Judgment 1. THE tenant-defendant in a suit for ejectment is the appellant before us. He has lost in both Courts. 2. THOUGH various questions were raised in this appeal, eventually the only one we have to deal with is a question of law or, rather, of statutory construction in respect of section 3 (A)as inserted into section 13 of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 by the West Bengal Premises tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969, read with section 13 of the said Amendment Act. In section 13 of the principal act, there is provision for the protection of tenants against eviction and, in various clauses, it lays down the only grounds upon which a tenant of a premises governed by that Act can be ejected by a landlord, by suit. It is to be noted at once that in section 13 (1)the opening words are "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds namely. . . . " It is evident that the bar which is imposed by section 13 (1) is aimed at the 'making of an order or decree' by the Court contrary to what is provided in sub-section (1) of the said act. It does not say anything to bar the institution of a suit. The language of section 3 (A), which has been inserted by the amendment Act of 1969, it may be noted at once, does not aim itself to the order or decree but to the institution of the suit for ejectment and runs as follows : "where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of sub-section (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest." 3. SO far as suits which are instituted after the coming into operation of the second amendment Act of 1969, are concerned, there is little trouble in literally complying with sub-section 3 (A) because, if any suit is sought to be instituted after 14. 11. SO far as suits which are instituted after the coming into operation of the second amendment Act of 1969, are concerned, there is little trouble in literally complying with sub-section 3 (A) because, if any suit is sought to be instituted after 14. 11. 69 in contravention of sub-section 3 (A), the Court will forthwith dismiss the suit as being not maintainable. 4. THE case before us relates to a suit which had been instituted prior to the commencement of the amendment act of 1969, or more precisely, on the 13th of May, 1958. The plaintiff was a purchaser who had acquired superior interest in the premises by transfer, on 13. 4. 1957. The suit, accordingly, was not instituted after the expiration but within the period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest as we have already stated. If such a suit were instituted after 14.11.69, it would have been dismissed irrespective of any other consideration. The only question is whether a different construction of sub-section (3a) can be made in respect of suits which had been instituted prior to sub-sec. 3 (A)came into operation, in contravention of the limitation which has been imposed by section 3 (A. The primary difficulty which has been presented before the Court in the application of section 3 (A) is that, instead of providing that sub-section (3a) will have retrospective effect, the Legislature in making the amendment Act has used the words "shall have effect'', which are not usually used in statutes of such nature section 13 of the Second Amendment act is as follows : ''the amendments made to the said Act by Sections 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Act shall have effect in respect of suits including appeals which are pending at the date of commencement of this Act." We have, therefore, to apply sub-section 3 (A) to the suit from which this Second Appeal arises, in view of section 13 of the amendment Act. If sub-section 3 (A) is literally applied then this suit must be dismissed by us, inasmuch as, at the time of the institution of the suit, the period of three years' bar of sub-section 3 (A) did not expire. If sub-section 3 (A) is literally applied then this suit must be dismissed by us, inasmuch as, at the time of the institution of the suit, the period of three years' bar of sub-section 3 (A) did not expire. A question has, however, been raised that this would be totally meaningless and unreasonable and would also involve the parties in multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary waste of time and money because, even if the Court dismisses this suit to-day, the plaintiff-respondent will be at liberty to institute an identical suit tomorrow morning, if not within the course of this day. The question which, therefore, arises is what interpretation should be given, as regards pending suits and appeals, to sub-section 3 (A) read with section 13 of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969. 5. SO far as unreasonableness is concerned, that it is no ground for departing from the literary interpretation of a statute was observed as early as 1882 by Lord Blackburn in the house of Lord's case, (1) The Countees of Rothes and Anr. v. The Kirkcaldv and Dysart Waterworks Commissioners, (1382) 7 AC 694 (702. There is, of course, one exception to the rule of literary interpretation of statutes and that is the exception of 'absurdity'. There is another exception, namely, that when the language of an enactment is ambiguous and two constructions are open, the Court may and should adopt the more reasonable of the two (2) R. v. London Court, (1892) 1 qb 273 (290. In the instant case, however the second exception cannot be applied particularly because the words "shall be instituted" in sub-section 3 (A)are quite clear and not ambiguous. As to the first exception, namely, that of absurdity, the principle has been explainea in several authoritative decisions that a Court may depart from the literal construction of a statute only in one case, namely, where the absurdity is patent from a reading of the statute itself, that is to say, where the different provisions of the statute cannot be read together so as to give a consistent meaning (3)Neeth v. Tamblin, (1881)8 QBD 247 (253) (4) Vacher v. London Soc. of compositors, (1913) AC 107 (118)unless the Court comes to the aid of the legislation like a surgeon. of compositors, (1913) AC 107 (118)unless the Court comes to the aid of the legislation like a surgeon. But the court cannot raise some sort of absurdity as may appear to the Court itself (5) Cox v. Hakes, (1890) AC 506 (542)and then seek "to rewrite the language of the statute in a way different from that in which it was originally framed," as was observed by Lord Green M. R., in (6) Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary mines, (1948) 1 Ch. 145 (160) C.A. The principle was expressed in a more picturesque language by Lord wensleydale in the case of (7) Grey and ors. v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H. L. C. 61, at page 106, "i have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted at least in the Courts of law in Westminster hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." 6. IT was contended that it would be against the notions of wisdom to dismiss a suit on a technical ground to enable a plaintiff to bring about a suit at the next moment. But it is difficult or sometimes unprofitable to try to find out the wisdom from the provisions of a drastic legislation like the one with which we are concerned in the present appeal. The West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956, is the resultant of a scheme of urban tenancy legislation launched since 1946 and each time the legislature takes up the matter into its hands, the law is made more and more in favour of the tenant and prejudicial to the landlord's rights under the general law of landlord and tenant. In fact, we may be excused in observing that in the anxiety of the Legislature to give protection to the tenant, even the drafting of the statutes sometimes becomes unscientific so as to give rise to a number of unnecessary litigations, as has been commented upon by this court in various previous decisions. In fact, we may be excused in observing that in the anxiety of the Legislature to give protection to the tenant, even the drafting of the statutes sometimes becomes unscientific so as to give rise to a number of unnecessary litigations, as has been commented upon by this court in various previous decisions. If one goes through the different provisions of the West Bengal Premises tenancy (Second Amendment) Act,, 1969, it will be quite evident that some of the provisions of this amending Act have the patent object of overriding the effect of some of the decisions of this Court, even though the result may be apparently incongruous. By way of illustration, we would like only to point out the provision in section 7 of the Amendment Act which has inserted section 18 (A). As a result of this new provision, even though a tenant might have been evicted, in fact, from a premises on the ground that the landlord would rebuild the structure after the lapse of a considerable period when the building has actually been reconstructed perhaps to a colossal magnitude, even then if the evicted tenant makes an application to the controller for being restored to a portion of the rebuilt structure, the Revenue officer has got the jurisdiction to put in the evicted tenant in such part of the premises and at such rent as he likes. By applying the standard of commonsense, it may be difficult to understand the logic behind this provision, because the newly built structure may be out of tune with what had been in the enjoyment of the tenant, say, some three or four years back and such restoration also does not solve the problem of the tenant once he has been evicted from the premises, and thrown to the street. 7. NEVERTHELESS, since the Legislature has incorporated this provision, the Courts have to see that it is applied, even though the provision might be repugnant to or out of harmony with our ordinary sense of fairness. 8. IN Anglo-Saxion jurisprudence, it is firmly established that it is no business of the Courts to question the wisdom of the policy behind a statute. In the words of Lord Macnaughten in (4) Vacher and Sons v. London Society, (1913) AC 107 (118) H. L. : "some people think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous to the community. . . In the words of Lord Macnaughten in (4) Vacher and Sons v. London Society, (1913) AC 107 (118) H. L. : "some people think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous to the community. . . . . . But a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act; which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction" again, in (8) K. E. v. Buwarilal (1944) 72 I. A. 57 (70), Viscount Simon expressed the principle forcefully, "again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used." In the case before us, the only object of the Legislature in getting the pending suits dismissed where the landlord might bring a fresh suit at the next moment may be to interpose mere delay and discouragement to the landlord and also to enable the tenant to take advantage of the change of circumstances. To a layman it may appear to be futile or meaningless, but there being nothing inherently absurd in this, the Court cannot twist the language of the enactment so as to continue the pending suits whose institution itself comes within the mischief of section 13 (3a) of the Act. "it is not the province of this Court to legislate so as to cure defects." (9) Queen v. Commrs, (1891) 1 QB 703 (716) HL. If it be a question of statute law, we must take the law as we find it; and if it be unjust or inconvenient, we must leave it to the constitutional authority to amend it." (10) Garland v. Carlisle, (1873) 4 Cl. and F. 693 (705) H. L. 9. IN the above view, the Courts below had no jurisdiction to decree this suit for ejectment. The appeal is accordingly, allowed and the judgments and decree of the Courts below are set aside, and the suit is dismissed. We do not, however, make any order for costs nor do we express any opinion on the merits of this suit.