Prem Shanker Bhargava v. State of Uttar Pradesh — 1970 DIGILAW 489 (ALL)

JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - In these writ petitions the petitioners have challenged the selection proceedings in respect of certain posts of the District Statistics Officers held in September 1969. The facts involved in the two petitions are substantially the same and consequently they may he disposed of by a common judgment. Sri Prem Shanker Bhargava is the sole petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ No. 697 of 1970 whereas in the other petition there are eight petitioners. 2. The material facts stated in the petitions are that in the year 1958 the scale of the posts of District Statistics Officer in the Directorate of Economics and Statistics was Rs. 250-850. The department was permanent but the posts were temporary. In 1961 the aforesaid 51 posts were downgraded as a measure of economy and they were brought down to a scale of Rs. 2 0 0-500. The petitioner (in writ No. 697) had applied for the advertised post of the District Statistics Officer in the year 1963. He was interviewed for the post by the Public Service Commission, U.P. and v/as duly selected along with fifteen other persons. He actually joined the said post in the scale of Rs. 250-600. In 1965 the pay Rationalisation Committee had recommended a change in the scale of pay from Rs. 200-500 to Rs. 250-690. By the G.O. dated 3-4-1967 (Annexure A to the writ petition) the aforesaid scales of Rs. 250-850 and Rs. 200-500 were merged in one scale of Rs. 250-600. By another G.O. dated 4-4-1967 all the posts of the District Statistics Officer in the scale of Rs. 250-600 were abolished and by the same order 51 posts of District Statistics Officer were created in the new scale of Rs. 300-900. It appears, however, that on account of the aforesaid abolition and creation of new posts the Government as well as the office of the Accountant General experienced some difficulty in fixing the salary and therefore eventually by G.O. dated 20-2-1969 (Annexure D) the Government stated that the aforesaid posts should not be deemed to be abolished but should be deemed to have been upgraded to the scale of Rs. 300-900 per month. 300-900 per month. After the upgrading of the post the Government issued a letter dated 10-10-1967 to the petitioner (Annexure C) wherein it was stated that the Government had decided that these posts be now refilled by direct recruitment through Lok Seva Ayog, Uttar Pradesh. The posts were to be re-advertised and a copy thereof was forwarded for information to all the District Statistics Officers concerned with the requests that they were to apply and take chance with others when the posts were advertised. Pursuant to this letter the petitioner was required to appear before the Public Service Commission, U.P. when the posts were advertised. The petitioner realising that the post on which he was already working had been upgraded made a representation dated 14-4-1969 to the Government (Annexure E) objecting to the requirement that he must appear before the Public Service Commission. U.P. for that post and stating that he should be deemed to have been automatically transferred to that post with continuity of service and with all the grade and emoluments attached thereto. The representation remained undecided and the petitioner had to appear before the Public Service Commission in September 1969. The representation was ultimately rejected in November 1969. The petition further mentioned that in the Department the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 19 were also working on the same posts of the District Statistics Officer., that they were appointed when the scale of pay was Rs. 250-850. that the scale of pay was downgraded and then again upgraded and in the year 1966 when the petitioner was appointed in the scale of Rs. 250-600 the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 19 were also working and getting the same scale i. e. Rs. 250-600. The grievance made was that the petitioner appeared in an interview before the Public Service Commission but was disapproved by the Commission by an order dated 27-5-1970, his services as District Statistics Officer were terminated and he was asked to accept the lower post of Statistical Assistant. This order has been termed as an order of reversion by the petitioner and it was filed as Annexure I to the amendment application. 3. In the other petition No. 698 oi 1970 the services of petitioners Nos. 2.5 and 7 namely R.B.G. Bali. This order has been termed as an order of reversion by the petitioner and it was filed as Annexure I to the amendment application. 3. In the other petition No. 698 oi 1970 the services of petitioners Nos. 2.5 and 7 namely R.B.G. Bali. Murari Singh and Gopal Rai as District Statistics Officers were terminated whereas the services of petitioner No. 3 Sri R.G. Gupta were also terminated and he was further reverted in the sense that the lower post of Statistical Assistant was offered to him by the same order dated 27-5-1970 mentioned earlier. These later orders necessitated an amendment of the petition which was allowed and the petitioners added two reliefs i.e. for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the aforesaid orders and also a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to deem the petitioners in continuous service and accord them all the benefits and privileges attached thereto. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it was alleged that by the order dated 24-1-1957, 10 posts of District Statistics Officer which were in addition to the respective cadre of such posts in the Economics and Statistics Department were sanctioned. Again by G.O. dated 23-11-1957, 12 more posts of District: Statistics Officers were sanctioned. Thus, in the year 1957 the total number of 22 posts of such officers were sanctioned in the pay scale of Rs. 250-850 for the Directorate of Economics and Statistics. These posts were filled by direct recruitment through Public Service Commission, U.P. Allahabad. In the year 1958. 8 more posts were sanctioned out of which only four were filled by promotion. It was' admitted that by G.O. dated 17-8-1961 the Government as a measure of economy down-graded the posts of District Statistics Officer which were originally sanctioned in the scale of Rs. 250-850 to the scale of Rs. 200-500. Thereafter 25 more posts of District Statistics Officer were sanctioned by the Government and it was decided that 50 percent of these posts were filled by direct recruitment through Public Service Commission and the rest by promotion. The case of the State was that with a view to accommodating the Officers who were already appointed as District Statistics Officers through Public Service Commission in the pay scale of Rs. The case of the State was that with a view to accommodating the Officers who were already appointed as District Statistics Officers through Public Service Commission in the pay scale of Rs. 250-850 without affecting their salary it was decided to transfer some of them to the headquarter in posts of identical scale of pay and some of them were posted as Divisional Statistics Officers and continued in the same pay scale. Since, however, 9 officers who were working in the pay scale of Rs. 250-850 could not be accommodated in the identical scale either in the headquarter or as Divisional Statistics Officer despite the above-mentioned arrangement they were allowed to continue to draw the same salary as personal pay. Out of 51 posts of District Statistics Officer which were now available. 25 posts were to be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining 25 posts by promotion but as 9 officers who had been selected by the Public Service Commission were already working only 16 posts of District Statistics Officer were referred to the Public Service Commission for direct recruitment. The Commission recommended the names of 16 persons in the main list and three persons in the reserved list for appointment. Sri Prem Shanker Bhargava the petitioner was placed in the reserved list and was appointed in a temporary capacity. It was admitted that by G.O. dated 4-4-1967. 51 posts of District Statistics Officer were upgraded in the pay scale of Rs. 300-900 and that this order was subsequently followed by a corrigendum dated 10-7-1967 whereby the number of posts was reduced from 51 to 42. After upgrading the post in the new scale the Government also decided to re-advertise 16 posts and make appointments after selection by the Public Service Commission. The existing incumbents were also given an opportunity to appear at the selection which was held in the year 1969 and 4 of the existing officers were selected. The petitioner Sri Prem Shanker Bhargava failed to be selected and the petitioners in the other writ petition also failed to be selected by the Public Service Commission. According to the Government it became necessary after selection to make appointments of those persons who had been selected by the Public Service Commission to the posts of District Statistics Officers in the scale of Rs. According to the Government it became necessary after selection to make appointments of those persons who had been selected by the Public Service Commission to the posts of District Statistics Officers in the scale of Rs. 300-900 and that required reversion or termination of some of the officers who had been holding the post in temporary capacity. In paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit the State Government put forward the case that the District Statistics Officers in the pay scale of Rs. 250-850 formed a separate cadre from that of the District Statistics Officers in the pay scale of Rs. 200-500 and the petitioner could not lay any claim to those posts. 5. The learned Standing Counsel relied on a number of decisions in support of the proposition that it is open to the Government to reconstitute a service to create two separate grades within the same service on the basis of salary or long duration of service and to create two classes where the incumbents are not similarly placed. Reliance was placed on Kishori v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 SC 1139 wherein it was held that the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work had nothing to do with Article 14, which therefore could not be said to be violated where the pay scales of class I and class II Income-tax Officers were different, though they did the same amount of work. Incremental scales of pay can be validly fixed dependent on the duration of the Officer's service. In that case it was clear that the two classes of Income-tax Officers were created as two distinct grades and were got separated from each other in all vital matters. It was also made clear in that very decision that matters relating to employment or appointment to any office in Article 16(1) were wide enough to include the matter of promotion, and inequality of opportunity for promotion as between citizens holding different posts in the same grade may therefore be an infringement of Article 16. As I have already said since the service of the Income-tax Officer was clearly reconstituted and two distinct grades were created it could not be said that there was denial of equality of opportunity as among citizens holding the same posts of the same grade. 6. As I have already said since the service of the Income-tax Officer was clearly reconstituted and two distinct grades were created it could not be said that there was denial of equality of opportunity as among citizens holding the same posts of the same grade. 6. In State of Punjab v. Joginder Singh, A.I.R. 1963 SC 913 it was held that if an existing service was recruited on the basis of a certain qualification, the creation of another service for doing the same work in the same way but with better prospects of promotion could not be said to be unconstitutional. In other words, no illegality was found in the state constituting two services consisting of employees doing the same work but with different scales of pay or subject to different conditions of service and the constituting of such service was held not to violate Article 14. But as I have already indicated, the crucial test would be as to whether the intention of the Government was to create two separate services or two distinct grades or whether they were intended to constitute or were merged in a single grade or service. In the above case it was emphasised that by the order dated 27-9-1957 the teachers in the erstwhile Board Schools became employees of the Government and were given the same scales and grades of pay as were applicable to their counter part in the State cadre but except this equality of grade and pay there was nothing more that was contemplated or provided for by that order. It was made clear in paragraph 20 or the judgment that there was no integration of the two cadres either expressly or by necessary implication and the two distinct cadres existed independently of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincialised) Cadre. Class III Rules, which had created two distinct cadres. Thus the basis of the decision was that the two services had started as independent services, as two distinct classes and they were never integrated. 7. The respondents also relied on Govind Dattatray v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, A.I.R. 1967 SC 839. Class III Rules, which had created two distinct cadres. Thus the basis of the decision was that the two services had started as independent services, as two distinct classes and they were never integrated. 7. The respondents also relied on Govind Dattatray v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, A.I.R. 1967 SC 839. for the proposition that there could be preferential treatment based on the source of recruitment i.e. direct recruitment or by promotion and that when the recruitment to certain posts is from different sources, what ratio would be adequate and equitable would depend upon the circumstances of each and the requirements and needs of a particular post. Unless the ratio was manifestly unreasonable it could not be held to be discriminatory. That proposition of law is exceptionable but the petitioners do not urge anything contrary to it. Their whole contention is that when once the two groups of recruits drawn from different sources are integrated and absorbed into a single group or service there must be equality of treatment. 8. On the other hand, the petitioners relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Meryyn Continho v. Collector of Customs. Bombay and Roshan Lal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 SC 52 and 1889 respectively in support of their contention that persons recruited from different classes at a later stage formed a single cadre and hence any preferential treatment given to one class for promotion was discriminatory. It was observed in Roshan Lal's case in paragraph 5 of the reports that at the time when the petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade D there was one class in Grade 'D formed of direct recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The recruits from both the sources to Grade 'D were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade 'C. To put it differently, once direct recruits or promotees were absorbed in one cadre they formed one class and there should not be any discrimination for the purpose of promotion to a higher grade. In the other case i.e. in Meryyn Continho the petitioners who were appraisers in the Customs Department had challenged the validity of rotational system of fixing seniority of appraisers and principal appraisers. In the other case i.e. in Meryyn Continho the petitioners who were appraisers in the Customs Department had challenged the validity of rotational system of fixing seniority of appraisers and principal appraisers. The system provided that in the relevant department vacancies occurring in the cadre of appraisers were to go alternatively to promotees and direct recruits. According to the petitioners of that case this resulted in inequitable promotion to the grade of the principal appraisers from the cadre of appraisers, only those who had served as appraisers for five years were entitled to be promoted in higher grade. It was held that the rotational system in such a case was denial of equality of opportunity to appraisers which was the only source of recruitment to the principal appraisers grade. The main consideration which weighed in the decision was that irrespective of the lower stages of the service, so far as the post of principal appraisers was concerned, its source of recruitment was only one i.e. from the grade of appraisers. Thus, there could be no question of any quota being reserved from two sources in their cases and the rotational system was held not to be applicable when there was only one source of recruitment. This case also in essence affirmed the same principle namely irrespective of the initial source or origin, if at some stage there comes into existence a single grade of service and from that vantage point there has to be further promotion or appointment to a higher post, no discrimination can be justified on the basis of the so-called source of recruitment otherwise it would result in inequality. 9. Thus the principle which emerges from the above cases is that when either there is from the very inception a single grade of service or when different grades are subsequently merged into a common pool of servants who discharge the same duties and perform the same functions and belong to one single grade of service, there must be equality of treatment accorded to them. Preferential treatment given to any one of them would be discriminatory against the other. In the instant case there is no manner of doubt that the effect of the G.O. dated the 20th February, 1969, (Annexure 'D) was to create and maintain a single service in the new grade of Rupees 300-900. In fact, a perusal of the various G.Os. Preferential treatment given to any one of them would be discriminatory against the other. In the instant case there is no manner of doubt that the effect of the G.O. dated the 20th February, 1969, (Annexure 'D) was to create and maintain a single service in the new grade of Rupees 300-900. In fact, a perusal of the various G.Os. in this regard leads to the conclusion that all the 51 posts of District Statistics Officers were throughout treated as forming one entire service, which suffered various vicissitudes. The service as a whole was down-graded and upgraded and at one stage the posts were abolished but subsequently the abolition was done away with and the same integrated service endured. The G.O. dated April 3, 1967. (Annexure A) in unambiguous" terms stated that the incumbents of the 51 posts who were drawn from the two grades of Rs. 250-850 and Rs. 200-500 were absorbed in the new scale of pay i.e. Rs. 250-600 vide the chart attached to Annexure A. The G.O. dated April 4, 1967 (Annexure E) abolished all the aforesaid 51 posts and created new posts in the grade of Rs. 300-900. The effect of this change was visited equally on all the incumbents. The matter was clinched by the G.O. dated the 20th February. 1969, (Annexure D) which annulled the abolition of the posts and upgraded the entire post to the scale of Rs. 300-900 per month. In such situation, therefore, where all the incumbents of the posts of the District Statistics Officers were thrown into the common stock and belonged to the same service and grade and performed the same duties they had to be dealt with alike and treated equally. No discrimination could be made among them on the basis that some had been for a longer duration in service. The entire service was upgraded and the incumbents were entitled to all the benefits and amenities attaching to the upgraded service. Whatever argument could have been built on the abolition of the old post and the creation of a new one was demolished by the later order doing away with the abolition and maintaining one integrated service. The entire service was upgraded and the incumbents were entitled to all the benefits and amenities attaching to the upgraded service. Whatever argument could have been built on the abolition of the old post and the creation of a new one was demolished by the later order doing away with the abolition and maintaining one integrated service. In these circumstances there could be no justification for the issue of the notice dated the 19th October, 1967, (Annexure C) whereby the petitioners were Called upon to appear in an interview before the Public Service Commission whereas the respondents Nos. 3 to 15 belonging to the same service were not required to undergo such test. As regards respondents Nos. 16 to 19. paragraph 32 of the counter affidavit makes it clear that their cases has already been referred to the Public Service Commission and were under consideration. It is not disputed that they were not asked to appear in the interview before the Public Service Commission but only their records were sent to the Public Service Commission. Evidently the petitioners were treated differently. 10. The contention of the petitioners also finds support from the provisions of Fundamental Rule 23 of the Financial Handbook, Volume II, Parts II to IV which has been pressed into service; "23. The holder of a post the pay of which is changed shall be treated as if he were transferred to a new post on the new pay provided that he may at his option retain his old pay until the date on which he has earned his next or any subsequent increment on the old scale or until he vacates his post or ceases to draw pay on that time-scale. The option once exercised is final." I have already held that the successive Government Orders adverted to by the petitioners in the present case had the effect of upgrading or downgrading the service as a whole and therefore by virtue of the Fundamental Rule quoted above the petitioners should be deemed to be transferred to the new scale of Rupees 300-900 per month. So far as the salary of the petitioners is concerned, the effect of Fundamental Rule 23 is to entitle them automatically to the new grade and hence they could not be subjected to any further test for extending to them the benefit of the new scale of pay or the grade, nor could they be treated differently from those occupying the same post. On a parity of reasoning on the up- grading of the entire service the benefits thereof became available to all the incumbents of the post included therein. 11. Thus, in my opinion the present case has to be judged entirely on the criterion as to whether there was one integrated service created expressly or by necessary implication or whether there were in existence two distinct grades constituting two different services. If the latter position obtained, there could be no denial of equal opportunity if the incumbents were treated differently in the matter of promotion. On the contrary, if there was one single service or a common pool the imposition of any further condition such as asking the petitioners to appear at a test or interview in order to entitle them to the new grade would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 12. It was vehemently contended on behalf of the State that the plethora of cases on the subject of termination of service or dismissal of a Government servant has settled the position that there are certain fixed categories in which alone the Court can interfere with such orders. Those categories are said to be cases of dismissal, punitive orders, visiting the citizens with penal consequences or diminution of accumulated interest, 'mala fide orders and orders which cast stigma on the petitioner. It was argued that the petitioners were temporary servants and they had no right to the post held by them and consequently the Court could not strike down the orders of reversion or termination passed in their respective cases. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned standing counsel. In my opinion such categorisation overlooks another important category namely that of violation of the sanctity embodied in Article 16 of the Constitution. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned standing counsel. In my opinion such categorisation overlooks another important category namely that of violation of the sanctity embodied in Article 16 of the Constitution. Article 16 (1) of the Constitution provides that there should be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State and such protection certainly embraces within its scope cases where persons belonging to the same service or cadre are differently treated and some of them are singled out for a discriminatory treatment. The position in the present case virtually is that the petitioners who belonged to the same service as the respondents Nos. 3 to 19 were being called upon to re-enter into service after satisfying the suitability test and facing an interview before the Public Service Commission, a condition from which the respondents were exempted. This is clearly revealed by Annexure C of the writ petition which shows that an onerous obligation was being cast on the petitioners, who were initially appointed by the approval of the Public Service Commission by requiring them to appear in an interview wherein they were to compete with outsiders. This was manifestly an unreasonable and discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioners and of which they could legitimately make a grievance. 13. The learned Standing Counsel referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Special Appeal No. 758 of 1967. The Sahayak Sachiv to Government, U.P. Lucknow v. Sheo Brat Lal Gupta to which I was a party. In that case the respondent was officiating in the cadre of the U.P. Agricultural Service Junior Scale. He appeared before the Selection Committee constituted for selecting officers for substantive appointment to permanent posts in the U.P. Agricultural Service Junior Scale. The Selection Committee comprised of a Member of the Public Service Commission, the Secretary of the Agricultural Department and the Director of Agriculture. As a result of the interview the Commission found the respondent unfit for appointment to a permanent posts and it further found him and some others not to be fit even for temporary and officiating appointment in U.P. Agricultural Service Junior Scale. As a result of the interview the Commission found the respondent unfit for appointment to a permanent posts and it further found him and some others not to be fit even for temporary and officiating appointment in U.P. Agricultural Service Junior Scale. Section B. In these circumstances the Government passed an order of reversion dated 17-2-1964 saving that on the advice of the Public Service Commission the Governor had been pleased to order the reversion of the respondent. It was contended by the State in that case that the order of reversion was an innocuous order which did not cast any stigma on the respondent nor was it as a measure of punishment and that the respondent had no right to the post on which he was merely officiating. The order of reversion of the respondent was upheld by the Bench which allowed the Special Appeal filed by the State and it was held that a Government servant holding an officiating post had no right to it and the Government was competent to consider the suitability of such person to hold the post. It was further held that under Article 320 of the Constitution the Government could ask the advice of the Public Service Commission about the suitability or otherwise of the petitioner and hence the order of reversion passed on the basis of the advice tendered by the Public Service Commission could not be challenged. The Bench repelled the contention of the respondent that while interviewing him -for the purpose of selection to a substantive post it was not open to the Public Service Commission or the Committee constituted for the purpose of selection to report anything about the suitability or otherwise of the respondent. That case is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the first place, one important circumstance which weighed with the Court in that decision was that on the report of the Public Service Commission or the Selection Committee the Government itself had considered the performance of the respondent during the period of his. officiation and found it unsatisfactory. Another material distinction was that in Sheo Brat Lal's case the cases of other persons who were similarly officiating were reviewed and they were also sent to the Public Service Commission which found them unsuitable. officiation and found it unsatisfactory. Another material distinction was that in Sheo Brat Lal's case the cases of other persons who were similarly officiating were reviewed and they were also sent to the Public Service Commission which found them unsuitable. The grievance in the instant case is that the petitioners were subjected to hostile discrimination inasmuch they in contradistinction from the respondents belonging to the same service and working in the same grade were singled out for being sent to the Public Service Commission. 14. In support of his argument the violation of Article 16 is itself a formidable ground on which apart from the categories referred to by the learned Standing Counsel the Court may interfere with an order of reversion or termination in appropriate cases, the learned counsel for the petitioners referred to a number of authorities. It was contended that Article 16 could be violated in various ways. It may be by Passing a punitive order or casting a stigma on the petitioner etc. It may take place by retaining the juniors and asking the seniors to quit. In fact the forms in which the guarantee enshrined in Article 16 may be infringed are legion. One of such forms can be where persons initially appointed by the approval of the Public Service Commission are in the normal tenor of the service called upon as it were to reenter the service in competition with outsiders. Therefore, the usual stenotyped categories formulated by the Standing Counsel do not in my opinion exhaust the whole gamut of the violation of the protection of Article 16. Thus, for instance, where an order is passed on extraneous considerations and is without justification. it may even though not strictly falling within any of the above mentioned categories, be quashed as being repugnant to Article 16. The petitioner relied on Ramaswamy v. I.G. of Police, A.I.R. 1966 SC 175 wherein it was held that Rule 2(c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules did not provide for the principle of last come first go which had wide application in industrial law. Nevertheless it held that when reversion took place on account of the exigencies of public service, the principle followed was that the junior-most persons among those officiating in clear or long term vacancies were generally reverted to make room for the senior officers coming back from deputation or from leave etc. Nevertheless it held that when reversion took place on account of the exigencies of public service, the principle followed was that the junior-most persons among those officiating in clear or long term vacancies were generally reverted to make room for the senior officers coming back from deputation or from leave etc. Further ordinarily as promotion on officiating basis was generally according to the seniority, subject to fitness for promotion, the junior-most persons reverted was usually the person promoted last. The above observations clearly recognise that in a suitable case an order of termination or reversion can be interfered with on the general principle of violation of Article 16. 15. The above decision was followed by Satish Chandra, J. in H.S. Kalsi v. State of U.P., 1969 ALJ 207 who observed that the principle of last come and first go should be normally applied to cases of reversion. A departure from that rule would result in violation of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution unless there were exceptional or extraordinary circumstances over which the authorities had really no control. In that case it was held that the Government had not acted reasonably in passing the orders of reversion without determining the seniority of the various officers and its action in reverting the juniors was held therefore to be arbitrary and discriminatory and as such in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners also referred me to the case of Ganesh Singh v. State of U.P. 1969 All WR 641 where the orders of reversion passed by the Government on the basis that the petitioners names were no longer included in the select list were Quashed. In that case the learned Advocate-General had contended that the non-inclusion of the petitioner-officers in the selection list of 1968 by the Selection Committee should have been deemed to be a declaration of their unsuitability to hold the cadre posts any longer, particularly when the list had been approved by the Union Public Service Commission. That contention was repelled and it was held that the Selection Committee or even the Public Service Commission was not the employer of the officers. The petition were allowed on the ground, that non-inclusion in the select list was not a germane consideration for allowing the officers to continue to officiate in the cadre post. That contention was repelled and it was held that the Selection Committee or even the Public Service Commission was not the employer of the officers. The petition were allowed on the ground, that non-inclusion in the select list was not a germane consideration for allowing the officers to continue to officiate in the cadre post. It has been argued for the petitioners in the present case that in Ganesh Singh's case the High Court had interfered on the ground of affording to the petitioners the protection guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution. The Standing Counsel referred to the case of Sheo Brat Lal (supra) wherein Ganesh Singh's case had been noticed vet the writ petition was dismissed. I have already pointed out that Sheo Brat Lal's case, Spl. Appl. No. 758 of 1967 is clearly distinguishable on facts. 17. In Anand Swarup v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Raj 8 again it was emphasised that if a senior person was available and not shown to lack merit in comparison to his juniors, then if other things were equal, he had to be promoted in preference to his junior and disregard of this principle would be a violation of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of last come and first go is not involved in the present case, nevertheless I am inclined to hold that the grievance born of the infringement of Article 16 can be protean in shape; it is well-nigh impossible to categorise them or confine them within the ambit of a particular case. At any rate the above authorities leave no room for doubt that violation of Article 16 of the Constitution is a potent ground for interfering with an order of dismissal or reversion or fixation of seniority. 18. It may be borne in mind that the particular orders of reversion and termination impugned in the present writ petitions by means of later amendments were merely consequential or incidental orders. The gravamen of the charge made by the petitioners was that the selection proceedings held in 1969 were a nullity and the notices issued to them on the basis of Annexure C of the writ petition asking them to appear before the Public Service Commission for an interview was altogether void. The gravamen of the charge made by the petitioners was that the selection proceedings held in 1969 were a nullity and the notices issued to them on the basis of Annexure C of the writ petition asking them to appear before the Public Service Commission for an interview was altogether void. It was not the case of the respondents nor was any such averment made in the counter-affidavit that they were not temporary incumbents. In these circumstances the action of the Government in asking the petitioners to face an interview before the Public Service Commission in competition amounts flagrant violation of the guarantee of equality of opportunities for all citizens in matters of employment embodied in Article 16 of the Constitution. In my opinion the proceedings held in September 1969 as a result of which the petitioners were denied the benefits of the new grade or the service were illegal and it follows as a corollary that the impugned orders of reversion or termination of service were apparently vitiated. 19. The result is that both the writ petitions are allowed. The orders dated the 27th May, 1970 contained in Annexures I and II of the Supplementary Affidavit to the writ petition terminating the services of the petitioners are quashed.