Judgement ACHARYA, J. :- The petitioner, a partner of Messrs. Sahu Transport Corporation, Jajpur, filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying, in effect, for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the notice dated 15-5-69 (Annexure H) inviting applications for the grant of three permanent stage carriage permits on the route between Khalpal and Bhuban via Kamakshyanagar in the District of Dhenkanal. A writ of mandamus is also prayed for against the Regional Transport Authority, Dhenkanal, prohibiting it from proceeding further in the matter. 2. The Sahu Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Corporation) of which the petitioner is a partner, is plying buses on the route between Khalpal and Jajpur-Keonjhar Road on the strength of the permanent permit granted to the Corporation by the Orissa State Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as S. T. A.). Thereafter, the Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as R.T.A.), Dhenkanal, invited applications for three permanent stage carriage permits on the route between Khalpal and Bhuban via Kamakshyanagar, by issuing a notice dated 15-5-69 as at Annexure H. The Corporation, through the petitioner, preferred an objection on 6-8-69 before the Chairman, R.T.A. Dhenkanal. challenging, amongst other things, the R.T.A.'s jurisdiction to issue the said notice inviting applications for permits, and/or to grant any permit in favour of anybody else on any portion of the said route on which the Corporation has been operating on the basis of a permanent permit issued by the S.T.A. It was stated by Mr. Parija, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the above objection was rejected on 30-8-69, and the revision preferred on the said rejection was also dismissed on 20-9-1969. 3. In the counter filed on behalf of the R.T.A. on 6-10-69 it is contended that this petition is premature since the R.T.A. has not considered the above objection raised by the petitioner, nor passed any final orders thereupon. We, however, are not very much concerned with the rejection or otherwise of the petitioner's above mentioned objection before the R.T.A. as by this petition the R.T.A.'s jurisdiction and authority either to invite applications for stage carriage permits and/or to grant any such permit on any portion of the route between Khalpal and Jajpur-Keonjhar Road is challenged by the petitioner. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Parija contended that the S.T.A. assumed to itself all the powers of the R.T.A. with regard to the entire route between Khalpal and Jajpur-Keonjhar Road by taking over the said route under the provisions of Section 44(3) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and thereafter issued permanent permits in favour of the petitioner to operate on the said route. That being so, the R.T.A. is not left with any power or jurisdiction to act or to perform its duties in any manner whatsoever with respect to any portion of the said route, and as such the R.T.A., Dhenkanal, acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice dated 15-5-69 in respect of the route between Khalpal and Bhuban, which is only a portion of the above mentioned bigger route. 5. Mr. Mohapatra, the learned Standing Counsel for the Transport Department, contended that the Khalpal-Bhuban route, though a portion of the bigger route between Khalpal and Jajpur-Keonjhar Road, is entirely within the region of the R.T.A.. Dhenkanal, who, under the provisions of the M. V. Act, has the jurisdiction and authority to call for such applications and also to grant permits in respect of a route within its own jurisdiction. Mr. Mohapatra asserts that both the points between Khalpal and Bhuban being within the jurisdiction of the Dhankanal R.T.A., it is immaterial if it is a part of the bigger route common to two or more regions on which the S.T.A. previously exercised power to grant permit; and only because of such exercise of power by the S.T.A. under Section 44(3) (b) of the M. V. Act, the R.T.A. of the region does not become powerless to act and function in accordance with the provisions of the Act within its own jurisdiction. 6. On hearing the counsel for both the parties we are satisfied that the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioner are without any weight or force. 6. On hearing the counsel for both the parties we are satisfied that the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioner are without any weight or force. Sub-section 3(b) of Section 44 of M. V. Act is as follows : "(3) A State Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under Section 43, and subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided by or under this Act shall exercise and discharge throughout the State the following powers and functions, namely :- (a) xx xx (b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority and, if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions;" Rule 52-A framed under the M. V. Act provides : "When the disposal of any matter relates to the business of more than one Regional Transport Authority such disposal shall be made by the State Transport Authority. Provided that with the general or specific direction of the State Transport Authority, a Regional Transport Authority may issue a permit for two regions and such permit shall be deemed as permit issued by the State Transport Authority and shall not require counter-signature by the Second Regional Transport Authority." * * * On reading Section 44(3) (b) of the M. V. Act together with Rule 52-A quoted above, it becomes abundantly clear that it is the S.T.A. who shall have to dispose of matters which relate to the business of more than one Regional Transport Authority. In the present case, the S.T.A. therefore in exercise of its power under Section 44(3) (b) read with Rule 52-A granted the permit in favour of the petitioner in respect of the Khalpal Jajpur-Keonjhar Road route which is an inter-regional route passing through the local jurisdictions of more than one R.T.A. The S.T.A. in so exercising its power merely performed the duties of the R.T.A. in respect of the route common to two or more regions, and there is no support for Mr. Parija's contention that the S.T.A. by acting in such a manner, took over the entire route for all intents and purposes, and none other than the S.T.A. could exercise any power over any portion of the same. Parija's contention that the S.T.A. by acting in such a manner, took over the entire route for all intents and purposes, and none other than the S.T.A. could exercise any power over any portion of the same. There is nothing in the Act or in the Rules to show that merely because the S.T.A. performed the duties and functions of the R.T.A. in respect of a route common to two or more regions, in accordance with the provisions in the Act and the Rules, the R.T.As. of the different regions through which this route passes, lose all their powers and jurisdiction to perform their own duties and functions within their respective regions. 7. Under Section 45 of the M. V. Act every application for a permit has to be made to the R.T.A. of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. In accordance with the provisos to the said section, an application for a permit to use a vehicle on two or more regions lying within the same State or lying in two different States has also to be made to the R.T.A. of the respective regions as specifically provided therein. But as per Rule 52-A, quoted above, it is the S.T.A. alone who can dispose of any matter which relates to the business of more than one R.T.A. and as such the S.T.A. alone can deal with and dispose of an application for permit relating to a route running through two or more regions, and as per the proviso to the said Rule, the R.T.AS. of any of the regions through which such a route passes cannot exercise the power to grant a permit for such a route unless such an authority is specifically vested in any one of them by a general or specific direction of the S.T.A. From this it is clear that while the S.T.A. can deal with and dispose of matters relating to a route running through two or more regions, the R.T.A.'s power to deal with matters relating to a route which is entirely within its own jurisdiction is left intact and is not affected in any manner. Section 47 of the Act lays down the procedure to be adopted by the R.T.A. in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, and Section 48 lays down the power of the R.T.A. to grant a stage carriage permit. Section 47 of the Act lays down the procedure to be adopted by the R.T.A. in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, and Section 48 lays down the power of the R.T.A. to grant a stage carriage permit. So, therefore, merely because the S.T.A. deals with a common route running through two or more regions, the R.T.A.'s power and jurisdiction to function within its own region, as expressly provided in the M. V. Act, is not taken away either expressly or by implication by any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. 8. The crucial test in regard to the power of a R.T.A. to grant a permit is whether the entire route notified is exclusively within its own jurisdiction, AIR 1962 Mad 198 , Kannan Lorry Service, Pollachi v. Nataraja Motor Service, Pollachi. The word 'route' has not been defined in the Act; but its meaning, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is "Way taken in getting from starting point to destination". So, therefore, if both the starting and destination points and the entire route fall within the jurisdiction of the R.T.A., it cannot only entertain applications for a stage carriage permit as provided for under the first paragraph of Section 45, but has also the power as per Sections 47 and 48 of M. V. Act to independently deal with the matter and grant permit for such a route within its own jurisdiction. Rule 60 makes provision for the grant of temporary permit and authorises the State or Regional Transport Authority to grant such a permit as and when they think fit. In the present case before us, the R.T.A., Dhenkanal, invited applications for stage Carriage permits by the issue of a notice (Annexure H) dated 15-5-69 for the route between Bhuban and Khalpal via Kamakshyanagar. As the entire route and both the starting and the destination points of this particular route fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the R.T.A. Dhenkanal, it acted in due exercise of the powers vested in it under the law, and is therefore legally competent to issue the above notice (Annexure H). On the above considerations, there is no weight or substance in the above contention raised by Mr. Parija. 9. On the above considerations, there is no weight or substance in the above contention raised by Mr. Parija. 9. The two decisions reported in ILR 1967 Cut 643, Cuttack Motor Association v. District Transport Manager, Cuttack Zone, State Transport Service and AIR 1951 Orissa 81, Raghunath Patnaik v. State Transport Authority, Orissa, cited by Mr. Parija in support of his above contention are entirely on different facts and do not deal with the questions under consideration in the present case, and are not helpful for a decision of this matter. The other two decisions reported in AIR 1962 SC 1135 , Nilkanth Prasad v. The Secretary, Chhotanagpur Regional Transport Authority. Ranchi and AIR 1969 SC 273 , M/s. Standard Motor Union Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala cited by Mr. Parija are cases of routes nationalised as per notifications issued under Section 68-C of the Act, for being operated upon directly by the State Transport undertakings. All the above decisions therefore will not be relevant, and/or helpful for a decision of this case. 10. We are therefore satisfied that R.T.A. Dhenkanal. acted within its power and jurisdiction in issuing the notice dated 15-5-69 inviting applications for permanent stage carriage permits for the route between Bhuban and Khalpal via Kamakshyanagar. That being so, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed as being without any merit. 11. Messrs. Pragati Private Limited filed applications in this court to be impleaded as an intervener and to contest this writ petition. Mr. Sahu, their learned counsel, in moving these petitions challenged the maintainability of the writ petition on certain grounds. In view of our finding that the writ petition is without any merit and is liable to be dismissed, it is not necessary for us to deal with Mr. Sahu's submissions. Moreover, at present it is immaterial either to allow or not M/s. Pragati Private Limited to be impleaded as an intervener in this case. 12. In the result, this petition being without any merit is accordingly dismissed. Hearing fee of Rs. 100/- be paid by the petitioner to each of the opposite parties. 13. A. MISRA. J. :- I agree.