JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - Ganga Ram, Applicant, is the auction purchaser. Hari Shanker Paliwal, opposite party No. 2, obtained a decree against Hira Lal, opposite party No. 1. In execution, the judgment-debtor's house was put to auction on 4-3-1968. The Applicant Ganga Ram purchased the same for Rs. 18,600/-. On 3-4-1968 the judgment debtor filed an objection Under Order XXI, Rule 90, CPC for the setting aside of the sale. 20-5-1968 was fixed by the court for the deposit of the requisite security in support of the objection. The judgment debtor failed to appear on that date. The objection was consequently consigned to the record room by the execution court. In due course the sale was confirmed on 31-5-1968. 2. On 3-7-1968, the judgment debtor made an application for the setting aside of the order passed on 20-5-1968 consigning the objection to the record room. He supported the application by an affidavit giving the reasons for his failure to attend the court on that date. The execution court found that the cause shown was sufficient. It allowed the application on payment of Rs. 30/- as costs to the auction purchaser. Aggrieved, the auction purchaser has come to this Court. 3. It was urged that the execution court had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for the setting aside of an order dismissing the objection Under Order XXI, Rule 90, CPC after it had passed an order of confirmation of sale Under Order XXI, Rule 92, Code of Civil Procedure. Order XXI, Rule 92, states: 92 (1) Where no application is made Under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. (2) Where such application is made and allowed and where, in the course of an application Under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale; Provided that no order shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. 4. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. 4. It would be seen that the power to confirm a sale accrues only if no application has been made Under Rules 89, 90 or 91 or if such an application is made, it is disallowed. During the pendency of such an application a sale cannot be confirmed. It is by now well settled that the execution court has an inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order dismissing an objection Under Order XXI, Rules 89, 90 and 91 Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. In Dwarka Prasad Babu Ram v. Vaish Flour Mills 1931 ALJ 622 a Division Bench of this Court held that where an application Under Order XXI, Rule 90 is dismissed in default, there is inherent jurisdiction in the Court to restore an application, if good cause is made out. The same view was taken in Gopi Lal v. Sita Ram AIR 1960 MP 196. 6. The question is whether the executing court can exercise this inherent jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order of dismissal of the objection, if it has passed an order confirming the sale. Courts have held that if the order disallowing the objection is set aside in appeal or in an independent suit, then the order of confirmation of sale would automatically fall or become null and void. If that be so, I fail to see why the same result will not come about, if a court in exercise of its admitted inherent jurisdiction sets aside the order disallowing the objections. 7. In Charitter Shukul Vs. Lal Behari Singh and Another, AIR 1934 All 433 , an auction sale was declared null and void in another suit. It was held that the order of confirmation of the sale would as a result become void. Similarly in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdery v. Hurropurshad Roy Ghowdery 10 Moo. Ind. App. 203 it was held that when an order is set aside by a higher court, then any consequential order passed by the lower court on the basis of the earlier order which was ultimately set aside, automatically falls. 8. Similarly in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdery v. Hurropurshad Roy Ghowdery 10 Moo. Ind. App. 203 it was held that when an order is set aside by a higher court, then any consequential order passed by the lower court on the basis of the earlier order which was ultimately set aside, automatically falls. 8. Under Clause (1) of Rule 92, CPC where no application is made Under Rules 89, 90 or 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the court can make an order confirming the sale. If the order disallowing the objection is set aside in appeal or in another suit, the confirmation falls with it. In our opinion there is no distinction on principle in the case of an order disallowing objections being set aside by courts other than the court which passed it and in a case where the order is set aside by that very court. If the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the setting aside of an order disallowing the objection, the consequence that the order of confirmation which might have been passed in the meanwhile will be null and void will follow. The institution of an appeal does not in law mean that an application containing objection Under Rules 89, 90 or 91 remains pending in the sense that it has not been disallowed. The institution of the appeal does not operate as an automatic stay or suspension of the order disallowing the objections. So, if in the case of an appeal, the order disallowing objections remains in force and operative and yet the effect of its being set aside subsequently has the impact of nullifying the order of confirmation, the same result ought to follow if the order disallowing the objections is set aside by the same court. The institution of an application for the setting aside of that order may not operate to suspend the operation of the order disallowing the objection, but that position obtains even when an appeal is filed. So on principle, there is no difference in the two situations. In our opinion, the view taken in Varadarajan v. Muthu Venkatapathi Reddy AIR 1953 Mad. 587 that setting aside of an order disallowing the objection as a result of the success of an application for restoration would make the order of confirmation of sale ineffective, is correct in law. So on principle, there is no difference in the two situations. In our opinion, the view taken in Varadarajan v. Muthu Venkatapathi Reddy AIR 1953 Mad. 587 that setting aside of an order disallowing the objection as a result of the success of an application for restoration would make the order of confirmation of sale ineffective, is correct in law. The execution court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for restoration and on being satisfied that it disclosed sufficient cause, to set aside the order disallowing the objections. 9. In the present case the court had on 20-5-1968 consigned the objection to the record room because the security was not furnished. That order was tantamount to the dismissal of the objections for default. The court had jurisdiction to set aside that order on the finding that there was sufficient cause. 10. The revision has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs.