Judgment :- 1. The landlord is the appellant and he seeks, in this suit, to evict the defendant who claims fixity by virtue of his being a Kudikidappukaran. Both courts have negatived the claim of the plaintiff and the point pressed before me is that the requirement of the landlord to provide a building for her grandson will attract S.75 (2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1 of 1964. The preliminary impediment in the way of the landlord is that S.75 (2) contains a restrictive provision in regard to the membership of the family of the landlord. Loosely understood, may be the children and grand-children of a person who are dependent on him or, look up to him for help may be embraced by the term 'family' particularly in a country like India where the institution of joint family, with its wealth of population, has taken root. But the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, has taken care to define the expression 'family' in S.2 (14) which reads: "'family' means husband, wife and their unmarried minor children or such of them as exist." When we come to S.75 (2), the Legislature has compassionately extended the definition to include major sons and daughters. Sons and daughters denote the first generation but not the further descendants, even as children do not normally take in grand-children. It is clear that the Land Reforms Act wants to limit the scope of a family in its demand for recovery of possession; and understanding the intendment of the statute, it is difficult to accept the expansive connotation put forward by the appellant's counsel that 'children' means children's children how-low-so-ever and sons and daughters include all progeny. In contexts where the statute wants to be liberal, it has used wider language. For instance, S.2 (7) defining 'cultivate' contains an Explanation which runs: "Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, 'members of family" shall mean, (i) in the case of lands held by a joint family, members of such family; and (ii) in any other case, wife Or husband, as the case may be and the lineal descendants;" It is obvious, therefore; that the legislature has taken particular care to express itself precisely when dealing with the concept of family. S.75 (2) leaves no doubt in my mind that the requirement contemplated must be that of the landholder or of any member of his family, which means, the husband or wife, as the case may be, their unmarried minor children and their major sons and daughters. It does not go farther to include a grandson. And if a grand-son has no place in a family as defined in S.75 (2) of the Act, the scheme of eviction of a kudikidappukaran contained in that provision will not enable the land-holder to remove or shift the kudikidappukaran from his existing site on the score of the bonafide requirement of the grandson. I, therefore, agree with the learned District Judge that the ground set up by the plaintiff does not justify the relief claimed. 2. But this is not the end of the matter. Counsel for the appellant contends that the defendant is not a Kudikidappukaran as now defined, that is to say, within the meaning of S.2 (25) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. It is true that there are certain restrictive factors incorporated in the amended statute and if the claimant of the kudikidappu has a certain extent of land in excess of want is specified in the statute, he ceases to be a kudikidappukaran and cannot resist eviction under S.75 (2). There is no factual foundation yet made for this contention of the appellant, but he must be given an opportunity to prove the necessary facts since the amendment itself came in only at a time when the p resent second appeal was pending. 3. In conclusion, I confirm the finding of the court below that the appellant is not entitled to urge the building purposes of his grandson as justifying eviction, but the question as to whether under the amended definition in S.2 (25) of the Act, the respondent can at all claim to be a kudikidappukaran is left to be decided by the trial court. S.125 of the Act will have to be considered by the learned Munsiff in this context. The decree will be set aside to the limited extent indicated above, that is to say, the trial court will go into the question whether the defendant is a kudikidappukaran as per the present law, subject as I said earlier, to the provisions of S.125. The decree will be set aside to the limited extent indicated above, that is to say, the trial court will go into the question whether the defendant is a kudikidappukaran as per the present law, subject as I said earlier, to the provisions of S.125. A decree will be passed granting the plaintiff the relief claimed or rejecting it after deciding the only issue left open as to whether the defendant is a kudikidappukaran or not. The appeal is allowed to this very limited extent. Parties will bear their costs in this appeal. Partly allowed.