JUDGMENT : SHAMBHU PRASAD SINGH, J. The petitioners have filed this application under Section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing, the proceeding pending in G.R. Case no. 434 of 1969 before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Godda. Petitioners 2 and 3 are driver and cleaner respectively of a motor truck bearing no. B.R.W. 7105 and petitioner no. 1 is an employee of a firm M/S Sheoshanker Rice Mills of Deoghar. 2. It appears that on the 7th December, 1969, a first information was drawn up at Godda Police Station on the basis of a sanaha alleging, inter alia, therein that on the 6th December, 1969, the said truck was carrying paddy from Godda to Deoghar for M/S Sheoshanker Rice Mills without informing the authorities and obtaining their permission for transport of the paddy. It is not in dispute that permission was accorded to the truck to carry paddy once from Godda to Deoghar, but, according to the allegations in the first information report, that permission was being misused for making several trips. The police has not completed investigations as yet. G. R. Case DO. 434 of 1969 in the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Godda, has been registered merely on receipt of a copy of the first information repot. Though the prayer in the application was for quashing the -proceeding in the said case, at the time of arguments, it has been submitted that the investigations pending before the police be quashed. If on merits, it is found that it is a fit case for quashing the investigation, in my opinion, the application of the petitioners ought not to fail on the technical ground that no 'specific prayer for quashing the investigation has been made in it. 3. Mr. H.L. Agarwal, appearing for the petitioners, bas submitted that it is a fit case for quashing the investigation inasmuch as even if the allegations in the first information report are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out any offence. According to the prosecution, the petitioners have committed an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). Section 7 of the Act lays down that any person contravening any order made under Section 3 of the Act can be punished. According to the prosecution, the petitioners have committed an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). Section 7 of the Act lays down that any person contravening any order made under Section 3 of the Act can be punished. Learned counsel, appearing for the State, was not able to produce before me any order purported to have been passed under Section 3 of the Act banning movement of rice from one subdivision to the other subdivision of the same district without informing the authorities and obtaining their permission. He his however, relied on a D.O. letter of the Food Commissioner, Bihar, dated the 14th December, 1967, which shows that -before taking food grains from a block, subdivision or district to another place, for which permit was not required, information should be given to the authorities concerned and permission obtained from them for the purpose. This letter has been made Annexure 1 to the petition itself, It is nowhere stated in this letter that it was being issued as an order under Section 3 of the Act. Really it was a D.O. letter for giving facilities to the businessmen and by no stretch of imagination it can be said to be an order under Section 3 of the Act. No one can be punished under' Section 7 of the Act for contravention of this letter. In the circumstances, it is manifest that the allegations in the first information report, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute any offence. 4. Learned Counsel for the State has then submitted that this Court can not and ought not quash an investigation pending before the police. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the decision- of the Supreme Court in (1) State of West Bengal V.S.N. Basak (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 447). It was observed in this case – "The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the decision- of the Supreme Court in (1) State of West Bengal V.S.N. Basak (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court, 447). It was observed in this case – "The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of and alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the court under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code." In support of this observation, the Supreme Court relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee in (2) Emperor V. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (A.I.R. 1945 Privy Council, 18) and set aside the order of the High Court of Calcutta quashing an investigation pending before the police. 5. Mr. H.L. Agarwal, on the other hand, has' contended that in Basak's case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were concerned with a first information report which did disclose a cognizable offence. According to him, an investigation pending before the police on the basis of a first information report, which does not disclose a cognizable offence of any offence at all, can be quashed by this Court. He relies on the following observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad's case itself: "No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam, J. may well have decided rightly in A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 129". The case of (3) M.M.S.T. Chidambaram Chettiar V. Shanmugham Pillai (A.I.R. 1938 Madras, 129) was a case started on a petition of complaint and not on a first information report. The above quoted observation of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad's case, however, does support the contention of Mr. 129". The case of (3) M.M.S.T. Chidambaram Chettiar V. Shanmugham Pillai (A.I.R. 1938 Madras, 129) was a case started on a petition of complaint and not on a first information report. The above quoted observation of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad's case, however, does support the contention of Mr. Agarwal that an investigation pending before the police in cases where the first information reports do not disclose a cognizable offence or an offence at all, can be quashed, as in such cases the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation. Mr. Agarwal bas also relied on the well koown decision of the Supreme Court in (4) R.P. Kapur V. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court, 866). In this case, while laying down in what circumstances, a High Court may quash the criminal proceedings under its inherent powers, Gajendra Gadkar, J. (as then he was) who delivered the judgment for the Supreme Court, observed - “Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First. Information Report on the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person." These observations, though they do not expressly speak of quashing an investigation, do impliedly support the contention of Mr. Agarwal that where the allegations in the first information report do not disclose an offence, the investigation can be quashed by this Court. 6. In (5) A. K. Jain and others V. Government of India and others (1968 P.L.J.R. 179), a bench of this Court did issue a writ of mandamus to the Investigating Officer not to take any further step or to do anything in the matter of investigation inasmuch as that would have amounted to a mala fide exercise or an abuse of power. Learned counsel, appearing for the State, bas drawn my attention to another Bench decision of this Court in (6) State of Bihar V. Baijnath Sharma. Learned counsel, appearing for the State, bas drawn my attention to another Bench decision of this Court in (6) State of Bihar V. Baijnath Sharma. (A.I.R. 1956 Patna, 528) where an order of the Magistrate summoning the accused and withdrawing the investigation from the police was set aside with an observation that where a complaint had been filed before a Magistrate and an investigation on the basis of a First Information Report alleging the same facts was proceeding on simultaneously, the proper procedure was to allow the investigation to continue. It was also observed in this case that the statutory right of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence should not be interfered with in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of this observation, reliance was placed on Nazir Ahmad's case. That case is not an authority for the proposition that in no case an investigation pending before the police can be quashed by this Court. Baijnath Sharma's case too was not a case where the allegations in the First Information Report did not disclose a cognizable offence or any offence at all nor there was any question of mala fide exercise or abuse of power and, therefore, cannot be held to be an authority that in no case an investigation pending before the police can be quashed by this Court. In the instant case, as the allegations in the first Information Report, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not make out an offence, the police has no authority to proceed with the investigation and to allow it to proceed with the investigation will amount to mala fide exercise or an abuse of power. 7. For the foregoing reasons, I would allow this application and quash the investigation pending with Godda Police in Case No.1 dated 7-12-1969 based on the First Information Report, which is Annexure 2 to this application. Application allowed.