JUDGMENT : Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. 1. The second party to a proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter referred to as 'the Code', have preferred this application in revision against an ORDER :directing them to execute ad-interim bond under Section 117(3) of the Code. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that as there was no legal ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code, nor there was any inquiry under Section 117(1) of the Code, the ORDER :under Section 117(3) is illegal. According to him, unless there is a legal ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code, no inquiry under Section 117(1) can start, and unless an inquiry under Section 117(1) starts, no ORDER :under Section 117(3) can be passed. It is perfectly correct to say that in absence of an ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code, there can be no inquiry as contemplated by Section 117(1), and that the proper stage for passing an ORDER :under Section 117(3) comes in only when an inquiry as contemplated by Section 117(1) has been started. But learned counsel for the petitioners does not appear to be correct in his submission that the ORDER :under Section 112 suffered from such an illegality that all further steps taken in the proceeding by the Magistrate are vitiated. Nor he appears to be correct in submitting that no inquiry as contemplated by Section 117(1) of the Code had started in the instant case before passing of the impugned ORDER :under Section 117(3) of the Code. 2. The preliminary ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code drawing up the proceeding under Section 107 was passed in the following terms: Perused the report of O/C Garhara O.P. duly recommended by the D.I. of Police for taking action u/s 107 Cr.P.C. against the members of 2nd party. I am satisfied from the report of police that there is an apprehension of breach of peace at the hands of the O.Ps. Draw up proceeding under Section 107 Cr.P.C. against the members of 2nd party calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not be ORDER :ed to execute a bond of Rs. 1000/- each with two sureties of the like amount to keep peace for a period of one year within the local limits of my jurisdiction. Put up S.R. by 19.7.69. 1000/- each with two sureties of the like amount to keep peace for a period of one year within the local limits of my jurisdiction. Put up S.R. by 19.7.69. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, as this ORDER :does not set forth the substance of the information received against the petitioners, it was not a legal ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code. He relies in support of this contention on the language of Section 112 of the Code itself which requires that the substance of the information received should be set forth in the ORDER :. He also relies on a recent decision of this Court in (1) Balkishun Sao and others V. Munno Khan (1969 P.L.J.R. 223), wherein it has been held that an ORDER :under Section 112 of the Code which does not contain the substance of the information received is bad. There cannot be two opinions that a Magistrate ought to follow the requirements of the Statute and, therefore, set forth the substance of the information received by him in the ORDER :which he passes under Section 112 of the Code. But the question is whether failure on his part to comply with the provisions of Section 112 would divest him of his jurisdiction to deal with the proceeding. In (2) Raghunath Singh and others V. State (A.I.R. 1953 Pat 1), a Bench of this Court held that the failure to comply with the provisions of Section 112 of the Code does not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction to deal with the proceeding, and in the absence of prejudice, the subsequent proceedings ought not to be treated as being void ab initio. This decision, it appears, was not cited before the learned Single Judge who delivered JUDGMENT : in (1) Balkishun Sao's case and, therefore, it was not considered by him. The Bench decision in (2) Raghunath Singh's case is binding upon me in preference to the decision in (1) Balkishun Sao's case. The learned Judge who delivered JUDGMENT : in (1) Balkishun Sao's case has also said that the ORDER :which was challenged in that case was vague. Perhaps he was satisfied that the vagueness of the ORDER :had caused prejudice to the petitioners and, therefore, set aside the ORDER :. 3. The learned Judge who delivered JUDGMENT : in (1) Balkishun Sao's case has also said that the ORDER :which was challenged in that case was vague. Perhaps he was satisfied that the vagueness of the ORDER :had caused prejudice to the petitioners and, therefore, set aside the ORDER :. 3. In the instant case, the petitioners did file show cause and in that show cause they did not make any grievance that the preliminary ORDER :in the proceeding did not set forth the substance of the information received against them or that it was vague, and, therefore, they were not in a position to file their show cause. Rather, it appears from the show cause filed by the petitioners that they knew what were the allegations against them and they denied them and attempted to meet them. It cannot be said, therefore, that they have been prejudiced in any way by not setting forth the substance of the information received by the Magistrate in the preliminary ORDER :passed under Section 112 of the Code. Thus this is not a case where it can be held that all steps taken in the proceeding are bad and illegal because of the aforesaid lacuna in the ORDER :passed under Section 112 of the Code. 4. On 27.6.1969, when the preliminary ORDER :was passed, the petitioners were not present in the Court-room. They appeared on the 11th July, 1969 and were released on bail. Then there was a petition by the opposite party for taking action against the petitioners under Section 117(3) of the Code. On 19.7.1969, that petition was sent to the police for inquiry and report. On the next date fixed in the case, that is 5.9.1969 the petitioners wanted further time for filing their show cause. It was actually filed on 10.10.1969. The report of the police on the petition for taking action under Section 117(3) of the Code has been received earlier. The impugned ORDER :was passed after filing of the show cause by the petitioners. It was actually filed on 10.10.1969. The report of the police on the petition for taking action under Section 117(3) of the Code has been received earlier. The impugned ORDER :was passed after filing of the show cause by the petitioners. Section 117(1) of the Code runs as follows: When an ORDER :under Section 112 has been read or explained under Section 113 to a person present in Court, or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant issued under Section 114, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary. The expression "the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary" shows that the inquiry must not start with evidence. As soon as the Magistrate applies his mind to the information upon which action has been taken for finding out whether they were true or not, the inquiry under Section 117(1) starts. In the instant case, in my opinion, as soon as the Magistrate ORDER :s for a report from the Police as to whether it was necessary to take action under Section 117(3) of the Code or not after the petitioners had appeared, an inquiry as contemplated by Section 117(1) started. An ORDER :passed under Section 117(3) of the Code after that cannot be said to be illegal. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this Court in (3) Jagdish Prasad Verma and others V. The State (A.I.R. 1967 Pat 106) and Single Judge decision in (4) Ramsaran Singh and others V. Ramakant Prasad (1961 B.L.J.R. 860). In both these cases, ORDER :s under Section 117(3) of the Code were passed simultaneously with ORDER :under Section 112 before an inquiry as contemplated by Section 117(1) had started. The decisions in these cases, therefore, are of no help to the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has next submitted the impugned ORDER :is bad in law as it is based only on police report and the Magistrate has not given his own reasons. He does not appear to be right in his submission even in this respect. The decisions in these cases, therefore, are of no help to the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has next submitted the impugned ORDER :is bad in law as it is based only on police report and the Magistrate has not given his own reasons. He does not appear to be right in his submission even in this respect. The ORDER :is not based only on the police report, but the Magistrate has taken into consideration many other Sanhas and petitions filed by the opposite party about the high-handedness of the petitioners. He has also given his own reasons for passing the ORDER :. 6. Petitioners 1 to 4 admittedly are railway ex-employees at Liluah in West Bengal. This fact was brought to the notice of the Magistrate, and while considering that he has observed as follows: It was submitted that 4 of the O.Ps. are Railway employees at Liluah meaning thereby that their physical presence is not always possible. That is not very convincing. Overt acts have not been reported as happening every day. Men from Liluah can come frequently and whenever they may assemble overt act can be indulged in. It is true that a person serving at Liluah may come to his village home and take part in overt act, but it does not appear likely, as observed by the Magistrate, that he would frequently come to his village home for that purpose. In view of the fact that the first four petitioners were likely to stay away from their village home, the ORDER :of the Magistrate against them does not appear to be proper. In the result, the application of petitioners 1 to 4 is allowed and the ORDER :of the Magistrate calling upon them to execute ad-interim bond under Section 117(3) of the Code is set aside. The application of petitioners 5 and 6 dismissed and the ORDER :of the Magistrate, as far as they are concerned, is confirmed. Petition dismissed