JUDGMENT - R.M. KANTAWALA, J.:---The plaintiffs have taken out a Chamber Summons in this suit for a direction and order that this suit along with the Notice of Motion dated December 10, 1968 taken out by the plaintiffs against the defendants be transferred from the file of this Court to that of the Bombay City Civil Court, in pursuance of sub-section (2)(c) of section 6 of the Suits Valuation and Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) and Bombay City Civil Court Decree and Orders (Validating) Act, 1969, (Maharashtra Act No. IX of 1970). 2. The material allegations in the plaint can be briefly summarised as under :--- 3. "According to the plaintiffs, M/s. Parshurampura Sons Pvt. Ltd., were at the relevant time the owners of an immoveable property situate at Walkeshwar Road, comprising two plots of land bearing Cadestral Survey Nos. 3 and 7 of Malabar Hill Division along with all the structure standing thereon including a main building consisting of a basement, a ground floor and two upper floors and a chawl godown etc. It is case of the plaintiffs that under a registered Indenture of lease dated January 23, 1960 M/s. Parshrampuria Sons Pvt. Ltd. created a lease in favour of the plaintiffs of these properties for a period of 15 years commencing from January 18, 1960 and upon the terms and conditions therein contained. The plaintiffs further allege that pursuance to this lease they are in possession of this property including the bungalow and the structure standing thereon. Portions of this property are sublet by the plaintiffs and portions thereof are used for personal occupation by the partners of the plaintiffs and the members of their family. The plaintiffs further state that the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and A-1 Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. who are the defendant in this suit are since the month of June, 1968 holding out threats to demolish the existing bungalow and also to carry out other demolition work set out in Municipal Notice No. EB. 28/2176/A of 1968-1969 dated May 13, 1968 Ex. C to the Plaint. 28/2176/A of 1968-1969 dated May 13, 1968 Ex. C to the Plaint. By this notice, the Executive Engineer of the Bombay Municipal Corporation has contended that the existing old bungalow facing Walkeshwar Road is to be pulled down to the ground level and the land thereof is to be converted into a garden as per the plans approved vide I.C.D. No. EB/2176/A of March 9, 1963, that the existing old building in north east corner which is partly demolished is to be pulled down to the ground level as per the plans approved vide intimation of disapproval referred to above; that the connection passage at the second floor level between the old building leading to the portion of the new building is to be demolished. By this notice issued under section 353 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. Ratanlal Parusrampuria, to whom the notice is addressed, is called upon to comply with the requisition therein contained. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendants are threatening to demolish the bungalow and to enforce the said notice dated 31st May, 1968 in utter disregard of the plaintiffs proprietary rights in the property. They distinctly ever that the defendants are not entitled to carry out the demolishing work mentioned in the said notice and that the said notice is totally illegal, null and void, without jurisdiction and ultra vires on the grounds which are enumerated thereafter in para 5 of the plaint, in the first ground they have alleged that this impugned notice has been issued without issuing a show cause notice that the defendants had not given to the plaintiffs any opportunity whatsoever at any time in connection with the purported decision to demolish the said property and carry out the demolition work referred to in the said notice; in ground (b) they alleged that the impugned action of the defendants contravenes the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India; It may be stated that the words "impugned action" referred to in this ground are only referrable to the decision of the Corporation and/or its officers to demolish the various structures as stated in the Notice. The ground (c) they allege that the bungalow and all the structures in question are duly authorised structures; that the same have not been constructed in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act or the Bye-laws made thereunder and that the defendants have unjurisdiction to issue any notice for carrying out the demolition work under section 353 of the Act or under any other provisions of the Act. In ground (d) they challenged the validity of section 353 of the Act. In ground (e) they allege that even if section 353 is valid, the provisions thereof cannot be availed of by defendant No. 1 after the expiry of 3 months from the date of the completion of structure in question. In ground (f) they allege that the impugned notice Ex. C to the plaint is too vague and that it has been issued without application of mind whatsoever. In ground (g) they allege that the defendants are not entitled to enforce against the plaintiffs an agreement or an arrangement that may have been strived at or entered into between the landlords of the property or defendant No. 2 and the Municipal Corporation while approving the plans. Lastly, in ground (h) they allege that the impugned notice Ex. C to the plaint, is issued as a result of collusion between some of the flat holders in the new building erected in Plot No. 7 by defendant No. 2 and the Officers of defendant No. 1 and the same is issued mala fide. In para 7 of the plaint, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants have held out threats to commit a tort threatening to demolish the property to which the plaintiffs have lease hold interest without due course of law and in colourable exercise of its powers and on pretext of exercising such alleged powers. There are two substantive prayers in the plaint. By prayer (a) the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that the said notice dated May 31, 1968 a copy whereof is Ex. C to the plaint in null and void and illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. By prayer (b) they pray for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from enforcing the impugned notice dated May 31, 1968 or from taking only steps pursuant thereto or in connection therewith in any manner whatsoever. 4. C to the plaint in null and void and illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. By prayer (b) they pray for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from enforcing the impugned notice dated May 31, 1968 or from taking only steps pursuant thereto or in connection therewith in any manner whatsoever. 4. As shown by the averments in para 11 of the plaint, it is the case of plaintiffs that the reliefs claimed in this suit are not susceptible of monetary valuation and that the plaintiffs have, therefore, paid a fixed Court fee of Rs. 30/- under the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. The plaint in this suit was lodged on December 6, 1968. 5. The present Chamber Summons is taken out by the plaintiffs in view of the provisions of sections of section 6(2)(c) of Maharashtra Act No. IX of 1970. It is as under :--- "It any suits or proceedings, the subject matter of which is not susceptible of monetary evaluation or is not capable of being estimated in money value, have been filed and pending in the High Court at the commencement of this Act, they shall be transferred to the City Court and shall be heared and disposed of by the City Civil Court; and the City Civil Court shall have all the powers and jurisdiction thereof as if they had been originally instituted in that Court. Any order made by the High Court granting any interim relief shall stand as if it had been made by the City Civil Court." 6. The contention of Mr. Dhanuka on behalf of plaintiffs is that the subject matter of this suit is not susceptible of monetary evaluation or not capable of being estimated in money value. He submits that a distinction should be drawn between the subject matter of a suit and a case where the dispute relates to property which may be capable of monetary evaluation or being estimated in money. He submits that a distinction should be drawn between the subject matter of a suit and a case where the dispute relates to property which may be capable of monetary evaluation or being estimated in money. He said that in such a case it is the subject matter in dispute that has to be valued and not the value of the property to which the dispute relates; on the other hand, the contention on behalf of the defendants is that the subject matter of this suit inter alia is to restrain the defendants from demolishing the various structures referred to in the Municipal notice or from implementing or enforcing the said notice. It is contended on their behalf that the present suit is governed by Article 7 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 and that the plaintiffs are in error in contending that for the purposes of Court fees, the suit is governed by the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Act. 7. Under section 6(iv)(j) of the Act, in suit where declaration is sought, with or without injunction or other consequential relief and the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary valuation and which are not otherwise provided for by this Act, the Court fees payable shall be thirty rupees. The material part of the Article 7 of the Schedule 1 of the Act provides that in respect of any other plaint, application or petition (including memorandum of appeal) to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss, including cases wherein application or petition is either treated as a plaint or is described as the mode of obtaining the relief as aforesaid, a fee on the amount of the monetary gain or loss to be prevented, according to the scale prescribed under Article 1 shall be paid as and by way of Court fees. 8. The first question to be considered is whether the plaintiffs were right in contending that Court fees in respect of the plaint in this suit are payable in accordance with the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Act. 8. The first question to be considered is whether the plaintiffs were right in contending that Court fees in respect of the plaint in this suit are payable in accordance with the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Act. The provisions of this sub-section will be attracted if the following conditions are fulfilled; (i) the suit should be for a declaration with or without injunction or other consequential relief; (ii) the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and (iii) the suit must be of a nature which is not otherwise provided by the provisions of the Court Fees Act. The last ingredient above specified indicates that if the suit as framed is capable of being valued under any other provisions of the Act, the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) cannot be invoked. The only other provision referred to on behalf of the defendants is Article 7 of the Schedule 1 of the Act. That article inter alia applies where the plaint is to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of prevention of monetary loss and the fees payable on such a plaint are in the amount of the loss to be prevented, according to the scale prescribed under Article 7. The argument on behalf of the defendants is that one of the primary objects of the plaintiffs in instituting this suit is to prevent to threatened action of the Corporation to demolish the various structures set out in the notice (Copy whereof is Ex. "C" to the Plaint). On the other hand, the contention of Mr. Dhanuka is that it is only the validity of the notice that has been challenged and when such is a case, it cannot be said that the substantive relief is capable of being valued in terms of prevention of monetary loss. 9. For considering the contention whether provisions of Article 7 Schedule 1 applied. Mr. Dhanuka contents that the Court should merely look at the reliefs claimed in the suit and not the substantive averments and in the plaint on which the issues are likely to arise. 9. For considering the contention whether provisions of Article 7 Schedule 1 applied. Mr. Dhanuka contents that the Court should merely look at the reliefs claimed in the suit and not the substantive averments and in the plaint on which the issues are likely to arise. He submits that the substantive reliefs claimed in the suit are (i) a declaration that the impugned notice is null and void and (ii) an injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from enforcing the impugned notice of from taking any steps pursuant thereto or from taking any steps pursuant thereto or in connection therewith in any manner whatsoever. It is not possible to insolate the prayers and to ignore the substantive averments made in the plaint. The prayers are the reliefs claimed by an aggrieved party having regard to his various contentions which are set out in the substantive averments in the plaint. Briefly, their case is that as losses, the plaintiffs have proprietary interest in the properties which the corporation intends to demolish; that the defendants are not entitled to carry out the demolition work mentioned in the notice and that the notice itself is illegal having regard to the various grounds enumerated in para 5 of the plaint. Thus the reliefs for declaration and injunction are asked for by the plaintiffs inter alia on the ground that the Corporation has no right whatsoever to carry out the demolition work. The suit is not restricted to merely challenging the validity of notice on technical grounds. By the present suit, the right of the Corporation to demolish the structures as well as the issuance of the notice are challenged. These are the objectives which are intended to be carried out by the reliefs that are asked for. Thus the reliefs are prayed inter alia on the ground that there is no power at the demolition work. When such is the case, the substantive relief in the suit is capable of being valued in terms of prevention of monetary loss. These are the objectives which are intended to be carried out by the reliefs that are asked for. Thus the reliefs are prayed inter alia on the ground that there is no power at the demolition work. When such is the case, the substantive relief in the suit is capable of being valued in terms of prevention of monetary loss. The case is therefore directly governed by Article 7 of Schedule 1 of the Bombay Court Fees Act and the plaintiffs are liable to pay Court Fees on the amount of the loss to be prevented according to the scale prescribed under Article 1 of Schedule I. If the case is governed by Article 7 of Schedule I, as I consider it to be, the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) cannot be invoked or applied because it is one of its essential ingredients that the suit must be of the nature as is not provided otherwise by this Act. If the suit is governed by any specific provision of the Act, it is not open to the plaintiffs to value the suit for the purposes of Court Fees Act in accordance with the provisions of section 6(iv)(j) of the Act. In my opinion having regard to the averments is the plaint and the reliefs asked for the suit is governed by Article 7 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fees Act and the plaintiffs are bound and liable to pay the Court Fees in accordance therewith. To such a suit the provisions of section 7(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Act IX of 1970 cannot be applied. 10. A number of cases were replied upon by Mr. Dhanuka with a view to support his contentions. I will briefly refer to the cases cited by him. He referred to two decisions of the Madras High Court, both of which are reported in. The first case that he referred to, is the case of (Venkatewara Rao v. Masultipatam Municipality)1, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 284. The Court held there that for the purposes of Court fees a suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the citizens and rate payers of a Municipality for a declaration that a resolution passed by the Municipal Council in respect of market and all that was done in pursuance thereof were illegal, ultra vires and void, false under Article 17-B of Schedule II, Court Fees Act. The subject matter of the suit is the resolution whose validity is being impeached and not the market to which the resolution related. Relying upon this case, the argument of Mr. Dhanuka was that simply because the impugned resolution relates to the property, the property is not the subject matter of the suit. In my opinion, in each case the subject matter of the suit has to be determined having regard to the various averments made in the plaint and the reliefs asked for. There can be no doubt that in the present case, the principal contention of the plaintiffs is that they have proprietory interest in the property, that the defendants have no right to demolish their property and the notice issued by them is open to challenge on the various grounds enumerated in para 6 of the plaint. There is not a case where the validity of a notice to challenged on technical ground only. Undoubtedly that the plaintiffs have done but that is not all. They have also challenged the right of the Corporation to demolish the structures mentioned in the notice. When such is a case the validity of the notice is not the only point in issue in the suit but the other issue that will arise in the suit will be whether the Corporation has a right to demolish the structures in which the plaintiffs claimed proprietary interest. One of the objects of this suit is to prevent loss which is capable of being monetarily valued. 11. The order decision of the Madras High Court relief upon is the case of (T.S.P. Sannadhigal v. State of Madras)2, A.I.R. 1956, Mad. 262. In that case all that the plaintiff alleged was that the defendant the State was taking action under the Madras Act No. 30 of 1947 which was illegal because the said Act did not apply to the properties in his possession. There was no dispute as to the title of the plaintiff to the proportion in question. There was no dispute as regard the suit properties between two rival claimants. The subject matter there was the applicability of the Madras Act No. 30 of 1947 to the properties, and that such subject matter was not obviously capable of valuation. The principle in this case has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no dispute as regard the suit properties between two rival claimants. The subject matter there was the applicability of the Madras Act No. 30 of 1947 to the properties, and that such subject matter was not obviously capable of valuation. The principle in this case has no application to the facts of the present case. It is one of the matters of controversy between the parties in this suit that the Corporation contents that it has a right to demolish the structures mentioned in the notice while the plaintiffs contend that the Corporation is not entitled to demolish any of the structures in which they have proprietary interest. 12. Mr. Dhanuka also relief upon the decision of this Court is (Chhotalal Kalidas v. Laxmidas Marvaram)3, 60 Bom.L.R. 587. This was a suit filed by a mortgagor for a declaration that a certain sale effected by defendant No. 1 a mortgagee, in favour of defendant No. 2 was illegal, void and invalid, ineffective and bad in law and the same be set aside and for an injunction against the two defendants restraining them from proceeding further with the completion of the sale. 13. The suit was valued as a suit for a declaratory decree where consequential relief was prayed for. The plaintiffs contended that such a suit was governed by the provisions of section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 and the plaintiffs were entitled to put their own valuation on the subject matter of the suit. The suit in this case is of a nature materially different from the one which I have to consider and the decision cannot be have any application to the facts of the case before me. 14. Same was the position as regards the case (Nariman K. Irani v. Batcha Sehib)4, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 676. 15. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Dhanuka upon a recent decision of this Court in (Jafferali v. Dossa Co.)5, A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 661. In this case a suit was filed by a creditor under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act seeking a declaration that a deed of assignment was void against the plaintiff. 676. 15. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Dhanuka upon a recent decision of this Court in (Jafferali v. Dossa Co.)5, A.I.R. 1969 Bom. 661. In this case a suit was filed by a creditor under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act seeking a declaration that a deed of assignment was void against the plaintiff. The Court took the view that the subject matter of the suit as framed was not the property comprised in the deed of assignment which was sought to be set aside but is the relief by way of declaration itself, namely, the declaration that the deed of assignment was void as against the plaintiff. That such a relief was not susceptible of monetary valuation and is governed by section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959. It is not possible to equate the present suit with the suit in that case. In every case, the substance of the matter has to be Judged from the averments made in the plaint, rights claimed thereafter and the reliefs asked for. Judged from this point of view, the contention of the plaintiffs seems to be that the Corporation has no right to demolish the structures in which the plaintiffs notice was illegal and void. Thus the authority of the Corporation to proceed with the threatened action as well as the issuance of the notice are both challenged. Thus one of the objects of this suit is to prevent the loss which is capable of being estimated in monetary value. 16. In the result, the Chamber Summons is dismissed with costs Counsel certified. 17. As I have taken the view that the suit in the present case is governed by Article 7 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959, the prothonotary and Senior Master shall intimate to the plaintiffs the amount of Court fees that is payable on the plaint in this suit. The plaintiffs shall pay the Court fees so demanded by the Prothonotary Senior Master, within a week of receipt of such intimation from the Prothonotary if the plaintiff commit default in paying the amount of the Court fees so demanded, the matter should be placed on my Board for further directions. -----