JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. This is an appeal ostensibly from the final decree in a partition suit made after the Commissioner's report was received by the trial Court and the objection of the parties heard. Actually, however neither is the preliminary decree a real decision by the Court of the facts in dispute, nor is the Commissioner's report so-called one he could properly make under Order 26 Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure Code. What has obviously happened is that the trial Court in the so-called preliminary decree based upon an alleged compromise (which at the most is only partial) abdicated in favour of the Commissioner's decision of issues which the Court itself should have decided. The facts of the case are simple and to some extent common ground. The Defendant-Appellant and the Plaintiff-Respondent were partners in a joint venture for the collection and sale of forest produce. The business seems to have gone on till 1954 and then stopped on account of mutual differences. Whether in terms of law the partnership stood dissolved at that time was another question. Anyway, the parties had their usual differences about various points of detail and accordingly the present Respondent brought a suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts, against the Defendant-Appellant in 1955. The suit took its usual course till 1959 when the parties filed what they called a compromise petition. But actually the field of compromise was very narrow and most of the points in dispute remained unsolved in spite of the show of settlement. The compromise related only to the joint assertion that the partnership stood dissolved in 1954. Four other material problems remained unsolved, they being: (i) In which of the two partner's charge the account books have been placed and in whose charge they are actually at present? (ii) Who was the managing partner of this business? (iii) On the capital invested in the partnership business would the partner investing it be entitled to interest? (iv) For the day-to-day conduct of the partnership business would the managing partner be entitled to a remuneration (mehnatana) ? On the face of it, each of these problems is one for a solution to be recorded by the Court after admission and assessment of evidence brought in by the parties. (iv) For the day-to-day conduct of the partnership business would the managing partner be entitled to a remuneration (mehnatana) ? On the face of it, each of these problems is one for a solution to be recorded by the Court after admission and assessment of evidence brought in by the parties. Surprisingly enough, while accepting the so-called compromise, the Court made a preliminary decree on 11-4-59 incorporating these four questions and directed that a Commissioner appointed by the Court would solve them and further: After finding an answer to these four questions the Commissioner shall decide whether there had been a profit or loss in the business and how that profit or loss, if any, should be shared between the parties...... Let the Commissioner submit a report after investigating this. The final decree will be made after study of that report in the light of the objections, if any, by the parties. The Commissioner was appointed and after devoting considerable time and attention produced a report on 31-7-1962 in about 30 pages of typescript. He solved the four questions and in addition made certain investigations about the existence, custody and possible contents of the partnership books. The parties being heard on this "a final decree" was made on 22-7-1963, which has really no finality about it and will be meaningful only after some more investigations. A final decree should state how much in terms of money one of the parties owes the other or may incidentally set out the modus operandi for such settlement mutually of liquidated headings of assets and liabilities. Here, however, there are four headings and each of them involves an "if". Without going into the preliminary decree which in any event has to be followed up by further investigations, we note that the reference to the Commissioner was basically unsound. It is not merely the case of wrong decision at the preliminary stage, followed by a wrong decree, Which having been allowed to remain unchallenged is resjudicata; it is a case where the Court has abdicated in favour of the Commissioner in fields for which a Commissioner could not be appointed in any event. The direction that the Commissioner should answer those four questions is basically illegal and without jurisdiction. The Commissioner's answers, inconclusive as they are, are also certainly without jurisdiction and cannot be noticed by any Court. The direction that the Commissioner should answer those four questions is basically illegal and without jurisdiction. The Commissioner's answers, inconclusive as they are, are also certainly without jurisdiction and cannot be noticed by any Court. If by the "compromise" was meant that the parties were agreeable to a nominee of the Court giving a binding decision as arbitrator of these four problems, then the procedure would have been quite regular though somewhat unusual. But that is not the actual position ; the parties did not and do not agree to any such course ; they did not agree that the so-called Commissioner's decision would be binding on them. It was just a case of the Commissioner making a report and forwarding his recommendations. Since the learned lower Court seems to have laboured under a serious misunderstanding as to the scope of "a Commissioner's" inquiries, it is better that a brief analysis is made about the fields demarcated by the law for the Court's on the one hand and the Commissioner's discretion on the other. Broadly speaking, it is the duty of the Court to answer every problem that comes up in Course of the controversy noticeable by it in a suit or other form of litigation. Making over a problem to some outside agency-usually called a "commission" is an exception; like all exceptions it has to be supported by statute which should be interpreted narrowly. In other words, whenever there is a doubt whether answering a particular question on a matter in dispute is within the province of the Court or of the commission, the answer should be in favour of the former; because it is only exceptional that a Court can make over its functions to some outsider. Order 26, Code of Civil Procedure is the only statute justifying such abdication and a perusal of the different headings of legal abdication in favour of a commission would show that it involves what may be called purely mechanical or ministerial functions, the judicial functions being invariably within the province of the Court. The order itself should be treated as exhaustive; at the most any heading which is claimed to be within the province of commission should be ejusdem generis with any one of the headings expressly set out. The order itself should be treated as exhaustive; at the most any heading which is claimed to be within the province of commission should be ejusdem generis with any one of the headings expressly set out. They are: (a) Commission to examine witnesses: (Rule 1 to Rule 8):-This is to cover cases where for reasons of distance, physical disability, social status or public functions, the Court is unable to be present during the examination of the witness. No doubt the Court loses the advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witness ; but as against it there is the saving of the disadvantage of long journey, upset of public duties of high functionaries, social irritation of the witness and the like. The point to note is that the function allotted to the Commissioner is mechanical or ministerial without the exercise of a judicial mind, that is, the weighing of the pros and cons of a problem in controversy. (b) The second heading is commissions for local investigations (Rules 9 and 10):-Here again the disadvantage is the absence of the first-hand impression in the mind of the Court; but the balancing advantage is that the Court does not run the risk of making itself a witness and is spared the trouble and the waste of time in making journeys from the head quarters. Here again the commission only records what is palpable and leaves the Court to exercise its judicial mind. (c) The third heading is relevant in this case, namely, commission to examine accounts (Rules 11 and 12):-Here again ideal justice would be satisfied by nothing less than the Court itself ploding through the account-books, tabulating the headings and working out plus-minus memos. But that would cause a disproportionate loss of time and effort and accordingly somebody of education, and if possible special aptitude for taking accounts, is deputed. Here again the process is mechanical though somewhat complicated. The commission does not decide in principle who is liable and for what. But the liability being already decided by the Court it works out the details with reference to the pre-existent material in the form of account books and memoranda. (d) The last heading is the effecting of partitions by metes and bounds, again a mechanical process implementing the Court's decision as to the shares. This involves some special knowledge of surveying and value assessment (Rules 13 and 14). (d) The last heading is the effecting of partitions by metes and bounds, again a mechanical process implementing the Court's decision as to the shares. This involves some special knowledge of surveying and value assessment (Rules 13 and 14). (e) The rest of the Order (Rules 15 to 22) are of a general nature. It is obvious that not one of the four problems set out in the beginning and made over to the Commissioner for finding answers falls in any of the headings, least of all, the taking of accounts. It is not merely a case of a wrong decision which we would allow to remain because neither party has challenged it at any earlier stage, but the Court acting without jurisdiction by abdicating in favour of somebody else and inviting his opinion instead of asking for his factual report on matters of mechanical detail. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and all proceedings from and including the preliminary decision contained in the decree dated 1-4-1959 are quashed. The trial Court should take up the suit at the stage in which it stood when the so-called compromise petition was filed. Since there is no controversy about the dissolution of partnership it need take evidence only on the four other issues set out in the "preliminary decree". After hearing the parties it should decide on each of these issues and make a proper decree. Whether it would be a preliminary or a final decree would naturally depend upon the answers given to these questions. It is suggested that this should be done without any further delay as the suit is already very old. It is also suggested that the materials such as the account books and memoranda, if any, collected by the Commissioner should be carefully preserved in the Court and utilised if and when an occasion arises for using them as evidence. In the special circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. Appeal allowed