JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The suit out of which the Second Appeal arises is one for redemption of Ex.P4. mortgage dated 5-9-1123 executed by the plaintiff in favour of the husband of the first defendant. Plaint item No. 1 is 35 cents of land comprised in Sy. No. 1801 of Madathuvilakam Village and item No. 2 is 23 cents out of the above said 35 cents. What is sought to be redeemed is plaint item No. 2 though the original mortgage was in respect of plaint item No. 1. the entire 35 cents. The husband of the first defendant who was the mortgagee under Ex. P4 assigned his mortgage right over 12 cents out of item No. 1 in favour of one Parameswaran Pillai who later took a sale deed from the plaintiff for the abovesaid 12 cents under Ex. P2 dated 14-7-1951. The mortgage thus became split up and the plaintiff on his own title and as power of attorney holder of his son therefore claims redemption of the remaining 23 cents which is item No. 2 in the plaint. The first defendant's husband is dead and the first defendant is his heir. The second defendant is impleaded as a person in possession under the first defendant. The claim of the plaintiff, entitling him to redeem, is admitted by the first defendant in her written statement. According to her she is in possession of item No. 2 except a small portion of about 3 cents, which, according to her, was leased out to the second defendant by her husband. She has also set up a claim for value of improvements effected in the suit property. The second defendant has filed a written statement disputing the title of the plaintiff to the plaint item. His case of independent title to the plaint item is traced as follows: Plaint item 1. 35 cents in extent was obtained by 3 persons in the partition of the family to which the property belonged. That property was. at that time, subject to a hypothecation in favour of one, T. Madhavan Pillai who filed suit on the bond as O. S.1651 of 1106 of the Trivandrum Munsiff's Court and obtained a decree for the hypothecation amount. In execution of the decree so obtained by him he brought this 35 cents to sale and in the court auction he purchased it. In execution of the decree so obtained by him he brought this 35 cents to sale and in the court auction he purchased it. The sale was on 25-2-1111. Pursuant to the court sale the property was delivered over to him through court on 20-12-1111 and he was in possession and enjoyment thereafter. While so, in the year 1117 he hypothecated the property and in 118 he executed a mortgage of the property in favour of one Krishnan Vydian. In 1119 under Ex. P6 sale deed he sold the property to one Rozario, who in his turn, sold it to the plaintiff and his son in the year 1122 under Ex. P1. On the strength of Ex. P1 sale deed they executed a mortgage Ex. P4, in 1123, after taking a release from Krishnan Vydian of the earlier mortgage of 118. It is this mortgage, Ext. P4. that is sought to be redeemed in this suit. But in view of the sale of 12 cents, of the mortgage property thereafter it is only the remaining 23 cents, which is plaint item 2, that is sought to be so redeemed. 2. The 3rd defendant in the suit O. S. 1651 of 1108, one Krishna Pillai, filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree against him on 17-4-1123. On this application he obtained orders restoring the suit to file and thereafter the suit itself was posted and for default of the plaintiff it was dismissed on 14-10-1949. The 3rd defendant, thereafter, applied for re delivery of the property, possibly on the strength of the dismissal of the Suit O. S. 1651 of 1106 and assuming that thereby the sale pursuant to the execution of the decree also was set aside. The court ordered redelivery and when the Amin went to the spot, Parameswaran Pillai, who had obtained assignment of the mortgage and subsequent sale in respect of 12 cents, obstructed the Amin in taking possession. Due to his resistance the 3rd defendant was satisfied with the delivery of the rest of the property and 23 cents was delivered over to him under Ex. D1 delivery report. Due to his resistance the 3rd defendant was satisfied with the delivery of the rest of the property and 23 cents was delivered over to him under Ex. D1 delivery report. With regard to 12 cents, which was subject to the resistance of Parameswaran Pillai, an understanding seems to have been reached later between the 3rd defendant in O. S. 1651 of 1106 and the said Parameswaran Pillai as a result of which a consent deed is seen to have been executed in favour of Parameswaran Pillai. Based on the delivery obtained under Ex. D1, Krishna Pillai executed Ex. D2 mortgage in respect of item No. 2, 23 cents, on 7-1-1954 in favour of second defendant. He later executed Ex. D. 3 purakkadam on 6-6-1957 in favour of second defendant and soon thereafter Ex. D4, a deed of sale of item No. 2, was executed on 29-8-1960. The claim of the second defendant in the suit is based upon Ex. D2 to D4. The case of the 2nd defendant was that, by reason of the dismissal of the suit O. S. 1651 of 1106 after it was restored to file pursuant to the application under O.9 R.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sale which was held in execution of the decree automatically stood set aside, with the result that, the plaintiff had no title to the suit property and he had no possession also because of the redelivery effected in O. S. 1651 of 1906. 3. The question that had to be, therefore, considered was how far the decree dismissing the suit O. S. 1651 of 1106 on 14-10-1949 would affect the court sale held in 1111 pursuant to the execution of the decree in O. S. 1651 of 1106 and how far the redelivery proceedings would affect the right of the plaintiff to redeem the mortgage executed by him on the strength of his title. It has to be noticed here that the plaintiff, along with his son, took the sale deed from Rozario in the year 1122. This Rozario himself is seen to have taken the sale from Madhavan Pillai nearly eight years after the court auction purchase and delivery. The plaintiff claims to be a bona fide purchaser for value of the property sold in court auction, though, at the court auction, the purchase was the decree holder himself. This Rozario himself is seen to have taken the sale from Madhavan Pillai nearly eight years after the court auction purchase and delivery. The plaintiff claims to be a bona fide purchaser for value of the property sold in court auction, though, at the court auction, the purchase was the decree holder himself. The question for consideration is whether the subsequent alteration, reversal or modification of a decree would affect an earlier court sale held in execution of a valid decree by a competent court at which auction the decree holder himself purchases and later assigns it to a bona fide purchaser for fair value. In the circumstances of this case, where there were no proceedings challenging the decree pending at the time of the sale in favour of Rozario in 1119 M.E. and the title of the court auction purchaser was in no way, apparently, in jeopardy at that time, the sale taken by Rozario and later by the plaintiff and his son cannot but be bona fide and there is nothing to indicate or even suggest that such sale was not supported by consideration. Therefore it can be safely assumed that the plaintiff and hisson are bona fide purchasers for value from the court auction purchaser of the properties sold in court auction in 1111. 4. When a property is purchased by the decree holder himself in court auction and the decree is subsequently modified or reversed, the sale in favour of the decree holder is liable to be set aside. This rule does not hold good in the case of a stranger auction purchaser who purchases bona fide for fair value. These propositions have become well settled by now. The question in this case is whether the rule that a stranger auction purchaser acting bona fide will not be affected by subsequent reversal or variation of the decree in execution of which property was sold will hold good also in the case of a vendee from the decree holder auction purchaser who takes the sale bona fide and for value. Authorities on this question are not too many. 5. As early as in 1886 the Privy Council in the decision in Mahton v. Singh ILR 14 Cal. 18 PC recognised the principle that a stranger auction purchaser is not affected by the subsequent variation or reversal of a decree. Authorities on this question are not too many. 5. As early as in 1886 the Privy Council in the decision in Mahton v. Singh ILR 14 Cal. 18 PC recognised the principle that a stranger auction purchaser is not affected by the subsequent variation or reversal of a decree. The consequences of non compliance with the provision in S.246 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877) was the question which arose in the appeal before the Board. Cross decrees were held by the parties to a suit. One of the parties executed the decree without giving credit to the amount in the cross decree against him as required by the provision in S.246 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellant in that case was a bona fide purchaser in the court auction held in execution of the decree. The question was, whether, this infirmity in the execution would affect the title of such an auction purchaser and the Privy Council held: "The defendant appellant purchased bona fide, and for a fair value, property exposed for sale under an execution issued by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid judgment". It may be profitable to extract the following passage also from that Judgment here: "Their Lordships are of opinion that the High Court came to an erroneous decision with regard to the construction of S.246, and that the judgment of the High Court in that respect must be set aside. A purchaser under a sale in execution is not bound to inquire whether the judgment debtor had a cross judgment of a higher amount any more than he would be bound in an ordinary case to inquire whether a judgment upon which an execution issues has been satisfied or not. Those are questions to be determined by the Court issuing the execution. To hold that a purchaser at a sale in execution is bound to inquire into such matters would throw a great impediment in the way of purchases under execution. If the Court has jurisdiction, a purchaser is no more bound to inquire into the correctness of an order for execution than he is as to the correctness of the judgment upon which the execution, issues." The Privy Council had occasion to consider that question again in the decision in Abdin Khan v. Ali Khan ILR 10 All. 166. If the Court has jurisdiction, a purchaser is no more bound to inquire into the correctness of an order for execution than he is as to the correctness of the judgment upon which the execution, issues." The Privy Council had occasion to consider that question again in the decision in Abdin Khan v. Ali Khan ILR 10 All. 166. That arose from a suit to set aside certain court auction sales held in execution of an ex parte decree. Later, this decree was modified by the appellate court which disallowed a part of the plaint claim, In the meantime a series of court auction sales had been held in execution of the decree and in some of these the decree holder himself figured as auction purchaser and in some others, strangers were the auction purchasers. By the time the suit was filed, assignees from the decree holder auction purchaser also came into the picture, as, such assignments came into existence in the meanwhile. Some of the defendants in the suit were decree holder auction purchasers and some were purchasers from them, claiming under them. For the purpose of that judgment and for the sake of convenience, these were classed in the judgment of the Privy Council under the head of decree holder. I am referring to this because this has led to some comment in certain decisions as to the scope of the right of assignees from decree holder auction purchasers. The other defendants in the suit were stranger auction purchasers. The plaintiff sought the setting aside of all these court sales. The Subordinate Court which tried the suit set aside all the sales. The High Court, in appeal by the stranger auction purchasers, held that the sales at which they purchased were not liable to be set aside by reason of the variation of the decree. Neither the decree holders auction purchasers nor their assignees filed any appeal and therefore the decision of the Subordinate court had become final as against them. The judgment of the High Court was taken up on appeal to the Privy Council and Sri. Neither the decree holders auction purchasers nor their assignees filed any appeal and therefore the decision of the Subordinate court had become final as against them. The judgment of the High Court was taken up on appeal to the Privy Council and Sri. B. Peacock delivering the judgment for the Board observed as follows: "It appears to their Lordships that there is a great distinction between the decree holders who came in and purchased under their own decree, which was afterwards reversed on appeal, and the bona fide purchasers who came in and bought at the sale in execution of the decree to which they were no parties, and at a time when that decree was a valid decree, and when the order for sale was a valid order." A great distinction has been made between the cases of bona fide purchasers who are no parties to a decree at a sale under execution and the decree holders themselves. In Racon's Abdridgment, Title "error", it is laid down, citing old authorities, that "if a man recovers damages, and hath execution by fieri facias, and upon the fieri facias the sheriff sells to a stranger a term for years, and after the judgment is reversed, the party shall be restored only to the money for which the term was sold, and not to the term itself, because the sheriff had sold it by the command of the writ of fieri facias " There are decisions to a similar effect in the High Court at Calcutta. They are collected in a note in Broughton, in his book on the Code of Civil Procedure, fourth edition, note to S.246, Act VIII of 1859. So in this case, those bona fide purchasers, who were no parties to the decree which was then valid and in force, had nothing to do further than to look to the decree and to the order of sale " 6. The case before their Lordships of the Privy Council was one in which the decree of the Trial Court was challenged only by the stranger auction purchasers as appellants and not by the assignees from the decree holder auction purchasers. Therefore, necessarily, the decision did not involve any adjudication as to the title that would be obtained by the latter class of purchasers. 7. Therefore, necessarily, the decision did not involve any adjudication as to the title that would be obtained by the latter class of purchasers. 7. Though it is clear from these authoritative pronouncements of the Privy Council that there can be no doubt as to the consequence of reversal, modification or alteration of a decree in the case of the decree holder auction purchaser as well as a bona fide stranger auction purchaser the question is not free from difficulty in the case of a person who bona fide purchases from a decree holder auction purchaser. Is he to be classed along with bona fide stranger auction purchaser or is he to be put in the category of the decree holder auction purchaser? To appreciate this, it is necessary to consider what exactly is the reason for treating the decree holder auction purchaser as different from the bona fide stranger auction purchaser for fair value. 8. The provisions relating to the setting aside of a court auction sale must be found within the four corners of the Code of Civil Procedure. O.21 R.89 to 92 deal with this. O.21 R.89 enables the judgment debtor or any person holding an interest in the property to apply to set aside the sale on deposit. O.21 R.90 enables any person whose interests are affected by the sale, or any person entitled to a share I in rateable distribution of assets to apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. O.21 R.91 enables the purchaser himself to apply to the court to set aside the sale, on the ground that the judgment debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold. O.21 R.92(1) may be relevant and therefore it is extracted: "Where no application is made under R.89, R.90 or R.91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." Sub-r.3 of R.92 may also be noticed here. O.21 R.92(1) may be relevant and therefore it is extracted: "Where no application is made under R.89, R.90 or R.91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." Sub-r.3 of R.92 may also be noticed here. That sub-rule runs as follows: "(3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought, by any person against whom such order is made." Therefore, apparently, once a sale becomes absolute, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not contemplate the sale being set aside by a reversal of the decree or variation or modification of the decree. But it is necessary that the judgment debtor whose property is sold at an auction sale should be restored to his original position when his legal rights are altered by the decision of the court. This is the principle underlying restitution. Even where S.144 on the Code of Civil Procedure may not apply, in terms, courts have recognised the duty to restore the parties to status quo and power in that behalf will be exercised invoking inherent jurisdiction of the court. It is this Principle that would operate to vacate the court auction sale at which the decree holder himself has purchased in auction. The decree holder is a party to the suit and he must be bound by the result of the suit and it is only equitable to vacate the court auction sale in which he is the auction purchaser to restore the opposite party to status quo. This principle of equity which operates to vacate the sale already confirmed must have necessary limitations because it must not operate inequitably on others. A stranger auction purchaser, being not a party to the suit, is not bound to enquire about the infirmities of the judgment or the order for sale. If he purchases bona fide in auction he is to be protected for more reasons than one. To invoke the rule that parties must be restored to status quo would work hardship and injury on a stranger, in the sense, a person who is not a party to the I suit, if he had purchased in auction on paying fair value for the property and without notice of any defect or irregularity in the proceedings or in the decree. It is necessary that court auction purchases must secure the best price. If the title of a stranger court auction purchaser would be in jeopardy by the subsequent course of the litigation, potential purchasers may hesitate to participate in court auctions and this would directly tell upon the price that may be obtainable at court auction sales. As a matter of policy it is better to see that people are encouraged to participate in court auctions even if securing title to them may cause prejudice in certain individual cases, to the judgment debtors. In the larger interests of securing the best price at court auctions assuring title to the court auction purchasers who are strangers to the decree, would be desirable; though this may limit or restrict the principle of restoring status quo to the judgment debtors. This appears to be the basis for treating the bona fide stranger court auction purchaser differently from the decree holder auction purchaser. If that is the reason, then, I have to see how far this would be applicable in the case of a bona fide assignee from a decree holder auction purchaser. 8. In this connection I may refer to the decision reported in Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh AIR 1931 PC 33 . In that case the question that arose was whether an adjustment between the decree holder and judgment debtor, come to at any time before confirmation of an execution sale, would divest the stranger auction purchaser of his right to have the sale confirmed. Noticing the view of the Nagpur High Court taken in the decision in Maroti v. Vithoba AIR 1928 Nag. 43 that, on such adjustment, the foundation of the court's power to execute the decree is taken away. Their Lordships expressed the view that they were unable to agree with this reasoning. It was observed: "The only means by which the judgment debtor can get rid of a sale, which has been duly carried out, are those embodied in R.89, viz., by depositing in Court the amount for the recovery of which the property was sold, together with 5 per cent, on the purchase money which goes to the purchaser as statutory compensation, and this remedy can only be pursued within 30 days of the sale: See Art.166, Sch.1, Lim. Act, 1908. That this is so is, in Their Lordships' opinion, clear under the wording of Rs. Act, 1908. That this is so is, in Their Lordships' opinion, clear under the wording of Rs. 92, which provides that in such a case (i.e., where the sale has been duly carried out), if no application is made under R.99: "The Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.' ' Their Lordships make no reference to cases under R.91 which has no application to the present case. They only desire to add that the view they have expressed above accords with the judgment of Mitchell, A.J.C., in the present case, with that of the Calcutta judges in Bibi Shaffan v. Muhammad Habibuddin (2) and they think, with that of Hallifax, A.J.C., when it was under consideration in the present case whether leave should be given in India to appeal to His Majesty in Council." I may also notice here the decision reported in Ambujammal v. Thangavelu Chettiar AIR 1941 Mad. 399 . The learned judge referred to the decision of the Privy Council reported in Nanhalal v. Umrao Singh AIR 1931 PC 33 the later decision in Birdichand v. Ganpatsao AIR 1938 Nag. 525 and also the decisions of the Madras High Court and noticed the fact that the view taken in these decisions had not been doubted in any decision of the Madras High Court. The last paragraph in that judgment is certainly instructive on the question before me. "There is no provision in the Code for the cancellation of a sale merely because of the cancellation of the decree and though it is in accordance with justice that a person who has succeeded in appeal should get from the opposite party such restitution as is possible, there is no principle of justice whereby an innocent third party who has purchased in a valid auction held by the Court should be deprived of his property, merely because the decree under which the sale was held has been cancelled in appeal. On general principles the judgment debtor can look to the decree holder to give restitution when the decree has been set aside in appeal, but there is no general principle which would give him a similar right to look to a thud party who has for good consideration purchased the property sold through the court. On general principles the judgment debtor can look to the decree holder to give restitution when the decree has been set aside in appeal, but there is no general principle which would give him a similar right to look to a thud party who has for good consideration purchased the property sold through the court. It seems to me to follow therefore that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be called in and to justify a power for which the Code contains no provision, when the desirability of the existence of such a power is purely a matter of policy upon which two opinions may quite well be taken." 9. The question that has arisen in this case arose in the same form in the Madras High Court. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the decision in Chokalingam v. N. S. Krishna ( AIR 1964 Mad. 404 ) has reviewed the authorities on this point. The case before that court was one where the auction purchaser, who was the decree holder himself, sold, the property purchased in auction by him to a stranger who so purchased it bona fide. The latter claimed that his title cannot be defeated notwithstanding the variation of the decree in execution of which this auction sale was held. Though the normal rule is that where the decree holder himself purchases in court auction the property purchased by him will be liable to answer a claim for restitution, in the event of the decree being reversed or set aside in appeal, the learned judges held this rule will not apply to a stranger who bona fide purchases the property from the decree holder auction purchaser. Even in the case of a decree holder auction purchaser it is not as if there is any defect in his title. The decree in enforcement of which the sale is held is a valid decree, the order is a valid order and the sale is held by a competent court. It is not correct to apply the principle that a transferee cannot get larger rights than the transferor to the case of an assignee from a decree holder auction purchaser since it is not as if the title of such auction purchaser is in any way defective. It is not correct to apply the principle that a transferee cannot get larger rights than the transferor to the case of an assignee from a decree holder auction purchaser since it is not as if the title of such auction purchaser is in any way defective. The obligation to be subject to restitution arises not from any defect in title but from an entirely different principle, namely, the principle of equity, that parties must be restored as far as possible to their original position. The qualification that such restitution is to be made only as far as possible necessarily exempts from the scope of restitution persons who are not parties to the decree. For the purpose of enabling a healthy competition at court sales it is necessary to secure title to property to strangers who purchase bona fide at court auctions and it is only just and proper that their title be not defeated by events for which they are not responsible or events in which they play no part. I see no reason why similar security should not be given to a bona fide assignee from a decree holder auction purchaser. Property, once purchased in court auction, is transferable and unless it can be so transferred freely even decree holders may be hesitant to bid in auction. No doubt, I am aware that to hold, as I propose to do in this case, namely, that there need be no distinction drawn between a bona fide stranger auction purchaser for value and a stranger purchaser bona fide for value from the decree holder auction purchaser may create some practical difficulty. It may be that, in cases where the decree holder auction purchaser anticipates a contingency of the title vested in him by court auction purchaser being liable to be defeated he may transfer the property so that the transferee successfully defeat the claim for restitution. But then the question of bona fides will arise and possibly in such cases the court may have to scrutinise the claim of good faith of the transferee carefully and keeping this possibility in view. But the result would not affect the principle as such. In this connexion I would cite here a passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Chokkalingam v. N.S. Krishna AIR 1964 Mad. 404 . But the result would not affect the principle as such. In this connexion I would cite here a passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Chokkalingam v. N.S. Krishna AIR 1964 Mad. 404 . "Learned counsel for the first respondent contends that it is the latter rule which applies to the instant case. His contention is that the general rule is that no man can convey a bear or higher title than what he has, barring certain specified exceptions contained in some of the statutes, and that in this case at the time of the execution sale an appeal from the original decree was pending and that when the property was purchased by the decree holder, in his hands, it was undoubtedly subject to a claim for restitution, the title itself being a defeasible title depending upon the reversal of the decree, and that the decree holder - purchaser cannot possibly transfer or pass on the property free from that obligation for restitution. He further urges that a person who purchases property from a person with such a defeasible title must suffer restitution when there is a reversal of the decree in execution of which the sale had taken place. On the other hand, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the protection which is extended to a stranger purchaser would equally apply whether a stranger is one who directly purchases in execution sale or one who bona fide purchases the properly from the decree holder purchaser for valuable consideration. His main argument is that at the time when the property was sold there was a valid enforceable decree, that the Court had ample and undoubted jurisdiction to sell the property, and that a valid title clearly passed to the decree holder purchaser. Learned counsel further contends that in this view, there was no defect whatsoever in the title of the purchaser, and that a contingent future claim for restitution cannot possibly be regarded as a defect in the title of the purchaser, and that, therefore, the rule that no man can convey a better or higher title than what he has, has no application to the instant case." I think it will be interesting to notice here the consequence of taking a different view. This may best be illustrated by an example and no better example can be thought of than the present case itself. A decree for sale is obtained by a hypothecatee as early as in 1106. The property is sold in 1111. The property is delivered over in the same year. There was no contest at any time. The sale was not challenged at that time. Years afterwards, when the plaintiff himself lost his interest in the litigation, by the conveyance of the property to strangers, and property has passed many hands, one of the defendants in the suit files a petition to set aside the ex parte decree, the notice is served apparently by refusal to accept, the decree is restored, naturally the suit is not prosecuted and the suit is dismissed. If these were to affect the rights of strangers who had bona fide dealt with properties years after the court sale ' there would not be any confidence in any court sale and properties which are sold in court sales at any time would be treated as in a separate category by intending purchasers. 10. Before leaving this question, I must notice the decision reported in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1967 SC 608 . In that case the decree was set aside after the court auction sale but before its confirmation. The purchaser was a stranger. The court held that notwithstanding the setting aside of the decree before confirmation the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure must operate to confirm the sale as a matter of course. By reason of the decree having been set aside the court sale will not be vacated. The question now before this Court in this second appeal was not decided by the Supreme Court. But the decision of the Madras High Court reported in Chokkalingam v. N.S. Krishna AIR 1964 Mad. 404 , where, the question, as in this case, arose was noticed by the Supreme Court. I am mentioning this just to point out that the Supreme Court which noticed the decision of the Madras High Court has not apparently doubted the correctness of the view taken therein. 11. 404 , where, the question, as in this case, arose was noticed by the Supreme Court. I am mentioning this just to point out that the Supreme Court which noticed the decision of the Madras High Court has not apparently doubted the correctness of the view taken therein. 11. In view of what I have stated above and as a result of review of the decisions referred to by me, I hold that an assignee for value taking an assignment bona fide from a decree holder auction purchaser will not be affected by the subsequent reversal or alteration of the decree in execution of which the sale was held. His position is the same as that of a stranger auction purchaser who purchases for fair value and bona fide. Unfortunately the Trial Court assumed, as a matter of course that, when a decree is set aside all sales held in execution of the decree will automatically stand set aside. There is no discussion of this question in its judgment. The lower appellate court, no doubt noticed the decision reported in Chokkalingam v. N.S. Krishna AIR 1964 Mad. 404 . But it considered that the decision of the Madras High Court is not applicable to the case since the question that arose in the Madras case was in restitution proceedings consequent on the reversal of the decree while in the present case the question is raised in a suit. But I fail to see any difference. Redelivery by way of restitution was obtained not from the plaintiff in the suit but from his mortgagee who was in possession. If the sale was not vacated by reason of the subsequent fate of the suit, the title of the plaintiff continues to vest in him and any person dispossessing his mortgagee by redelivery cannot defeat plaintiff title and consequently his right to redeem. Possibly, after dispossession, if property is held adversely to the plaintiff for such a period as is required by law to prescribe title by adverse possession, that is another question altogether. That does not arise in this case. No such case of adverse possession can be sustained as the suit is filed within 12 years of the date of redelivery. 12. In the result, I allow this Second Appeal setting aside the decrees of the courts below and granting a preliminary decree to the plaintiff for redemption of Ext. That does not arise in this case. No such case of adverse possession can be sustained as the suit is filed within 12 years of the date of redelivery. 12. In the result, I allow this Second Appeal setting aside the decrees of the courts below and granting a preliminary decree to the plaintiff for redemption of Ext. P4 mortgage in respect of plaint item No. 2. All questions, such as the amount payable towards mortgage money and value of improvements, if any, effected are to be determined at the time of passing the final decree and will be provided for in such decree. The parties will suffer costs up to this stage throughout.