JUDGMENT Misra, C.J. This is an application for quashing Kolhan Title Suit no. 3 of 1967 pending in the court of opposite party no. 2, the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. The suit was instituted by opposite party no. 3, Dharamchand Jain, against the petitioner, claiming mainly the relief of recovery of possession of the properties described in the schedule attached to the plaint and the Additional Deputy Commissioner entertained the suit under a rule which is popularly known as Wilkinson's Rules. The petitioner has challenged the validity of these rules in so far as they provide for the maintainability of such title suits in the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner. 2. The main ground on which the validity of these rules has been challenged is that Regulation XIII of 1833 provided that the Governor-General of India in Council shall be competent to prescribe such rules as be would deem proper for the guidance of officers for the administration of civil and criminal justice and such rules prescribed by him came to be known as Wilkinson's Rules, but in fact these rules were never made by the Governor-General. The rules were in fact made by Captain T. Wilkinson, who was an Agent to the Governor-General, for the guidance of the officers appointed within the scheduled districts of Kolhan. As a matter of fact, Regulation XIII of 1833 was not meant for the Kolhan areas of Singhbhum but it was meant to be applicable to the district of Ramgarh and the Jungle Mahal comprised in the tracts mentioned in Section III. Regulation XIII of 1833, on the face of it, could not apply to the Kolhan areas because whatever is included within the Kolhan areas as such did not come under the British rule before 1837 and hence it could not have been the intention of the framers of the Regulation of 1833 to make it applicable to the Kolhan areas. Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874, known as the Scheduled Districts Act, also would not operate to give validity to Wilkinson's Rules. Assuming that the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, did apply to Wilkinson's Rules, that Act having been repealed by the Constitution of India, Wilkinson's Rules cannot be held to be valid after the repeal of 1874 Act. Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874, known as the Scheduled Districts Act, also would not operate to give validity to Wilkinson's Rules. Assuming that the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, did apply to Wilkinson's Rules, that Act having been repealed by the Constitution of India, Wilkinson's Rules cannot be held to be valid after the repeal of 1874 Act. Moreover, even assuming that Wilkinson's Rules were covered by Section V of Regulation XIII of 1833 as having been made by the Governor-General by an order in Council, that too would cease to be operative after the passing of Act I of 1903 which put an end to the life of these Rules. 3. It has further been urged that Wilkinson's Rules, no doubt, have been challenged from time to time on several occasions before, but they have been found intra vires on the assumption that there was nothing to show that these rules were not made by the Governor-General in Council, but the onus to prove this would lie upon the party who would contend that these rules were passed by the Governor-General by an order in Council by producing such an order. This is more so because Wilkinson's Rules themselves do not show that the rules were framed by an order of the Governor-General in Council. In the circumstances, it must be held that these rules were made by Captain T. Wilkinson on his own initiative. Even on the assumption that Wilkinson's Rules have been acted upon since 1837 onwards and several titles have resulted from the observance of these roles, the only effect would be that the past decisions may not be disturbed on the doctrine of factum valet, but so far as the prospective litigations are concerned, Wilkinson's Rules must be struck down as invalid as having no force of law and they cannot regulate the procedure of administration of justice in the Kolhan areas. 4. Reference is made further to Bihar Act III of 1967, known as the Kolhan Civil Justice (Regulation and Validating) Act which purported to validate all actions taken under Wilkinson's Rules. 4. Reference is made further to Bihar Act III of 1967, known as the Kolhan Civil Justice (Regulation and Validating) Act which purported to validate all actions taken under Wilkinson's Rules. It has also provided that in all suits and proceedings within the local limits of Kolhan, with the exception of the areas comprised within the Municipality of Chaibasa in the Sadar subdivision of the district of Singhbhum, the officers mentioned in column one of the schedule attached thereto shall exercise the powers of officers under Wilkinson's Rules of 1837 mentioned in column two. Under the authority vested in the Deputy Commissioner under the aforesaid Act III of 1967, the Deputy Commissioner delegated his powers to try civil suits and proceedings of the value exceeding rupees three hundred as also of hearing appeals reviews and revisions arising out of the judgments passed by the Munsif within the local limits of Kolhan, with the exception of the areas comprised within the Municipality of Chaibasa. Sadar subdivision of the district of Singhbhum, to the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. Section 2 of Act III of 1967 is also challenged as ultra vires in so far as it affects prospective litigation and as such the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum could not have been vested with the power to delegate his jurisdiction in the matter of administration of civil justice to the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singbbhum and, in any case, the suit being entertained by the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum, cannot be taken to be validly triable by him. It has further been urged that Article 244 of the Constitution of India provides for the application of the Fifth Schedule to the administration and control of the scheduled areas and the scheduled tribes in any State other than the State of Assam, but that would not authorise the Governor of the State to withdraw the application of the Code of Civil Procedure from Kolhan areas as administration and control of the scheduled areas' does not contemplate procedural laws and relate only to laws conferring or withdrawing substantive rights. Hence a different procedure for administration of justice in Kolhan areas inconsistent with the Code of Civil Procedure is itself bad in law. 5. Hence a different procedure for administration of justice in Kolhan areas inconsistent with the Code of Civil Procedure is itself bad in law. 5. Before dealing with the arguments in detail, it will be sufficient for me to refer to a decision of this Court in (1) Dulichand Khirwal V. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 366). That too was a case in which the order passed by the Commissioner of Chotanagpur Division dated the 11th of February, 1956, passed in Kolhan Title Appeal No. 124 of 1954, was sought to be quashed. That suit was also filed in the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum. The suit was filed by the State of Bihar against the petitioner for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,250/- on account of the minimum royalty due for the period from 21.5.1945 to 20.5.1950. The suit was dismissed. The State of Bihar went up in appeal from that decision and the Commissioner of Chotanagpur Division allowed the appeal and decreed the suit filed by the State of Bihar. That decision was challenged in the writ application before this Court in which also it was urged that the suit was entertained by the Additional Deputy Commissioner under Wilkinson's Rules which are no longer in force and so the Commissioner of Chotanagpur Division had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The application before this Court also failed on several grounds. One ground was that although there was a judgment of this Court in the case (2) K. K. Sinha V. Basudeo Harjiwan Pathak (Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 392 of 1952 dated 22.12.1952) wherein it was held that Act II of 1951 amended the Code of Civil Procedure so as to extend its operation to the whole of India including the so-called scheduled districts with the Exception of certain tribal areas in the State of Assam, in the State of Madras and in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the State of Manipur, the Act received the assent of the President on 17.2.1951 and as such the Code of Civil Procedure must be held to be applicable to the entire district of Singhbhum including Kolhan areas. The effect of this judgment was, however, obviated by a subsequent notification of the Government of Bihar dated the 26th August, 1953, issued in exercise of the authority conferred on the State Government by Sub-paragraph (1) of Paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which directed that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951 (II of 1951) shall not apply to the Sadar subdivision of the district of Singhbhum except the areas comprised within Chaibasa and Chakradharpur municipalities. Thus, the effect of Act II of 1951 was neutralised and the existing law in regard to the entertainment of suits in the Court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner was held to be applicable. Mr. J.C. Sinha for the petitioner has not placed reliance upon Act II of 1951. 6. In that case, however, it was also urged that Regulation XIII of 1833, in pursuance, of which the Agent to the Governor-General made Wilkinson's Rules, having been repealed by Act XII of 1876, Wilkinson's Rules did not exist any longer as they had automatically been repealed with the repeal of Regulation XIII of 1833. That argument was negatived with reference to Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 which has been quoted in extenso in that judgment. Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 says that "All rules heretofore, prescribed by the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government for the guidance of officers appointed within any of the Scheduled Districts for all or any of the purposes mentioned in Section 6 and in force at the time of the passing of this Act, shall continue to be in force....". Before the benefit of this rule could be invoked in favour of continuance of Wilkinson's Rules, it must be established that Wilkinson's Rules were prescribed by the Governor-General and not by the Agent to the Governor-General as Mr. Wilkinson, undoubtedly, at that time was. After quoting further Sections IV and V of Regulation XIII of 1833, it was stated that the argument on be half of the petitioner was that Wilkinson's Rules were framed under Section IV of Regulation XIII of 1833 conferring upon the officer appointed by the Governor-General in Council the administration of civil and criminal justice and would not empower the officer so appointed also to promulgate rules of procedure. If, however, the rules in question were prescribed by the Governor-General in Council under Section V of the Regulation, the position might be different. There was nothing to show that Wilkinson's Rules were prescribed under Section V and not under Section IV. This Court, however, overruled the contention on the ground that at nothing was brought on record by the petitioner to show that the rules were not framed by the Governor-General under Section V of Regulation XIII of 1833. This conclusion was reinforced by an elaborate examination of the effect of continuance of a certain rule of law as valid for a long time, in that case for nearly 125 years before the suit was instituted, and it was held that it must be assumed that the rules were issued validly. The position was examined by the committee known as Kolhan Enquiry Committee in 1948 appointed by the Government of Bihar, which also referred to the fact that civil justice was still administered in Kolhan areas under Wilkinson's Rules and that these rules are statutory rules framed under Regulation XIII of 1833, and were still in force by virtue of Section 7 of the Scheduled Districts Act. A view similar to the one in (1) Dulichand's case (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 366) has also been taken in (3) Mahendra Singh V. The Commissioner of Chota Nagpur Division (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 603). In my opinion, the reasoning adopted by the learned Judges of this Court in the above decisions appears to be well-founded and the contention of learned Counsel that it should be held to be invalid because onus would lie upon the party supporting the validity of the rules to establish that they are valid by bringing on record relevant materials, is not correct. This argument was advanced in Dulichand's case also and it was held that presumption must be made that such rules were validly made following the maxim omnia presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donee probetur in contrarium. The principle, in my opinion, will preeminently apply to a case like the present one and it must be presumed that the rules were made by the authority of the Governor-General although they purport to have been issued by the Agent to the Governor-General, Mr. T. Wilkinson, who describes himself as Governor-General's Agent. The principle, in my opinion, will preeminently apply to a case like the present one and it must be presumed that the rules were made by the authority of the Governor-General although they purport to have been issued by the Agent to the Governor-General, Mr. T. Wilkinson, who describes himself as Governor-General's Agent. It may be that the Governor-General's Agent promulgated the rules after they were drawn up by him as an authority familiar with the local conditions in Kolhan areas but approved by the Governor-General as rules to be applicable to Kolhan areas for the administration of civil justice. If this argument fails, the only argument on which learned Counsel placed reliance is that Kolhan areas were not in existence in 1833 so that they should not have been in contemplation when Regulation XIII of 1833 was promulgated. In my opinion, Section V of Regulation XIII of 1833 was comprehensive and made the Governor-General competent, by an order in Council, to prescribe such rules as he might deem proper for the guidance of the Agent and all officers subordinate to his control and authority to determine what powers would be exercised by the Agent and his assistants respectively; also to determine to what extent the decision of the Agent in civil suits would be final. It is notable that under Section VII power was conferred upon the Governor-General to make alterations in the limits of the district under the Agent. Hence it is immaterial that the Kolhan area was acquired by the British sometime after 1833 as after acquisition the area might have been added to the jurisdiction of the Agent on account of the peculiar nature of the terrain and population. It was only under Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874, by which time the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 had come into existence, that the rules prescribed by the Governor-General for the administration of justice were held to be applicable for the guidance of the officers appointed within any of the scheduled districts for all or any of the purposes mentioned in Section 6 and in force at the time of the passing of this Act, so that the rules prescribed by the Governor-General and known as Wilkinson's Rules were still left valid in respect of the procedure to be followed for the decision of suits in Kolhan areas. The question, therefore, as to whether such areas were in existence in 1833, when that Regulation was passed, or not is quite immaterial. The relevant point would be the year 1874 when under Section 7, such rules were still made applicable to the scheduled districts within which Kolhan areas of the district of Singhbhum were certainly included. Any repeal, therefore, even of the Regulation of 1833 by a subsequent Act will not affect the validity of these rules in as much as in spite of the repeal of Regulation XIII of 1833, under the special power conferred upon the State Government under Schedule V of the Constitution, the Code of Civil Procedure was made inapplicable to the Sadar subdivision of the district of Singhbhum except the areas of Chaibasa and Chakradharpur municipalities. Hence, the administration of justice in the Sadar subdivision of Singhbhum could not be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, but by Wilkinson's Rules which still bold 1tbe ground. The argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, must be overruled as being without substance. 7. I may also state here that our attention has been invited to Singhbhum Old Records (Volume 1), page one, which refers to a letter from the Judicial Department of the Governor-General to Captain T. Wilkinson, Agent to the Governor-General, Hazareebaugh, in which reference was made to the proposal of Captain Wilkinson for adoption of the rules her-drafted for the guidance of Assistants in the administration of civil and criminal justice within the tracts placed under their respective jurisdiction. That letter refers to the approval granted by the Governor-General to the rules for the administration of criminal justice which were in the nature of general instructions issued by Captain Wilkinson for the guidance of officers with the modification noted in the annexed paper. In Paragraph 3, however, it is stated thus: “It is considered proper to suspend the orders regarding the proposed Rules for Civil Justice till the regulation on that subject which is now preparing by Mr. In Paragraph 3, however, it is stated thus: “It is considered proper to suspend the orders regarding the proposed Rules for Civil Justice till the regulation on that subject which is now preparing by Mr. Millet under the direction of Sudder Courts be passed Many of the new rules will be applicable to your jurisdiction, and it will be easy to add any that may be specially applicable to that territory as well as to exclude from operation, there; such as may be inapplicable there.” It is clear that the proposals of Captain Wilkinson in the shape of rules for the administration of civil justice were being considered by the Governor-General and even as approval was granted to the rules framed by him for the administration of criminal justice, as referred to in paragraph two of this letter, so also approval must have been granted to the rules framed by him for the administration of civil justice referred to in paragraph three. This is an additional reason why I am inclined to hold that there is no substance in the contention on behalf of the petitioner that these rules were framed only by Captain Wilkinson, Agent to the Governor-General, and never assumed the approval of the Governor-General. If that were so, the rules could not have had the ground after 1837 in the same manner as if they were rules duly promulgated by the Governor-General. It is remarkable that the above letter which refers to the proposal for the examination of the rules for the administration of civil justice, bears date, the 17th February, 1834, whereas Wilkinson's Rules actually started being acted upon from 1837 onwards in respect of Kolhan accused. The interval must have been utilised for granting approval to the rules with reference to the various other proposals of which mention is made in paragraph three above. In any view of the matter, the decisions of this Court in the case of Dalichand Khirwal and that of Mahendra Singh (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 366 and 603-supra) have laid down the law correctly and the argument of Mr. J.C. Sinha to the contrary must fail. 8. In any view of the matter, the decisions of this Court in the case of Dalichand Khirwal and that of Mahendra Singh (A.I.R. 1958 Patna 366 and 603-supra) have laid down the law correctly and the argument of Mr. J.C. Sinha to the contrary must fail. 8. It has also been urged that the application must be allowed to the extent that the suit is being tried before the Additional Deputy Commissioner whereas it could have been tried only before the Deputy Commissioner, as the latter has no valid power to delegate such authority to the Additional Deputy Commissioner. It may be stated that in the two cases referred to above, the suits were tried by the Additional Deputy Commissioner and the point was not raised that the Additional Deputy Commissioner was not competent to bear the suits and in fact the trials were held to be valid. But even assuming that the point can be raised as it has been done, the Act of 1967 is wide enough for the purpose in so far as it provides that in the case of suits of the value exceeding three hundred rupees, the Deputy Commissioner or any other officer authorised by him can try such suits. In the present case such authority has been conferred on the Additional Deputy Commissioner by the Deputy Commissioner by order dated the 28th December, 1968 (vide Annexure 2 to the petition) and hence there is no defect of jurisdiction so far as the trial of the suit by the Additional Deputy Commissioner is concerned. In the case of (4) Jugdu Ho and others (C.W.J.C. Nos. 654 and 745 of 1967-decided on the 19th December, 1969). It has been laid down that unless such an authority is specifically conferred by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 2, column one, of Bihar Act III of 1967, trial of a suit by the Additional Deputy Commissioner is not valid. In that case, however, power was vested in the Additional Deputy Commissioner after the trial of the suit was over. Hence the point for decision in that case was different and it has no bearing on the instant case where trial has not taken place as yet and the Additional Deputy Commissioner is duly vested with authority to try suits of the present nature. Hence the point for decision in that case was different and it has no bearing on the instant case where trial has not taken place as yet and the Additional Deputy Commissioner is duly vested with authority to try suits of the present nature. The same consideration applies to the decision in (5) Gangaram Munda alias Gono Munda V. B. B. Shrivastava 1968 (B.L.J.R. 430 = 1968 P.L.J.R. 61). In that case also the Additional Deputy Commissioner was authorised by the Deputy Commissioner to decide the suits only after the decision which was the subject matter of the application in the High Court was given by the Additional Deputy Commissioner. Hence, on facts, that case also is distinguishable. 9. As to the wider question that this part of Section 2 is ultra vires as it amounts to delegation of power by a delegate the Deputy Commissioner is authorised to vest any officer with power to try a suit, it may be stated that the argument is not tenable. In the first, the contention would have been plausible if the Deputy Commissioner alone were required by law to try the suit and he would have transferred this jurisdiction to any other officer. But here the Act itself provides that either the Deputy Commissioner himself may try such suits or he may authorise some other officer to do so which in substance is a case of alternative jurisdiction introduced by the legislature itself, and the Deputy Commissioner does not do it at his own option. The choice also must be confined to another government officer and not to any outside individual. There was nothing unreasonable in the legislation and more so as it is intended to provide for the expeditious trial of suits of petty nature in the aboriginal areas. The Munsif Assistant or the Agent to the Governor-General were to try such suits in those simple days since 1837 onwards soon after the revolt of the aboriginals, but the entire super structure of administration changed thereafter and other officers took the place of the officers mentioned in Wilkinson's Rules. The Munsif Assistant or the Agent to the Governor-General were to try such suits in those simple days since 1837 onwards soon after the revolt of the aboriginals, but the entire super structure of administration changed thereafter and other officers took the place of the officers mentioned in Wilkinson's Rules. Hence, the superintendent, the Deputy Commissioner or any other officer authorised by him has taken the place of the originally designated officers and the power vested in the Deputy Commissioner either to try such suits himself or to authorise some other officer can not be regarded as invalid either as a case of delegate delegating his authority which it is not or as a piece of unreasonable legislation. The argument based on this ground also must, therefore, be overruled. 10. In the result, the application fails and must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250/-. K.B.N. SINGH, J. I agree Application dismissed.