PATHAK, J.:- This application has been filed under Article 226 of the Con­stitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 4-3-1970 passed by the Assam Board of Revenue. 2. The petitioner's case is that opposite party No. 3, the Sub-Divisional Officer, North Cachar Hills invited ten­ders for settlement of Haflong Country Spirit Shop for a period of three years from 1st April, 1970 to 31st of March 1973. The petitioner and six others in­cluding the opposite party No. 2 Kumbha Kumar Hojai submitted tenders in the usual form. In the tender filed by the petitioner, he did not fill up the column relating to caste and community. He also did not fill up column 5 of the ten­der form regarding the past and pre­sent occupation of the tenderer but in the remarks column he stated that he was a Public Works Department con­tractor since 1963. The Sub-Divisional Officer, North Cachar Hills agreeing with the unanimous decision of the Ad­visory Committee settled the shop with the petitioner for the period from 1970 to 1973, by his order dated 3-11-69. 3. Against the said order of set­tlement opposite party No. 2 preferred an appeal before the Assam Board of Revenue, who by its judgment and order dated 4-3-70 allowed the appeal, set aside the order dated 3-11-69 of the Sub-Divisional Officer and settled the shop with opposite party No. 2. 4. Regarding non-filling up of column 4 of the tender, the settling authority observed that though the peti­tioner did not fill up column 4 yet from his name it could easily be presumed that he was a 'Dimasa' because none but a Dimasa could use the family name of "Kemprai". Regarding non-filling up of Column 5, the settling authority observed that the tenderer had stated in the remarks column at the end of the tender that he was a P. W. D. con­tractor over a long period and it could be presumed that he had stated about his past and present occupation and that these two defects were minor de­fects, which did not make the tender liable to be cancelled. 5. 5. The learned Board of Revenue however, found that under Rule 205 of the Assam Excise Rules read with Settlement Instruction No. 104, the pro­visions for filling up the tender form were mandatory and the tenderer was under a legal obligation to comply with all the requirements under the different items mentioned in the tender form and any omission on the part of the ten­derer in this regard could not be cured by collecting information otherwise. Thus the learned Board held that the tender of the petitioner was invalid in law and liable to be rejected. 6. Mr. R. C. Choudhuri, the learned counsel for the petitioner sub­mitted that the provisions for filling up the tender form are not mandatory but directory and if there were any omis­sion in filling up any item of the ten­der form, that would not invalidate the tender. The learned counsel also sub­mitted that though nothing was stated against item 5 of the tender, yet against item 16, the remarks column, it was stated that the petitioner was a register­ed contractor under the Assam Public Works Department (Haflong Division) since 1963 and that this clearly showed that since 1963 onwards the petitioner's occupation had been that of a Govern­ment contractor and thus his present and past occupation as required under column 5 was in fact furnished in the tender itself. 7. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that furnish­ing informations as required under the prescribed form of the tender was man­datory and if any item of the tender was not filled up that would invalidate the tender itself. His further submis­sion was that though the learned Board observed that the tender of the peti­tioner was invalid under the law, yet it considered the tenders of the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 and selected opposite party No. 2 as the best candi­date, inasmuch as there was suppression of material information under item 5 of the tender of the petitioner. 8. The points that arise for deci­sion in this case are (1) whether the provision for filling up the prescribed tender is mandatory or directory and (2) whether in the facts and circum­stances of the case a writ of certiorari may be issued. 9. 8. The points that arise for deci­sion in this case are (1) whether the provision for filling up the prescribed tender is mandatory or directory and (2) whether in the facts and circum­stances of the case a writ of certiorari may be issued. 9. Rule 205 of the Assam Excise Rules reads as follows:- "With the previous sanction of the Excise Commissioner, the District Col­lector (and in sub-divisions, the Sub-divi­sional Officer), may instead of putting up shops to auction, call for tenders for any shop or class of shops in such form as may be prescribed by the district Collector. Each such tender shall be only for a single shop, but any person may submit separate tenders for different shops. The State Government or the Governor of Assam may require that each tender shall bear a Court-fee stamp of a -value to be fixed by them or him, but when amalgamated shops are advertised for tenders, a single stamp will suffice for the amalgamated shops. The tender must be submitted to the district Collec­tor or the Superintendent of Excise at Sadar, and to the Sub-Divisional Officer in the case of sub-divisions on such date or dates as may be fixed in the sale notice. This date shall ordinarily be a few days before the date fixed for announcing the result of settlement." From the language of Rule 205 it does not appear that if there be any omis­sion to fill up any item in the tender form, the tender becomes invalid in law and it shall be rejected. No other rule in the Assam Excise Rules has been pointed out to us which says that the filling up of all the items in the tender form is mandatory and if there be any omission in filling up any item, the tender shall stand rejected as invalid. 10. In this connection Executive Instruction No. 104 may be read: "The tenders must be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed by the Deputy Commissioner. The tenders will be open or sealed ten­ders as may be directed and will, on the date or dates fixed, be presented personally by the tenderers and receiv­ed by the Collector or Superintendent of Excise at sadar and by the Sub-divi­sional Officer (or the Senior Extra Assis­tant Commissioner) in a sub-division. The tenders will be open or sealed ten­ders as may be directed and will, on the date or dates fixed, be presented personally by the tenderers and receiv­ed by the Collector or Superintendent of Excise at sadar and by the Sub-divi­sional Officer (or the Senior Extra Assis­tant Commissioner) in a sub-division. The officer receiving the tender will thus be in a position to collect at least some particulars about a tenderer by putting direct questions to the tenderer. The information thus elicited may be noted down on the tender. This will greatly help further enquiries about a tenderer and in some cases may even obviate the necessity of a further enquiry. The latest date for submission of the tenders for each shop be a few days before the date fixed for settlement, so as to allow the tenders being examined and classi­fied. The tenders should be treated as strictly confidential and dealt with only by the officers mentioned above." (The underlining is mine) On a perusal of the language of Execu­tive Instruction 104 it is clear that dif­ferent items of the tender form are to be filled up, so that necessary informa­tions regarding the tenderer may be ob­tained by the settling authority. There is no bar for the settling authority to get further information from the ten­derer by putting direct questions to him at the time of filing the tender and also through some other agency, for exam­ple the Excise Staff. 11. In Dinesh Chandra Dowerah v. A. M. Dam, AIR 1959 Assam 64, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:- "Nowhere it is laid down that failure to mention any of the facts which may be regarded as necessary under column 10 entails the rejection of the tender. The provisions requiring the applicants to fill in the tender in a particular form are not mandatory in the sense that omission to mention any fact which may be considered necessary in column 10 must result in the rejection of the tender. The object of insisting upon a tenderer to give particulars is to place the settlement authority in a position to know the antecedents of the tenderer and to form a correct opinion about his suitability." We are in respectful agreement with the above view. The object of insisting upon a tenderer to give particulars is to place the settlement authority in a position to know the antecedents of the tenderer and to form a correct opinion about his suitability." We are in respectful agreement with the above view. In our judgment, the pro­visions for filling up the different items of the tender form are only directory and not mandatory, and the learned Board committed an error of law ap­parent on the face of the record. 12. In the instant case, as ob­served earlier, items 4 and 5 of the tender form were left blank. Item 4 relates to the caste and community of the tenderer. Column 4 was 'left blank in the tender of the petitioner and the settling authority held that from his title "Kamprai" it could be easily pre­sumed that the petitioner was Dimasa (a scheduled tribe). The learned Reve­nue Board appears to have accepted this finding of the settling authority. Re­garding item 5 which requires present and past occupation of the tenderer to be shown, the settling authority unani­mously decided that in the remarks column at the end of the tender the petitioner described himself as a Public Works Department contractor for a long period and therefrom it could be pre­sumed that he had stated about his past and present occupation. These de­fects in filling up the tender from were treated by the settling authority as minor defects. The learned Revenue Board held that because item 5 in the tender was not filled up, the tender of the petitioner must be held to be in­valid in law and it decided the appeal on that footing. 13. The learned Board's judg­ment is based on its finding that the provision for filling up the tender form was mandatory and non-compliance thereof invalidated the tender itself. In our judgment the view of the learned Board that the provision of filling up the tender form is mandatory, is not correct and by enunciating the law in a wrong way and deciding the appeal on that basis the learned Board com­mitted a manifest error of law. 14. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. In our judgment the view of the learned Board that the provision of filling up the tender form is mandatory, is not correct and by enunciating the law in a wrong way and deciding the appeal on that basis the learned Board com­mitted a manifest error of law. 14. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, AIR 1958 SC 398 the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "It is clear from an examination of he authorities of this court as also of the courts in England, that one of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked, is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error either of law or fact, which can be corrected by a superior court, in exercise of its statutory powers as a Court of appeal or revision. ** ** ** But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expres­sion 'error of law apparent on the face of the record'. Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdic­tion of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This court, as ob­served above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is essen­tial that the error should be something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear on an examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in England referred to above, as also those consi­dered in the several judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order of certiorari which was also adopted by our Constitution is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essen­tial requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction." 15. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essen­tial requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction." 15. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard, it is clear that if an inferior court com­mits an error of law, which is apparent on the face of the record, or, in other words, which is a manifest error of law, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Con­stitution may quash an order. In the instant case the learned Board of Reve­nue propounded that the provision for filling up the tender form was manda­tory and if there be any omission in filling up any column of the tender, the tender becomes illegal and liable to be rejected outright. This proposition of the learned Revenue Board, in our judg­ment, is not warranted by law, and by deciding the appeal relying on such a wrong proposition of law the learned Board of Revenue committed an error of law apparent on the face of the re­cord and as such the impugned order of the learned Board is liable to be quashed. We, therefore, quash the impugned appellate order of the learned Board of Revenue and remand the case to it for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein above. 16. The rule is made absolute and the case is remanded. There will be no order as to costs. P. K. GOSWAMI, C. J.:- 17. I agree. D. M. SEN, J.:- 18. I agree. Rule made absolute. Case remanded.