JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J 1. In Writ Petition No. 81 of 1967 the dispute between the parties relate to Khata No. 55 of village Lakhaura, Pargana and tahsil Haidargarh, district Barabanki. This Khata was recorded in the name of Respondent No. 4 Asharfi. The Petitioner Badal preferred an objection u/s 9(2) of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming sirdari rights on the basis of adverse possession, over the land comprising Khata No. 55 and prayed for the entry of his name in the villager records and the expungement of the name of Asharfi. The Consolidation, Officer dismissed this objection on 3-9-1965 and the Badal's appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was dismissed on 4-1-1966. The revision application filed by Badal was also dismissed on 16-9-1966. The question raised in the writ petition is that inasmuch as Asharfi did not file any suit against Badal u/s 209 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the UP, ZA and LR Act) and the latter was in possession over the land comprising the Khata Badal had acquired sirdari rights in the land in dispute. The case set up by Asharfi, is that a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act could not be filed because of the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. 2. In writ petition No. 161 of 1967, the plots in dispute are Nos. 282, 292, 293/2, 295/2, 310/2, 1113, 1137/2, 1182/2, 1215/2 and 1218/2 situate in village Yakgharwa, Pargana Tahsil and district Bahraich. 3. The plots mentioned above were recorded in the name of the Respondent No. 4 Sohbat Ali. The Petitioners Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali filed an objection for the expungement of the name of Sohbat Ali in respect of the half share in the aforesaid plots and the entry of the names of Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali over that half. Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali prayed' in the alternative for the entry of their names as sirdar on the basis of adverse possession. It seems there was an appeal and thereafter a Second Appeal and the Dy. Director Consolidation in second appeal held that Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali were entitled only to be recorded as trespassers over the plots in dispute from the year 1366 Fasli. The village was thereafter denotified. 4. It seems there was an appeal and thereafter a Second Appeal and the Dy. Director Consolidation in second appeal held that Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali were entitled only to be recorded as trespassers over the plots in dispute from the year 1366 Fasli. The village was thereafter denotified. 4. Again, when the village was re-notified for consolidation operations, some time in Nov. 1963, Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali filed two object, ions in respect of the plots aforesaid. One of the Khatas, i.e. No 226, was recorded exclusively in the name of Sohbat Ali, while on the other Khata, the names of Mohabbat Ali, Sohbat Ali and Usman Ali were recorded. By means of the order dated 29-9-1964 the Consolidation Officer upheld the claims of Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali and ordered that their names be recorded as sirdar from 1366 Fasli oven the plots constituting the two khatas after expunging the names of Sohbat Ali and others. Sohbat Ali field an appeal which was allowed by the Settlement Officer, Bahraich on 11-7-1966 and it as ordered that the entries in favour of Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali were to be made only as trespassers. Rahmat Ali and Musibat Ali filed a revision application which was dismissed on 25-11-1966 by the Dy. Director Consolation. Rahmat Ali's case is that they are in possession of the land in dispute and inasmuch as Sohbat Ali and others did not-file a suit u/s 309 of the UP ZA and LR Act, they have acquired the status of sirdars. The case set up 'by Sohbat Ali and other Respondents, is that a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act could not be filed in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. 5. The sole question that requires determination in these writ petitions is whether, under the circumstances mentioned above, St 49, of the Act barred the filing of suits by Asharfi and by Sohbat Ali and others u/s 209, UP ZA and LR Act. .6 In Abdul Wahid Khan v. Dy. Director Consolidation 1968 AWR (sic) it was held by a Full Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Jagdish Sahai. J.) was a member, that Section 49 of the UPZA and LR. .6 In Abdul Wahid Khan v. Dy. Director Consolidation 1968 AWR (sic) it was held by a Full Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Jagdish Sahai. J.) was a member, that Section 49 of the UPZA and LR. Act did not bar a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act even in respect of land situate in a village which (had come under the consolidation operations. Subsequent to this decision, the Supreme Court decided Ramadhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh 1968 AWR 14. This was a decision u/s 5 and not (sic) 49 of the Act. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Srimati Shakuntala Devi v. Dy. Director Consolidation, UP 1968 AWR 271 doubted the correctness of Abdul Wahid's case (supra) in view of the Supreme Courts' decision in Ram Adhar's case (supra). Since Abdul Wahid's case (supra) was decided by a Full Bench of three Judges, the matter has now come up before a Full Bench of five Judges. 7 Section 49 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time after amendment by UP Act XXXVIII of 1958 reads: 49. Bar to civil court, jurisdiction notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued Under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceedings could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. 8. 8. Whereas it is contended in support of the proposition that suits u/s 209, UP-ZA and LR Act would not be barred because of the provisions of Section 49 of the Act inasmuch as a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act could not have been entertained under the provisions of the Act, it is contended for the reverse proposition that even though a suit as such u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act could not be instituted before or entertained by a consolidation authority, the purpose sought to be achieved by a suit u/s 209, UP ZA and LR Act could be achieved by having recourse to proceedings under the provisions of the Act, it is contended that if an effective, even though not identical, relief could be granted under the Act, a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act would he barred. 9. It would be useful to quote Section 5(2) of the Act as it stands today. 5(2). Upon the said publication of the notification Under Sub-section (2) of Section 4, the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely: (a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. Provided further that on the issue of a notification Under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated. Provided further that on the issue of a notification Under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated. (b) Such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. The preamble of the Act reads: An Act to provide for the consolidation of holdings in UP for the development of agriculture. The long title of the Act reads: Whereas it is expedient to provide for the consolidation of agricultural holdings in UP for the development of agriculture. 10. It is true that the act is intended to achieve a very limited purpose only, that is, to consolidate the agricultural holdings in UP. It is clearly not a statute dealing with the land tenure of the State. The authorities which function under the provisions of the Act are not regular law courts. However, it is self contained special enactment and along with the rules framed under it is a complete code dealing with matters relating to consolidation of holdings. 11. The provisions of the Act would show that by operation of law the tenure-holders lose rights in respect of their existing plots which are generally scattered and instead of it they get consolidated blocks (Chaks). The consolidated chaks can not be prepared or given to tenure holders without first deciding who is entitled to them. The Act contains five chapters. The first chapter is headed 'Preliminary' and contains Sections 1 to 3. The second Chapter is headed as "Revision and correction of maps and records" and contains Sections 4 to 12D. The Chapter third is headed as 'preparation of consolidation scheme' and contains Sections 13 to 23. Chapter fourth of the Act is headed as 'Endorsement of the scheme' and contains Sections 24 to 36 A. Chapter fifth is headed as 'Miscellaneons' and contains Sections 37 to 54. 12. There is no provision in the Act which deals or regulates the rights of the tenure-holders. Chapter fourth of the Act is headed as 'Endorsement of the scheme' and contains Sections 24 to 36 A. Chapter fifth is headed as 'Miscellaneons' and contains Sections 37 to 54. 12. There is no provision in the Act which deals or regulates the rights of the tenure-holders. True, those rights are regulated expressly by the UP ZA and LR Act, but if the holdings are to be consolidated it must first be decided as to whom the holdings belong. The Act, therefore, provides a machinery for preparing land records. It also makes provisions for objections being filed with regard to the correctness of the land re cords or with regard to the rights of the persons recorded. The Act also provides a machinery by which persons who claim rights in the holdings can assert their rights and have their objections decided. After the land records have been prepared and objections have been disposed of, a provisional consolidation scheme is framed under the provisions pf the Act and objections to it are invited. After the objections have been disposed of, the provisional scheme is confirmed and possession on its basis is given to persons in whose favour chaks have been carved out in the scheme. The Act also provides for appeals against the decisions on objections and for revisions. It could not have been possible to consolidate the holdings if the question of rights and claims had not been left to be decided by the consolidation authorities. The legislature, therefore, conferred the necessary jurisdiction on them. If the regular courts continued to exercise powers to deter mine matters relating to the rights of the parties in an area where consolidation operations are in force, possibility of there being conflicting orders could not have been avoided. The legislature, therefore, enacted Sections 5 and 49 of the Act. u/s 5 of the Act all suits, appeals or revisions or other proceedings pending in a civil or revenue courts shall stand abated if they concern land on which consolidation authorities have to take action or record decisions. This section provides that notwithstanding abatement of the suits, proceedings in respect of those matters; can be taken before the consolidation authorities. u/s 5 of the Act all suits, appeals or revisions or other proceedings pending in a civil or revenue courts shall stand abated if they concern land on which consolidation authorities have to take action or record decisions. This section provides that notwithstanding abatement of the suits, proceedings in respect of those matters; can be taken before the consolidation authorities. The effect of Section 5 is to oust the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue courts from deciding existing suits or proceedings or disputes in respect of land falling in an an area under consolidation operations. 13. Section 49 of the Act bars the filing of subsequent suits or proceedings in respect of matters which can be substantially decided by the consolidation authorities. It is true that for the adjudication of rights or for resolving all disputes, the Act does not have parallel provisions to those contained in the UP ZA and LR Act. There are no provisions in the Act such as Sections 201, 202, 206, 209, 211, 211A, 212 and 212-A of the UP ZA and LR Act which deals with ejectment. Similarly there are no provisions in the Act similar to Sections 229 and 229-B which deal which declaratory suits or Section 234 which deals with the ejectment of adhivasis. There is no provision in the Act similar to Section 284 of the UP ZA and LR Act. It is also true that there ate no words similar to those contained in Section 242 of the UP Tenancy Act, 1939, in Section 49 of the Act to show that even if the consolidation authorities cannot give full relief or cannot completely redress the grievance of a suiter, it would be enough if they can substantially resolve the dispute. There are no word similar to those contained in Section 331 of the UP ZA and LR Act clearly (sic) the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts completely. But in my opinion the effect of Sections 5 and 49 of the Act along with the Scheme of the statute as disclosed by its various provisions is that all matters which are necessary to be decided in order to consolidate the holdings would be decided by the consolidation authorities and not by regular courts. But in my opinion the effect of Sections 5 and 49 of the Act along with the Scheme of the statute as disclosed by its various provisions is that all matters which are necessary to be decided in order to consolidate the holdings would be decided by the consolidation authorities and not by regular courts. It is true that Section 49 of the Act provides that "No civil or revenue courts shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could; or ought to have been taken under this Act." These words, if they stood by themselves, perhaps may have given scope for, the argument that is prohibited is a suit or proceeding with regard to rights in the land in respect of which a notification u/s 4 has been issued or proceedings, which can be or should be taken under the Act. and that a suit u/s 209 not being in respect of rights in land and in respect of which no proceedings could be taken under the Act was not affected by the bar created by Section 49 of, the Act. 14. Section 49 can be divided into three parts. The first part provides that notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a notification has been issued shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The second part provides that adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regards to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the third part says that 'no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act.' The words "notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force" inter alia refer to the provisions of the UP ZA and LR Act or suits contemplated by Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure. These words, supersede the provisions of the UP ZA and LR Act and Section 9, CPC in respect of declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in any area under consolidation operation?. The effect of second part of Section 49 is that the adjudication of any rights arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The effect of the third part is that all suits and proceedings in a civil or revenue court in respect of rights in the land situate in the consolidation area or in respect of any other matter relating to such a land shall not be entertained by a civil or revenue court. 15. It was contended that Abdul Wahid Khan's case (supra) does not require reconsideration and the view taken therein is correct but in view of the Supreme Court decision in Ram Adhar Singh v. Ram Rup Singh (supra) it is not possible to accept that contention. The purpose of Sections 5 and 49 is similar. Whereas Section 49 bars subsequent suits for matters which have to be decided in order to prepare and implement the consolidation scheme, Section 5 abates all suits or appeals or revisions or proceedings pending on the date when the village is brought under consolidation operations. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has held in Ram Adhar Singh's case (supra) that a suit u/s 209 would abate, on parity of reasoning it must be held that a suit u/s 209 cannot be filed once a village had been notified u/s 4 of the Act. It is not necessary to deal with various authorities cited at the bar because in my judgment we are bound by the decision of Ram Adhar Singh's case (supra) which though on Section 5 of the Act, is also effective with regard to Section 49 of the Act. 16. I would, therefore, hold that Section 49 of the Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. 16. I would, therefore, hold that Section 49 of the Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. In as much as we have only decided this question of law and have not heard arguments over other points raised in the case, I would direct that these cases be now listed before a learned Single Judge for decision on merits. Sahgal, J. 17. I have gone through the judgment prepared by my brothers Jagdish Sahai and Lakshmi Prasad. I have not much td add. I agree with Jagdish Sahai, J that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. I also agree with Lakshmi Prasad, J. that a person, who has still limitation to file a suit u/s 2 (sic) 9 of the UP ZA and LR Act on the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, has every right to get relief under the provisions of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act notwithstanding his failure to file a suit u/s 209 of the UP 2A and LR Act. 18. The law of limitation is based on the principle that the law helps the vigilent. It is also based on the principle that a person, who has acquiesced in a certain state of affairs without caring for his right, should be deemed to have given up his right after acquiescence in such a state of affairs for a reasonable time so that the affairs of men may be regulated on the supposition that his right, which he has not cared to enfroce, has ceased to exist. On this principle if the law does not allow him to initiate or pursue his remedy for the vindication of that right, how can it be said that he has not been vigilent or that he has acquiesced in the state of affairs without caring to get his right Vindicated. The limitation, therefore, should cease to run during the period he has been disabled under the law to pursue his remedy. The limitation, therefore, should cease to run during the period he has been disabled under the law to pursue his remedy. Even if the Limitation Act does not contain any specific provisions to the effect that limitation will cease to run in such cases, on general principle the period of limitation stands suspended during the period a litigant is left without a remedy. 19. The two cases were referred to a larger Bench by me as a whole. The larger Bench consisting of Hon'ble Jagdish Sahai and Hon'ble Gur Sharan Lal Srivastava, JJ. referred them to the Full Bench. I have no objection if only the decision on the points, above referred to, is sent back to the single Judge for the case being decided On the merits. Lakshmi Prasad, J. 20. I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by my brother Jagdish Sahai, J. I agree that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 309 of the UP ZA and LR Act in respect of land situate in an area under consolidation operation. I, how ever, wish to add a few words. 21. These petitions came to be referred to a Full Bench of Five Judges as it was felt that the Full Bench decision in Abdul, Wahid Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur (supra) required reconsideration. As shall appear from the said Full Bench case, two points are decided in it. One of the points is that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act does not bar a suit u/s 209 pf the UP ZA and LR Act in respect of land situate in an area under consolidation operations. The other is that even if the aforesaid queision be answered in the affirmative, Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act will have its effect, namely, that the person in adverse possession of the holding of bhumidhar or sirdar would become a sirdar thereof if no suit as envisaged by Section 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act is brought within the period of Limitation provided therefor. In this connection I refer to the observations of the Full Bench appearing on p. 29 of the report (Abdul Wahid Khan's case (supra): The argument of the learned Counsel is that inasmuch as Section 49 of the Act (UP Consolidation of Holdings Act) barred the filing of a suit, there was no question of bringing one u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act with the result that Section 210 would not apply and no benefit would accrue to the Respondents on the ground that no such suit was filed. In our view, Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act deals with a factual state, that is, if a suit is not filed for whatever reasons the consequences mentioned in that section would, follow. If what Mr. Bashir Ahmad contends is correct, then the words used by the Legislature would have been : "If a suit, though Capable of being brought is not brought u/s 209". The Legislature has, however, not used any such words. The language used by it suggests that what the provision contemplates is, the fact that a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act is not filed and does not take notice of the grounds why the suit was not filed. The elementary rule of interpretation is that "when the text is explicit, the test is conclusive," and that the' basis of interpretation should be the words used by the Legislature which should be construed in their natural meaning.... In the present case the meaning of the words used in Section 210 is clear and does not admit of any doubt. Therefore, addition of any words in the existing, language of the provision cannot be justified.... Obviously mere decision that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act in respect of land situate in an area under consolidation operations does not solve the problem, in view of the above noted decision in Abdul Wahid Khan's case (supra) because, according to this case, even if Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act, Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act will have its play. We have thus tp consider that aspect, of the matter as well in deciding these writ petitions. We have thus tp consider that aspect, of the matter as well in deciding these writ petitions. Our learned brother Jagdish Sahai, J. has not considered that, aspect of the matter in his judgment at at all, even the arguments at length were addressed on the point. 22. In effect Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act provides that where a suit is not brought u/s 209 within the period of limitation provided for the filing of the suit, the person taking or retaining possession shall where the land forms part of the holding of a bhumidhar or sirdar become a sirdar thereof. Obviously this provision pre-supposes that the right to sue remains available throughout the period of limitation to the person who is sought to be visited with some adverse consequences because of his failure to bring a suit. To borrow the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Basau Kuer v. Dhum Singh ILR 11 All 47 occurring on p. 56, "It would be an inconvenient state of the law if it were found necessary for a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of his losing property if he does not," with due respect to the Hon'ble Judges constituting the Full Bench in Abdul Wahid Khan's case (supra) find it difficult to subscribe to the view that the language used by the Legislature in Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act that what the provision contemplates is the fact that a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act is not filed and does not take notice of the grounds Why the suit was not filed. There can arise no question of filing a suit at a time when the right to sue itself has been taken away. The language employed by the Legislature in Section 210 clearly admits of an interpretation to the effect that the consequences envisaged by it are to be visited where a suit is not filed within the period of limitation provided therefor even if it could be. True the interpretation placed on Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act in the F.B. case does no violence to the language of Section 210. True the interpretation placed on Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act in the F.B. case does no violence to the language of Section 210. Still that interpretation has to be rejected as against one sought to be placed by Sri Basbir Ahmad learned Counsel appearing in that case for the mere reason that the interpretation preferred by the Fall Bench in Abdul Wahid Khan's case (supra) results in attributing an intention to the Legislature which it would obviously be improper to attribute. It is difficult to see as to how any Legislature would insist on an entirely vain suit being instituted on pain of losing property. Once it is found that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act in respect of land situate in an area under consolidation operations, it follows that any such suit, if filed, would immediately be dismissed on that score. So there is little doubt that such a suit would be an entirely vain suit. Could it still be held that the failure to file such a suit would result in consequences envisaged by Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act. In my view there is only one answer to the question and that is in the negative. There is yet another approach to the same question. The consequences envisaged by Section 210 of the UP ZA and LR Act are to accrue only where no suit is filed within the period of limitation. It may be that the period of limitation provided under the Act is six years from the date on, which the cause of action arises. It does not necessarily follow from those premises that the consequences envisaged by Section 210 will necessarily follow on the expiry of six years from the accrual of the cause of action in each and every case in the absence of any suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act having been filed earlier. There may be cases where, while that period of limitation is still running, certain circumstances supervene taking away the right to sue. The question arises what happens in those cases. It can safely be said that in such circumstances limitation gets suspended right from the time such circumstances arose and continues to remain suspended till those circumstances disappear. There may be cases where, while that period of limitation is still running, certain circumstances supervene taking away the right to sue. The question arises what happens in those cases. It can safely be said that in such circumstances limitation gets suspended right from the time such circumstances arose and continues to remain suspended till those circumstances disappear. In this connection I may refer to the following observations made in Midnapore Zemindary Co. Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1961 Cal 353 by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court occurring on page 356 in para. 9 of the report: It is clear, from what we have said above that at the earliest, the starting point of limitation must be the accrual of the cause of action for the suit. It is true that, under the Indian Limitation Act, the starting point of limitation is not always, or, in all cases the accrual of the cause of action, but it is never earlier. If, then, the cause of action has arisen and the particular event (which may or may not synchronise always and in all cases, with the accrual of the cause of action), as mentioned in the third column of relevant Article of the Indian Limitation Act, has happened, limitation starts. The cause of action, however, as seen above, must have, for its support, a right to sue. If now, due to some intervening circumstances, this right to sue itself disappears or becomes extinct or nonest or is extinguished or cancelled, no suit can be brought, prosecuted or supported, there being no cause of action and no right to sue to support it on which the same can be founded or maintained or proceeded with and a fortiori, limitation will cease to run, there being, at the moment, nothing, on which it can operate, unless there be something in the statute or the particular law of limitation, providing to the contrary. 23. 23. The effect of the provisions contained in the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act is that the remedy available u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act in respect of land brought under consolidation operations gets substituted by the remedy provided thereunder with the result that a suit pending on the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act would stand abated and Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act would apply to bar any such suit being instituted subsequent to the notification u/s 4 of the Act. So there is no escape from the conclusion that from the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act limitation for a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act would stand suspended till the right to sue thereunder gets revived. Of course that would be so only where 1 imitation for filing a suit u/s 209 of the UP Z A and LR Act had not already run out but was still there on the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 24. For the foregoing reasons, my conclusion is that a person, who has still limitation to file a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act on the date of the notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, has every right to get relief under the provisions of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act notwithstanding his failure to file a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 25. Having decided the questions of law, I agree that these cases be now listed before a learned single judge for decision on merits. G.S. Lal, J. 26. I have gone through the judgments of brothers Jagdish Sahai, J., Lakshmi Prasad, J. and Sahgal, J. I agree that Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars also a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950 and that upon a notification being issued u/s 4 of the former Act the running of the period of limitation is suspended for the purposes of both Sections 209 and 210 of the latter Act, I also agree that these cases be now listed before a learned Single Judge for decision on merits. O.P. Trivedi, J. 27. O.P. Trivedi, J. 27. I have seen the judgments of Jagdish Sahai, G.D. Sahgal, Lakshmi Prasad and Gur Sharan Lal, JJ. and I agree that (sic) the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) if the land in respect of which' the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. I further agree that if a suit is not brought u/s 209 of the Act on account of this bar during the, continuance of the consolidation, Operations then the benefit of Section 210 of the Act Will not accrue to the person taking Or retaining possession of the holding With the result that if on the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act there is still limitation in favour of a person for the fifing of a suit u/s 209 of the Act then such a person can obtain relief under the provisions, of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act notwithstanding his failure to file' a suit u/s 209 of the Act. These propositions flow as a logical corollary to the conclusion recorded by brother Sahai that the suit u/s 209 of the Act is barred if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. The result of such a bar would, be that the forum provided by Section 209 of the Act will be frozen of placed in 'partial eclipse' while the consolidation operations last and therefore if the forum is not available in that duration then the limitation should be deemed to be in suspense. That being so the benefit of Section 210 of the Act will fail td accrue in favour of the person taking or retaining possession before the holding. 28. I agree that these cases may now be listed before a Single Judge for decision on merits. By the Court 29. The two petitions are returned to the learned Single Judge for decision on the merits after the following findings: Section 49 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR Act if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations. A person who has still limitation to file a suit u/s 209 of the UP ZA and LR. Act on the date of notification u/s 4 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act has every right to get relief under the provisions of the latter Act notwithstanding his failure to file a suit u/s 209 of the former Act.