This appeal filed by the defendants Bama Sundari Biswas and others on 2-3-1970 raises the question whether it is not barred by time although it is directed against the decree dated 3-4-1967. 2. To appreciate the points canvassed on behalf of the appellants the relevant facts may be briefly stated. Jamini Kumar, the respondent, filed a suit for declaration of his title to certain lands as also for possession of those lands. The trial Court dismissed his suit on 16-7-1962. He took the matter in appeal to the District Judge, who allow­ed the appeal on 1-9-1965 on setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. When execution of the appellate decree was sought by Jamini Kumar, it was noticed that the relief for possession of the lands had not been incorporated therein. Jamini Kumar consequently moved an application before the District Judge under Sections 151 and 152 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for neces­sary corrections in the judgment and the decree. That application was accepted by an order dated 3-4-1967 with the consequence that the judgment and the decree were amended. Aggrieved by that order, the judgment-debtors, the appellants herein, filed a revision peti­tion in this Court. That revision peti­tion was rejected on 4th of December 1969. It is thereafter that the judgment-debtors hit upon the idea of filing an appeal against the amended decree dated 3-4-1967. 3. As I found the appeal to be prima facie barred by time, I fixed it for hearing on the point of limitation. It was claimed on behalf of the appellants by Shri M. R. Choudhury, their learned counsel, that the period of limitation for filing an appeal against the amended decree passed by the District Judge would begin to run from 4th December, 1969, when this Court rejected the revi­sion petition. Article 116 of the Limita­tion Act provides that an appeal to the High Court from any decree or order, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be ninety days and it shall begin to run from "The date of the decree or order". Assuming that the decree for the purposes of Article 116 is the decree which was amended by the District Judge on 3-4-1967, and not which he had earlier passed on 1-9-1965, the period of ninety days expired sometime in the month of July, 1967. Assuming that the decree for the purposes of Article 116 is the decree which was amended by the District Judge on 3-4-1967, and not which he had earlier passed on 1-9-1965, the period of ninety days expired sometime in the month of July, 1967. Therefore, the appeal filed on 2-3-1970 appears apparent­ly to be hopelessly barred by time. However, Shri Choudhury endeavored to get over the hurdle by contending that the date of the amended decree should be taken as the one, on which the revision petition was rejected by this Court, viz., 4th of December, 1969,.He^was unable to cite any authority In support of that con­tention and was fair enough, at the same time, in conceding that despite Ms efforts he had not been able to lay hand on any reported case, one way or the other, bearing on the point in issue. However, he cited the cases of Nagendra Nath v. Ambika Charan, AIR 1929 Cal 676 and Aditya Kumar v. Abinash Chan­dra. AIR 1931 Cal 323 and urged that the propositions enunciated therein lend weight to his contention though some­what indirectly. I have gone through the two autho­rities very carefully but regret to state that they are clearly distinguishable, being concerned with altogether diffe­rent topics, and so nothing said therein lends weight to the proposition canvass­ed by Shri Choudhury. In the case of Nagendra what happened was that a final mortgage decree was passed on 10th October, 1971, and the decree-holder presented an application on 8th of April, 1919, praying for quite a few amendments. That application was allowed and the decree amended. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal against the amended decree. His appeal was partly allowed inasmuch as one of the amendments granted on 8th of April 1919 was disallowed by the first appel­late Court. The second appeal to the High Court by the judgment-debtor was rejected on 24th of July, 1924. The first application for execution was pre­sented by the decree-holder on 18th November. 1925. It was contended by the judgment-debtor that that applica­tion was barred by time. Repelling that contention, the Calcutta High Court held that the correct date for determining the time of limitation under Article 182 was 24th July, 1924, the date on which the second appeal against amended decree was dismissed by the High Court. 1925. It was contended by the judgment-debtor that that applica­tion was barred by time. Repelling that contention, the Calcutta High Court held that the correct date for determining the time of limitation under Article 182 was 24th July, 1924, the date on which the second appeal against amended decree was dismissed by the High Court. This finding was rested on the principle that for execution purposes an appeal by it­self never operates as a stay since the right to execute the decree accrues the moment the decree is passed, but if there is an appeal, the time of limitation for an execution application is postponed and does not run until the decree deter­mining the appeal is made. The High Court observed further that the broad principle in India as regards execution matters is that time for an execution application is not computed from the date when the right to apply for execu­tion accrues but is postponed in cases where there is an appeal. Another pertinent observation made by the High Court was that upon strict construction of Art. 182 or in principle the case of an appeal from amended decree is in no way different from the case of an appeal from any other decree and that as in the other case, appeal from an amended decree postpones the date from which limitation runs for execution pur­poses. It is evident from the facts of the reported case and the observations made therein that the High Court dealt only with the point whether there is any distinction between an original decree and the amended decree in the matter of postponement of the date from which limitation runs for exe­cution purposes in case of an appeal, and the reply given was in the negative. The High Court was not called upon to decide whether the period of limitation for filing an appeal against the amended decree is postponed until a revision filed against that decree is decided by the High Court. Hence, that case is of no help in deciding the point that calls for determination in the instant appeal. 4. In the other case of Aditya Kumar. AIR 1931 Cal 323 the point debated before the High Court was whe­ther after a decree is modified in review, the appeal is competent against the original decree or not. Hence, that case is of no help in deciding the point that calls for determination in the instant appeal. 4. In the other case of Aditya Kumar. AIR 1931 Cal 323 the point debated before the High Court was whe­ther after a decree is modified in review, the appeal is competent against the original decree or not. The High Court held that if a decree is modified in review, to however slight an extent it may be, the modified decree is the final decree for the purposes of an appeal, and that the fact that no decree is drawn up or that a decree was drawn up to the extent of the modification only pursuant to the order allowing the re­view does not affect the question. On this view of the matter the High Court rejected an appeal filed against the origi­nal decree when no appeal was filed against the decree that followed the order allowing review. In substance the principles which emerge from this deci­sion of the Calcutta High Court are that if the decree is amended on review, then an appeal against the amended and not the original decree is called for in law and that the appeal, if any. filed against the original decree in such circumstances becomes untenable. These principles, again, have no relevancy to the point this Court has to determine in the present appeal. The decree in favour of Jamini Kumar was amended by the District Judge as far back as 3-4-1967. The mere fact that a revision peti­tion was filed in this Court against the order allowing the amendment would not extend the time for filing an appeal against the amended decree. When two concurrent remedies are available against a particular order they cannot be avail­ed of one after the other even at a point of tune when the period of limitation for either of the remedies has run out. As an instance, the judgment-debtor has three concurrent remedies against a decree passed ex parte; he can either apply for its review under O. 47, R. 1, or can move an application for setting it aside under O. 9. R. 13 or he can agitate its correctness by an appeal filed under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. As an instance, the judgment-debtor has three concurrent remedies against a decree passed ex parte; he can either apply for its review under O. 47, R. 1, or can move an application for setting it aside under O. 9. R. 13 or he can agitate its correctness by an appeal filed under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. If he chooses one remedy and fails and then takes recourse to the alternative remedies but after the period for adopt­ing them has run out, obviously he will have to face nothing but a dismal failure. Likewise, in the present case it was clearly open to Bama Sundari and others to file an appeal against the amended decree or a revision petition against the order allowing the amendment. They having chosen the latter remedy and failed, their appeal could have been ad­mitted if it were within time in terms of Article 116. As indisputably they have come to this Court in appeal more than ninety days after the passing of the amended decree, that appeal has to be thrown out as barred by time. In other words, the provisions of Section 3, Limitation Act. are clearly attracted and they leave no alternative to the Court but to act that way. 5. I may usefully and appro­priately invite attention to Note 8 under Article 116, Page 1774, of the Limitation Act by the celebrated Commentators Chitaley and Rao, 4th Edition. There it is stated on the basis of a large number of authorities that an amended decree must be taken as in force from the date of the original decree and that there is a clear distinction between the case of amendment and one of novation or sub­stitution. Where an instrument is amend­ed, it is stated further, so as to express the real intention which, it was intended to express, but which it did not com­pletely express, the transaction is not, in substance, varied, but only its inaccu­rate description rectified. Where an instrument is amend­ed, it is stated further, so as to express the real intention which, it was intended to express, but which it did not com­pletely express, the transaction is not, in substance, varied, but only its inaccu­rate description rectified. On this principle it has been held that an amendment of a decree under Sec. 151 or Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code does not give a fresh starting point of limitation for an appeal or application though where a party is prejudiced by an amendment but finds that by the date of amendment an appeal from the decree is barred if the period is calcu­lated from the original decree, the Court will excuse the delay under Sec­tion 5 of the Limitation Act. Some authorities of Patna, Calcutta and Madras High Courts taking the contrary view are also cited by the Commentators but it is said that that view cannot be accepted as correct on principle. It is not necessary in the present appeal to determine which of the two rival views is correct since even if it is assumed that the remedy of appeal against an amended decree is available, then too the appeal is barred by time having been filed almost three years after the decree was amended. I may add that neither an application in writing under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made in the present appeal, nor an oral prayer under that provision of law was put in during the course of arguments. 6. As a result. I hold the appeal as hopelessly barred by time and so reject the same in limine. Appeal dismissed.