JUDGMENT-The State has come here in appeal from an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Buldana. He allowed the appeal of the accused, who was convicted for the offence punishable under section 12-A of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (hereinafter called the Gambling Act), set aside his conviction and acquitted him. 2. The prosecution case against the accused was that on 21-1-1968, in the weekly market at Khamgaon on Sunday, the accused was selling "Worli-Matka Express" pamphlets each for 25 Paise. He was sitting there on a public road and was having his book-stall, selling these pamphlets and shouting slogans to attract the customers, There pamphlets contained Worli-Matka numbers. The case of the prosecution therefore is that the accused was setting this Worli-Matka Express with a view to aid and facilitate gaming. The accused denied having shouted any slogans as alleged by the prosecution. He denied having sold (Worli-Matka Express". According to him, these pamphlets were taken out from a box at the time when he was closing his shop. He explains that the Police Officer came there at that time and opened his box and then took out the contents. He says that he did not know the contents of these pamphlets. He however admits the seizure of 28 Worli-Matka pamphlets from him. The learned Magistrate who tried the accused found that the accused was selling Worli-Matka Express in the weekly market there and was shouting saying "~fif t;q<rf 3. This order was challenged by the accused. The learned Sessions Judge also found that 28 Worli-Matka pamphlets were seized from the possession of the accused and that the accused was also having all these pamphlets with him for the purpose of selling them in the weekly market. According to him, the prosecution, however, did not establish that the accused had actually sold the Worli-Matka Express pamphlets and received money. He is of the opinion that the offence under section 12-A could not be committed unless and until there was an actual sale. According to him, because the prosecution did not lead more evidence to show that the accused had actually sold the pamphlets, therefore, his act did not come within the purview of section 12-A of the Gambling Act. Accordingly, therefore, he allowed the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquitted the accused. According to him, because the prosecution did not lead more evidence to show that the accused had actually sold the pamphlets, therefore, his act did not come within the purview of section 12-A of the Gambling Act. Accordingly, therefore, he allowed the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and acquitted the accused. This order of the learned Sessions Judge, therefore, is challenged here by the State. The only point, therefore, that arises here for determination is to see whether this order of acquittal is proper. 4. The prosecution have examined the panch-witness as well as the investigating officer for the purpose of establishing the guilt against the accused. The panch-witness Syed Abbas has deposed that the accused was sitting in the weekly market on that day and had a number of books with him including the "Matka Express" books. These were all there for sale. The accused was giving out the prices of these books as 25 paise each. He was shouting to the publio "fcfi~ 3T~l1mf ~ 5. But the learned advocate for the accused contends here that the panch-witness Syed Abbas gives one slogan and the Police Sub-Inspector gives another slogan and, according to him, therefore the Police Sub-Inspector or Syed Abbas could not be believed It is therefore argued that the pauch-witness docs not corroborate the Police Sub-Inspector on this point. Now it is quite possible that the accused may be shouting not one slogan but several slogans. If, therefore, One slogan was remembered by the panch and another slogan was remembered by till; Police Sub-Inspector, it cannot certainly be said that they are contradicting such other. In fact, neither the Police Sub-Inspector nor the panch-witness was cross-examined to show such contradictions. It does appear to me, therefore, that the accused was selling Worli-Matka Express along with other books in the weekly bazar keeping a shop on the public road there. He was shouting slogans to attract the customers for the purpose of selling these Matka Express books. The prosecution have however not produced evidence of a completed sale of matka Express books at that shop. 6. He was shouting slogans to attract the customers for the purpose of selling these Matka Express books. The prosecution have however not produced evidence of a completed sale of matka Express books at that shop. 6. Section l2-A of the Gambling Act is as follows:- "A Police-officer may apprehend without warrant any person who prints, publishes, sells, distributes or in any manner circulates any newspaper, news-sheet or other document or any news or information with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming, Any such person shall on conviction, be punishable." 7. The point, therefore, that arises here fur consideration is to see whether the prosecution has established that the accused had committed on offence under section 12-A of the Gambling Act. The learned Magistrate convicted the accused because he was found selling. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused because, according to him, the prosecution did not establish an actual sale. The prosecution only established an act of selling by the accused. We have, therefore, to see whether it is necessary under section 12-A for the prosecution to establish completed sale and receipt of money by the accused before he is convicted or will it he enough if the prosecution establishes that the accused was selling with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming and that it is not necessary that a completed sale should have taken place. 8. The learned Assistant Government Pleader contends here that it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish a completed sale; that it is enough if all the circumstances show that the accused was selling the Worli-Matka news papers with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming On the other hand, the learned advocate for the accused contend here that the sale should be complete. The words used are "any person who prints, publishes, sells, distributes or in any manner circulates". It is, therefore, argued that an offence would be completed only when the printing is completed, when the publishing ill completed, when the sell is completed, when the distribution is completed and when the circulation is completed. Because the prosecution did not establish actual sale, therefore, according to the learned advocate for the accused, the accused cannot be convicted. We will, therefore, have to examine these contentions. 9. Because the prosecution did not establish actual sale, therefore, according to the learned advocate for the accused, the accused cannot be convicted. We will, therefore, have to examine these contentions. 9. In construing the meaning of any word med in any Act, normally, it must be given its ordinary meaning in the dictionary However, when that word is actually defined in that Act, then we have the construe the meaning of that word according to that definition. Admittedly, the word "sells" is not defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to follow the normal rule of interpretation. Was it the intention therefore of the Legislature that the person should be convicted only when the prosecution has established a completed sale or was it also its intention that he could also be convicted when the accused was found, for all purposes, selling these incriminating newspaper with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming? I have no doubt that this "Worli-Matka Express" was there in the shop of the accused with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming. There is intrinsic evidence in the newspaper itself to show that only persons who are gamblers would purchase those Matka newspapers. His shouting also clearly established that he was attracting customers with an intention to aid persons and facilitate them in gaming. I have, therefore, no doubt that the prosecution did establish that, the accused was in possessions of thebe incriminating newspapers and was there selling with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming. But the prosecution, in fact, did not establish a completed sale. Will this affect the case of the prosecution? 10. In the "Interpretation of Statutes" by Maxwell, 12th Edn., the learned author on page 96 under the head, To suppress the mischief and advance the remedy", observed as follows:- "It is said to be duty of the Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. To this end, a certain extension of the letter is not unknown, even in criminal statutes. So, to supply beer to a drunken man and his sober companion amounted to "setting" liquor to the former, even though it was ordered and paid for by the latter." The Legislature naturally wanted to suppress gambling by persons. To this end, a certain extension of the letter is not unknown, even in criminal statutes. So, to supply beer to a drunken man and his sober companion amounted to "setting" liquor to the former, even though it was ordered and paid for by the latter." The Legislature naturally wanted to suppress gambling by persons. Could they have intended, therefore, that the prosecution should establish a completed sale and if they only establish the act of selling with all the accompanying circumstances that he would well if somebody comes there, that would not be enough? The case referred to in Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes viz. Scatchard v. Johnson I was of a publican who was convicted by the Justices of selling intoxicating liquor to a drunken person, though at the hearing it had been proved that the liquor had been ordered and paid for by the sober companion of such drunken person. It was observed by Mr. Justice Cave that the whole object and intent of the statute was the prevention of drunkenness, and of drunkenness in public-houses. The 13th section (of the Licensing Act in that case) with which the learned Judge was concerned provided that, if any licensed person permits drunkenness, or any violent, quarrelsome, or riotous conduct to take place all his premises, or sell any intoxicating liquor to any drunken person, he shall be liable to a penalty " He considered also another section and it was held that the conviction was right and must be affirmed. Therefore, although the accused in that case had sold beer to a sober person and not to a drunken person, still it was held that it was a sale to a drunken person in the circumstances of that case. 11. This Court in Emperor v. Shankar Venkusa Chavan2 was dealing with the Gambling Act and the word "found" in section 5 of that Act. It was argued that the word "found" in section 5 means that the accused should be found in any common gaming house by the police and that he should be found in the place where he was actually present. According to Mr. Justice Beaumont, who was delivering that judgment, that word should not be given a restricted meaning. He was not prepared to accept Mr. According to Mr. Justice Beaumont, who was delivering that judgment, that word should not be given a restricted meaning. He was not prepared to accept Mr. Pradhans argument that a prosecution under section 5 must necessarily be preceded by a search under section 6 and that a prosecution under section 4 or section 5 might be launched on evidence quite independent of police evidence, for example, the evidence of neighbours. In his Lordships opinion, sections 6 and 7 were enabling sections and gave powers to the police to facilitate proof of their case and did not make a search obligatory before any case could be launched. Accordingly, therefore, his Lordship did not see any sufficient reason for restricting the prima facie meaning of the word "found" in section 5. The finding of fact by the learned Magistrate and the lower appellate Court in that case was that the accused in question were in a common gaming house for the purpose of gaming. But just before the arrival of the police, they escaped to the neighbouring house. Two of them were arrested in the neighbouring house about half an hour after the raid by the police and the other was arrested three days later. The learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that on those facts the accused were not found in a common gaming house. Therefore, this Court had not restricted the prima facie meaning of the word "found" even in section 5 of the Gambling Act. 12. In another case-Emperor v. Tribhuvan Motiram3, similar view was held by this Court. That was a case in which the accused was not seen inside the house but was seen coming out of the house. A question therefore arose whether he was found in the house. This Court held that it makes no material difference whether the accused was seen inside the house or was seen coming out of the house if the door through which the accused was seen coming out of the house was a means of ingress and egress to that particular house where the offence was committed. 13. In Ghanashamdas and others v. Emperor the Sind High Court was considering section 12 of the Gambling Act. Their Lordships were considering a game of dart. When the police arrived, the game had ceased. Tickets were not actually being sold. 13. In Ghanashamdas and others v. Emperor the Sind High Court was considering section 12 of the Gambling Act. Their Lordships were considering a game of dart. When the police arrived, the game had ceased. Tickets were not actually being sold. Darts were also not actually being thrown or pulled out of the board. Their Lordships did not think that section 12 required that the police should apprehend persons in the actual act of gaming, for, if that were the case, those gaming, would merely have to sit quietly when the police entered to have a perfect answer to the charge. Their Lordships thought that the words "are found gaming" in section 12 have a wider meaning than "seen gaming". Therefore, it appears to me that the word "sells" used here in section 12-A has also to be construed in that way. If the accused was found by the police in such circumstances that it was clear that when the police went there upon the scene, the accused was setting, I do not think it matters much if he had not completed the sale to anybody at that place. The transaction as a whole must be looked at and not at a particular minute or second or time when the police had gone there. It appears to me, therefore, that the word "sells" need not necessarily be restricted to mean that the prosecution should also establish a completed sale. It is enough if they establish the circumstances which make it clear that the accused was selling the incriminating newspapers there and that he would sell them at the next moment if somebody went there. In this view of the matter, therefore, it would be difficult for me to agree with the view of the learned Sessions Judge. 14. The accused could also be said to have committed an offence from another angle. Under section 12-A of the Gambling Act, the accused could also be said to have committed the offence if in any manner he circulates any newspaper or any news or information with the intention of aiding or facilitating gaming. Therefore, the Legislature have also intended to penalise such a person if he circulates in any manner any newspaper or news or information. Therefore, the Legislature have also intended to penalise such a person if he circulates in any manner any newspaper or news or information. Surely the accused could also be said to be circulating that newspaper when he was shouting and attracting persons with the intention of aiding and facilitating gaming. In this view also therefore the accused could be said to have committed the offence with which he was charged. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, therefore, the appeal will be allowed. I, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge and restore the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. The respondent-accused, therefore, should surrender to his bail. Appeal allowed.