JUDGMENT This second appeal by the defendants is directed against the judgment and decree dated 28th of February, 1967 of the District Judge, Manipur, who, on accepting the appeal of the plaintiffs and setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 18-1-1963, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for possession by partition of their one half share in the ingkhol in dispute. 2. The following pedigree table would be helpful in understanding the facts of the case: 3. The suit was founded on the allegations that the ingkhol in dispute had been acquired by Balaram Singh in the name of his elder son Tarpon Singh and that on his death it was equally inherited by his two sons Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh in equal shares. The two plaintiffs represent the line of Rupa Singh, being his daughters, while the defendants are the heirs of Tarpon Singh. The two brothers, Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh, had been in joint occupation of the ingkhol, each having constructed a house of his own on different parts thereof. After the death of their parents, it was alleged further, the two plaintiffs continued in the joint possession of the ingkhol together with the defendants. However, the defendants 1, 2 and 4 secured surreptitiously the mutation of the ingkhol in dispute in their own names, and that when the plaintiffs learnt about that development they requested the defendants for partition of the ingkhol. The defendants refused to do so and that left the plaintiffs with no option but to claim partition of the joint property in assertion of their right thereto. 4. The suit was resisted by the defendants who traversed the allegations of the plaintiffs that the ingkhol had been acquired originally by Balaram Singh or that he had done so in the name of his elder son Tarpon Singh. It was pleaded by the defendants that Balaram Singh had lived and died at Heisnam Leikai, which is now the south eastern portion of the land where the Ist Bn. of Manipur Rifles, Imphal, is housed, that after the war between Manipur and the British the two surviving sons (Tarpon and Rupa) of Balaram Singh were forced to vacate that property by the Government, and that they then took temporary shelter in the house of one Ayam Ibungobal Singh at Sawaijam Leirak, Moirangkhom, and lived there for a couple of years. During that period of two years. Tarpon Singh purchased the ingkhol now in dispute for himself from the father of Yumnam Natum Singh. In those days it was not customary to make purchases of immoveable properties by written instruments and as such this purchase was made orally but it was accompanied by delivery of possession. When, subsequently the system of pattas came into vogue, Tarpon Singh secured the registration of the ingkhol in his own name. This happened in the year 1898, by which date the survey had taken place in Manipur. Since that date, it was alleged further, it was Tarpon Singh during his lifetime and thereafter his sons who have been paying revenue regularly respecting the ingkhol. The ingkhol continued to be entered in the revenue records in the name of Tarpon Singh until the year 1960. Tarpon Singh, it was pleaded further, allowed Rupa Singh, his younger brother, to live in the ingkhol in dispute since he (Rupa Singh) could not afford to purchase a separate homestead for himself. The understanding reached between the two brothers was that Rupa Singh and the members of his family would quit the ingkhol when required to do so by Tarpon Singh. It was subject to the same understanding that Rupa Singhs daughters continued to reside in the ingkhol. The plaintiff No. 1 Thambal Devi, it was alleged, was divorced by her husband and so was forced to return to the ingkhol in dispute. She was, like her father, permitted to reside there along with her two sons as a mere licensee. 5. One technical objection raised by the defendants was that one of the two deceased daughters of Rupa Singh being survived by her two female children, Radhamani and Amusana, the suit for partition cannot be said to be properly constituted without bringing them on the record. 6. The trial Court settled the following issues between the parties: (i) Is there any defect of parties? (ii) Have the plaintiffs locus standi to bring the suit? (iii) Whether the suit land was acquired and left by late Balaram Singh, predecessor of the parties? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs have heritable right in the suit land to the extent of half? (v) Whether Rupa Singh, and after his death, his daughters, plaintiffs, are the permissive holders in the suit land? (vi) Have the plaintiffs cause of action? (iii) Whether the suit land was acquired and left by late Balaram Singh, predecessor of the parties? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs have heritable right in the suit land to the extent of half? (v) Whether Rupa Singh, and after his death, his daughters, plaintiffs, are the permissive holders in the suit land? (vi) Have the plaintiffs cause of action? (vii) Are the plaintiffs entitled to the relief as claimed? The first issue was decided by it in negative and issues Nos. 2 and 6 in the affirmative. Issues Nos. 3 and 4 were found against the plaintiffs, and issue No. 5 was decided in favour of the defendants. As a consequence of these findings the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs. 7. The District Judge held in the appeal filed by the plaintiffs that the latter had successfully established that Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh had either jointly acquired the ingkhol in dispute or had inherited the same from their father as co-owners, and that the two brothers had remained in occupation of the same in that capacity. The decree of the trial Court was consequently set aside and suit decreed with costs of both the Courts in the manner prayed for in the plaint. Having felt aggrieved with the decree made by the District Judge, the defendants have come up in appeal to this Court under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. 8. Shri Ibotombi Singh, the learned counsel for the respondents, raised a preliminary objection bearing on the maintainability of the second appeal. The precise contention raised by him was that no question of law arises for determination in the appeal and that second appeal on a question of fact is barred by Sections 100 and 101 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no doubt on the point that the two sections when read together make it manifestly clear that a second appeal will lie only on the ground of error in law or procedure and that it shall not lie merely on the ground of an error on a question of fact. It follows that if questions of fact alone arise for determination in the instant appeal, the submission made by Shri Ibotombi Singh must prevail and the appeal rejected on that short ground. It follows that if questions of fact alone arise for determination in the instant appeal, the submission made by Shri Ibotombi Singh must prevail and the appeal rejected on that short ground. Shri Budhachandra Singh, appearing for the appellants, did not join issue with the respondents counsel on the point that second appeal is not maintainable on a question of fact. However, he urged that since the learned District Judge had approached the question of ownership of the property in dispute from a wrong angle and had determined the same on the basis of a faulty presumption, a question of law does arise for determination in the appeal. While developing his point, Shri Budhachandra Singh submitted that the District Judge firstly recorded the finding that the defendants had failed to establish that Rupa Singh or his daughters had been in occupation of a part of the property in dispute as licensees, and then proceeded to examine the question of ownership of the property in that background. It was urged that this approach to the question of ownership is not legally permissible. However, I have not been able to find any fault with the manner in which the learned District Judge dealt with the two main issues that were debated before him by the parties counsel. One of those issues was whether Rupa Singh and after his death the plaintiffs had commonly owned the property in dispute with Tarpon Singh and his descendants. This point was covered by issues Nos. 3 and 4 framed on the basis of the pleadings adopted by the plaintiffs. The second point discussed before the District Judge was whether Rupa Singh and his daughters had been in occupation of a part of the property in dispute with the permission of Tarpon Singh and his descendants. This point was covered by issue No. 5 which had been formulated on the allegations made in the written statement. The two points, it looks obvious, were not mutually exclusive in the sense and for the reason that the decision on one could affect the decision on the other. It was therefore legally open to the District Judge to decide upon the priority between them in the matter of their discussion in the judgment. The two points, it looks obvious, were not mutually exclusive in the sense and for the reason that the decision on one could affect the decision on the other. It was therefore legally open to the District Judge to decide upon the priority between them in the matter of their discussion in the judgment. As such, I cannot accept the proposition that since the District Judge happened to give his finding on issue No. 5 before he proceeded to discuss the point arising out of issues Nos. 3 and 4, he had committed an error of law, substantive or procedural. It was not denied by Shri Budhachandra Singh that the question whether the property was exclusively owned by Tarpon Singh or it was jointly owned by him and his brother Rupa Singh is a pure question of fact and not of law. Therefore, it is not open to the defendants to challenge the correctness of the finding given by the first appellate Court on that question of fact. They are barred from doing so by the provisions of Sections 100 and 101 of the Code. 9. By way of abundant precaution, I permitted the parties counsel to take me through the evidence and submit their arguments for and against the finding given by the District Judge that the property in dispute had either been jointly acquired by Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh or they had inherited the same as co-owners from their father. Shri Budhachandra Singh very frankly conceded at the bar that the defendants have failed to establish that the property had in the first instance been acquired by Tarpon Singh in the manner alleged in the written statement. Shri Ibotombi Singh was equally fair in stating that the plaintiffs too had failed to prove by any direct evidence that the property had been acquired firstly by Balaram Singh. Shri Budhachandra Singh placed reliance on the copies from the revenue records to establish the exclusive ownership of the defendants. Undoubtedly, those copies indicate that the property in dispute has been recorded since the year 1898 in the name of Tarpon Singh. Shri Budhachandra Singh placed reliance on the copies from the revenue records to establish the exclusive ownership of the defendants. Undoubtedly, those copies indicate that the property in dispute has been recorded since the year 1898 in the name of Tarpon Singh. Shri Ibotombi Singh, on the other hand, relied principally on the admitted facts that firstly Rupa Singh had been residing in a house set up by him in the southern part of the ingkhol and that after his death his daughters have been putting up there, to prove the plaintiffs ownership to one-half share in the ingkhol. That the entries in the Jamabandis are relevant to prove the stand taken by the defendants can admit of no doubt. This is made clear by Section 35 of the Evidence Act, which provides that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. Therefore, the entries in the Jamabandis are clearly relevant in proving the allegation of the defendants that the property in dispute was exclusively owned by Tarpon Singh and that Rupa Singh had no share therein. However, the law is equally well settled that the entries in the Jamabandis do not constitute conclusive evidence of title to the property in favour of the person recorded therein. At the best, a presumption of correctness attaches to such entries, and that presumption is clearly rebuttable. It is for the reason that the Jamabandis are primarily prepared by the Government for fiscal purposes and so they cannot create any title. The weight to be attached to the entries in such documents will depend on the circumstances of each case. Therefore, though the entries in the Jamabandis are relevant in deciding the crucial dispute between the parties to this appeal, but it is open to the Court to adjudge their value in the light of other material available on the record. 10. Therefore, though the entries in the Jamabandis are relevant in deciding the crucial dispute between the parties to this appeal, but it is open to the Court to adjudge their value in the light of other material available on the record. 10. Section 110 of the Evidence Act enacts that when the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that fact. This section obviously raises a presumption of ownership in favour of the person who is proved to be in possession of the property in dispute. It is correct that such presumption would arise if two conditions are satisfied, viz., (i) that the possession is not prima facie wrongful, and (ii) that the title of the other contesting party to the property is not proved by direct evidence. The provisions of the section can be availed of by the party who alleges title in himself and also relies upon possession in proof of it, but fails to establish the title and succeeds in proving his possession. If a person claiming to be the true owner of Appellant property interferes in the possession of another over it, the possession of the latter would cast upon the former the burden of proving his ownership. In other words, the presumption of ownership being in favour of the one in possession, the burden of showing that person is not the owner of the property is on the person who affirms that fact. The opponent of the one who is in possession can succeed on the strength of his own title and not by reason of the weakness of the opponent. Tersely put, the true import of Sec. 110 is that where a person is shown to be in possession of the property, the presumption of ownership is in his favour and the burden shifts on to the one who challenges that persons title to the property. The reason behind this rule is that men generally own the property which they happen to possess and possession is the sum of the acts constituting the ownership. The reason behind this rule is that men generally own the property which they happen to possess and possession is the sum of the acts constituting the ownership. Therefore, the possession has a twofold value; it is evidence of ownership as mentioned in Section 100 of the Evidence Act, and is itself the foundation of a right to possession as provided for in Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In India, the acquisition of title by possession for the statutory period mentioned in the Limitation Act being a lawful mode of acquiring title, the person in peaceable possession is entitled to maintain such possession against all but the true owner. Therefore, a third party who has no better title than the person in possession has no right to invade upon the possession of the latter and interrupt or arrest his lawful acquisition of title by his continuing to remain in possession for the statutory period. It is an established proposition of law that the interest of a person in possession is both heritable and transferable, and it is also capable of being disposed of by deed or will, or even by execution sale. Even before mere possession is converted by prescription into right of ownership, it is in itself a right which is protected and to enforce which remedies are provided by the Specific Relief Act. Hence, it was open to the plaintiffs of this suit to press their claim of ownership on the basis of their long and continuous possession, and it was equally open in law to the District Judge to give full weight to that aspect of the case in conjunction with other material available on the record and not to be overwhelmed by the value apparently associated with the entries in the Jamabandis. 11. In para 14 of his judgment, the learned District Judge marshalled the various factors which weighed with him in accepting the contention of the plaintiffs that they are owners to the extent of one-half share in the property in dispute. 11. In para 14 of his judgment, the learned District Judge marshalled the various factors which weighed with him in accepting the contention of the plaintiffs that they are owners to the extent of one-half share in the property in dispute. They are that Rupa Singh belonged to a well-to-do family judged by the Manipuri standards, that Manipuris of such status construct their own dwelling houses with an out-house and a tank as had been done by Rupa Singh, that it is customary in Manipur for the younger son to get the northern portion of the common property and for the elder son to get the southern portion as was the case with Rupa Singh and his elder brother Tarpon Singh, that Rupa Singh and his descendants had enjoyed undisturbed possession of their residential accommodation over the disputed ingkhol for nearly 70 years, that the defendants, according to the admission of defendant Yaimabi Singh as D.W. 2, had never asked the plaintiffs to vacate the ingkhol, and that Yaimabi Singh had also admitted that he had never talked to anyone else that the plaintiffs or their father Rupa Singh had been putting up in the ingkhol as mere licensees. I may add that it is not quite abnormal in the case of joint Hindu families that the property should be purchased in the name of the elder brother of the family or that even a father may acquire property in the name of his elder son. Tarpon Singh was admittedly the eldest son of Balaram Singh. It was not denied by the defendants that ever since the ingkhol was acquired. Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh had been living thereon in their respective houses, one in the south and the other in the north, constructed by them individually. There is absolutely no evidence to sustain the contentions that Tarpon Singh had acquired the ingkhol exclusively for himself and with his own money or that Rupa Singh had built a house on a part of that ingkhol with the permission of Tarpon Singh on the distinct understanding that he would vacate the property if and when called upon to do so by Tarpon Singh. Therefore, the continued possession of Rupa Singh and his descendants for a period of almost 70 years is not inconsistent with the stand taken by the plaintiffs that Rupa Singh and Tarpon Singh were the joint owners of the ingkhol. 12. It was distinctly alleged in para 11(c) of the written statement that Tarpon Singh had permitted Rupa Singh to live with him on the ingkhol in dispute as Rupa Singh could not afford to purchase a separate homestead for himself, and that this arrangement was subject to the understanding that Rupa Singh and his family members would vacate the ingkhol when asked to do so by Tarpon Singh. The District Judge has recorded the clear-cut finding that the defendants had failed to prove these allegations. In his Court statement the defendant Yaimabi Singh deposed, as D.W. 2 that he was aged 7 when his father died and that his aunt had once told him that Rupa Singh was permitted to live in the ingkhol so long as he could not manage an ingkhol for himself. There is a complete discord between the averments in para 11(c) of the written statement and the Court statement made by the only defendant who entered the witness box in regard to conditions subject to which Rupa Singh was allowed to occupy the ingkhol. Therefore, the District Judge was not unjustified in his conclusion that the defendants had failed to establish that the possession of the plaintiffs or of Rupa Singh was of permissive nature. This conclusion is re-inforced by the facts that Yaimabi Singh admitted while in the witness box that they had never called upon the plaintiffs or Rupa Singh to vacate the ingkhol and that the plaintiff No. 1 Thambal Devi had constructed a new house with her own money in the northern part of the ingkhol subsequent to the death of her father and after she had been divorced by her husband. If Rupa Singh had remained in possession of the ingkhol as a licensee, the defendants were not expected to permit Thambal Devi to re-enter upon the ingkhol after the demise of her father and build a new house for herself thereon. Yaimabi Singh also happened to affirm as D.W. 2 that Thambal Devi had committed herself to vacate the house after her sons became major. Yaimabi Singh also happened to affirm as D.W. 2 that Thambal Devi had committed herself to vacate the house after her sons became major. Yaimabi Singh conceded that one son of Thambal Devi is above the age of 40 and the second son is near about 40. It can bear repetition to state that we have Yaimabi Singhs own admission that the defendants had never asked the plaintiffs to vacate the premises. If Thambal Devi had been permitted to set up a new house on the basis mentioned in the Court statement of Yaimabi Singh, the defendants or someone of them was expected to call upon Thambal Devi and her sons to vacate the ingkhol after those sons had reached the age of majority. In the context of these factors, I am inclined to agree with the finding of the District Judge that the ingkhol was jointly owned by Tarpon Singh and Rupa Singh and that the mere fact that in the revenue records the ingkhol stands in the name of Tarpon Singh is not decisive of the conflict between the parties. 13. No other point was urged before me in support of the appeal. 14. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.