JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Defendants are in appeal against a reversing judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge Berhampur, in a suit for title and declaration that the entry in the final record-of rights published on 6-11-1959 is wrong and for confirmation of possession. 2. The Plaintiffs came to Court on the allegation that they were all members of an undivided family and the suit land was purchased in the name of Plaintiff No. 2 under a registered sale deed dated 3-6-1940 (Ext. 1) for Rs. 2000/-. The Plaintiffs claimed that their vendors were inamdars and were in khas possession of the suit land which was a private land of the intermediary. They obtained delivery of possession from their vendors and had been in khas possession of the same. During the settlement operations the brother-in-law of the Plaintiffs' vendors Sitaram Dora (Defendant No. 1) got himself recorded as a raiyat in respect of the disputed land. The Plaintiffs had applied to the Board of Revenue for correction of the record. They also applied u/s 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act subsequent to vesting of the estate. Originally the Collector under the Estates Abolition Act bad dismissed their application. But, later on, as would transpire from the judgment the property came to be settled with them. There was a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the disputed property when rival claims for possession were raised. The said proceeding terminated in favour of the Plaintiffs, but Defendant No. 1 brought a revision to this Court in Criminal Revision No. 419 of 1960. The said revision was allowed and possession of Defendant No. 1 was found. Therefore, the present suit has been filed. 3. The defence taken was that Plaintiff No. 2 under Ext. 1 purchased only the malevaram right by the sale deed dated 3-6-1946. The land was already in possession of the Defendant as a tenant and, therefore, the purchaser under Ext. 1 did not get khas possession of the land. It is specifically asserted that the Plaintiff's vendor was an intermediary not in khas possession and as such was not competent to deliver khas possession under Ext. 1. It was further asserted that the Plaintiffs realised raj bhag from the Defendants after their purchase under Ext. 1. Defendant No. 1 had occupancy right and the record of rights as published was correct. 1. It was further asserted that the Plaintiffs realised raj bhag from the Defendants after their purchase under Ext. 1. Defendant No. 1 had occupancy right and the record of rights as published was correct. Defendant No. 2 is an alienee from Defendant No. 1. 4. The trial Court held that Defendant No. 1 was in possession of the suit land the Plaintiff No. 2's purchase under Ext. 1 was of the malevaram right only; the sale under Ext. 1 was void and inoperative in view of the provisions of Orissa Act 1 of 1948. On these findings t be suit was dismissed. 5. The Plaintiffs carried an appeal to the District Court and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who eventually came to dispose of the appeal held that the Plaintiffs and before them their vendors were in khas possession under Ext. 1 possession bad been duly parted with along with title; the order of the Estates Abolition Collector which was marked in the appellate Court as Ext. 9 by way of additional evidence was relied upon for these findings. He further found that the Plaintiff's purchase was a valid one and was not hit by Orissa Act 1 of 1948. On these findings the suit was decreed. It is against this reversing judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge that the two Defendants have come in appeal before this Court. 6. Mr. Ramdas raises the following contentions: (1) The learned Appellate Judge could not have given a decree for confirmation of possession in view of the categorical finding of this Court in the Criminal Revision referred to above that the possession of the disputed property was with Defendant No. 1. As there was no prayer for recovery of possession, the suit was liable to be dismissed. (2) The Estates Abolition Collector had no jurisdiction to give a settlement u/s 7 of the Estates Abolition Act. The settlement records showed the land to be an occupancy holding and therefore, to such a land the provisions of Chapter II of the Estates Abolition Act has no application. The order of the Collector (Ext. 9) is thus a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction. The settlement records showed the land to be an occupancy holding and therefore, to such a land the provisions of Chapter II of the Estates Abolition Act has no application. The order of the Collector (Ext. 9) is thus a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction. (3) Even conceding that the Collector had jurisdiction, the original order of the Collector had become final and it was not open to the Additional District Magistrate to treat the application sent to him by the Board of Revenue as an appeal against a claim u/s 7 of the Estates Abolition Act and to give life to the proceeding again. (4) The findings recorded by the lower appellate Court with reference to what was conveyed under Ext. 1 is clearly erroneous. The Estates Abolition Collector as also the lower appellate Court have given a wrong interpretation to the said document and have erroneously held that both title and possession were conveyed under it. He further contended that even if the documents purported to convey possession no evidentiary value could be given to such a document. The lower appellate Court went wrong in unduly emphasising on the fact that Defendant No. 1 was an attesting witness to the document. It is well settled that knowledge of the contents of the document cannot be imputed to an attesting witness without anything more than the fact of mere attestation. (5) The view taken about the applicability of Orissa Act of 1948 is clearly wrong and the learned Appellate Judge had no jurisdiction to decide in the manner he has on the said question. Each of these contentions requires careful consideration and detailed examination for the purpose of elucidation. 7. I will proceed to examine the first question. Neither party has placed the final order of this Court in the Criminal Revision in the present case. In paragraph 6 of the plaint it has been stated as follows: While matters stood thus the Defendant who successfully manoeuvred some documents in his favour filed a petition u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure against the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 and some others who have got no interest in the lands and got the suit lands attached in M.C. 141/59 on the file of the First Class Magistrate, Kodala. The said proceedings went against the Defendant by virtue of the orders of the First Class Magistrate dated 15-10-1960. The said proceedings went against the Defendant by virtue of the orders of the First Class Magistrate dated 15-10-1960. The Plaintiffs got possession of the suit lands as they were put into possession through Court. Against the said order the Defendant preferred a Criminal Revision before the Hon'ble High Court in Criminal Revision No. 419/1960 which was allowed on 10-5-1961. Hence the present suit is filed for a, declaration of title of the Plaintiffs and confirmation of possession as the Plaintiffs are still in possession of the suit lands. In paragraph 8 of the plaint it was further stated: The order of the Hon'ble High Court does not affect t be title of the Plaintiffs to the suit lands and has not yet disturbed the possession of the Plaintiffs over the suit lands. All the facts could not be placed before the Hon'ble High Court by the Plaintiffs who were parties therein. In paragraph 6 of the written statement, it was averred. The Plaintiff Do doubt obtained order of I Class Magistrate in his favour in M.C. 141/59 but that was reversed by the Hon'ble High Court in Criminal Revision 419/1960. After discussing the significance of all documents on either side, High Court declared that suit lands are in possession of Defendant. 8. The trial Court raised issue No. 4 on this aspect of the matter which ran to the following effect: Whether the suit is maintainable in law for mere confirmation of possession without recovery of possession and is the order u/s 145 by Hon'ble High Court in Criminal Revision 419/60 liable to be set aside? The trial Court, however, did not record an independent finding under this issue, but in his general discussion under issues 1 and 3 came to bold that the Plaintiffs bad no possession. The learned Appellate Judge in paragraph 7 of his judgment mainly confined his attention to the question of conveyance of title under Ext. 1 both in respect of the malevaram and the kudivaram rights and did not give any reasonings for coming to his finding about the possession of the suit land by the Plaintiffs, but ultimately held, I in disagreement with the learned Munsif hold that it is the Plaintiffs and their vendors who were in actual physical possession of the land in suit and the Defendant has not acquired the Kudivaram right in respect of the suit land. The learned Appellate Judge seems to have relied upon Ext. 9 the order of the Collector under the Estates Abolition Act for the aforesaid finding of his. During the pendency of the civil litigation there was a proceeding u/s 144, Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the disputed property. There were two criminal revisions before this Court being Criminal Revision Nos. 227 and 228 of 1966. These revisions were inter parties. Reference was made to this judgment at the time of hearing of the appeal. Therein, while disposing of the revisions, his Lordship the present Chief Justice has indicated, It is patent on the facts narrated that the Plaintiff was directed to be in possession of the disputed land until evicted therefrom in due course of law. The Plaintiff's suit was dismissed. The lower appellate Court could not have passed an order for confirmation of possession without giving sufficient reasons that the Plaintiff was dispossessed after the passing of the order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. I think, the view expressed by his Lordship in the aforesaid passage is correct. It is not the case of the Plaintiffs that they had dispossessed the Defendant at any point of time after the final order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the final order in the said proceeding the Plaintiff was entitled to recover possession, but could Dot obtain a decree for confirmation of possession as such. In the circumstances, the decree given by the lower appellate Court for confirmation of possession is not sustainable in the face of the final order u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure and in the absence of a finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the allegations in paragraph 8 of the plaint were correct. This disposes of the first contention of Mr. Ramdas. 9. The second and the third questions which Mr. Ramdas raised can be taken up together as they relate to the proceedings under the Estates Abolition Act and actually cover the two aspects of the same point. Under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, an intermediary is entitled to make an application for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of lauds held by him in khas possession and used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. Under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, an intermediary is entitled to make an application for settlement of fair and equitable rent in respect of lauds held by him in khas possession and used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. If such lands are in his khas possession on the date of vesting, these lands are deemed to be settled with him on the basis of tenancy and the Collector is entitled to determine fair and equitable rent on an application to be made in the manner indicated in Section 8-A of the Estates Abolition Act. The application u/s 8-A of the Act has to be made within a time limit under Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8-A of the Act. Failure to make an application within the prescribed period entails serious consequences as provided under Sub-section (3) thereof. After the final order is passed, an appeal is provided u/s 9. If the order is by a Collector not being the Collector of the District, the appeal lies to the Collector of the District and if it is by the Collector of the District that appeal lies to the Board of Revenue. As the records in the instant case show, the original order by which the Plaintiffs were aggrieved was passed by a Collector under the Estates Abolition Act not being the Collector of the District and as such that appeal lay to the Collector of the District. Instead a miscellaneous petition was made to the Board of Revenue and the same had been forwarded to the Additional District Magistrate as would appear from Ext. 5. The Additional District Magistrate in Appeal Case No. 14 of 1961 passed the final order on 13.9.1961. He condoned the limitation in filing of the appeal, vacated the order of rejection and directed the matter to be disposed of in accordance with law after giving the Plaintiffs a chance to substantiate their claim. The final order in the proceeding was passed by the Collector under the Act on 14-3-1964 and a copy of the final order was accepted as additional evidence by the lower appellate Court and has been marked as Ext. 9. The Collector under the Act came to hold as is apparent from Ext. 9 that 'khas possession was delivered under Ext. 1 and the Plaintiffs were in possession on the date of vesting. 9. The Collector under the Act came to hold as is apparent from Ext. 9 that 'khas possession was delivered under Ext. 1 and the Plaintiffs were in possession on the date of vesting. The argument advanced against the correctness of the decision of the Collector seems to be acceptable and it is quite possible that the Collector took a view which may not have been upheld by the appellate Court. It is undisputed that the Collector had jurisdiction if the claim made in the case came within the purview of Orissa Act I of 1952. Any irregularity in the procedure or even the errors in the decision cannot give jurisdiction to the civil Court to sit in judgment over the correctness of the Collector's decision. The Collector's decision, if it is not a nullity, is binding on the parties and has also the effect of res judicata for on other litigations. Therefore, the objection raised by Mr. Ramdas about the validity of the decision on account of irregularities or non-compliance with the provisions of the Statute are not open to dispute. As I would presently indicate that the suit is not maintainable in the civil Court and a special jurisdiction is available under Orissa Act I of 1948, it is not necessary to give any final finding on this point. 10. The only other question in this connection that requires decision is as to whether the Estates Abolition Collector had jurisdiction to determine the point. It is conceded at the Bar by the learned Counsel for both the sides that if the settlement record is valid and the status of Defendant No. 1 was that of an occupancy tenant the Estates Abolition Collector had no jurisdiction to settle the land with the Plaintiffs. That the Orissa Act I of 1952 does, not deal with tenancy right is beyond dispute and appears to have been fully settled in Bimal Chandra v. State of Orissa 1962 S.C.D. 226. The Estates Abolition Act assumed finality of certain records as would appear from the definition of the term "estate" u/s 2(g) of the Act. Those revenue records were accepted to be correct and the Collector or all other authorities under the Act were required to proceed on the basis of such records. But the final records in a settlement proceeding have not been given any finality for the purposes of the Statute. Those revenue records were accepted to be correct and the Collector or all other authorities under the Act were required to proceed on the basis of such records. But the final records in a settlement proceeding have not been given any finality for the purposes of the Statute. It is well known that such records neither create or take away a right if it exist in fact and the presumption attached to the correctness of the entry is a rebuttable one. In the circumstances, it was open to the Collector under the Act in a proceeding under Chapter II to examine the correctness of such record and decide the matter one way or the other. It cannot be contended that the Collector under the Act bad no authority to decide as to whether such a record was correct and as to whether possession as recorded in the path, was correct. It is one matter to say that the decision of the Collector is wrong in relation to such a matter and it is quite a different matter with different consequences to contend and establish that the record being one way the jurisdiction was not vested in the Collector to decide the case. Ultimately the decision of the Collector may have been wrong, but in view of the finality already given to the decision I am bound to bold that the Defendants are not entitled to challenge that the Collector went wrong in settling the land with the Plaintiffs. That settlement must be held to be correct and the civil Court is bound to proceed on the basis of such settlement. The Bar u/s 39 of the Estates Abolition Act is available to be raised by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants unless the Defendants are in a position to show that the requirements of the Statute which would confer jurisdiction on the statutory tribunal (that is, the Collector) were not existent and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction vested for determining the question. I would refer to Commissioners of Arrah Municipality Vs. Jatendra Chandra Jain and Others, in this connection. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the correctness of the decision of the tribunal which exercises its jurisdiction on the basis of certain special facts is wen recognised. The Courts below have not gone into the matter from that point. I would refer to Commissioners of Arrah Municipality Vs. Jatendra Chandra Jain and Others, in this connection. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine the correctness of the decision of the tribunal which exercises its jurisdiction on the basis of certain special facts is wen recognised. The Courts below have not gone into the matter from that point. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. D.C. Patel that the civil Court has jurisdiction to examine its own jurisdiction. In the circumstances whether the bar u/s 39 of the Estates Abolition Act would apply to the facts of the case should have also been examined in the Courts below. It has not been done in the trial Court on account of the fact that by the time the suit was disposed of the original proceeding was still pending and by the time the appeal came to be disposed of the original order was received by way of additional evidence without examining this aspect of the matter. 11. The next point for examination is to determine as to whether the judgment of the lower appellate Court is correct on the question of the kudivaram right and possession. As I have just held the Estates Abolition Collector settled the land with the Plaintiffs holding that the kudivaram right had also been conveyed under Ext. I. If the Collector had jurisdiction to give such a decision, the said decision must he taken to be final as between the parties on the point. The result of this litigation, however, would depend on a question which will be examined under the fifth point. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to discuss the position further under this question. 12. We are now left with the final point argued by Mr. Ramdas. It has been conceded in the Courts below that Orissa Act I of 1948 has application to the facts of this case. In paragraph 9 of the written statement the following contention was raised; The Plaintiffs are never in possession of suit lands and the sale deed relied on by them is invalid in law even if it was assumed to be a conveyance of private land prohibited by Orissa Act I of 1948. In paragraph 9 of the written statement the following contention was raised; The Plaintiffs are never in possession of suit lands and the sale deed relied on by them is invalid in law even if it was assumed to be a conveyance of private land prohibited by Orissa Act I of 1948. Issue No. 2 was raised on this plea and was to the following effect: Whether the sale-deed dated 3-6-1946 is valid in law and confers any title on the Plaintiffs to the suit land?. The trial Court disposed of this issue in a short paragraph which is to the following effect: The learned lawyer for the Defendant contends that even assuming that the Plaintiffs' version that the suit land was their vendors' private land is true, still u/s 4 of the Orissa Act I of 1948 the transfer of any such land after 1-4-1946 without the previous sanction of the Collector is void abinitio. Against his such contention the learned lawyer for the Plaintiffs had no answer. It is true that u/s 4(1) proviso 2, transactions in respect of private land, entered into prior to 30-11-1947, in good faith and for valuable consideration, have been saved but the burden of proving good faith lies on the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs having however, not shown as to how they come under this proviso, the Ex. 1, which was executed after 1-4-1946, even though for consider action, must be held to be void and inoperative. The learned Appellate Judge examined this aspect of the matter in paragraph 8 of his judgment and disposed of this contention in the following manner: It is admitted by the Defendant that the Plaintiffs' purchase is genuine and they have only purchased the melevarem right by paying the valuable consideration. The Defendant is an attestor of Ext. 1. In view of these admitted facts and in view of the fact that the transaction has been entered into between the parties before 30th November 1947, I in disagreement with the learned Munsif hold that the Plaintiffs have purchased the suit land in good faith and for valuable consideration. As such the Plaintiffs' purchase comes under exception as provided u/s 4 of Act I of 1948. In view of that, I in disagreement with the learned Munsif hold -that the Plaintiffs' purchase is valid and genuine. As such the Plaintiffs' purchase comes under exception as provided u/s 4 of Act I of 1948. In view of that, I in disagreement with the learned Munsif hold -that the Plaintiffs' purchase is valid and genuine. Both the Courts below seem to have lost sight of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of that Act. It provides, If any dispute arises as to the validly of the claim of any person to any land under Clauses (i) and (ii) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), it shall be open to such person to apply to the District Judge of the district in which the land is situated for a decision as to the validity of such claim. In view of such a provision neither the learned Munsif nor the learned Appellate Judge had jurisdiction to determine as to whether the instant case came under Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act. Sub-section (2) clearly indicates that once such a dispute is raised, the claim is only entertainable by the District Judge and the other Courts have no jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, issue No. 2 could,not be decided in the manner done by the Courts below and since the Plaintiffs want the advantages of Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act it is for them to go to the District Court and obtain the relief as indicated. 13. The Orissa Communal, Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948 (Act I of 1918) and the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Act I of 1952) are both Statutes passed by the State Legislature and had received the assent of the Governor General and the President respectively. The Estates Abolition Collector in his order has not taken the bar under Orissa Act I of 1948 into consideration. Under the Estates Abolition Act it is only the intermediary with whom the land can be settled. The Plaintiffs' claim of being the intermediary is on the basis of the sale (Ext. 1). If Ext. 1 is not valid, the settlement of the Collector under his final order Ext. 9 may be without jurisdiction as the Collector has no power under the provisions of the Act to settle the land with a person who is not the intermediary. 1). If Ext. 1 is not valid, the settlement of the Collector under his final order Ext. 9 may be without jurisdiction as the Collector has no power under the provisions of the Act to settle the land with a person who is not the intermediary. In this case, the entire focus has to be placed on the validity of the sale deed Ext. 1. That has not been gone into by the Estates Abolition Collector though he was required to go into the matter and decide it. If he had decided the point whether u/s 4 of Orissa Act I of 1918 he had jurisdiction would have been open to question. But since he has not and there is a special forum created u/s 4(2) of the Act for the purpose, I must hold that the entire matter has to be validly adjudicated only in the manner indicated under the provision of the special Act of 1948. On the aforesaid analysis, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is bound to be vacated and the suit has to be dismissed. I, however, do not concur with the view taken by the trial Court though its decree of dismissal of the suit is upheld. The Second Appeal is allowed. Both the parties would bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed