Judgement A. MISRA, J.- This appeal has been preferred against an order granting temporary injunction restraining the appellants from withdrawing the compensation money awarded to their share in a land acquisition proceeding. 2. The facts, in brief, are that 1.294 acres of land were acquired by the State in 1952 in Land Acquisition Case No. 3 of 1952-53. In the course of the said proceeding, the Land Acquisition Collector made a reference u/s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge, Cuttack which was registered as Misc. Case No. 64 of 1956 (L.A.). In the said proceeding before the Land Acquisition Court, it was held that respondents Nos. 1 to 8 were entitled to one-third interest in the acquired property and the court passed orders apportioning the compensation awarded between the different parties. Respondents Nos. 1 to 8 filed T. S. No. 73 of 1968 to set aside the aforementioned award on grounds of fraud and claimed that they alone are entitled to the entire compensation money amounting to about Rs. 85,000/-. They also filed a petition under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil P. C. for grant of a temporary injunction restraining the present appellants from withdrawing the compensation money awarded to their share by the Land Acquisition Court. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed this prayer and issued a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from withdrawing their share of the compensation money till disposal of the suit. The said order is under challenge in this appeal. 3. For the appellants, it is contended that in the circumstances proved, there is no valid ground for issue of a temporary injunction, particularly when they are prepared to furnish adequate security for the amount to be withdrawn, they will be put to considerable loss as the compensation money already in deposit will not earn any interest during the period payment is not made to them in accordance with the injunction order. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents Nos. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 8 contends that though the Land Acquisition Court has passed an award declaring the share to which the appellants are entitled, the said award having been brought about by fraud committed by the appellants, they should not be allowed to withdraw the amount, and in case such withdrawal is permitted, plaintiffs will be put to considerable hardship in recovering the same when ultimately they succeed in the suit. It is also argued that when the validity of the award is being challenged on grounds of fraud, it is necessary that the status quo as it was on the date of the suit should be maintained. 4. The well-settled principles which govern exercise of the discretion conferred under Order 39, R. 1, Civil P. C. in the grant of injunction are (1) the person seeking a temporary injunction must satisfy the Court that there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on the facts before the Court there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for; (2) Court's interference is necessary to protect the applicant from the species of injury which is described as irreparable before his legal right can be established on trial and (3) the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. 5. In the present case, there is no dispute that the award passed by the Land Acquisition Court apportioning the compensation amount between the respective parties has the force of a decree. No appeal was filed against the said decision of the Land Acquisition Court, and as such, so long it stands, the appellants are entitled to the share of money awarded to them. Plaintiffs in the title suit have sought to set aside the decision of the Land Acquisition Court on grounds of fraud. To succeed in such a suit, the onus necessarily is on the plaintiffs to establish positively the species of fraud on which the award of the Land Acquisition Court is sought to be set aside. This will depend on the evidence and other material produced before the court at the trial. To succeed in such a suit, the onus necessarily is on the plaintiffs to establish positively the species of fraud on which the award of the Land Acquisition Court is sought to be set aside. This will depend on the evidence and other material produced before the court at the trial. In such circumstances, at best it can be said that there is a point to be decided on merits about the alleged fraud having been perpetuated. The court below has observed that the principle of granting injunction is to maintain the status quo. Strictly, this is not a correct enunciation of the principle. As already stated, even if it is held that plaintiffs have got a prima facie case or a point to be decided in the suit, that by itself will not be sufficient to grant an injunction. The applicants must further show that in the event of withholding the relief for temporary injunction, they will suffer irreparable injury, that balance of comparative mischief or inconvenience will justify grant of such temporary injunction and the existence of a clear necessity for affording immediate protection. 6. In the present case, the apprehension of plaintiffs is that unless such a temporary injunction is granted and appellants are allowed to withdraw their share of the compensation, plaintiffs will be unable to recover the amount when ultimately they succeed. This apprehended injury, in our opinion, cannot be considered irreparable or even substantial. Appellants have all along offered to furnish adequate security for the amount to be withdrawn by them. Therefore, even if plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 to 8 ultimately succeed in the suit, the decision of the Land Acquisition Court is set aside and they are found entitled to the entire compensation money, there will be no difficulty in their recovering the amount from the security furnished by the appellants. The balance of convenience, in our opinion, also does not justify grant of the temporary injunction. Admittedly, the entire compensation money which is a heavy amount is already in deposit and will not earn any interest so long it continues in deposit. Restraining the appellants from withdrawing their share will mean nothing else than allowing the amount of compensation to remain in idle deposit. Admittedly, the entire compensation money which is a heavy amount is already in deposit and will not earn any interest so long it continues in deposit. Restraining the appellants from withdrawing their share will mean nothing else than allowing the amount of compensation to remain in idle deposit. On the other hand, if appellants are allowed to withdraw their share of the money, they will derive benefit by earning interest or utilising it otherwise instead of its continuing as dead capital. The present case is not one where refusal of the injunction will result in injury or damage to the property which would necessitate immediate protection. All that the plaintiffs can achieve by continuance of the injunction is to prevent the appellants from taking their share of the money granted under the award of the Land Acquisition Court. Thus, considered from any point of view, in our opinion, it is not a fit case for grant of a temporary injunction, particularly when appellants offer to furnish adequate security for the amount before withdrawing their share. 7. Hence, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the court below and order that appellants be entitled to withdraw their share of the compensation money as awarded by the Land Acquisition Court on furnishing sufficient security in immoveable properties to the satisfaction of the learned Subordinate Judge. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 8. PATRA, J. :- I agree.