle and if, as the Bench says, even is respect of a goods vehicle section 95(2)(a) applies only to the class of persons mentioned in proviso (i), it would follow that there is no provision in section 95(2) (a) for strangers. Obviously section 95(2)(b) and 95(2)(c) will not apply to a goods vehicle and if, as the Bench says, even is respect of a goods vehicle section 95(2)(a) applies only to the class of persons mentioned in proviso (i), it would follow that there is no provision in section 95(2) (a) for strangers. Merely from the absence of the provision it would not be right to infer that no upper limit at all was intended in the case of death or injury to a stranger.It may be noted that section 95(1)(b) contemplates that the limit of the liability of the insurer would be specified in sub-section (2) and it would create a lacuna in the Act if we were to hold that in the case of an important category of persons, namely, third parties, who are killed or injured as a result of the negligent driving of a goods vehicle no positive provision has been made in section 95(2). One could understand the position if the case of strangers could be brought under section 95(2)(c); but that could not be worked in the case where the stranger is killed or injured as a result of the negligent driving of a goods vehicle, because section 95(2)(c) does not apply to goods vehicle. The normal method of construction seems to me to proceed on the basis that section 95(2) completely defines the limit of the liability of the insurer for every conceivable case and it does so by dividing the vehicle concerned into three categories. Only in the case of a vehicle failing in class (c) there is no upper limit, but in the other types of vehicles an upper limit is provided. I may also put it negatively in another form, namely, that, if, as the Bench says, the intention of the Parliament was that section 95 (2)(a) would apply to the class of persons mentioned in the proviso to section 95(1), the intention could have been expressed more easily and in clear language. The main reason for the Bench decision is the use of the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" at the beginning of section 95(2). I confess that the proviso is not worded in the manner easy to understand. I think, however, that the words do not lead to interpretation placed by the Bench. The meaning of the proviso itself if fairly clear. I confess that the proviso is not worded in the manner easy to understand. I think, however, that the words do not lead to interpretation placed by the Bench. The meaning of the proviso itself if fairly clear. It means that, though section 95(1)(b) is general in terms by requiring the insurance to be against any liability incurred by the owner in respect of death or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place, the proviso carves out some exceptions to the generality of then provision. Thus in the case of employees, it is sufficient if the insurance is in respect of liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for, (a) the driver, (b) the conductor or ticket examiner (in the case of a bus), and (c) the persons being carried in the vehicle if it is a good vehicle. This is the meaning of the proviso (i).Proviso (ii) means that, in respect of passengers in the vehicle concerned in the accident (colliding vehicle), there need not be any insurance except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Thus, in the case of an ordinary car used for a private purpose, there need not be any insurance for the passengers. For this purpose a passenger is defined not merely as a person carried in or upon the vehicle, but also as a person entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the collision out of which the claim arises. Proviso (ii) also means that, where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, there must be insurance of the liability of those passengers as well. There again the term "passenger" must be construed as defined in the later part of the proviso (ii). Proviso (iii) means that there need not be an insurance to cover contractual liability of the assured person. Thus, there is not much difficulty in construing the proviso. Difficulty, however, comes in because of the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" at the beginning of sub-section (2) of section 95. Proviso (iii) means that there need not be an insurance to cover contractual liability of the assured person. Thus, there is not much difficulty in construing the proviso. Difficulty, however, comes in because of the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" at the beginning of sub-section (2) of section 95. As a matter of pure construction and without reference to the subject-matter, if a provision (B) is enacted subject to the provision (A), it would prima facie mean that the provision (A) cuts down or modifies to some extent the provision (B). On this method of construction, it might be felt that the words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", prima facie mean that the enactment of section 95(2) would stand modified to some extent by the proviso to sub-section (1). But it seems to me that this is not what the words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", are intended to mean in the context. I shall explain what I have in mind. Sub-section (2) specified the limit of the liability of the insurer as contemplated by section 95(1)(b). Section 95(1) itself, even including the proviso, does not seem to contain any such limit of the liability of the insurer. Hence, it will not be right to construe the words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", as though they modify to any extent the limit of the liability specified in sub-section (2). I shall make this clearer by some concrete illustrations.Thus take section 95(2)(b) to start with. It means that, in the case of a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, in respect of strangers who are killed or injured by rash or negligent driving of the vehicle, the total liability of the insurer is only Rs. 20, 000. Similarly in the case of passengers (as defined in proviso (ii) to section 95(1), the total liability of the insurer is only Rs. 20, 000. There is a further restriction that for each passenger the limit of liability is Rs. 4, 000 if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers (excluding the driver) and Rs. 2, 000 if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers (excluding the driver). 20, 000. There is a further restriction that for each passenger the limit of liability is Rs. 4, 000 if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers (excluding the driver) and Rs. 2, 000 if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers (excluding the driver). There is nothing in the proviso to sub-section (1) which qualifies these upper limits (total and individual). The words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", should only be applied to the extent necessary without distributing the monetary limits. Thus in construing the word "passengers" in section 95(2)(b), we will have take into account proviso (ii) to section 95(1). Similarly, take section 95(2)(c). There is no upper limit to the liability. But that is subject to the proviso to sub-section (1); that is to say, there is no liability at all in respect of passengers because of proviso (ii) to sub-section (1). Now, take section 95(2)(a). The interpretation is not so easy. But we have to bear in mind the possibility that the draftsmen introduced the words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", merely by way of abundant caution. Even without those words, the principle of harmonious construction would demand that, in construing section 95(2), the court must have regard not merely to section 95(1) (a) and (b), but also to the proviso thereto. There is also the further possibility that the words, "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)", were introduced as primarily necessary for clauses (b) and (c) of section 95(2) and the draftsmen thought that the words might as well be put in the beginning of section 95(2) itself. On such considerations it seems as though the words do not really serve any useful purpose so far as section 95(2)(a) is concerned. Thus the proviso itself contemplates insurance of employees in respect of the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. For the driver and the persons carried in the vehicle, section 95(2) deals with that liability, but limits it.On the above considerations it seems to us that there is no justification for saying that section 95(2)(a) does not deal with strangers at all. Section 95(1)(b) requires insurance even for strangers - in fact primarily for strangers - and says that the limits are laid down in sub-section (2). Why should section 95(2)(a) be interpreted in a manner as not providing for stranger ? Section 95(1)(b) requires insurance even for strangers - in fact primarily for strangers - and says that the limits are laid down in sub-section (2). Why should section 95(2)(a) be interpreted in a manner as not providing for stranger ? The words, in all, followed by the words "including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act" * , are quite apt to take in the liability for strangers also. If strangers were to be excluded from section 95(2)(a), and section 95(2)(a) was intended to be confined only to employees, the wording would have been different and the use of the word "including" would not be appropriate. Thiru Govind Swaminathan, the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the appellants, and Thiru Askar Ali, who appeared for the second respondent, urged in this connection that, in the view which I have indicated, section 95(2)(a) might well have stopped with the words, "in all". The answer is that in the succeeding words, Parliament has restricted the liability of the insurance company in respect of the employees by limiting the number of employees to six. That has been probably done with a view not to reduce the liability of the insurance company to a stranger unduly. Apart from the Bench decision, it was stated before us that there was no other decision bearing on section 95(2)(a). But, on the construction of section 95(2)(b), the learned counsel for the insurance company brought to our notice a decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amrawatti. There the driver of a passenger bus drove the vehicle negligently as a result of which two of the passengers were killed. The claims Tribunal found that in respect of one of the passengers a compensation of Rs. 8, 000 was payable to the widow and in respect of the other passenger a sum of Rs. 14, 000 was payable to the concerned widow. The insurance company filed appeals contending that in view of section 95(2)(b) the limit of their liability was Rs. 2, 000 in the case of each of the two passengers who were killed. This contention was accepted by the Full Bench. The actual argument which was advanced on behalf of the widows of the victims was that section 95(2)(b) meant that the limit of the liability of the insurance company was Rs. 2, 000 in the case of each of the two passengers who were killed. This contention was accepted by the Full Bench. The actual argument which was advanced on behalf of the widows of the victims was that section 95(2)(b) meant that the limit of the liability of the insurance company was Rs. 20, 000 plus Rs. 4, 000 in the case of each passenger where the bus was registered to carry not more than six passengers (excluding the driver) and Rs. 20, 000 in the case of each passengers where the bus was registered to carry more than six passengers (excluding the driver). The submission on behalf of the widows was repelled. The decision was reached on the plain language of the Act. It is instructive to note the submission on behalf of the widows and how it was repelled : "It is said on behalf of the passengers and the transporters that if all that is recoverable from the insurer by an injured passenger is Rs. 2, 000 and no more and even that amount may have to be reduced in case a larger number of persons are injured, as there is the second overall limit of Rs. 20, 000 then the provision would seem to be hardly adequate. This is, however, only looking at one side of the picture. On the other side is the consideration that the Parliament may well have thought it unreasonable to impose a heavy burden on the transporters arising out of insurance, for, obviously if the Act requires them to insure their vehicles in such a way that a large amount of compensation would become payable by the insurer, then the burden of insurance will increase and that burden has necessarily to be borne by the transporter. That consideration may well have led parliament to limit the amount to Rs. 20, 000 in all in connection with any one single accident and may further have led to the limit of Rs. 2, 000 in respect of an individual passenger who may be injured. As I have said, the words of the Act do not seem capable of the meaning attributed to them on behalf of the transporters and the passengers and there seems no justification why the plain words should be subjected to any violence. 2, 000 in respect of an individual passenger who may be injured. As I have said, the words of the Act do not seem capable of the meaning attributed to them on behalf of the transporters and the passengers and there seems no justification why the plain words should be subjected to any violence. What sub-section (2) of section 95 seems to say is that where a vehicle is a goods vehicle, the limit is Rs. 20, 000 and that includes liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act payable to workmen not exceeding six and where the vehicle is carrying the passengers, that is, a bus carrying passengers, then the limit is Rs. 20, 000 in all and there is a further limit in respect of individual passengers which is Rs. 4, 000 if the vehicle can carry not more than six passengers, and is Rs. 2, 000 if the vehicle can carry more than six passengers." * The observations may be applied to section 95(2)(a) as well. In other words, parliament may well have thought that in the case of a goods vehicle providing a service for carriage of a goods of the public, it may not be reasonable to impose a heavy burden on the transporter by obliging him to take an insurance with unlimited liability in the case of strangers. In any case, we are governed by the words of the provision. On account of these reasons, we direct that the papers be placed before the Honourable the Chief justice for constitution of a Full Bench to consider the following question : "Where an insurance company insures the owner of a goods vehicle under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the liability which the owner may incur in respect of the death of the person (third party) caused by the use of the vehicle in the public place, the policy being simply one conforming to the requirements of the Act (and not beyond them), is the liability of the insurance company limited to Rs. 20, 000 (rupees twenty thousand only) under section 95(2)(a) of the Act ?" * [The case was heard by a Full Bench consisting of K. VEERASWAMI C.J., NATESAN and GOKULAKRISHNAN JJ. 20, 000 (rupees twenty thousand only) under section 95(2)(a) of the Act ?" * [The case was heard by a Full Bench consisting of K. VEERASWAMI C.J., NATESAN and GOKULAKRISHNAN JJ. and the following judgment was delivered on 3-2-1970.] NATESAN J. - This reference to the Full Bench arises out of a proceeding before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Madras, for compensation in respect of an accident involving the death of one Krishnaswami. It is the case of claimants for compensation, that when the said Krishnaswami was driving his car along the Mount Road, the lorry belonging to the 2nd respondent, driven in a rash and negligent manner by her driver Munuswami, dashed against his car as a result of which Krishnaswami died. While the claims tribunal dismissed the application for compensation, the Division Bench (Kailasam and Venkataraman JJ.) have taken the view that a compensation of Rs. 40, 000 would be payable to the claimants. On behalf of the insurance company with whom the lorry had been insured, it was contended before the learned judges that under section 95(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act IV of 1939) the liability of the insurance company must be limited to a sum of Rs. 20, 000, the vehicle involved being a goods vehicle. The learned judges are inclined to accept this contention and have referred the matter to the Full Bench, in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan where the learned judges (Srinivasan and Sadasivam JJ.) have held that the liability of an insurance company in respect of injury to a third party is not subject to the limit of Rs. 20, 000 under section 95(2)(a) of the Act. Examining the relevant provisions of the Motor vehicles Act at length and setting out reasons for their view contrary to that taken in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan the following question has been referred to the Full Bench : "Where an insurance company insures the owner of a goods vehicle under section 95 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939, against the liability which the owner may incur in respect of the death of the person (third party) caused by the use of the vehicle in a public place, the policy being one conforming to the requirements of the Act (and not beyond them), is the liability of the insurance company limited to Rs. 20, 000 (rupees twenty thousand) under section 95(2)(a) of the Act ?" * During the hearing of the matter before us, a doubt was raised whether the insurance policy in question in the case is what is commonly termed as "Act policy", that is, a policy conforming to the minimum requirements of the Act, or a comprehensive policy which, inter alia, does not limit the extent of the liability covered. The insurance policy itself has not been exhibited in this case, and, as the question referred proceeds on the assumption that the policy in question is one limited to the terms of the Act, we examine the matter on that basis. There can be no doubt that it is perfectly open to the owner of a vehicle to take out an insurance policy which goes beyond the terms of the Act and covers more risk than what is required to be covered by the Act. The provisions for compulsory insurance against third party risk from the user of the Motor vehicle in a public place are placed under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. By these provisions by compelling owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles to protect themselves against financial risks arising out of accidents which they may incur, the liability of third parties to get damages is not made wholly dependent on the financial condition of the owner, user or driver of the vehicle. Section 94 emphasises. The necessity for insurance against third party risk by prohibiting in mandatory terms the use of a motor vehicle by any person in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or other person as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII. There are certain exceptions in section 94; but a reference to them is unnecessary in the context of the question now under consideration. Section 125, which provides penalties for contravention of the provisions of section 94, states that whoever drives a motor vehicle or causes or allows a motor vehicle to be driven in contravention of the provisions of section 94 shall be punishable with imprisonment which may exceed to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. In interpreting the provisions of the Chapter, we have to bear in mind both the apparent object of the enactment and the penal consequence following the failure to take out an insurance policy in terms of the Chapter.Section 95, sub-sections (1) and (2), lay down the requirements to be complied with by an insurance policy taken in accordance with Chapter VIII for the use of a particular vehicle. The policy has to be issued by an authorised insurer and must specify the person or classes of persons who are insured against liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place in India or in a reciprocating territory. The policy must insure to the extent of the liability specified in sub-section (2). Sub-section (4) of section 95 requires the issue by the insurance company of a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form in favour of the person for whom the policy is effected. Sub-section (5) of section 95 makes the insurer liable to indemnify the person or classes or persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover, notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in any law. Section 96 makes it the duty of the insurer to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks as if he were the judgment-debtor. The provisions as to insuring a person or classes of person found in section 95 means that the insurance policy gives to the person or classes of persons insured the right to enforce against the insurer the undertaking which the policy gives in respect of the liability incurred by the assured Sub-section (2) of section 95 is the section that really calls for interpretation now. For taking it up, as it is necessary, we shall set out the relevant parts of section 95 having a bearing on the question : "95. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter a policy of insurance must be a policy which -(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer ......... For taking it up, as it is necessary, we shall set out the relevant parts of section 95 having a bearing on the question : "95. (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter a policy of insurance must be a policy which -(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer ......... (b) insures the person or classes of person specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place in India or in a reciprocating territory; Provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of him employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises, or (iii) to cover any contractual liability. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely :- (a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of twenty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle;(b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, in respect of person other than passengers carried for hire or reward, a limit of twenty thousand rupees; and in respect of passengers, a limit of twenty thousand rupees in all, and four thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger, if the vehicle is registered to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver or two thousand rupees in respect of an individual passenger, if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver; (c) where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount of the liability incurred ............" The meaning of the several expressions found in the section," goods vehicle"," public service vehicle"and" passengers carried for hire or reward" * may be gathered from the definitions in section 2 and other provisions of the Act. "Goods vehicle" is defined to mean any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted, when used for the carriage of goods, solely or in addition to passengers. The body of sub-section (2) of section 95, clauses (a), (b) and (c), limits the liability incurred in respect or any one accident with reference to the vehicle insured. When it is a goods vehicle, the policy of insurance need cover, for compliance with Chapter VIII, a liability to a limit of Rs. 20, 000 in all, including a liability, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees other than the driver not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle. 20, 000 in all, including a liability, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees other than the driver not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle. In the case of vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment under sub-section (2), clause (b), there is an overall limit of Rs. 20, 000 in the case of persons other than passengers who are being carried for hire or reward and Rs. 20, 000 in the case of passengers. Here, if the vehicle is registered for carrying passenger not more than six, the maximise liability in respect of an individual passenger is Rs. 4, 000 and, in any other case, Rs. 2, 000. Clause (c) of section 2 provides that where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the amount payable as compensation will be the amount of liability incurred. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the claimants lays emphasis on the words "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" at the beginning of section 95(2) and submits that the limits of liability specified in sub-section (2) can in the context be only with reference to the classes of person excepted from the proviso to section 95(1).Section 95(1), clause (b), makes it the first requirement of a policy under the Act, in general terms, that the policy must be one which insures against any liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The second requirement under clause (b) is that the person or classes of person who effect insurance are specified in the policy and are insured against the above liability which may be incurred by him or them, that is, the policy gives to such person or persons or the members of the class of persons specified in the policy the right to enforce against the insurer the undertaking which the policy gives. The third requirement is that the insurance against liability specified in the clause must be to the extent specified in sub-section (2) of section 95. The third requirement is that the insurance against liability specified in the clause must be to the extent specified in sub-section (2) of section 95. Section 95(1)(b), after imposing an obligation for insurance against any liability which the insurer may incur in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, by proviso excepts certain liabilities which because of the use of words "death or bodily injury to any person" would otherwise have to be insured against. Generally speaking, provisions relating to third party insurance do not extend to persons carried in the vehicle. The provisos to section 95(1)(b) first bring out that feature and then engraft exceptions thereon, on the provisos. Proviso (i) exempts from the requirement of insurance cover for liability in respect of death arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee, of a person insured by the policy, or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee. Proviso (ii) exempts from requirement of insurance to cover liability in respect of the death or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises. Proviso (iii) exempts from the requirement of insurance to cover any contractual liability. The proviso, without the exceptions or savings from their operation, stated that compulsory insurance need not be effected against liability to voluntary passengers and against liability to persons who would have a claim against the insured as their employer.The saving clause introduced to proviso (i) provides for compulsory insurance in favour of three classes of persons for liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act - (1) an employee driving a vehicle, (2) conductors and ticket examiners in case of public service vehicle, and (3) and employee carried in a goods vehicle. By the exception to proviso (ii), it is necessary to insure against liability to passengers in a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. By the exception to proviso (ii), it is necessary to insure against liability to passengers in a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Proviso (ii) which grants exemption from compulsory insurance cover for liability to passengers, excepted from the proviso a particular class of vehicles, namely, vehicles in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Insurance is compulsory where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Section 95(1)(b) thus sets out liabilities to be covered by the compulsory insurance policy. With the provisos and exception therefrom, it specifies what all liabilities that may be incurred in respect of the death or bodily injury to a person arising out of the use of the vehicle which must be covered by insurance for due compliance with the requirements of Chapter VIII. The monetary extent of insurance cover is then dealt with in section 95(2). Section 95(1)(b) having provided that the policy, to comply with the requirements of Chapter VIII, must be one which insures to the extent specified in sub-section (2) of section 95, by sub-section 2(a) specifies the limits in respect of a goods vehicle and by sub-section 2(b) certain limits where the vehicle is vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or rewards or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Sub-section (2)(c) says that where the vehicle is a vehicle of any other class, the limit is the amount of the liability incurred. The first impression that one gets on a reading of section 95(2) is that the limits of compulsory insurance liability is fixed with reference to the vehicle.The relevant provision with which this reference is concerned is section 95(2)(a), whereby it is provided that a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, up to the limit of Rs. 20, 000 in all. This sum of Rs. 20, 000 in all. This sum of Rs. 20, 000 includes the liability, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of the death of or bodily injury to the employee other than the driver not exceeding six in number being carried in the vehicle. A reference to section 95 before its amendment in 1956 by Act 100 of 1956 is useful in this context. Before the amendment of section 95, there was no exception to the exemption from compulsory insurance granted by proviso (i). In its unamended form the proviso to sub-section (1) read that a policy shall not, except as may be otherwise provided under sub-section (3), be required to cover liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such and employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. Sub-section (3) of section 95 left it to the state Government in their discretion to lay down that a policy of insurance should, in order to comply with the requirements of the Chapter, cover any liability arising under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. By the amending Act, the insurance cover for the liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act has been made compulsory by engrafting an exception on proviso (i). A consequential amendment was made to sub-section (2)(a) which fixed the limit of compulsory insurance liability for a goods vehicle, and sub-section (3) was omitted. The significant part of the amendment that has to be noticed is that the liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act to be insured in respect of a goods vehicle has been restricted to six employees other than the driver carried in the vehicle. Section 95(1), proviso (i), before its amendment, exempted from insurance cover employer's liability risk reflecting presumably the well established distinction in the insurance world between public liability risk and employer's liability risk. The qualifying words in the beginning of section 95(2) were the same before the amendment : "Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely" * . The qualifying words in the beginning of section 95(2) were the same before the amendment : "Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely" * . Clause (a) of sub-section (2) specifying the limit for a goods vehicle then ran : "Where the vehicle is a vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of goods, a limit of Rs. 20, 000." * Sub-section (2)(a) read with the qualification at the beginning subjecting it to the proviso to section 95(1) clearly cannot, and so did not before the amendment, fix the limit of Rs. 20, 000 to any particular class of persons. The limit was with reference to the vehicle involved in the accident and not the persons involved. By the amendment and introduction thereby of an exception to proviso (i), insurance cover was insisted upon for certain liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act also. Corresponding amendment was made to sub-section (2)(a). By the amendment the following words were added after "a limit of Rs. 20, 000": "In all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle;" * . The above words added by the amendment cannot by themselves alter either the meaning or scope of the qualifying words at the beginning of subsection (2). The qualifying words apply not only to clause (a) but also the clauses (b) and (c). If it had been the intendment of the amendment to take away the existing limit in respect of third party risks, very different language should have been employed. Far from manifesting an intention to change the law in other respects, there are two significant expressions in the amendment to clause (a), (1) "in all" and (2) "including the liabilities", indication that the amount specified is the overall limit that should be covered by the insurance. If the limit of Rs. 20, 000 is only in respect of party liability the words "in all", and "including" would lose all significance. The expression "including" shows that there are other liabilities covered by the limit. If the limit of Rs. 20, 000 is only in respect of party liability the words "in all", and "including" would lose all significance. The expression "including" shows that there are other liabilities covered by the limit. The word "including" is normally used to signify that what is enumerated as included is not exhaustive. A liability which was not there previously is taken in under the limit. What was already covered by the limit is not excluded therefrom. In our opinion, the qualifying words at the beginning of section 95(2) are there only to emphasise that certain risks are exempted from compulsory insurance by the provisos, and there are exceptions thereto which have to be covered by the policy. The qualifying words are there as a matter of abundant caution emphasising a sound rule of construction that the enacting part and the proviso must be read as a whole, each part throwing light on the other, as all the parts of the section are inter-related. So read, there is nothing in the provisos that would control the plain language of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) that the amounts specified therein are for the total liability incurred in respect of any one accident and not just the liability incurred in respect of the classes of person mentioned in the clauses. The proper principle of construction to be adopted in a case like the present one is to get ar the meaning of the section on a comprehensive view of the enacting provision, the provisos and the exceptions therefrom all taken as a whole and interpreted together.As the qualifying words at the beginning of section 95(2) "subject to the proviso to sub-section (1)" are common to both clauses (a) and (b), it is relevant to examine section 95(1)(b). Section 95(2), clause (b), provides in the case of vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward insurance for a limit of Rs. 20, 000 in the case of persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward and another sum of Rs. 20, 000 in the case of passengers. In the case of passengers, there is a further limit on the extent of individual passenger compensation to be insured against; if the vehicle is registered for carrying passengers not exceeding six excluding the driver, the liability in respect of an individual passenger is Rs. 20, 000 in the case of passengers. In the case of passengers, there is a further limit on the extent of individual passenger compensation to be insured against; if the vehicle is registered for carrying passengers not exceeding six excluding the driver, the liability in respect of an individual passenger is Rs. 4, 000 and, if the vehicle is registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver, the liability is Rs. 2, 000 in respect of a passenger. The phrase in clause (b) "persons other than passengers" in respect of whom a limit of Rs. 20, 000 is provided, in its setting read with the other provisions of the Chapter, manifestly refers to third parties. Clause (b) indicates that the word "passengers" would, but for the specific exclusion, include also the driver. The limits of compulsory cover specified in section 95(2)(b) is in respect of all liabilities that have to be insured against. With reference to section 95(2)(b) it would be misreading the qualifying words at the beginning subjecting the sub-section to the proviso to section 95(1) as confining the limit of liability only to the classes of person excepted from the proviso to section 95(1)(b). Section 95(2)(b) has been the subject of construction by a Full Bench of Punjab High Court in Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. v. Amrawatti. The claim for compensation that came up for consideration before the Full Bench was by the widows and other heirs of two passengers who were killed in an accident to a passenger bus. If was held by the full Bench that, if an insurance policy is taken out in respect of a large passenger bus and is limited to the terms of section 95 of the Act and the bus meets with an accident resulting in injuries to several persons, the liability of the insurer is not to exceed Rs. 20, 000 in respect of all the passengers taken together and it is not to exceed Rs. 2, 000 in respect of each injured passenger. It was there argued on behalf of the passengers and the transport company that if all that is recoverable from the insurer by an injured passenger is Rs. 2, 000 and no more and even that amount may have to be reduced in case a large number of persons are insured as there is the second overall limit of Rs. It was there argued on behalf of the passengers and the transport company that if all that is recoverable from the insurer by an injured passenger is Rs. 2, 000 and no more and even that amount may have to be reduced in case a large number of persons are insured as there is the second overall limit of Rs. 20, 000 then the provision would seem to be hardly adequate. The argument was met by the learned judges with the observation that it is only looking at one side of the picture and that parliament may well have thought it unreasonable to impose a heavy burden on the transporters arising out of insurance, for, obviously, if the Act requires them to insure their vehicle in such a way that a large amount of compensation would become payable by the insurer, then the burden of insurance will increase and that burden has necessarily to be borne by the transporter. Of course, any bus owner may voluntarily take out an insurance policy to cover more risks than the minimum required to be covered by the statute for his own self protection.Section 95(1), before its amendment in 1956, corresponded with section 36(1) of the English Road Traffic Act, 1930. Section 35(1) of the English Act, corresponding to section 94(1) of our Act, provided as an alternative to a policy of insurance that the person using a motor vehicle or owner may cover the risk of third party liability arising from the use of the vehicle on the road by providing security under section 37 of the English Road Traffic Act. The security was generally given by authorised insurers under section 37(1)(b) and consisted of an undertaking by the giver of the security to make good, subject to any conditions specified therein, any failure by the owner of the vehicle or such other person or classes of persons as may be specified, to discharge any compulsorily insurable liability which may be incurred by him or them. It is interesting to note that, where security is given as an alternative to insurance, limits have been prescribed. The reason for the difference is not apparent. The security, to be valid in the case of a public service vehicle, must be for an amount of not less than Pounds 25, 000 and, in any other case, for an amount of not less than Pounds 5, 000. The reason for the difference is not apparent. The security, to be valid in the case of a public service vehicle, must be for an amount of not less than Pounds 25, 000 and, in any other case, for an amount of not less than Pounds 5, 000. The distinction in the compulsory limit for security is according to the character of the vehicle and the limit is an overall limit. Shawcross on Motor Insurance, 2nd edition, at page 226, says that the public service vehicle would generally be of the class against liability to passengers in which insurance is required by section 36, whilst other vehicles would not generally be of that class and this, it is presumed, is why the limit is so much lower in the case of vehicles other than public service vehicles. Parliament has for reasons best known to itself, may be having regard to the economic levels in this country adopted different criteria for fixing limits The English Road Traffic Act, 1930, retains the provision for security as an alternative to a policy of insurance, and with reference to the security, maintains the distinction between public service vehicle and other vehicles.In Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan, where a goods vehicle was involved in an accident, the Division Bench of this Court observed : "Thus sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act cannot be invoked to restrict the liability of the Co-operative Fire and General Insurance Society Ltd., to Rs. 20, 000 in this case, sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act can have no application to damages caused to third parties like the claimant in this case as he is not one of the class of person referred to in the proviso to section 95(1) of the Act." * There is not much discussion. The learned judges only say that sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act clearly governs only the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Act, and that it is clear from the terms of sub-section (2) to section 95 that they are subject to the proviso to sub-section (1). The learned judges are of the view that the limit of liability that has to be insured against is in relation to the person exempted from the proviso the section 95(1). The learned judges are of the view that the limit of liability that has to be insured against is in relation to the person exempted from the proviso the section 95(1). In our view, the effect of subjecting sub-section (2) of section 95 to the provisos to sub-section (1) of the section is to require that they all have to be read together and harmonised. Effect must be given to every part of the section. The sub-sections, provisos and exceptions to the provisos must all be given effect to. The argument for the claimants is that certain exceptions have been carved out from the operation of the provisos and it is a reasonable inference that it is the liability in respect of the excepted persons, who, strictly speaking, are not third parties to the vehicle, that is limited by sub-section (2). There is no basis for such an interpretation. The language of sub-section (2) does not warrant the same and, even if the sub-sections under consideration are not examples of legislative precision and clarity, we see no such ambiguity for the court to search for some undisclosed intention. The plain meaning is generally the true meaning. On our reading of sub-sections (1) and (2), they do prescribe limits in respect of compulsorily insurable risks including third party risk and are not confined only to the classes of persons who are excepted from the proviso the section 95 (1)(b). Section 95(2) fixes limits in relation to vehicles and makes a distinction between a goods vehicle and a vehicle in which persons are carried. With reference to vehicles carrying passengers a further distinction is made between vehicles registered to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver and vehicles registered to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver. Under clauses (a) and (b) of section 95(2), the overall liability for insurance cover in respect of a vehicle involved in an accident is specified. The compulsory insurance policy, that is, "the Act policy", is one which contains the bare minimum requirements of cover, if the vehicles is legally usable in a public place. Under clauses (a) and (b) of section 95(2), the overall liability for insurance cover in respect of a vehicle involved in an accident is specified. The compulsory insurance policy, that is, "the Act policy", is one which contains the bare minimum requirements of cover, if the vehicles is legally usable in a public place. But a comprehensive third party liability policy may provide cover against legal liability for bodily injury to or death of any party, even if he is not within the limited categories provided for under the Act; the assured is free to take out a policy for his own protection to the full extent of the liability that may be incurred, even where limits are prescribed. We are here on the question of the liability incurred by the insurer under a policy complying with the minimal requirements of the Act, the insured taking the policy to avoid penal consequences. It is not for the court to judge the adequacy of the compulsory cover in the changed times, making the amounts available miserably low if a large number of persons are involved in an accident. It is matter for Parliament to consider.It follows that sub-section (2) of section 95 has not been correctly interpreted by the Division Bench in Gopalakrishnan v. Sankaranarayanan. We are in agreement with the learned judges who have referred the matter to the Full Bench in their interpretation of the sub-section. It is our opinion that where an insurance company insures the owner of a goods vehicle under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, against the liability which the owner may incur in respect of the death of a third party caused by the use of the vehicle in a public place, the policy being simply one conforming to the requirements of the Act, the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 20, 000 under section 95(2) of the Act. Costs of this reference would be as may be ordered by the Division Bench. BY THE COURT KAILASAM J. - In view of the opinion of the Full Bench, we pass the following judgment. We find the second respondent is liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 40, 000 to the appellants. Out of this amount, the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 20, 000. BY THE COURT KAILASAM J. - In view of the opinion of the Full Bench, we pass the following judgment. We find the second respondent is liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 40, 000 to the appellants. Out of this amount, the liability of the insurance company is limited to Rs. 20, 000. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs of this court, payable by the two respondents. There will be no order as to costs in the Full Bench reference.