JUDGMENT Bahadur, J. This appeal by defendant nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 arises out of a suit for partition of the eight annas share in kasht and bakasht lands lying in different villages, besides movables, ornaments, cash, deposits in banks, Post-Offices and money lending transactions through handnotes, mortgages, bahis, khatas, etc., as detailed in Schedules 1 to 9 of the plaint. 2. It will be convenient to give below a genealogical table of the family of the parties : DASRATH PANDEY = Most. Lakhi Devi (Defendant no. 5 - died during appeal) _______________________________________|______________________________ | | | | Rampadarath Pandey Ramchander Pandey Rambahadur Pandey Ramsohan Pandey (dead) (Plff. No.3) (defendant No. 1) (dead) =Most. Janki Devi (died) in appeal = Smt. Jogni Devi (Defdt. No.6) = Lagan Kaur (Defdt. 7) (Defdt. No. 8) _____________________|____ | | | | Sudhisht Narain Pandey Parsidh Narain Pandey | (Plff. No. 1) (Plff. No. 2) | _______________________________________________ | | | Basist Narain Pandey Jagat Narain Pandey Raj Narain Pandey (Defdt. No. 2) (Defdt. No. 3) alias Satruhan Pandey (Defdt. No. 4) It would thus appear that plaintiff nos. 1 and 2 are sons of Rambahadur Pandey and plaintiff no. 3, who was initially impleaded as defendant no. 8, was subsequently transposed as plaintiff no. 3. 3. The plaintiffs' case is that they are entitled to a takhta of eight annas share on the footing that the widow of Dasrath Pandey and widow of Rampadarath Pandey (defendant nos. 5, and 6 respectively) were entitled only to maintenance. They have also asked for a decree against Rambahadur Pandey, defendant no. 1, for rendition of accounts, their case being that the defendant no.1 had all along been karta of the family of the parties and that for the last 6 or 7 years sufficient cash, movables etc. had come into his hands, who, in spite of repeated requests, has not effected disclosure of the same on some pretext or the other. 4. The defendant no. 1 and his sons, namely defendants 2 to 4, had filed one written statement and subsequently they filed two additional written statements on different dates, after certain amendments in the plaint having been allowed. 4. The defendant no. 1 and his sons, namely defendants 2 to 4, had filed one written statement and subsequently they filed two additional written statements on different dates, after certain amendments in the plaint having been allowed. The defence case was that firstly there was complete partition of all the properties of the family of the parties on the 25th Baisakh, 1950, in which the allotments to the plaintiffs on the one hand and the defendants 1 to 4 on the other were made, as detailed in Schedules Y and Z of the additional written statement. Secondly, defendant no. 1 denied that he was the karta and manager of the family of the parties, his case being that he was the karta of his own branch consisting of his sons and grandsons. His brother, Ramchandra Pandey, (plaintiff no. 3) was, on the other hand, karta of his own branch consisting of his sons and grandsons. The different branches had no concern with the other and thus there was no occasion for any demand by the plaintiffs from defendant no. 1 for any disclosure of cash, movables etc. For this reason the plaintiffs were also not entitled to ask for rendition of accounts. Their further case was that their father Dasrath Pandey died sometime in the year 1910 when defendant no. 1 was a minor and in 1921 when he became major, his brother Ramchandra Pandey (plaintiff no. 3) was the karta of the joint family. Thirdly, their case was that the lands, as mentioned in Schedules D and F of the original written statement were the self acquisition of defendant no. 1, Schedule D having been acquired before the partition of 1950 and Schedule F, after partition. The property mentioned in Schedule C of the written statement was acquired by his brother, namely, plaintiff no. 3, prior to partition. Schedule B and E were the joint acquisitions of the two brothers prior to partition, partly before 1930 and partly thereafter. In respect of Schedules B and F the defence case was that defendant no.1 had made those self-acquisitions by means of his income from the homeopathic practice as also from his personal money lending transactions, which were started cut of the income from his practice and which he carried on all along separately from the money lending transactions of the joint family. Schedule A was in respect of 6 to 7 bighas of lands, besides collection of rent of Rs. 10/- per year. According to the defence, the common ancestor, namely, Dasrath Pandey, had left only these properties and those properties, besides others acquired jointly, mentioned above, were divided between the parties in the said partition of 1950. The defence case further was that the bank balances, dues on handnotes, mortgage bonds and bahi, khatas, if any, after 1948, belonged absolutely to defendant no. 1 and his branch with which the plaintiffs had no concern at all. The defendants questioned plaintiffs' claim for the takhta of eight annas share on the ground that defendant no. 5, widow of Dasrath, who was the mother of defendant no. 1 and plaintiff no. 3, was entitled to one-third share. Lastly, the defence also urged that there was defect of misjoinder of widow of Rampadarath, defendant no. 6, and wife of Ramchandra, defendant no. 7, and non-joinder of Rambujhawan Pandey and others. The plea of bar of limitation, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence was also raised. 5. The wife of defendant no. 1, namely, Jogni Devi, had filed a separate written statement and her case was that the mortgage bond dated the 17th September, 1954, executed by Mahabir Pandey in her favour for Rs. 7000/-(Ext.5/q) was her stridhan with which neither the plaintiffs nor her own husband and sons, defendants 1 to 4, had any concern. She claimed to be a registered money-lender carrying on her own money-lending business with her personal fund. She adopted the defence of her husband and sons, defendants 1 to 4. 6. The widow of Dasrath Pandey, defendant no. 5, had filed one written statement supporting the plaintiffs' case and another supporting the defendants 1 to 4. She, however, did not contest the suit and both the written statements were rejected. 7. The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, has held that (i) there was no division or partition of cash or money-lending business of the joint family either in 1948 or in the year 1950; (ii) defendant no.1 was the karta of the family of the parties on the date of the suit and that he had been acting as such since long before; (iii) even though the defendants had got a shop of medicine and defendant no. 1 had after obtaining Diploma in Homeopathic medicine practised the same, yet the income therefrom was not such as to enable him to make deposits in banks and the acquisitions as claimed by him; (iv) it had not been established that the wife of defendant no. 1 or the defendants had any separate money-lending business at any point of time; (v) the properties relating to Schedule D were acquisitions on behalf of the joint family and (vi) properties in Schedule F, which were claimed to be self-acquisition after partition, were also joint family acquisitions. Thus, he held that all the properties-movables, immovables, cash, deposits in banks, money-lending assets covered by hand notes and mortgages, all furnitures and other articles of the family-were joint family properties of the parties and were liable to partition in the suit. There were only two items, namely, land given in security under the mortgage bonds (Exts. 5/Q and P/21), which stood in the name of the wife of defendant no.1, were not liable to partition. Since, however, the plaintiffs had not asked for any relief or questioned the apparent title of the wife of defendant no.1 and had not paid any court-fee, still as the parties were members of the joint family, they were entitled to get their proportionate share. In respect of the handnotes taken by defendant no.1 as karta, which stood in the name of his wife, the plaintiffs were entitled to have their share. As regards ornaments, it was held that they being the presents made to the ladies concerned were not liable to partition. The learned Judge further held that the defendant no. 1 was also liable to rendition of accounts. On the above findings the learned Subordinate Judge has decreed the suit in part against the contesting defendants holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to one-third share inasmuch as the widow of Dasrath Pandey (defendant no.5) being still alive was entitled to a share in law equal to that of a son. 8. As against the judgment and the decree of the court below, as stated above, defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 have filed this appeal. No one has appeared for the respondents and Mr. Shilesh Chandra Misra has appeared as Deputy Registrar guardian for respondent no.5, who was found to be insane. 9. 8. As against the judgment and the decree of the court below, as stated above, defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 have filed this appeal. No one has appeared for the respondents and Mr. Shilesh Chandra Misra has appeared as Deputy Registrar guardian for respondent no.5, who was found to be insane. 9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the case set up by defendant no. 1 that there was a partition on the 25th Baisakh, 1950, is correct ? Mr. Balabhadra Prasad Singh appearing for the appellants has, in the first place, argued that in face of the admission of the plaintiff that he was not in possession it amounted to lack of unity of possession and the suit for partition should therefore, be dismissed. His contention was that in a suit for partition the plaintiffs must establish both unity of title and unity of possession. In other words, the plaintiffs must establish title and then possession on that basis. Thus the plaintiffs must amend their plaint accordingly and pay the requisite court-fee and this not having been done the suit was clearly bad and liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel in support of his contention has taken us through the evidence of plaintiff no.3, Ramchandra Pandey, who was examined as P.W.24. In his cross examination this witness has said that he did not know any paper which showed that the money-lending transaction started by his father was carried out by them; nor did he know anything regarding the produce or sowing during any year. He was unable to give any detail about 60 to 65 bighas of land as stated by him nor about its boundaries either purchased in the name of Rambahadur, his son or wife. In Paragraph 20 he has stated that the entire properties under partition were in possession of his brother and he was not in possession of any property. He further stated that there was no paper to show that the properties under partition were the joint family properties. On these statements in the evidence of plaintiff no. 3, it is contended that the plaintiffs should be non-suited as they are not entitled to get a decree for partition. His further argument is that the plaintiffs have not asked for any declaration of title. On these statements in the evidence of plaintiff no. 3, it is contended that the plaintiffs should be non-suited as they are not entitled to get a decree for partition. His further argument is that the plaintiffs have not asked for any declaration of title. It is difficult to accept these contentions as the evidence of plaintiff no.3 must be read as a whole. He has stated in his examination-in-chief that after the death of their father, Rambahadur became Karbari of the family and he himself was in charge of cultivation as he was illiterate. During the life time of his father there was money lending business and lands and milkiat share were also acquired. Money lending transactions were continued and augmented several times and they had also coal business and ghat thikas, as also grain business. There were also cash deposits in banks and that they were still joint and their cultivation remained joint. Further, it is the case of the defendants that after the partition in 1950 there were certain properties, which were in exclusive possession of the plaintiffs and certain other properties which were in exclusive possession of the defendants. Besides, there was no such issue framed in the suit and the appellants are not entitled to take the point for the first time in appeal. I, therefore, hold that the point raised on behalf of the appellants is without substance and must be rejected. 10. It has then been contended by learned counsel that in view of the two koras (Exts. X and X/1) dated the 25th Baisakh, 1950, containing the list of shares, which each party got at the time of private partition, the trial court had erred in not accepting those as conclusive evidence of partition as claimed by defendant no. 1. I might mention that the defendants had examined a number of witnesses such as D.Ws. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18 to 29, 31, 37 and 45 (who is defendant no. 1) out of whom D.Ws. 8, 11, 12, 29 and 31 were Panches of the partition, to support the case of the defendants in respect of the partition but the trial court has not accepted their evidence and learned counsel has not placed their evidence before us in support of the case of defendant no. 1. 1) out of whom D.Ws. 8, 11, 12, 29 and 31 were Panches of the partition, to support the case of the defendants in respect of the partition but the trial court has not accepted their evidence and learned counsel has not placed their evidence before us in support of the case of defendant no. 1. It is, therefore unnecessary to deal with their evidence all over again, which has been dealt with at great length by the trial court. Learned counsel has, however, relied on the evidentiary value of the two koras, which, as stated earlier, are dated the 25th Baisakh, 1950, and purport to show that the partition was effected from that dat between the parties. The learned Subordinate Judge did not accept these koras on the ground that they were unregistered and were thus inadmissible as evidence of partition. These papers were initially not stamped but later on they were stamped on payment of the requisite duties and penalty. According to the learned Judge they could be used only collaterally for showing the nature and extent of the possession of the parties provided they were found to be genuine. Besides none of the Panches had signed these papers and the learned Judge after full discussion of the story of partition came to the conclusion that neither the oral evidence nor the koras themselves furnished any reliable evidence of partition. 11. Learned counsel has urged that since the koras had been admitted without any objection at the trial, their admissibility in evidence or their genuineness could not be questioned. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied on a number of decisions of various Courts. In (1) Madhabi Sundari Dassya and others V. Ganganendra Nath Tagore and others : 9 Calcutta Weekly Notes 111, it was held that if a document were in admissible in evidence, objection could be taken to its admissibility at any stage of the case, even if it had been duly proved. But an objection as to the mode of proof of a document was one which should be taken at the time when the document was attempted to be put in. But an objection as to the mode of proof of a document was one which should be taken at the time when the document was attempted to be put in. Similarly in (2) Gopal Das and another V. Sri Thakurji and others.: A.I.R. 1943 Privy Council 83, it was held that where the objection to be taken was not that the document was in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward was irregular or insufficient, it was essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document was marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party could not lie by until the case came before a court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. Again it was held in (3) Bindeshwari Singh and another V. Ramraj Singh and another : A.I.R. 1939 Allahabad 61, that the proper time to object to the admissibility of evidence was at the trial when the evidence was tendered and it was then that the court should rule as to the admissibility or indamissibility of the evidence. Hence where a document was once admitted into evidence without any objection by a party in the first court the party was precluded from objecting to the admissibility of the document in appeal. It was also held in (4) Ram Lochan Misra V. Pandit Harinath Misra : 1922 I.L.R. (Patna) 606, that where a copy of a document had been admitted in evidence in the trial court without objection, its admissibility could not be challenged in the appellate court. It was further observed that omission to object to its admission implied that it was a true copy and, therefore, it was not open to the appellate court to consider whether the copy was properly compared with the original or not. In this case the document in question was a genealogy and was admittedly a copy and part of it was a copy of a copy. It was, therefore held that as the document was admitted as secondary evidence, that is, it was admitted as being a true copy and as such it was not open for consideration at the appellate stage whether the provisions of the section had been complied with or not. 12. It was, therefore held that as the document was admitted as secondary evidence, that is, it was admitted as being a true copy and as such it was not open for consideration at the appellate stage whether the provisions of the section had been complied with or not. 12. I do not find any force in the contention raised by learned counsel as the admissibility of the document is not in question. It is only the weight that is to be given upon consideration of the evidence and the other circumstances appearing on the record. The learned Judge has examined the oral evidence, as also the koras themselves. We have also looked into the koras ourselves and I am in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge that they could not be accepted in support of the defendants' case. As stated earlier, none of the Panches, who had effected partition or batwara, had signed these koras. According to defendant no. 1, the division of the money-lending assets took place in 1948 and the evidence of the Panches shows that they were approached by both the brothers for effecting partition. No panchnama was, however, executed nor any of the Panches put their signatures or these papers, even though these were the only papers prepared in respect of the batwara. The present suit was filed on the 23rd February 1955, and the koras are of 1950. According to the evidence of defendant no. 1, one of the two koras was all along in his possession, though curiously he never stated in any of his petitions filed in the trial court before the written statement was filed in June, 1956, that he had any kora. Mention may be made of the two petitions, which were filed in court namely, one of the 1st March, 1955, and the other of the 14th March, 1955, in which the defendants had merely alleged separation in mess and chaukidari and made no mention of the koras. The learned Judge has also noticed the circumstances in which these koras and other documents came in charge of the pleader commissioner in course of the preparation of the inventory. For instance important papers like registered kebalas, mortgages, pass-books, etc. were found in an iron safe. The Commissioner also took out from the iron safe, of which the key was supplied by defendant no. For instance important papers like registered kebalas, mortgages, pass-books, etc. were found in an iron safe. The Commissioner also took out from the iron safe, of which the key was supplied by defendant no. 1, ordinary papers like Chaukidari receipts, rent receipts, khista papers, envelopes, etc. One of the koras which was said to be in possession of defendant no. 1, was, however, not to be found in the iron safe and it was curiously found in a drawer of a table kept in the apparent occupied by a male in a room. The petition dated the 20th March, 1955, shows that the plaintiff had detected the implanting of this kora in the drawer stealthily by the defendant and it was found by the Commissioner of that very date. The plaintiffs thereafter filed the said petition and the defendants filed a counter petition denying the allegation. The kora alleged to have been given to plaintiff no. 3, was found in a basket by the side of a window in a north western room in the zenana house in which, according to both the parties, their mother Lakhi Devi (defendant no. 5) was living. The plaintiffs alleged that this kora had been planted by the defendants in the said room for supporting the story of partition. The inventory of the room, according to the report, however, shows that the Commissioner had already finished the preparation of the inventory on the 7th May, 1955, and the 8th May, 1955, On the 9th May, 1955, the defendants filed a petition for a further detailed inventory of the zenana house and when the Commissioner was proceeding with the inventory he found the kora on the 14th May, 1955, in a basket, which was kept on the ground in a room. Mother, Mt. Lakhi Devi, has not been examined in the case and various reasons have been given by the parties for her non-examination. Learned counsel has not taken us through the evidence about the koras but merely based his case on the decisions mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment; namely, that once a document has been admitted into evidence without objection, its genuineness could not be questioned. As I have said even on the examination of the koras themselves it is difficult to hold that the defendants have proved their case of partition in 1950 on the basis of the two koras. As I have said even on the examination of the koras themselves it is difficult to hold that the defendants have proved their case of partition in 1950 on the basis of the two koras. 13. So far as the oral testimony of the witnesses examined by the respective parties is concerned, the learned Judge found, as stated earlier, that the evidence of the witnesses examined by the defendants was quite unimpressive. Similarly, the evidence of the plaintiffs themselves, namely plaintiffs 1 and 3, and their witnesses; namely, P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 16 and 18, was also unimpressive. The learned Judge, however, thought that their evidence was consistent with the other circumstances arising in the case. Learned counsel for the appellants has not taken us through the evidence of the witnesses for either side and has frankly conceded that it was not possible to act on their oral testimony. He has, however, contended that the documentary evidence and the circumstances in the case are sufficient to enable the court to hold that there was division of cash and money-lending assets of the joint family in 1948 and complete partition in 1950. Let me, therefore, consider the validity of these contentions. 14. It will be recalled that there is no specific case of division in any of the written statements, though in one of the written statement it was stated that "bank balance, dues on handnotes, mortgage and bahi khatas, if any, after 48 absolutely belonged to defendant no. 1 and his sons and grandsons with the plaintiffs had no concern at all." The Pleader Commissioner (D. W. 43), who had been appointed to make inventory, sealed the rooms of the house of the parties the very next day after the suit was filed, i. e., on the 23rd February, 1955. The parties had been given notice and the inventory was started on the 25th February 1955, and was completed on the 25th May, 1955. The report, which is in five parts along with the sketch map, is Ext. I. The inventory (Ext.J) is in three volumes and Ext. K is the order sheet. It appears that the Pleader Commissioner took charge of various papers, including kebalas, mortgages, handnotes, bahi, khatas etc., which were in respect of a very long period, namely, from 1900 to the beginning of 1955. I. The inventory (Ext.J) is in three volumes and Ext. K is the order sheet. It appears that the Pleader Commissioner took charge of various papers, including kebalas, mortgages, handnotes, bahi, khatas etc., which were in respect of a very long period, namely, from 1900 to the beginning of 1955. I t is curious that if the case of the defendants was that there was a partial partition in 1948, they did not claim division of cash and money lending assets in 1948 either before the Commissioner or in court. Learned counsel has Urged that the learned Judge was not right in his view that the sworn petition filed by the defendant no. 1 on the 14th March, 1955, in reply to the plaintiffs' petition dated the 1st March, 1955, for directing him to pay Rs. 1000/- to the plaintiffs for their day expenses, showed that the money lending of the two brothers was carried on till 1949. There were other recitals also in the petition namely, that from the profits of the coal business, which had been dosed in 1930, the two brothers had purchased lands and also taken lands in mortgage. So far as the momy-lending of the two brothers was concerned, it was stated that they had purchased the properties in joint names from defaulting debtors and they bad divided realised from them. It was also said that from 1950 defendant no. 1 started his own money-lending separately and had taken licence in the name of his wife and sons. It was further said that the advances had been made by him from his own separate fund in his own name before and that he had taken bonds and handnotes in his separate name for his separate money -lending, which was started out of the earnings from his Homeopathic practice, which was started in 1930. The defendant no. 1 of course denied that he was the karta of the joint family of the parties and, therefore, prayed that he should not be asked to pay the amount of Rs. 1000/-, as was asked by plaintiff no. 3. The learned Judge took the view if the story of division in 1948 were true, then defendant no. 1 would have certainly mentioned this fact in the affidavited petition. 1000/-, as was asked by plaintiff no. 3. The learned Judge took the view if the story of division in 1948 were true, then defendant no. 1 would have certainly mentioned this fact in the affidavited petition. On the other hand, it showed the continuance of the joint money-lending of the family till 1949 and about the separation in mess and chaukidari from 1950. Learned counsel took us through the two petitions and contended that the assumptions of the learned Judge were erroneous and further contended that there was no occasion for the defendants to mention these facts, which had not been taken against them. I am unable to accept this contention as defendant no. 1 would certainly have mentioned these facts about the division of cash and money-lending assets in 1948. It cannot, therefore, be said that the trial court took an unreasonable view in holding that the story of the division in 1948 could not possibly be correct. As stated earlier, the oral evidence in this connection is worthless and it consisted of the testimony of the Panches like D. W. 11, apart from defendant no, 1 (D. W. 45) himself. There are other witnesses like D. Ws. 8, 11, 12, 29 and 31, who bad acted as Panches in the partition of 1950. These witnesses have been disbelieved and learned counsel has not asked us to reassess their evidence or accept their testimony. 15. There is another difficulty in accepting the evidence of defendant no. 1. Exts. 1 series, 34 series, W and C series are bahis and khatas of the money lending transactions, which are in respect of the period from 1927 to sometime in February 1955. All these bahis were written by D. W. 45, which started in 1921-22 and the joint family money-lending business was started in 1930-34. There is an admission of D.W. 45 that none of the papers of the family had been lost. The earliest jama kharch bahi is of 1927 (Ext. 34). Then there are Exts. 34/a and I/g of 1939 and there are other documents, Ext. 1 series ranging from 1941 to 1948, while Ext. 34/b is for the year 1949 and Ext. 34/c is for the year 1950 For the years 1951 to 1955 are Exts. O series and W respectively. 34). Then there are Exts. 34/a and I/g of 1939 and there are other documents, Ext. 1 series ranging from 1941 to 1948, while Ext. 34/b is for the year 1949 and Ext. 34/c is for the year 1950 For the years 1951 to 1955 are Exts. O series and W respectively. We have seen these documents for ourselves and there is the admission of D.W.45 that the bahis up to 1948 were written in the names of both the brothers, which were mentioned at the top of the front page, though defendant no. 1 has claimed that in the bahi from 1949 only his name was mentioned. This is wholly incorrect, as Ext. 34/b, which is for the year 1949 shows that the name of plaintiff no. 3 had been written there but the relevant portion is said to have been eaten away by white ants. Thus, the defendants' case that there was division in 1948 cannot possibly be true. It is, however, urged by learned counsel that in the bahi of 1950, (Ext. 34/c) and in the bahi of the subsequent years (Exts. O series) the name of defendant no. 1 only is mentioned. It is not possible to accept this contention as this cannot support the story of division in the year 1948. Further, on his own admission the defendant no.1 cannot give any detail of the lands divided between the two brothers or of the debtors divided between them or regarding the nature of the documents of the debtors. It is true that defendant no. 1 in his evidence has stated that one list of the debtors allotted to each brother was prepared though it was not signed by any of them. According to him, he had written out his own list while plaintiff no.3 had written out his own. It is difficult to understand as to why none of the brothers signed the list of each other, apart from the fact that the lists were not filed in court nor were given to the Commissioner. Significantly, D.W. 45 was unable to say the name of any of the debtors, who was allotted to his brother. The learned Judge has examined this matter in great detail and, in my opinion, has rightly held that there was no division of money lending and cash in 1948, as claimed by defendant no. 1. 16. Significantly, D.W. 45 was unable to say the name of any of the debtors, who was allotted to his brother. The learned Judge has examined this matter in great detail and, in my opinion, has rightly held that there was no division of money lending and cash in 1948, as claimed by defendant no. 1. 16. So far as the partition in 1950 is concerned, learned counsel has merely stated his case on the koras and was unable to displace the other reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge in rejecting the case of partition. The petitions of the 1st March, 1955 and 14th March, 1955 (dealt with earlier) also show that there could be no partition in 1950 as no such case was made out therein. Besides, I have stated earlier that no reliance can be placed on the evidence of a large number of witnesses, including the Panches, who effected the partition. Learned counsel has not attempted to take us through their evidence and I am in full agreement with the reasonings of the trial court and hold that the oral evidence does not prove the case of defendant no. 1 of the partition in 1950. 17. Similarly, the same conclusion has to be reached on the state of the documents filed in the case. Entries in the registers of collection of chaukidari, assessment registers and chaukidari registers have been filed showing that from 1922 till 1949 chaukidari tax was paid and receipts were granted in the name of plaintiff no.3 only. In 1950 the receipt (Ext.E/16) mentioned the name of plaintiff no.3 and in 1952, Ext. A only mentioned the name of defendant no.1. In the registers of 1950-51 the names of two brothers appeared for the first time and it has been urged that these documents unmistakably showed that the case of partition as claimed by the defendants must necessarily be true. In my opinion, these papers are of no value, quite apart from the fact that they were proved by the Dafadar (D.W. 44), who is apparently not a competent witness, as admittedly he had no knowledge regarding the correctness or otherwise of the entries in those registers, which were proved to have been written by one Tahsildar, Madan Ojha, who is alive but was not examined in court. There are other papers also which show that the case of partition in 1950 could not be true. The handnotes, which have been filed, show that up to 1950 they were on sada form and from February, 1951, till January 1955, were on printed; forms. The difference in the forms of handnotes cannot conclusively establish the case of the defendants and, in my opinion, the learned Judge took the right view though it is contended on behalf of the appellants that such view was wholly unreasonable. 18. The plaintiffs have also filed certain documents to show that the case set up by the defendants should not be accepted. A printed invitation (Ext. 8) shows that at the time of the wedding of defendant no. 1's daughter, which was held on the 16th February, 1953, the invitation was issued in the name of both the brothers, as also the invitation in connection with Yago-pavit ceremony. Further, the testimony of plaintiff no. 3 shows that till 1954 the two brothers had no difference or dispute of any kind. Learned counsel's argument is that even if there is partition or difference in the family, at the time of various functions such as marriages, and Yago-pavit, it is not uncommon to issue invitations under the names of the members of the family as such this is not a good ground to reject the story of the defendants and accept the case of the plaintiffs. In this connection, learned counsel has drawn our attention to the duplicate copy of the returns, which was submitted to the Collector of Muzaffarpur in 1952 but these papers have been filed by plaintiff no. 1, Sudisht Pandey in respect of the receipts granted to different tenants between 1949 to 1951 in relation to two villages. Thus if the story that the entire properties, including the Milkiat had been divided in 1950, then returns filed by plaintiff no. 1 appear to be against the normal human conduct and it cannot support the case of defendant no. 1. There are various other papers in which the same position appears and I am satisfied that the learned Judge having examined them very carefully took the correct view that the defendant no. 1 had completely failed to prove his case of partition in 1950. 1. There are various other papers in which the same position appears and I am satisfied that the learned Judge having examined them very carefully took the correct view that the defendant no. 1 had completely failed to prove his case of partition in 1950. Accordingly, I hold that there was no partition either in 1948 or in 1950, as claimed by defendant no 1. 19. Learned counsel has nextly contended that in view of the fact that even during the period of jointness purchases of properties and the sale deeds stood in the names of the two branches and in several cases in single name of the members of the two different branches, it was legitimate for the court to infer that the properties in the joint family were the interests of the members of both the families. It is urged that the record shows that those properties that were self-acquisitions of individual members were conveyed to individual names and as such the court was wrong in giving decree to the plaintiffs for those items that stood in the name of defendant no. 1. In other words, the contention is that in respect of the properties acquired after 1950 the finding of the learned Judge that defendant no. 1 was not solely entitled to them ought not to be sustained. 20. Let me, therefore, give a list of the acquisitions claimed by defendant no. 1 as standing in his name or in the name of his sons from the 27th April, 1950, that is, after the date of the two koras. They are : Date Document. Exhibit No. 7-7-50 Mortgage bond P/28 8-8-50 Mortgage bond P/31 23-1-51 Sale deed 7/b 12-4-51 Sale deed 7/c 14-5-51 Mortgage bond P/26 15-12-51 Sale deed F/l3 20-12-51 Handnote 3/z(3) 4-2-52 Mortgage bond P/25 6-2-52 Sale deed F/18 29-7-53 Mortgage bond P/30 7-8-53 Sale deed F/14 10-9-53 Handnote 3/z(17) 8-10-53 Sale deed F/19 19-12-53 Mortgage bond P/29 24-4-54 Sale deed F/16 27-4-54 Sale deed F/17 20-5-54 Sale deed F/20 23-12-54 Handnote 3/z(36) 24-1-55 Handnote 3/z 26-2-55 Handnote 3/z( 45) It is true that the defendant no. 1 had taken a Diploma in Homeopathy medicine and also practised the same but the income from the same, as correctly noticed by the learned Judge, was not such as to enable him to make the above acquisitions. 1 had taken a Diploma in Homeopathy medicine and also practised the same but the income from the same, as correctly noticed by the learned Judge, was not such as to enable him to make the above acquisitions. The properties were acquired with the aid of joint family property and they must be held joint. Therefore none of these items can be said to be self acquisitions of the defendant no. 1 or his family. The learned Judge has given good reasons and we have not been shown any material which would justify us taking a contrary view. 21. Mention may be made of two other items, namely, the mortgage bond dated the 3rd August, 1954 (Ext. P/27) and the mortgage bond dated the 17th September, 1955 (Ext. 5/q). The learned Judge of course took the view that these mortgages were for consideration, which was not advanced by the wife of defendant no. 1 and in view of the fact that the parties were members of the joint family, they were entitled to get their share in the consideration amount of the said mortgages, even though they stood in the name of the wife of the defendant no. 1 in proportion to the legal share. In my opinion, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants must be accepted as correct and they must be excluded for the simple reason that the plaintiff had claimed no relief for these items. Further, there is no presumption in Hindu law that transactions standing in the name of a wife are the "husband's transactions and onus lies on the other side to make out that the transaction is benami-see for instance (5) Yugal Kishore Sinha V. Nagendra Prasad Yadav : A. I. R. 1964 Patna 543. No such evidence has been led and the onus has, therefore, not been discharged by the plaintiffs. The assumption of the court below was, therefore, clearly erroneous and the direction for partition in respect of the said two items must be set aside. 22. The next contention of learned counsel that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that defendant no. 1 is liable to rendition of accounts as he was the karta of the joint family must prevail. 22. The next contention of learned counsel that the learned Judge was wrong in holding that defendant no. 1 is liable to rendition of accounts as he was the karta of the joint family must prevail. It is now too well settled, as a result of a number of decisions that in absence of proof of misappropriation or fraudulent or improper conversion by the manager of a joint family a coparcener seeking partition is not entitled to call upon the manager to account for his past dealing with the family property. The coparcener is entitled only to an account of the joint family as it exists on the date he demands partition. See for instance: (6) Sukhdeo and another V. Basdeo and others : A. I. R. 1935 Allahabad 594, (7) Manikrao Jairamji V. Deorao Baliram and others : A. I. R. 1955 Nagpur 290, and (8) L. Bappu Ayyar and another V. Renganayaki and others : A. I. R. 1955 Madras 394. In the present case, there was no allegation in the plaint nor was any evidence led to show or prove the charge of misappropriation or fraudulent conversion of the family property by defendant no, 1. As such, the trial court was clearly wrong in holding that defendant no. 1 was liable for rendition of accounts. The direction of the trial court requiring defendant no. 1 to account for any period to the date of the institution of the suit must, therefore, be set aside. 23. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, the judgment and the decree of the court below are modified to this extent that defendant no. 1 is not liable to rendition of accounts till the date of the suit and the two mortgage bonds, (Exts. P/27 and S/q) will be excluded from partition to which the plaintiffs will not be entitled to any share. In view of the fact that there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondents, as also in view of the facts that the appeal has been allowed in part, there will be no order for costs in this Court. The judgment and the decree of the court below will be modified to the extent as I have mentioned above. KANHAIYAJI, J. I agree. Appeal allowed in part.