JUDGMENT 1. - This is an appeal by the landlord plaintiff, by special leave, against the judgement of a learned single judge, allowing the second appeal filed by the tenant against an appellate decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur City. 2. The facts are briefly these. The plaintiff is the owner of a shop situated in Jaipur city. Ambey Prasad respondent was its tenant. He committed default in payment of rent and on 5.4.58, the plaintiff brought the present suit for ejectment against him. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 28.2.59. An appeal against the decree was rejected on 12.7.61. On 19.9.61 he filed a second appeal in the High Court. On 20.9.61 a stay order was passed which was vacated on 8.1.62. Three months time was given to the defendant to vacate the shop. The defendant was actually evicted from the shop in the year 1962, sometime after 8.4.62. 3. During the pendency of the appeal, the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment Act No. 12 of 1965 came into force with effect from 9.6.65. On 8.7.65, the defendant filed an application to High Court under section 13A for determining the rent etc., payable by him under the provisions of that section in order that the decree against him may be set aside. The learned single Judge held that Section 13A was applicable to the case and he set aside the decree for ejectment, and remended the case to the trial Court for determining the amount payable by the tenant under Section 13A and to dispose of the suit in accordance with the provision thereof. The learned Single Judge followed his own earlier decision in Vassumal v. Sampatmal Lodha, (S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 331 of 1965 decided on 22.11.1965.) and the decisions of another learned Single Judge in Chunnilal v. Vaspujaji Maharaj, 1966 RLW 285. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is correct. We proceed to give our reasons briefly along with the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant. 5. The first Contention on behalf of the appellant is that the defendant was not a tenant within the meaning of the expression as defined in Section 3(vii) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. The first Contention on behalf of the appellant is that the defendant was not a tenant within the meaning of the expression as defined in Section 3(vii) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This definition runs as follows:- "Tenant" means the person by whom the rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any premises and includes any person holding or occupying the premises as a sub-tenant or any person continuing in possession after the termination of a tenancy in his favour otherwise than under the provisions of the Act." The first argument is that the rent was not payable by the defendant on the date of application as he was not in possession. The second argument is that the contractual tenancy of the defendant having been terminated by a valid notice he did not remain a tenant within the meaning of the definition any longer and rent was not payable by him. In support of this argument reliance is placed on Anand Nivas Private Ltd. v. Anandi Kalayani Pedhi and others, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 414. The third argument is that he does not come under the last portion of the definition as he is not continuing in possession. 6. In our opinion, none of these arguments has any force. A suit is decided on the basis of rights of the parties on the date of the suit and therefore, the dispossession during the pendency of an appeal is of no consequence. The doctrine of Lis Pendens contained in Section 52 of Transfer of property Act is fully applicable in the present suit. The facts in Suah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Shbhash Chandra Yograj Singh, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1596, are distinguishable. In the last portion of the definition the words "otherwise than under the provisions of the Act" qualify the words "termination of a tenancy in his favour". 7. The second contention on behalf of the appellant is that section 13A is not applicable to a case where a decree has been passed by any of the lower Courts. In the last portion of the definition the words "otherwise than under the provisions of the Act" qualify the words "termination of a tenancy in his favour". 7. The second contention on behalf of the appellant is that section 13A is not applicable to a case where a decree has been passed by any of the lower Courts. In our opinion Section 13A has to be read in the context of the Act and the words "no Court in any proceedings pending on the date of commencement of the amending Act" have to be read along with the expiation which defines "proceeding" as meaning a suit, appeal or application for revision. This makes it clear that the decree means the decree to be passed by the Court where the proceeding is pending when the Act comes into force. 8. The last contention is that Section 13A is hit by Art 19(i)(f) of the Constitution. The argument in this connection is that it is not reasonable or in public interest to displace a new tenant who has since taken over possession after the eviction of the previous tenant. Our reply to this is that so long as the appeal is pending the rights of the old tenant are in suspension and whosoever accept the tenancy of the premises during the pendency of the appeal does so subject to the provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The provision, in our opinion, is reasonable and in public interest. 9. We accordingly dismiss the special appeal with costs. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is prayed for, but it is declined.Appeal dismissed. *******