( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition under Ss. 435 and 439 of the Crl. P. C. and is directed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge of Dharwar in SC. No. 1 of 1969 on the file of that Court. By that judgment, the learned Sessions judge acquitted the 22 persons who were the accused in that case. The petitioner who is stated to be a son of one of the persons murdered in the incident out of which the sessions case arose, prays that the judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge be set aside. Respondents 1 to 22 in this revision petition were the 22 accused in that sessions case. Respondent 23 is the State of Mysore. This revision petition was filed on 7-7-1969 and was admitted on 28-7-1969. After the respondents were served with notices, Sri K. A. Swamy has appeared for respondents 1 to 22 and Sri G. Dayananda, learned Advocate has appeared for the State Public prosecutor on behalf of the State. ( 2 ) WHEN the case was taken up for arguments, Sri K. A. Swamy, learned Advocate for respondents 1 to 22, submitted that since the filing of this revision petition, an appeal which had been filed by the State against the order of acquittal made by the Sessions Court had been dismissed by the High Court and that in view of the dismissal of the said appeal, this criminal revision petition directed against the said order of acquittal need not be proceeded with and may be dismissed. He also produced a certified copy of the order made by this High Court in that Criminal Appeal, viz. , Criminal Appeal No. 254 of 1969. That certified copy shows that the appeal filed by the State of Mysore against the judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge of Dharwar in Sessions Case No. 1 of 1969, was dismissed at the stage of admission. The order made by the High Court is as follows:"order heard the learned Counsel for the State. There are no grounds to admit the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Sd. M. Santhosh, judge, 7-10-69. Sd. K. Bhimiah, judge, 7-10-69. " ( 3 ) SRI Khazi learned Advocate for the petitioner did not agree with the above contention advanced by Sri K. A. Swamy and wanted to address arguments on the merits of the revision petition. There are no grounds to admit the appeal. Appeal dismissed. Sd. M. Santhosh, judge, 7-10-69. Sd. K. Bhimiah, judge, 7-10-69. " ( 3 ) SRI Khazi learned Advocate for the petitioner did not agree with the above contention advanced by Sri K. A. Swamy and wanted to address arguments on the merits of the revision petition. But, on being requested by the Court to establish the maintainability of this revision petition in the face of the order of the High Court declining to admit the state's appeal against acquittal, 'the learned Advocate for the petitioner advanced the following main grounds: (1) That the order made by the High Court in the abovesaid criminal appeal was not a final order and would not operate as a bar to the continuance of this revision petition. (2) that the order made by the High Court in the said criminal appeal filed by the State, was one of summary dismissal and that, therefore, the court of revision is not precluded from going into the matter once again;and (3) that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court being a separate jurisdiction, the view taken by the High Court in appeal would not be a bar to the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. ( 4 ) SRI G. Dayananda the learned Advocate appearing for the State public Prosecutor, did not take any firm stand but gave the impression that he was inclined to support the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. ( 5 ) IN support of the first contention that the order made by the High court in Crl. A. No. 254 of 1969 was not of a final nature, Sri Khazi sought to place reliance on a decision of this High Court reported in State of mysore v. Biyamma, (1963) 1 Mys. L. J. 275. The finality attached to judgments of criminal courts is dealt with by S. 480 of the Cr. A. No. 254 of 1969 was not of a final nature, Sri Khazi sought to place reliance on a decision of this High Court reported in State of mysore v. Biyamma, (1963) 1 Mys. L. J. 275. The finality attached to judgments of criminal courts is dealt with by S. 480 of the Cr. P. C. and the question of finality of the criminal appellate judgments of the High Courts came up for consideration in State of Mysore v. Biyamma (1); but that was in the context of the question as to whether the High Court could review its own judgment when it was found that the said judgment was based entirely on a mistaken impression of the Counsel as well as the High Court that the lawyer appointed for the defence of the accused in the Sessions Court had not been given sufficient time to prepare the case (when, as a matter of fact, ample time had been given ). It was held, in the circumstances of that case, that in order to secure ends of justice, the High Court could review its earlier judgment. But, in the present case, there is no question involved of reviewing any judgment of the High Court, the revision petition being one directed against the judgment of acquittal made by the Sessions Judge. There being no question now as to whether the High Court can or cannot review its own criminal appellate judgment, the decision in State of Mysore v. Biyomma (1) will not be helpful in any way. In U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 , it has been stated (in the majority judgment of bhagwati and Imam JJ.) at page 652, that under S. 439 Cr. P. C. , the High court has no jurisdiction to exercise any revisional powers 'qua' its own judgments or orders, the same being invested with finality and otherwise being outside the purview of the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The order of dismissal made by the High Court in Crl. App. 254 of 1969 cannot be questioned in revision. Therefore, the position in the present case is, that the said order dismissing the criminal appeal not having been set aside by the High Court in review or by the Supreme Court in appeal, has become final. The order of dismissal made by the High Court in Crl. App. 254 of 1969 cannot be questioned in revision. Therefore, the position in the present case is, that the said order dismissing the criminal appeal not having been set aside by the High Court in review or by the Supreme Court in appeal, has become final. ( 6 ) BUT it was argued by Sri Khazi that as the order made by the high Court in the said criminal appeal is one of summary dismissal and not after a full hearing of both the parties, the Court of revision can go into the matter once again. It was urged that the order of summary dismissal of the criminal appeal would not have the effect of replacing the judgment of the trial Court and therefore it would be open to the Court of revision to examine the correctness of the judgment of acquittal passed by the Court of Session. Sri Dayananda the learned Advocate appearing for for the State Public Prosecutor, pointed out that in the context of considering the scope and effect of sub-sec. (6) of S. 439 Cr. P. C. , certain observations have been made by the Supreme Court in Chopra v. State of bombay (2), to the effect that an order dismissing a criminal appeal 'in limine' would not tantamount to a judgment replacing the judgment of the lower Court. Even so, it does not follow that the High Court, while summarily dismissing a criminal appeal, has not applied its mind as to the correctness of the judgment of the lower Court. The power of summarily dismissing a criminal appeal is one which has been expressly conferred by S. 421 of the Cr. P. C. The implications of summary dismissal of the appeal under S. 421 of the Cr. P. C. have been explained by Gajendragadkar, J. in a decision of the Supreme Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of W. B. , AIR 1963 SC 1696 . P. C. The implications of summary dismissal of the appeal under S. 421 of the Cr. P. C. have been explained by Gajendragadkar, J. in a decision of the Supreme Court in Chittaranjan Das v. State of W. B. , AIR 1963 SC 1696 . In para 12 at page 1700, it has been stated as follows:"when a criminal appeal is brought before the High Court the high Court has to be satisfied that it raises an arguable or substantial question; if it is so satisfied, the appeal should be admitted; if on the other hand, the High Court is satisfied that there is no substance in the appeal and that the view taken by the trial Court is substantially correct, it can summarily dismiss the appeal. It is necessary to emphasise that the summary dismissal of the appeal does not mean that before summarily dismissing the appeal, the High Court has not applied its mind to all the points raised by the appellant. Summary dismissal only means that having considered the merits of the appeal, the High court does not think it advisable to admit the appeal because in its opinion, the decision appealed against, is right. Therefore, we do not think the High Court was right in granting certificate to the appellant on the ground that his appeal should not have been summarily dismissed by another Division Bench of the said High Court. If the high Court in dealing with criminal appeals takes the view that there is no substance in the appeal, it is not necessary that it should record reasons for its conclusion in summarily dismissing it. "therefore, from the mere iact that the order in the criminal appeal by the State is one of summary dismissal, it would not be correct to assume that the High Court had not applied its mind to the merits of that appeal. On the other hand, it would be proper to proceed on the basis that it was because the High Court was satisfied that there was no substance in the appeal and that the view taken by the trial Court was substantially correct, that the High Court summarily dismissed that appeal. On the other hand, it would be proper to proceed on the basis that it was because the High Court was satisfied that there was no substance in the appeal and that the view taken by the trial Court was substantially correct, that the High Court summarily dismissed that appeal. There is no merit in the contention that because the order made by the High Court in the said criminal appeal was one of summary dismissal, the Court of revision is not precluded from going once again into the question of the correctness of the trial Court's judgment of acquittal. ( 7 ) IT is necessary to understand the true nature of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in order to correctly assess the last contention of Sri Khazi that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court being a separate jurisdiction, the view taken by the High Court in the criminal appeal filed by the State, would not come in the way of the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The very language of sub-sec. (1) of S. 435 Cr. P. C. makes it clear that the revisional power vested in the High Court or the sessions Judge is for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of any inferior criminal Court. It is made clear in sub-sec. (1) of S. 439 that the High Court may in its discretion, exercise any of the powers mentioned therein. It is, therefore, a discretionary power. While referring to the revisional jurisdiction vested under S. 439 of the Cr. P. C. the Supreme Court has stated in Pranab kumar Mitra v. State of W. B. , AIR 1959 SC 144 as follows at page 147:"indeed, it is a discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of justice. Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given case, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given case, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by S. 439 of the Code, read with S. 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their powers vested in them by the code. "in the present case, the High Court had occasion, in the criminal appeal which had been preferred by the State, to satisfy itself about the correctness of the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court. The state, which under S. 417 of the Cr. P. C. had the statutory right to prefer the appeal, was heard and the Court considered the question whether there was any substance in that appeal. Acting under S. 421 of the Cr. P. C. , the High Court, being satisfied of the correctness of the lower Court's judgment of acquittal, summarily dismissed the State's appeal. The real purpose of S. 439 of the Cr. P. C. has thus been already served. It is, therefore, no longer necessary for the High Court to consider once again the question of the correctness of the judgment of acquittal passed by the court of Session. The petitioner has not been given any right under S. 439 of the Cr. P. C. , and the revisional jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be invoked for gratification of private malice or to vindicate the position of a private prosecutor. Nor can the revisional jurisdiction of the High court be exercised in such a way as to bring it into conflict with an order made by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under another provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. The implication of the High court's order summarily dismissing the State's criminal appeal being that in its view the Sessions Court's judgment of acquittal is correct, respondents 1 to 22 should not be further harassed by the continuance of this revision petition. The interests of justice will not be served by continuing this revision petition and there is no need to go into the merits of the allegations made therein. The interests of justice will not be served by continuing this revision petition and there is no need to go into the merits of the allegations made therein. ( 8 ) IN the result, this revision petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .