ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - The Petitioner had obtained a registered sale deed on 16-5-1947 of a one third share in two plots in village Sher in district Ballia. He thus became a co-tenure-holder of these plots with contesting opposite parties. His case was that a separate khata had been formed of this one third share which was thus partitioned and separated from the remaining area. But, this part of the Petitioner's case had neither been accepted by the Settlement Officer, in an appeal u/s 11(1) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act decided on 16-1-1964, nor by the Dy. Director of Consolidation on the revision application of the contesting opposite parties which was allowed on 19-3-1964 by the Dy. Director u/s 48 of the Act. 2. The Petitioner was, however, found recorded as the sub tenant in both 1356 fasli and 1359 fasli over two thirds area of the plots in dispute. The Settlement Officer had observed that the Petitioner had got himself recorded as Shikmi over 2/3 area of the disputed plots with the help of the patwari which was against law. It is, however, possible to argue, from the manner in which this observation occurs in the midst of statements of cases of the two sides by the Settlement Officer, that this was not meant to be a finding but only a statement of the case against the Petitioner. But, there could be no doubt about the finding given by the Settlement Officer a little later in his judgment. He held that the Petitioner, who was the Respondent before the Settlement Officer, being a cotenureholder of the two thirds' area also, "the entry of adhivasi was incorrect after zamindari abolition". 3. The Settlement Officer, agreeing with the Consolidation Officer, went on to hold that, the objection of the contesting opposite parties to the erroneous entry of the Petitioner's name as adhivasi of two thirds' area having been dismissed, without any reference to the application of opposite parties seeking permission to withdraw objections with liberty to object afresh, the question was concluded in favour of the Petitioner. He held that entries in the compensation roll had become final so that the contesting opposite parties could not deny the rights of the Petitioner as adhivasi and then sirdar. Thus, the Settlement Officer's view was that entries in the compensation roll were conclusive proof of adhivasi right. 4. He held that entries in the compensation roll had become final so that the contesting opposite parties could not deny the rights of the Petitioner as adhivasi and then sirdar. Thus, the Settlement Officer's view was that entries in the compensation roll were conclusive proof of adhivasi right. 4. The contesting opposite parties had gone up in revision against the Settlement Officer's findings. The Dy. Director held, a little more clearly and definitely than the Settlement Officer:--"The holding was joint. There has been no partition of the holding under the order of any court. The entry of sub-tenancy in favour of Ram Nandan Rai was obviously incorrect. The cotenureholder of joint khata cannot be recorded as sub-tenant. No adhivasi or sirdari rights in fact created in favour of Ram Nandan Rai on basis of fictitious and wrong entry of sub-tenancy". 5. The Dy. Director held that proceedings u/Ch. IX A of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had not extinguished the rights of the Petitioner before him who are contesting opposite parties in this Court. Although the line of reasoning chosen by the Dy. Director differs from that adopted by a Full Bench of this Court in Maqbool Raza v. Joint Director of Consolidation 1967 AWR 803 FB his conclusion was correct that the consolidation authorities were not debarred, by reason of proceedings u/Ch. IX-A of the UP ZA and LR Act, from deciding questions of disputed adhivasi rights which were converted into sirdari rights by statutory provisions. The view of the Full Bench in Maqbool Raza's case (supra) was that the compensation roll "did not either create a bar of res-judicata or that of conclusiveness". On this question, the Dy. Director had rightly overruled the decision of the Settlement Officer. In view of the authority of the above mentioned Full Bench decision of this Court, the' correctness of the conclusion of the Dy. Director on this matter could not be assailed even though the Dy. Director's reasoning may be open to attack. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the entry of the Petitioner's name as 'shikmi' over two thirds of the area of the two plots, whether correct or incorrect, entitled the Petitioner to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. Director's reasoning may be open to attack. 6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the entry of the Petitioner's name as 'shikmi' over two thirds of the area of the two plots, whether correct or incorrect, entitled the Petitioner to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. He relied strongly on an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in Hukum Singh v. Board of Revenue CMW No. 508 of 1956, decided on 1-5-1957. I sent for the record of that case and examined it. I find that the Petitioners there had complained that the Board of Revenue had not gone into the question whether the entry of occupant, of which benefit was given u/s 20(ii)(b) of the Act to the contesting opposite party, was fictitious. The Division Bench gave two answers to this submission: firstly, that the Board of Revenue had held that the trial court had not given any finding that the entry was fictitious and secondly, that the question whether "the entry is correct or incorrect or genuine or fictitious is irrelevant and is not a matter that can be considered by a court". The Division Bench went on to explain "The only circumstances in which an entry can be ignored inspite of its existence are those mentioned in Explanations I and II. If such an entry was made in the khasra of 1356 fasli under an erroneous order of a court and the order was subsequently set aside, the entry would be deemed to be nonexistent, as held in Pershadi v. Kunwar Sen 2955 AWR 718. Barring those cases which are mentioned in Section 20 of the ZA and LR Act, in nty case can the correctness or genuineness of the entry be considered by a court. In the present case, there was an entry recording Chhajju to be in occupation of the plots in dispute in the khasjra of 1356F. and therefore, he became an adhivasi and was entitled to get possession of the land in dispute". 7. I also find from the judgments in Hukum Singh's case (supra) of the Board of Revenue and the Addl. and therefore, he became an adhivasi and was entitled to get possession of the land in dispute". 7. I also find from the judgments in Hukum Singh's case (supra) of the Board of Revenue and the Addl. Commissioner, who had allowed the appeal of the recorded occupants, that they had relied on the proposition of law laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Lala Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue 1955 ED 165 : AWR 371. The Board of Revenue, while dismissing the Petitioner's second appeal against an order of the Addl. Commissioner putting the recorded occupant in possession u/s 332 of the Act, had observed that the trial court had not actually held the entry to be fictitious but had only referred to an order of a Magistrate where it had been so described. It had also observed that the case of Pershadi v. Kunwar Sen 1955 AWR 718, cited before it, applied only to a case where the entry had ceased to exist in the eye of law. Apparently, the Board of Revenue had gone into the question whether the entry was fictitious by holding that even the trial court had not found it to be fictitious so that the Addl. Commr. was justified in treating it as one which was covered by the principle laid down by this Court in Lala Nanak Chand's case (supra) which applied to erroneous or wrong entries but not to fictitious ones in the sense of fraudulent or collusive entries made contrary to law. It was not argued before the Board in that case that the entry was made contrary to the provisions of Sections 28 and 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act. Nor was it argued on the writ petition in this Court that the entry in question had been made contrary to the provisions of Sections 28 or 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act. It is clear from the language of Section 20(1)(b)that before the entry can be taken advantage of it must be an entry "prepared Under Sections 28 and 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act". That question was certainly not considered as it was not argued before the Division Bench in Civil Misc. Writ No. 508 of 1956. It is clear from the language of Section 20(1)(b)that before the entry can be taken advantage of it must be an entry "prepared Under Sections 28 and 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act". That question was certainly not considered as it was not argued before the Division Bench in Civil Misc. Writ No. 508 of 1956. Moreover, after coming to the conclusion that the Board of Revenue had not upheld the finding that the entry was fictitious, it was not necessary for the purposes of the decision of that case for the Division Bench to have added that the question whether the entry was genuine or fictitious was irrelevant. Its observations about the inability of courts to consider the fictitious nature of entries were mere obiter dicta. The above mentioned unreported Division Bench decision in Hukum Singh's case (supra) was discussed by Dhavan, J. in Lalta Pande v. Mahendra Nath Pande 1962 AWR 849 in the light of the decisions given in Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue (FB) 1955 ALJ 408 : AWR 371 and also the decision of the Supreme Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Khalil-ur-Rahman 1961 AWR 78. According to Dhavan, J., an observation made by the Supreme Court in U.G.S. Mills' case amounted to a question mark on the correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Lala Nanak Chand's case (supra). Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, have, however, affirmed the correctness of the view that what Section 20(1)(b) requires, for the conferment of adhivasi rights, is not the proof of actual possession but the recording of a person as an occupant in 1356 F whether the entry is right or wrong. The Supreme Court has interpreted Lala Nanak Chand's case (supra) as laying down No. thing more than that the recorded occupant need not show that he was actually in possession also in 1356 F. 8. In Amba Prasad v. Mahboob Ali Shah 1964 AWR 541, the Supreme Court considered the question whether entries not regularly made Under Sections 28 and 33 of the UP Land Revenue Act could be treated as entries at all of which the recorded occupant could take advantage. It held that there was nothing on the record of that case to show that the entry in question was not made in accordance with para 87 of the Land Records Manual. It held that there was nothing on the record of that case to show that the entry in question was not made in accordance with para 87 of the Land Records Manual. It however, noticed that, although the correctness of the Full Bench of this Court in Lala Nanak Chand's case (supra) was left open by the Supreme Court in Upper Ganges Sugar Mills' case Csupra), the view taken in Lala Nanak Chand's case was affirmed by later decisions of this Court including the Full Bench decision in Ram Dular Singh v. Babu Sukhu Rara 1963 AWR 461 and in L. Bhal Singh v. Bhop and Anr. 1963 AWR 208. The Supreme Court noticed that the Board of Revenue had also fallen in line with the view taken by this Court in Nanak Chand's case (supra). It held: "In view of the long established line of cases we see no justification for reopening of this question". 9. In Smt. Sonawati v. Sri Ram 1968 AWR 1, the Supreme Court, while confirming its earlier view in Amba Prasad's case (supra), that Section 20 of the Act does not require proof of actual possession and "eliminates enquiries into disputed possession by accepting the record in the khasra or khatauni of 1356 F. or its correction before 1-7-1962", examined the nature of the entry. It decided that an irregular entry in the remarks column did not confer an adhivasi right. It held : "cases of fraud apart, the entry in the record alone is relevant". Therefore, the position as declared by the Supreme Court finally, in Smt. Sonawati's case (supra), is that, although the entry of recorded occupant excludes an enquiry into its correctness, it does not preclude an enquiry into the regularity or propriety of the entry itself, in the light of the relevant rules, in order to determine whether there is an entry at all in the eye of law. It was clearly indicated in Sonawati's case (supra), that a fraudulent entry or an entry made contrary to the rules would not be an entry in the eye of law. In other words, a mere wrong entry unsupported by proof of possession will confer adhivasi rights, but, if an entry could be shown to be no entry at all, it has no effect. 10. In other words, a mere wrong entry unsupported by proof of possession will confer adhivasi rights, but, if an entry could be shown to be no entry at all, it has no effect. 10. The correctness of the view expressed by Dhavan, J. in Lalta Pande's case (supra), that Section 20(1)(b) does not preclude an enquiry into the fictitious or fraudulent character of an entry, has thus been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sonawati's case. I may also mention here that Gangeshwar Prasad, J., has also held, in Mahadeo Pande v. Surajbhan Singh 1964 AWR 711, that, before an entry of a recorded occupant in the khatauni or khasra of 1356 F. can be relied upon, proof of requirements of law relating to the preparation of the record must be provided where the genuineness or the character of the entry itself is disputed. I, therefore, think that it is too late in the day for the learned Counsel for the Petitioner to rely upon the observations made by the Division Bench in Hukum Singh's case (supra). 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the entry of subtenant in the name of the Petitioner, with regard to two thirds' area of the two plots, was not held by the consolidation authorities to be really fictitious or fraudulent or made contrary to the rules contained in the Land Records Manual. It was urged that the entry was, at the most, held to be a merely erroneous entry which entitled the Petitioner to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(1)(b) of the Act. Such an argument postulates that the Petitioner was not a sub tenant entitled to the benefit of Section 20(1)(a)(ii) of the Act, under which proved sub-tenants, other than certain sub-tenants excluded from its purview, became adhivasis. It was pointed out that the view adopted by a Full Bench of this Court in R.D. Singh v. B.S. Ram 1963 AWR 461 , that a recorded subtenant cannot obtain the benefit of Section 20(1)(b) of the Act, was overruled as it was in conflict with the ratio decidendi of the two subsequent Supreme Court decisions in U.G.S. Mill's case (supra) and Amba Prasad's case (supra) and that this was specifically held by a Full Bench of this Court, in Sunderlal v. Sonu (F.B.) 1967 AWR 426 . Hence, it was urged that the Petitioner would become an adhivasi u/s 20(1)(b) of the Act even if he was recorded as a subtenant. 12. I do not think that the position is quite so clear and simple. In Amba Prasad's case (supra), where the position of a person recorded as a subtenant was considered, the Supreme Court had said: The word 'occupant' is not defined in the Act. Since khasra records possession and enjoyment the word 'occupant' must mean a person holding the land in possession or actual enjoyment. The khasra, however, may mention the proprietor, the tenant, the sub-tenant and other person in actual possession, as the case may be. If by occupant is meant the person in actual possession it is clear that between a proprietor and a tenant the tenant and between a tenant and the sub-tenant the latter and between him and a person recorded in the remarks column as Dawedar qabiz the dawedar qabiz are the occupants. This is the only logical way to interpret the section which does away with all intermediaries. If rights are not to be determined except in the manner laid down by the section, the entries must be construed as explained by the four explanations. Once, we find out the right person in the light of the explanations, that person continues as an adhivasi after 1-7-1952, provided he is in possession on or was evicted after 30-6-1948. If he was evicted after 30-6-1948 he is entitled to regain possession inspite of any order or decree to the contrary. The word 'occupant' thus signifies occupancy and enjoyment. Mediate possession, (except where the immediate possessor holds on behalf of the mediate possessor) is of no consequence." It, therefore, follows that where the entry is of "sub-tenant" in favour of a co-sharer in tenancy rights and there has been no partition between co-tenure-holders, authorities concerned can interpret it to mean as entry of occupant on behalf of all co-tenureholders and not as of sub tenant. In U.G.S. Mill's case (supra) the Supreme Court said: The words in Section 20(b)(i) only speak of a person being recorded as occupant and there is nothing in that section as to the nature of the occupancy, namely, whether it is on behalf of the person recorded or on behalf of somebody else. In U.G.S. Mill's case (supra) the Supreme Court said: The words in Section 20(b)(i) only speak of a person being recorded as occupant and there is nothing in that section as to the nature of the occupancy, namely, whether it is on behalf of the person recorded or on behalf of somebody else. That is a matter which in our opinion must always be decided on other evidence for the entry does not contemplate recording the nature of the possession in the sense of its being on behalf of the person recorded or on someone else's behalf. 13. The position, therefore, is that, once a person is proved to have been duly recorded as an occupant, no further enquiry into the question whether he was actually in possession or not is required or permissible for proving or disproving his right as an adhivasi. He gets adhivasi right even if the entry is wrong or erroneous. But, Courts are not precluded from examining the entry and other evidence to interpret a dubious entry so as to correctly determine its meaning, or, to find out whether the entry was made in accordance with the rules so as to be aft entry at all. 14. In the instant case, the Deputy Director held : "The co-tenure holder of joint khata cannot be recorded as subtenant. No adhivasi or sirdari rights were in fact created in favour of Ram Nandan Rai on basis of fictitious and wrong entry of sub-tenancy." I have not been shown any rule under which a co tenure holder can be entered as a sub-tenant. It cannot be presumed that the Deputy Director did not examine the relevant rules for making the entries when he held that a co-tenure holder could not be recorded as a subtenant. The case taken up by the contesting opposite parties was that the entry was secured by the Petitioner by means of collusion with the Patwari. It could not be said that the findings recorded by the Deputy Director did not really amount to accepting this case of collusion after duly examining such evidence as was given before the consolidation authorities. It is obvious that no contract of sub tenancy over the two-thirds' area of land in the two plots was ever entered into between the Petitioner and his co-tenants. It is obvious that no contract of sub tenancy over the two-thirds' area of land in the two plots was ever entered into between the Petitioner and his co-tenants. It is difficult to see how the entry of subtenant could be anything other than a collusive and fictitious entry here. Such an entry does not, in my opinion, amount to an entry as a recorded occupant against co-tenure holders. The possession of the Petitioner would be deemed to be one on behalf of the other co-tenure holders as ouster was not shown. This is how the entry was interpreted by the Deputy Director as he could undoubtedly do under the law. There is, therefore, neither an error of jurisdiction nor error of law apparent on the face of the record. 15. Accordingly, I dismiss this writ petition with costs.