JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, C.J. - These two connected first appeals from orders raise a common question whether a civil suit lies for recovery of municipal toll tax. The Municipal Board of Muzaffarnagar filed in the Court of the Munsif, Muzaffarnagar two separate suits against Brij Bhushan Lal and Satya Prakash for the recovery of two sums as toll tax. In each case the defendant pleaded that no suit lies for the recovery of municipal toll tax. This contention raised in defence was accepted by the learned Munsif. He held that the civil suits were incompetent. Both the suits were, therefore, dismissed. 2. The plaintiff appealed against the decision of the trial court. The two connected appeals were allowed by the II Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar. He was of the opinion that a civil suit for the recovery of toll tax is competent. The suits were, therefore, remanded to the trial Court for decision on merits. The present first appeals are directed against the two orders of remand passed by the II Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar. 3. The trial court relied upon a decision of Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board Bareilly v. Abdul Aziz Khan, 1934 A.L.J. 739. In that case it was held that a suit for the recovery of octroi dues does not lie in a civil Court. 4. Mr. K.C. Agrawal appearing for the plaintiff respondent pointed out that in Abdul Aziz Khan's case, 1934 A.L.J. 739 the suit related to octroi, whereas the present suits relate to toll tax. The position of the two taxes under the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereafter referred to as the Act) is not identical. Sec. 155 of the Act provides for penalty for evasion of octroi dues. There is no similar provision in the Act for imposing penalty for evasion of toll tax. 5. In Abdul Aziz Khan's case, 1934 A.L.J. 739 the Court relied upon Section 114 of the Act. Formerly, Sec. 114 ran thus :- "There shall be for each Municipality a Municipal fund, and there shall be placed to the credit thereof all fines realised on conviction under the provisions of this Act." The Court noticed that all suns realised as penalty under Section 155 of the Act were ultimately payable into the municipal fund. The Court, therefore, concluded that there was ample provision for the recovery of octroi dues. The Court, therefore, concluded that there was ample provision for the recovery of octroi dues. But Section 114 of the Act has now been amended. Sec. 114 no longer lays down that amounts realised as penalty have to be credited to the municipal fund. For these reasons, the appellants can derive little assistance from the decision in Abdul Aziz Khan's case, 1934 A.L.J. 739. 6. Mr. N.D. Ojha appearing for the appellants, however, relies upon Section 153 of the Act. Sec. 153 deals with rules as to assessment, collection and other matters. Sec. 153 states :- "The following matters shall be regulated and governed by rules except, in so for as provision therefor is made by this Act, namely:- (a) the assessment collection or composition of taxes, and, in the case of octroi, or toll, the determination of octroi or toll limits; (b) ............ Mr. N.D. Ojha has drawn our attention to certain rules framed by the Competent Authority for assessment and collection of terminal toll in Muzaffarnagar Municipality. Sub-rule (2) of rule 4 provides for serving a written notice demanding toll dues. This is a rule as contemplated by Section 153 of the Act. 7. Mr. K.C. Agrawal suggested that, in view of the language of clause (a) of Section 153, the clause is applicable to toll tax as regards limits only. Now, clause (a) of Section 153 has been divided into two parts. The first part relates to assessment, collection and composition of taxes. The second part deals limits for octrai and toll tax. It is true that the second part of clause (a) is limited to octrai and toll tax. But it does not follow that octroi and toll have been excluded from the first part of clause (a) . The first part of clause (a) is general. The first part of clause (a) relates to assessment, collection and composition of all taxes including octroi and toll tax. 8. Art. 265 of the Constitution lays clown that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Relying upon Art. 265 of the Constitution, Mr. N. D. Ojha contended that collection of octroi or toll-tax has to be confined to the method laid down in the rules framed under Section 153 of the Act. 9. In State of Gujrat v. Shantilal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634, their Lordships observed on page 654 :- ".... Relying upon Art. 265 of the Constitution, Mr. N. D. Ojha contended that collection of octroi or toll-tax has to be confined to the method laid down in the rules framed under Section 153 of the Act. 9. In State of Gujrat v. Shantilal, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 634, their Lordships observed on page 654 :- ".... When power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all." 10. In Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1952 Nagpur 139, the Court had to consider the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Sec. 3 of that Act laid down that there shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise. It was held by Nagpur High Court that there was no power or authority to collect duty in respect of excisable goods which had been removed from the warehouse. Certain rules which had been framed by the Competent Authority did not prescribe the mode of collecting duty in respect of such goods. 11. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays clown a general provision that civil courts can try all claims of a civil nature unless barred. Sec. 9, C.P.C. states :- "The courts shall .... have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred." 12. In Dhulabhai v. State of M. P., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78. It was held that where a particular statute does not contain machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. Exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred. 13. In Inderchand v. Secretary of State for India, 9 I.T.R. 673 it was held by Patna High Court that a civil suit for the recovery of arrears of income-tax is maintainable. That case was decided in the year 1941. The present suits are governed by the provisions of the Constitution. If the plaintiff's suggestion that a civil suit lies in addition to the provisions of Section 153 of the Act is accepted, considerations of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution may arise. 14. That case was decided in the year 1941. The present suits are governed by the provisions of the Constitution. If the plaintiff's suggestion that a civil suit lies in addition to the provisions of Section 153 of the Act is accepted, considerations of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution may arise. 14. It is true that there is no clear provision in the Act excluding jurisdiction of civil courts. But such exclusion may either be by implication or by express words. 15. Mr. K. C. Agrawal also relied upon Section 176 of the Act. Section 176 states :- "Instead of proceeding by distress and sale, or in case of failure to realise thereby the whole or any part of the demand, the board may sue the person liable to pay the same in any court of competent jurisdiction." In order to ascertain whether this provision governs toll-tax or not, the context has to be examined. 16. Chapter V of the Act deals with municipal taxation. Chapter VI of the Act provides for recovery of certain municipal claims. The first section in Chapter VI is Sec. 166. Sec. 166 states :- "(I) As soon as a person becomes liable for the payment of- (a) any sum on account of a tax, other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand..." The language of Section 166 shows that this section does not govern octroi or toll-tax. The subsequent provisions also deal with taxes other than octroi or toll-tax. It is common ground that the coercive measures prescribed in Chapter VI do not deal with octroi or toll-tax. Sec. 176 appearing in Chapter VI must be confined to the machinery described in Chapter VI of the Act. The civil suits mentioned in Section 176 must, therefore, be confined to taxes other than octroi and toll-tax. Had the Legislature intended that a civil suit for the recovery of octroi or toll-tax should be competent, it was quite easy for the Legislature to insert a similar provision in Chapter V of the Act. 17. Sec. 153 of the Act lays down that certain matters shall be regulated and governed by rules. The matters enumerated in Section 153 include assessment, collection or composition of taxes. 17. Sec. 153 of the Act lays down that certain matters shall be regulated and governed by rules. The matters enumerated in Section 153 include assessment, collection or composition of taxes. The language of Section 153 shows that the rules to be framed under Section 153 constitute the exclusive machinery for the assessment and collection of taxes. A civil suit was excluded by necessary implication. The defendants are, therefore, right in their contention that no civil suit lies for the recovery of Municipal toll-tax. Since the point was not free from difficulty parties may be left to bear their own costs. 18. The two connected appeals are allowed. We set aside the appellate orders of the Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffarnagar, and restore the trial Court's decision dismissing the two suits. In the circumstances, we direct that parties shall bear their own costs throughout.