GOSWAMI, C. J.:- This Rule is directed against an order dated 26th April, 1969, removing the petitioner from his service under the Mizo District Coun­cil (hereinafter called the 'Council')- It is stated that the petitioner was held to be guilty of the offences charged and was disqualified for future employment The amount of revenue defalcated by him, viz., Rs. 646.80 was ordered to be written off from the accounts of the Council. The petitioner joined the Coun­cil as a Lower Division Assistant on 7th May, 1955 and thereafter was promoted to the post of Upper Division Assistant on 6th May, 1961. He was placed under suspension under Rule 29 of the Mizo District Council Service Rules (herein­after called 'the Rules') with effect from 11th September, 1965 pending depart­mental proceedings against him. On 8th January, 1966 he was asked to show cause against five heads of charges. The petitioner replied to the charges on 14th January, 1966 and denied the same. An enquiry was conducted by the Secreta­ry, Mizo District Council in which it ap­pears only the delinquent employee was subjected to a series of questions on 15th February and 19th February, 1966. No other witnesses were examined in order to establish the charges framed against him. The first two charges were with reference to the defalcation of Rs. 611.10 and misappropriation of service stamps of the value of Rs. 35.70 respectively. Charges Nos. 3 and 4 relate to his direct correspondence with the Government of Assam which was considered an act of disobedience of authority and "subser­vient (sic) activities against the Mizo District Council". Charge No. 5 need not be mentioned as that was dropped. On 1st July, 1966, the petitioner was hand­ed over the preliminary findings record­ed by the Secretary and the petitioner showed cause against those by his letter dated 4th July, 1966. Finally on 26th April, 1969, the Chief Executive Mem­ber passed the impugned order. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was not entertained by the authority and hence this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. The petitioner contends that he was not given a reasonable opportu­nity to show cause against the proposed punishment. He submits that Rule 26 of the Rules has not been complied with in his case. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was not entertained by the authority and hence this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. The petitioner contends that he was not given a reasonable opportu­nity to show cause against the proposed punishment. He submits that Rule 26 of the Rules has not been complied with in his case. Rule 26 runs as follows:- "No permanent employee of the Council shall be dismissed or otherwise punished without giving him a reason­able opportunity to show cause against the punishment proposed to be award­ed. Provided that it may not be neces­sary to give the opportunity to tem­porary employee or to a person whose dismissal or other punishment is the re­sult of a conviction on a criminal charge, or where there are grounds, to be re­corded in writing to the effect that it is not practicable to give the person such an opportunity. / For the purpose of this rule punish­ment includes dismissal, removal, reduc­tion of pay or transfer to a lower grade or post." 4. Mr. Lahirl contends that only a permanent employee of the Council is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause against punishment under Rule 26 and as the petitioner is a tem­porary employee he is not entitled to the reasonable opportunity as envisaged under Rule 26- Alternatively he sub­mits that reasonable opportunity all the same, has been afforded to the petitioner to meet the charges and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. The first submission of Mr. Lahiri turns on the interpretation of Rule 26. The first part of the rule, as it goes, provides that no permanent em­ployee shall be dismissed or otherwise punished without giving him a reason­able opportunity to show cause against the punishment proposed to be award­ed. This would ordinarily mean as if an employee other than a permanent em­ployee, that is to say, a temporary em­ployee is not entitled to such reasonable opportunity. If the rule ended with the first sentence and did not contain the proviso, which we will presently exa­mine, the above meaning perhaps may be possible. This would ordinarily mean as if an employee other than a permanent em­ployee, that is to say, a temporary em­ployee is not entitled to such reasonable opportunity. If the rule ended with the first sentence and did not contain the proviso, which we will presently exa­mine, the above meaning perhaps may be possible. But the proviso refers to temporary employee as well as to a person whose dismissal or other punish­ment is the result of a conviction on a criminal charge or where there are grounds to be recorded in writing to the effect that it is not practicable to give reasonable opportunity. 6. Dealing with 'Construction to avoid collision with other provisions', Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, puts it as follows (at page 155); "There is no rule that the first or enacting part is to be construed without reference to the proviso. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. (Jennings v. Kelly, (1940) AC 206, 229; Curis v. Maloney, (1951) 1 KB 736)." The same learned author in his latest Twelfth Edition, dealing with 'Construc­tion of Provisos', writes at pages 190-191 as follows: "If, however, the language of the proviso makes it plain that it was in­tended to have an operation more exten­sive than that of the provision which it immediately follows, it must be given such wider effect. (Piper v. Harvey, (1958) 1 QB 439). If a proviso cannot reasonably be construed otherwise than as contradict­ing the main enactment, then the pro­viso will prevail on the principle that "it speaks the last intention of the makers." 7. If the intention in Rule 26 were to deprive a temporary employee of a reasonable opportunity under all circumstances including an occasion when he may be dismissed for a serious of­fence or lapse amounting to gross mis­conduct, the rule would have been word­ed, in our opinion, differently. Since the words 'temporary employee' figure along with 'a person whose dismissal or other punishment is the result of a conviction' etc., it stands to reason that the qualify­ing clause, viz., 'whose dismissal or other punishment is the result of conviction on a criminal charge or where there are grounds' etc., would qualify not only a person but also 'temporary employee'. Even if this be, strictly speaking, imper­missible by the rule of proximity in English grammar or on account of the repetition of the word 'person' at the end of the proviso, still the word 'person' in the entire context, would include both temporary as well as permanent em­ployee. Even in this view of the matter, a temporary employee, except under the conditions of the proviso, cannot be dis­missed or punished without giving him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the punishment. If this opportu­nity were intended to be denied to a temporary employee even when he is dismissed for gross misconduct, the ob­ject would have been achieved by omit­ting reference to 'temporary employee' and substituting the word 'person' by the words 'permanent employee'. The pro­viso would have then read as follows: "Provided that it may not be neces­sary to give the opportunity to a perma­nent employee whose dismissal or other punishment is the result of a conviction on a criminal charge, or where there are grounds etc..................." 8. The fact that temporary em­ployee may be excluded from the pro­tection clause in the first part of the rule because of the mention of perma­nent employee alone being given there­in the right to reasonable opportunity made it necessary for including in the proviso temporary employee as well as any person of the specified category thereby limiting the scope and effect of the first portion of the rule. Since in the first part, only permanent employee is specifically mentioned, it was thought necessary to refer to 'temporary em­ployee' in the proviso, as otherwise even with the word 'person', there may be some uncertainty as to its inclusion for the purpose of the protection clauses. Since in the first part, only permanent employee is specifically mentioned, it was thought necessary to refer to 'temporary em­ployee' in the proviso, as otherwise even with the word 'person', there may be some uncertainty as to its inclusion for the purpose of the protection clauses. Clipped of details to put the content of the rule read with the proviso in plain language: (1) No permanent employee shall be dismissed or punished without giving him a reasonable opportunity; (2) Any person, whether temporary employee or permanent employee, shall also be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against punishment un­less he comes under the proviso; (3) Any person, whether temporary employee or permanent employee, may not be given reasonable opportunity to show cause against punishment if (a) his dismissal or other punishment is the result of a conviction on a crimi­nal charge; (b) where it is not practicable to give the person such an opportunity, in which case the grounds would have to be recorded in writing. The above, in our opinion, is the real meaning and significance of Rule 26. 9. It may be noted that Rule 11 and Rule 26 together attempt to provide for the protection that has been confer­red on Government employees under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Rule 11 may be said broadly and sub­stantially to correspond to Article 311 (2) and Rule 26 to Article 311 (2) before the Fifteenth Amendment. Article 311 (1) after the Fifteenth Amendment has given legislative recognition to the earlier judi­cial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts in the interpretation of Article 311 (2). The interpretation which we have given to rule 26 is in accord with the principles of natural justice, the violation of which cannot be attributed to the rule-making body. Although, therefore, unlike in Article 311 of the Constitution, Rule 26 opens with the qualifying word 'perma­nent' we are of opinion that the proviso has extended the right also to tempo­rary employee dismissed or punished for misconduct except under certain specified conditions mentioned above. 10. It should be observed that we are not required in this case to con­sider whether, if temporary employees were intended under Rule 26 to be de­prived of the procedural safeguard of reasonable opportunity against infliction of punishment, the said rule would be bad on that score or for any other seri­ous legal infirmity. 11. 10. It should be observed that we are not required in this case to con­sider whether, if temporary employees were intended under Rule 26 to be de­prived of the procedural safeguard of reasonable opportunity against infliction of punishment, the said rule would be bad on that score or for any other seri­ous legal infirmity. 11. We have next to consider the alternative argument of Mr. Lahiri that the rules of natural justice have not been violated in this case. We find that the enquiry was confined only to the cross-examination of the petitioner which fact is sufficient to vitiate it for violation of the principles of natural justice. Even from the finding of the enquiry report, it appears that the En­quiry Officer having cross-examined the petitioner held that he did not succeed in disproving the charges. It cannot therefore be said that the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity as envisag­ed under Rule 26. Mr. Lahiri contends that the reasonable opportunity is only to show cause against the proposed punishment, that is to say, only one op­portunity of the like of the second op­portunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this sub­mission. Rule 26 envisages two oppor­tunities in the manner provided for under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, viz,, to show cause against the charge and then after termination of the en­quiry and arrival of a tentative conclu­sion to show cause against the proposed punishment. Indeed, this very salutary procedure was actually followed by the respondent in the departmental enquiry. Two notices were given to the petitioner as required under the law. It is only in the course of the enquiry we find reasonable opportunity accorded to the petitioner was not adequate and the en­quiry, for reasons stated above, was vitiated for violation. of the rules of natural justice. 12. In the result, the application succeeds. The impugned order is quash­ed. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. M. C. PATHAK, J.:- 13. I agree. Rule made absolute.