JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Shaklu son of Dabar Ahir, one of the defendants in. suit No. 2136 of 1957, has filed the present second appeal. He has arrayed Munshi Ahir, plaintiff of the suit as respondent No. 1. Pekhu Ahir, Pujan Ahir and Kishore Ahir, the three brothers of the appellant, who were co-defendants along with him have been arrayed as respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in this appeal. 2. Relationship between the parties will be evident from the following pedgree, which is not in dispute. Plaintiff Munshi brought the suit on the allegation that the grandfather of the parties i.e. Khelawan, along with his brother Budh Raj, was the sub-tenant of plot No. 940 area 1.072 acres. The name of Budhraj was entered in village papers and he died issueless. After his death, Khilawan, the grandfather of the parties, continued to remain in possession over the plot. Plaintiff's father Chekuri pre-deceased Khilawan. On Khilawan's death Dabar's name alone was entered in village papers although the plaintiff also continued to remain in joint possession over the plot along with Dabar. After Dabar's death the defendants got their names mutated and wanted to oust the plaintiff from possession. Munshi then moved an application before the revenue court for correction of papers. During these proceedings parties resolved their dispute and moved an application, dated 27-8-1956, stating that the parties have compromised their dispute It was agreed that the plaintiff was also a tenure holder along with the defendants and it was by mistake that his name had not been entered in the village papers. It was prayed that the name of the plaintiff be also entered in the village papers. In order to settle their future dispute the parties had agreed that the plaintiff would cultivate 406 Karis of the plot towards the west whereas the remaining plot would remain under the cultivation of the defendants. A certified copy of this application has been filed as Ex. 1 in this case. According to the plaintiff, the defendants again started interfering with his possession over this piece of land, hence he prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the western portion of plot No. 940 measuring 406 Karis. In the alternative, he claimed that, if he was found to be out of possession over the plot in dispute, a decree for possession may also be passed. In the alternative, he claimed that, if he was found to be out of possession over the plot in dispute, a decree for possession may also be passed. The defendant claimed that whole of plot No. 940 had been settled by the Zamindar with their father Dabar who was separate from his brother Chekuri. After Dabar's death the defendants succeeded him. When U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Lard Reforms Act, (U.P. Act I of 1951) came into force, they acquired Adhivasi rights which in the year 1954 were converted into Sirdari rights. According to them, plaintiff was not in possession of the land in dispute and had no title to it. They also raised a plea that the suit was barred by limitation. 3. Trial court referred the issue about Sirdari rights to the revenue court which held that the defendants were Sirdars of the land in dispute. Trial court adopted the finding recorded by the revenue court and held that the plaintiff had no right in the land. It was also found that entries made in various revenue records showed that it were the defendants who had been in possession over the land in dispute throughout. The suit filed by the plaintiff was, therefore, barred by time. In the result plaintiff's suit was dismissed. 4. Plaintiff then went up in appeal. Lower appellate courts was of opinion that the issue about Sirdari right should not have been referred to the revenue court. It accordingly remitted the issue about the Sirdari rights of the parties to the trial court for recording its own finding. After going through the evidence on the record, the trial court reported to the appellate court that in its opinion also the defendants were the Sirdars of the land and that the plaintiffs had nothing to do with it. 5. The appellate court, however, came to the conclusion that the entries in revenue record showed that the plot in suit was originally acquired in the name of Budhraj, brother of the grandfather of the parties. It repelled the defendants' case that Ram Khilawan, grandfather of the parties, pre-decesed Budhraj and held that after Budhraj's death Ram Khilawan, grandfather of the parties alone remained in possession over plot No. 940. There was nothing an the record to show that either Budhraj or Ram Khilawan ever surrendered their interest in the land in favour of the Zamindar. It repelled the defendants' case that Ram Khilawan, grandfather of the parties, pre-decesed Budhraj and held that after Budhraj's death Ram Khilawan, grandfather of the parties alone remained in possession over plot No. 940. There was nothing an the record to show that either Budhraj or Ram Khilawan ever surrendered their interest in the land in favour of the Zamindar. Evidence about settlement of land with Dabar, as claimed by the defendants, was not accepted. It was found that the plaintiff had been paying a part of rent to the Zamindar before U.P. Act No. I of 1951 came into force. The compromise set up by the plaintiff was accepted and it was held that the plaintiff became tenure-holder of 406 Karis of the land lying towards the west of plot No. 940. In this view of the matter, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit for injunction as prayed. Defendants have now come up in second appeal before this Court. Sri Faujdar Rai, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court shows that its findings have been materially influenced by the certified copy of the application dated August 27, 1966 (Ex. 1) , which showed that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties, under which the plaintiff was given an exclusive right to cultivate the land in dispute. He contended that according to the defendant's case this document was Farzi and the trial court rejected it with the following observation :- "It was the duty of the plaintiff to have proved that the compromise was entered into by the parties conclusively and that the compromise bears their thumb impression, but not a shred of evidence to that effect has been laid. I find that oral evidence of the defendant is worthy of belief and I accept the same." 6. According to him, the certified copy Ex. 1 was not sufficient to prove that the parties had arrived at a compromise as there was no evidence on the record to show that this application had in fact been signed or thumb marked by the parties. He urged that the lower appellate court erred in basing its conclusions relying upon this document without meeting the objections raised by the trial court. 7. He urged that the lower appellate court erred in basing its conclusions relying upon this document without meeting the objections raised by the trial court. 7. It appears that before the lower appellate court, the factum of compromise itself was not challenged. It was not urged that the document Ex. I deserved to be excluded from consideration as it had not been shown that the parties had thumb marked it. What was argued was that the document was not admissible in evidence as it had not been registered. The argument was repelled on the ground that this document did not require registration as it did not involve any transfer of property. Counsel for the appellant, however, did not press the argument again before this Court. 8. The other argument raised before the lower appellate court was that the compromise evidence by Ex. 1 was not binding on the defendants as defendant No. 4 was a minor at the relevant time. This argument was correctly rejected by the lower appellate court on the ground that the compromise had been entered into on his behalf by defendant No. I as the head of the family. 9. Moreover, the document Ex. 1 is a certified copy of an application moved by the parties before the revenue court in case No. 1336 which was decided on 18th of January, 1957. In this application it was mentioned that the parties had compromised their dispute, and that it had been decided that the plaintiff would cultivate the western portion of the plot measuring 406 Karis, whereas the remaining plot was to be cultivated by the defendants. This application purports to bear the thumb impression of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 10. Section 90-A, as inserted in the Indian Evidence Act by U.P. Act 24 of 1964, reads as follows :- "(1) Where any registered document or a duly certified copy thereof or any certified copy of a document which is part of a record of a court of justice is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the court may presume that the original was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed. (2) This presumption shall not be made in respect of any document which is the basis of a suit or of a defence or is relied upon in the plaint or written statement." 11. Since Ex. I is a certified copy of an application which was part of the record of a court of justice (revenue court) and it was produced from a proper custody, the lower appellate court could in law presume that the original of Ex. I was executed by the plaintiff and defendants Nos. I to 3, by whom it purported to have been executed. The presumption drawn by the lower appellate court becomes apt when it is found that the learned counsel for the defendants did not dispute the factum of compromise before it. In the circumstances the lower appellate court was perfectly justified in law in taking the document Ex. 1 into consideration even though there may not be any evidence on the record to show that the original of Ex. I did bear the thumb impressions of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that in view of the provisions of Sec. 90-A (2) of the Evidence Act, the plaintiff was not entitled to rely upon the presumption under Sec. 90-A (1) as Ex. 1 was a document which was the basis of plaintiff's suit and had been relied upon in the plaint. I am unable to accept this argument. Ex. 1 is copy of an application said to have been moved before the revenue court. The suit was not based on this application, which was merely one of the pieces of evidence in support of the allegation made in the plaint viz. that the parties had agreed to divide plot No. 940 in the manner alleged in the plaint. These allegations could have been proved by oral evidence, if the same was believed, even without producing this document. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that Ex. 1 was the basis of the suit from which the present appeal arises. I have gone through the plaint. I do not find any mention of this document in it. These allegations could have been proved by oral evidence, if the same was believed, even without producing this document. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that Ex. 1 was the basis of the suit from which the present appeal arises. I have gone through the plaint. I do not find any mention of this document in it. In paragraph 7 it was mentioned that correction of record proceedings in respect of No. 940 took place in revenue record in which it was agreed that the plaintiff's name would also be entered in the revenue records along with that of the defendants, and that the plaintiff would cultivate 436 Karis of land in this plot lying towards its west. The plaintiff accepted a small area in order to put an end to the dispute. These factual allegations made in paragraph 7 of the plaint cannot be construed as referring to the application dated 27-8-1956 (Ex. 1) . It was open to the plaintiff to prove these allegations by producing any evidence, including the production of the certified copy of the application Ex. 1 which may be found to be reliable. in the circumstances it cannot be said that Ex. 1 was a document which had been relied upon in the plant. I am, therefore, of opinion that sub-clause (2) of Sec. 90-A of the Evidence Act has no application to the facts of the present case. The court was not precluded from raising the presumption mentioned in Sec. 90A (1) and from relying upon the document Ex. 1. 13. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court is that the plot No 940 belonged to the ancestor of the parties. The plaintiff and the defendants became its joint tenure holders. The parties arrived at a compromise under which the plaintiffs was to cultivate 436 Karies of land lying towards the west in plot No. 940. These are findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in a second appeal. 14. As the lower appellate court accepted the genuineness of the application Ex. 1 and found that the parties had entered into an agreement to cultivate different portion; of plot No. 940 separately, it is evidence that in its view the plaintiff had also been in possession over the plot in dispute along with the defendants. In the circumstances it is obvious that the present suit is not barred by limitation. 1 and found that the parties had entered into an agreement to cultivate different portion; of plot No. 940 separately, it is evidence that in its view the plaintiff had also been in possession over the plot in dispute along with the defendants. In the circumstances it is obvious that the present suit is not barred by limitation. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to the injunction prayed for. 15. With the permission of the court, learned counsel for the appellant then raised a. new argument which was neither raised in either of the two courts below, nor in the memorandum of appeal. He urged that the defendants were recorded occupants of the whole plot No. 940 in the year 1356 F. Under Section 20 (b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the defendants acquired Adhivasi rights which subsequently matured into Sirdari rights under the amending Act in the year 1954. He contended that as in the year 1356 Fash the plaintiff was not recorded as occupant, he did not acquire the brights of an Adhivasi and whatever rights he might have had in the land came to an end. after hearing the counsel for the parties. I have come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this argument. Learned counsel for the parties accepted the fact that the land in dispute was the Sir of the erstwhile Zamindars and that before coming into force of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the position of the tenure holders was that of tenants of Sir. It was also agreed that" the tenure holders were not the tenants belonging to the class referred to in Section 19 (x) or in whose favour hereditary rights accrued in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Act. In view of the finding that the plot No. 940 was the tenure holding of the common ancestor of the parties and they had been in its possession, there is no escape from the position that on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting both the plaintiff and the defendants were tenants of Sir. All of them acquired adhivasi rights in this plot under Section 20 (a) of the U.P. Act No. I of 1951. In the year 1954 the right acquired by the plaintiff also matured into Sirdari rights along with that of the defendants. All of them acquired adhivasi rights in this plot under Section 20 (a) of the U.P. Act No. I of 1951. In the year 1954 the right acquired by the plaintiff also matured into Sirdari rights along with that of the defendants. Subsequently, by means of an agreement between the parties it was decided that the plaintiff was to cultivate the land in dispute exclusively. The argument that under Section 20 (b) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the plaintiff did not acquire Adhivasi rights whereas the defendants acquired the same as they were recorded as occupants in the year 1356 F. is fallacious. Sec. 20 of the Act read as a whole shows that the Legislature intended that the Adhivasi rights were to be conferred on certain types of tenants of Sir. These rights were also intended to be conferred upon certain persons who did not belong to the category of tenants of Sir but were recorded as occupants. Right on such occupant was intended to be conferred under Section 20 (b) of the Act. In my opinion, if a tenant of Sir acquires Adhivasi rights under Section 20 (a) he does not acquire the same right over again under Section 20 (b) . Sec. 20 (b) was intended to cover the cases of persons other than tenants of Sir who acquired Adhivasi rights under Section 20 (a) , and who were recorded as occupants in accordance with the provisions of that clause. In this view of the matter clause (b) of Section 20 has no application to the facts of the present case. Rights of the parties are governed by Section 20 (a) of the Act, under which both the parties acquired adhivasi rights which subsequently matured into Sirdari rights. 16. I am, accordingly of the opinion that the decree passed by the lower appellate court is not contrary to law. There is no force in the present second appeal, which is dismissed with costs.