JUDGMENT- This is an appeal by the original plaintiff against the dismissal of his suit by a learned Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court on October 31,1960. The plaintiff had filed this suit for the recovery of sum of Rs. 1,030.19, which, according to him, has been wrongfully deducted from his Salary as and by way of "supervisory element", and for the recovery of a further sum of Rs. 3,972.44 in respect of the charge allowance payable to him, and for certain declarations, ancillary thereto. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff was employed as a clerk in the General Stores Inspection Department of the Army, that pursuant to the election given to him the plaintiff opted for the unified scale of pay and a unified scale of pay on the scale of Its. 100-10-200 was accordingly adjusted as far as he was concerned, and that in or about June 1947 it was provided by a corrigendum to the earlier Army Instructions that in the case of personnel whose rate of pay was Rs. 5 to Rs. 7 per day, a deduction of Rs. 40 per month should be made in respect of the supervisory element, so long as the pay after deduction would not be less than Rs. 100 per month. The authorities, however, later on decided, and a communication in that behalf was Sent to all concerned, that no recovery should be made on account of the deduction on the supervisory element up to June 30, 1947, but, inspite of those instructions, the plaintiffs pay was reduced to that extent with effect from September 1, 1944. The first head of the plaintiffs claim was, therefore, for this alleged wrongful deduction for the period from September 1, 1944 to June 30, 1947 aggregating to Rs. 1,000.19. 2 ... The facts in respect of the second head of the plaintiffs claim were that, in or" about September 1945, the Government of India introduced the grant of charge allowance to civilian personnel with effect from May 1, 194-5, and provided that a clerk was to be designated "Head Clerk" and was to be elegies for a charge allowance of Rs. 50 per month, if he was in actual independent charge of 12 to 25 clerks, but was to be designated as "Assistant .Head Clerk" and was to be eligible for a lower charge allowance of Rs. 50 per month, if he was in actual independent charge of 12 to 25 clerks, but was to be designated as "Assistant .Head Clerk" and was to be eligible for a lower charge allowance of Rs. 25 per month if he was in charge of 10 clerks. The plaintiffs case is that he was in charge of 10 clerks from September I, 1944 to April 10, 1946 but had not been paid the charge allowance of Rs. 25 per month for that period as Assistant Head Clerk; that he was in charge of more than 12 clerks from May 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947 but was riot paid the charge allowance of Rs. 50 per month as. Head Clerk; and that even for the period, subsequent to July 1, 1947 right upto August 12, 1956, he had been paid a charge allowance of totally Rs.20 per month, instead of Rs 50 per month to which he was entitled as Head Clerk. It is in respect bf the aggregate of these payments by way of charge allowance, which according to the plaintiff, are due to him, that the plaintiff has made the second head of his claim aggregating to Rs. 3,972.44. What may be called the third head of the plaintiffs claim is in the nature of declarations ancillary to the above two money claims of the plaintiff, the declarations claimed being to the effect that the plaintiff would be entitled to benefits by way of security, confirmation, promotion and pay on the basis of the said two claims. 3. Seven issues were framed by the learned trial Judge which are to the found in para. No. 12 of his judgment, but I am concerned in this appeal only with issues Nos. 2 and 4, which have been decided against the plaintiff by the learned trial Judge. As far as the remaining issues are concerned, the shall have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, except issues Nos. 6 and 7 which relate to the relief claimed by the plaintiff. I am, therefore, not called upon to deal with the same in this appeal filed by the plaintiff. 4. As far as the remaining issues are concerned, the shall have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, except issues Nos. 6 and 7 which relate to the relief claimed by the plaintiff. I am, therefore, not called upon to deal with the same in this appeal filed by the plaintiff. 4. The two main grounds on which the learned trial Judge has; dismissed the plaintiffs suit are, (1) that the plaintiff claim is not justifiable as it is not, based on any contract of service between the plaintiff and the defendants which could be enforceable at law (see issue No, 2) ; and (2) that the plaintiff’s claim in suit is barred by the law of limitation (see issue No.4). I must proceed to deal with each of these grounds. 5. The first of those questions requires a consideration of the authorities that were cited. In the case of R. Venkata Rao v. secretary of State, the appellant before the Privy Council was dismissed from Government service and he brought the suit out of which the said appeal arose for damages for wrongful dismissal and one of the questions which arose was whether the suit was maintainable as against the Government. The appellants contention was that he had a statutory right enforceable by action to hold office in accordance with the rules and that he could be only dismissed as provided by the rules and fu accordance with the procedure provided therein, whereas the respondents contention was that there was no actionable right conferred by statute upon the appellant. Sub-section (1) of section 86 B of the Government of India Act, 1919 laid down that, subject to the provisions of the said Act and the rules made there under, every person in the Civil Service of the Crown held office during His Majestys pleasure. The High Court at Madras confirmed the judgment of the trial Court dismissing the action of the appellant on the ground that he had no enforceable cause of action against the Government. On appeal to the Privy Council, that decision was confirmed. The High Court at Madras confirmed the judgment of the trial Court dismissing the action of the appellant on the ground that he had no enforceable cause of action against the Government. On appeal to the Privy Council, that decision was confirmed. The Privy Council in its judgment referred to section 96B and stated that that section in express terms laid down that office was held during pleasure and there was, therefore, no need for the implication of such a term and no room it, its exclusion and observed as follows: “…………… The argument for a limited and special kind of employment during pleasure but with an added contractual term that the rules are to be observed is at once too artificial and too far-reaching to commend itself for acceptance." (at p. 704) The Privy Council, therefore, came to the conclusion that the appellant had Do right of action and they were unable to hold as a matter of law that redress was obtainable .from the Courts by action (at p. 705). This decision of the Privy Council has been discussed by the learned trial Judge. The learned trial Judge has, however, not discussed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Abdul M ajid2 which, in my opinion, is important for the purpose of this case and to which I will now refer. The facts of that case were that a Sub-Inspector of Police appointed by the Inspector General of Police was dismissed by the order of Deputy Inspector General of Police after a departmental inquiry, and that dismissal was confirmed by the higher authority. He thereupon filed a suit against the State for a declaration that the order of dismissal was void and for arrears of salary. It may be mentioned that subsequently, however, the Sub-Inspector was reinstated at the instance of Chief Secretary to Government, but his claim for arrears of salary still survived, and one of the main questions which arose was whether the suit for arrears of salary by a civil servant was competent in a civil Court. It may be mentioned that subsequently, however, the Sub-Inspector was reinstated at the instance of Chief Secretary to Government, but his claim for arrears of salary still survived, and one of the main questions which arose was whether the suit for arrears of salary by a civil servant was competent in a civil Court. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the claim could only be made under rule 95 of the Bihar and Orissa Services Code, and that order of dismissal was confirmed by the Additional District Judge, but was reversed by the High Court which decreed his claim for arrears of salary in the sum of Rs.3,099-l2-0. The State of Bihar thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court. Dealing with the contention of the State that a suit by a public servant against the State for recovery of arrears of salary was not maintainable in a civil Court, the Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Punjab Province v. Tara chand3 in which it was held that the prerogative right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at will having been given statutory form in sub-section (1) of section 240, it could only be exercised subject to the limitations imposed by the remaining sub-sections of that section, and that it .must follow a~ a necessary consequence that if any of those limitations was contra developed, the public servant had a right to maintain an action against the Crown for appropriate relief, and there was no warrant for the proposition that the relief must be limited to a declaration and should not go beyond it. The Supreme Court referred to the observations of Kania J. (as he then was) in regard to the provisions of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that, if the States contention was to be accepted, the result would be that a civil servant could not recover money in a suit against the Crown, but his creditor could recover the same in execution of a decree against the civil servant. It may be mentioned that a passage from the judgment of Kaniaj was quoted in the judgment of the Supreme Court, in which the word "salary" was defined as an enforceable right to receive periodical payment. It may be mentioned that a passage from the judgment of Kaniaj was quoted in the judgment of the Supreme Court, in which the word "salary" was defined as an enforceable right to receive periodical payment. The Supreme Court in Abdul Majids case then referred to the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lal on which reliance was placed on behalf of the State, and pointed out that the attention of the Privy Council was not drawn in that case to the decision of the Federal Court in Tara chands case. The Supreme Court further observed that the decision in Lals case had been given without consideration of the provisions of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure relevant to the inquiry, and hC11d that the rule of English law that a civil servant could not maintain a suit against the State or against the Crown for recovery of arrears of salary did not prevail in this country and had been negatived by the provisions of statute, law in India. It further held (para. 14) that there was no warrant for the proposition that relief must be limited to the declaration and cannot go beyond it, and that to the extent that the rule that Government servants hold office during pleasure has been departed from by statute, Government servants are been, titled to relief like other persons under the ordinary law, and the relief had to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that it was difficult to see on what grounds the claim that the Crown cannot be sued for arrears of salary directly by the civil servant. though his creditor can take it could be based or sustained, and that what could be claimed in England by a Petition of Right can be claimed in this country by ordinary process (para. 17). The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal before it and confirmed the decree passed by the High Court for arrears of salary in favour of the respondent. 6. 17). The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal before it and confirmed the decree passed by the High Court for arrears of salary in favour of the respondent. 6. Both the decision of the Privy Council in Venlcata Raos case, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Majid’s case, Were considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. Framji v. Union of India5 in which the same question arose in regard to a suit filed by a guard of North Western Railway for a declaration that he was entitled to certain promotions and to receive certain payments and allowances, as well as for an order that the various emoluments due to him be paid to him. Chagla C. J. who delivered the judgment of the Bench formulated the question which arose before him in various ways, one of them being, whether the statutory rules framed by the Railway authorities relied upon by the plaintiff in the said case were rules of guidance and administrative rules, or whether they constituted a contract between the Union of India and its employees; After considering the provisions of Articles 309, 310, 311 and 312 of the Constitution and considering the decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Raos case as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Majids case, Chagla C. J, formulated the legal position emerging on the authorities in the following terms (at p. 1311) : " But subject to these exceptions, the exception of Article 311 and the exception enunciated by Abdul Majids case with regard to the recovery of arrears of salary, it is not suggested, with respect, by the Supreme Court in its judgment that the doctrine of a Government servant holding office during Kings pleasure has been in any way further limited or cut down." The learned Chief Justice then stated that it was clear from the record that the said case was not a case where there was any special contract between the Union of India and the civil servant by which the Union had undertaken the obligation or conferred the right upon the plaintiff in respect of which the said suit was filed, and, therefore, it was possible to dispose of the appeal before them on the narrow issue that, in the absence of any contract, the rules by themselves not constituting the contract, the plaintiff was not entitled to sue the Union of India. The appeal before them was dismissed by the Division Bench. 7. The position, therefore, is that, to the rule that a Government servant holds office during pleasure, there are only two exceptions, one under Article 311 with which I am not concerned in the present case, and the other the exception enunciated in Abdul Majids ca8e with regard to recovery of arrears of salary. 7. The position, therefore, is that, to the rule that a Government servant holds office during pleasure, there are only two exceptions, one under Article 311 with which I am not concerned in the present case, and the other the exception enunciated in Abdul Majids ca8e with regard to recovery of arrears of salary. The second exception which is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Majids case has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in at least three later cases, 2nd they are, (1) State of M. P. v. G. Q. Mandawar6, (2) P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India and (3) Moti Ram v. N.I£. Frontier Railways. In the first of these three cases, Abdul Majids case is construed as laying down that salary was not in the nature of bounty and whatever was recovered by Petition of Right in England could be recovered by action in this country. In the last of those cases, the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Majids case has been explained by the Supreme Court itself as being that the rule of English law that public servants hold office during pleasure has not been fully accepted either by section 214 of the Government of India Act, or by Article 310 (I) of the Constitution, and that to the extent to which that rule has been modified by the relevant provisions of Article 311, Government servants are entitled to relief like any other persons under the ordinary law and "that relief must be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure". 8. That being the legal position emerging from the authorities discussed above, the narrow question to which I must address myself is whether the claim in the present suit falls under the exception carved out by Abdul Majids case. If what the plaintiff claims in the present suit is a part of salary, or is property which is attachable under section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though called allowance or designated by any other name, it would fall within the ratio of the decision in Abdul Majids case and the plaintiff would be entitled to enforce payment of the same against the State in a Court of law, as laid down in that case. I have already pointed out above the basis of the plaintiffs claims in this suit. I have already pointed out above the basis of the plaintiffs claims in this suit. The first claim is for a wrongful deduction from salary which, it is not disputed, had been fixed on the unified scale of pay for which the plaintiff had opted under the option given to him. What the plaintiff claims under that head is, therefore, a part of what was his salary, and I have no doubt that the same would be covered by the exception laid down in Abdul Majids case. As far as the second head of the plaintiffs claim is concerned, charge allowance, whether it can strictly be called salary or not, is certainly property which is attachable under the provisions of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it has not been shown to fall within any of the clauses of the proviso to sub-section (1) thereof. That being the position, the ratio of the decision in Abdul Majids case is certainly applicable to the plaintiffs claim for charge allowance which forms the second head of his money claim in suit. The declarations which the plaintiff has claimed are merely ancillary to those money claims, and, without deciding whether the same are maintainable on other grounds and whether the plaintiff is entitled to those declarations in the wide terms in which the same have been formulated, I have no hesitation .in holding that the relief in respect thereof cannot be said to be non-justifiable. In that view of the matter, it is no necessary for me to consider whether the Army Instructions in the present case constituted a contract between the State and the appellant before me, or to deal with the decision of K. K. Desai J. in the case of Tara Singh v. Union of India9, to which the learned trial Judge has -referred. 9. That brings me to the next question, and that is the question of limitation. In my opinion, from its very terms Article 36 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, can have no application to the plaintiffs claim in this suit which does not relate to damages or compensation at all. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of National Bank, Lahore v. Sohan Lallo that Article 36 applies to acts or omissions commonly known as torts to English lawyers. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of National Bank, Lahore v. Sohan Lallo that Article 36 applies to acts or omissions commonly known as torts to English lawyers. I am unable to take the view that the plaintiffs suit could, by any stretch of language, be construed as a claim founded in tort for unliquid dated damages or compensation. It is in essence a claim for specific sums of money by . way of arrears of salary as well as charge allowance, and I am unable to see how it could be held to fall within Article 36 of the Limitation Act, as the learned trial Judge has held it to be. In my opinion, the proper article to apply to the plaintiffs claim for recovery of a part of the salary as well as for charge allowance is Article 102 of the Limitation Act, and indeed, it has been so laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. V. D. Angal. The Statell in a case where the claim was of a very similar nature. Under the said Article 102, the starting point of limitation is the date when the amount accrued due and limitation must, therefore, be computed accordingly for the purpose of finding out what part of this plaintiffs claim in this suit is within time. It may be stated that there could be no doubt that the whole of the plaintiffs claim is not within time, and it will be for the trial Court to find out from the material placed before it as to what part of the money claim in this suit is barred, and what part, if any, is within time. As far as the declaratory relief’s claimed by the plaintiff are concerned, the same would be governed by the provisions of Article 120 of the Limitation Act. As already stated above, it will be for the trial Court to consider whether the declarations sought by the plaintiff in the present suit are in proper form, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to them, apart from the questions decided by this judgment. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Judge dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Judge dismissing the plaintiffs suit with costs. I order that the suit be remanded to the trial Court for disposal on merits in the light of this judgment. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the suit. The parties will be at liberty to apply for the framing of such further issues as they may think fit. It will be of course for the trial Court to decide which of them should be framed. Appeal allowed.