Ramchandra v. Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya
1970-07-18
A.P.SEN, K.L.PANDEY
body1970
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER A. P. Sen, J. This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Vice-Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, terminating the services of the petitioner. The few facts that need to be mentioned are these. The University was established under Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya Act, 1963 (No. 12 of 1963), which came into force w. e. f. 1st October 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On 6th May 1965, the petitioner was appointed to officiate temporarily until further orders as Assistant Registrar by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of his powers under section 48 (1) (d). Such appointment continued to have effect until the Vice-Chancellor terminated his employment w. e. f. 17th June 1967 F. N. by his order dated 6th May 1967. The petitioner made representations against the termination of his service but the same were rejected by the Vice-Chancellor by orders dated 21st February 1968 and 4th May 1968. Only question involved in the petition is whether the appointing authority of the petitioner was the Board. The petitioner urges that any orders passed by the first Vice-Chancellor during a period of 18 months from the date of his appointment or for such shorter period as may be determined by the Chancellor under section 4a (1), including the power of appointment of University Officers under clause (d) thereof, continued to have effect after the expiry of the period specified in sub-section (1), until it is modified or set aside by the authority or body competent to deal with in accordance with the provisions of the Act, by reason of section 48 (2). Under section 27 (2) (xxiii), the power of appointment of Officers, other than the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, vests in the Board. The Board is, however, empowered under section 27 (3) (xxviii) to delegate by regulation such power to the Vice-Chancellor. There is no regulation framed by the Board as required under section 38, and the order dated 1st June 1966, Annexure R-3, cannot be so regarded. Even otherwise, the Board has not delegated to the Vice-Chancellor its power of termination of service. Lastly, it is urged that the delegation of powers is not unqualified but subject to certain restrictions and the termination of service is a power which is outside the ambit of the powers delegated.
Even otherwise, the Board has not delegated to the Vice-Chancellor its power of termination of service. Lastly, it is urged that the delegation of powers is not unqualified but subject to certain restrictions and the termination of service is a power which is outside the ambit of the powers delegated. On a construction of the order of delegation, it is urged that the power delegated is in relation to posts other than posts of statutory officers, and the post of an Assistant Registrar does not fall in that category. Further, the powers are in relation to staff for which the Vice-Chancellor is the appointing authority. None of these contentions can be accepted. For a proper appreciation of the question involved, we think it necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act, Statute and Regulation framed thereunder which read as follows :- Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya Act, 1963: Section 12. The following shall be the officers of the Vishwa Vidyalaya, namely:- (1) the Chancellor, (2) the Vice-Chancellor, (3) the Comptroller, (i) the Registrar, (5) the Deans of the Faculties, (6) the Deans of Student Welfare, (7) the Director of Research Service, (8) the Director of Extension Service, and (9) such other officers in the service of the Vishwa Vidyalaya, as may be declared by the Statutes to be officers of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. Section 27. (1) The Board shall be the supreme authority of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. .....and shall exercise all the powers of the Vishwa Vidyalaya for carrying out the purpose of this Act: (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, the Board shall exercise the following powers and perform the following duties, namely:- 0)........................ (xxiii) save as otherwise provided by this Act, or the Statutes, to approve the appointments of officers, (other than the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor) teachers and other servants of the Vishwa Vidyalaya, to define their duties and conditions of their service and to provide for the filling of temporary vacancies in their posts; (xxviii) to delegate by Regulation any of its powers to the Vice-chancellor, the Registrar or such other officer of the Vishwa Vidyalaya or a Committee appointed by it as it may deem fit: Section 38. (.1) The authorities and other bodies of the Vishwa Vidyalaya may make Regulations consistent with this Act and the Statutes:- (a)........................
(.1) The authorities and other bodies of the Vishwa Vidyalaya may make Regulations consistent with this Act and the Statutes:- (a)........................ (b) providing for all matters which by this Act, and the Statutes are to be provided for by the Regulations; and Section 48. (i) The first Vice-Chancellor shall for a period of eighteen months from the date of his appointment or for such shorter period as may be determined by the Chancellor, have the following powers, namely:- (d) with the sanction of the Chancellor, to make such appointments as may be necessary to enable this Act or any part thereof to be brought into operation; (f) generally to exercise all or any of the powers conferred on the Board by this Act or Statutes. (2) Any orders passed by the Vice-Chancellor in exercise of the powers conferred by items (b), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall continue to have effect after the expiry of the period specified under sub-section (1) until it is modified or set aside by the authority or body competent to deal with it in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Delegation of powers" ORDER No. M & P/8057 Dated the 1st June, 1966. The Board of the J. N. Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya in their meeting held on 25th April 1966 have approved and sanctioned the delegation of administrative and financial powers, as listed respectively in Annexures I and II to this order, to various officers and employees of the Vishwa Vidyalaya shown in the Annexures. These delegations of powers will take effect from the date of issue of this order. By order of the Board of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. Sd/-(T. C. R. Menon, I. A. S.) Registrar. Statement showing delegation of Administrative powers at various levels in the Vishwa Vidyalaya sanctioned by the Board of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. S. No. Name of Power. Vice-Chancellor. 2. 3. To order appointments to posts other than posts of statutory officers. Full powers ?n respect of posts carrying a pay-scale minimum of which does not exceed Rs. 550 p.m. Removal or dismissal from the services of Vishwa Vidyalaya. In respect of staff for which he is the appointing authority. "Statutes" "Chapter II-Officer'' of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. A-Other officers.
2. 3. To order appointments to posts other than posts of statutory officers. Full powers ?n respect of posts carrying a pay-scale minimum of which does not exceed Rs. 550 p.m. Removal or dismissal from the services of Vishwa Vidyalaya. In respect of staff for which he is the appointing authority. "Statutes" "Chapter II-Officer'' of the Vishwa Vidyalaya. A-Other officers. Other officers-ID addition to the officers mentioned in clauses (i) to (8) of section 12, the following shall be the officers of the Vishwa Vidyalaya:- (1) Director of post-graduate Studies. (2) Director of Physical Plant. (3) Associate Deans. (4) Vishwa Vidyalaya Librarian. Under the scheme of the Act, the power of appointment of officers, other than the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, vests in the Board under section 27 (2) (xxiii), and that power could be delegated by the Board to the Vice-Chancellor, by a Regulation framed under section 27 (2) (xxviii). The Board, however, has to be constituted in the manner provided by section 25. Until the Board is so constituted, the Act directs by section 48 (1) that the first Vice-Chancellor shall, for a period of 18 months from the date of his appointment or for such shorter period as may be determined by the Chancellor, have the powers specified therein. One of the powers given to the first Vice-Chancellor is the power under clause (d) to make, with the sanction of the Chancellor, such appointments as may be necessary. When such an appointment is made, the appointment shall continue to take effect under section 48 (2), until it is modified or set aside by the authority or body competent to deal with it, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In accordance with the provisions of the Act, the appointment of the petitioner having been made by the first Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor became his appointing authority. The submission that the appointment so made by the first Vice-Chancellor, must be deemed to have been made by the Board, cannot be accepted. It is pertinent to observe that there is no provision made in section 48 like the provisions of sections 15 (10) and 17 (6), which read as follows;- 15(10). Alt acts done by the person appointed under sub section (8) or by the Registrar under sub-section (9) shall be deemed to be acts done by the Vice-Chancellor. 17 (6).
It is pertinent to observe that there is no provision made in section 48 like the provisions of sections 15 (10) and 17 (6), which read as follows;- 15(10). Alt acts done by the person appointed under sub section (8) or by the Registrar under sub-section (9) shall be deemed to be acts done by the Vice-Chancellor. 17 (6). The action taken by the Vice-Chancellor shall be deemed to be the action taken by the appropriate authority until it is set aside by such officer, authority or body... If the Legislature had intended that any action taken by the first Vice-Chancellor under section 48 (1), should be so regarded, the Legislature would have inserted a like provision in section 48. The absence of such a provision militates against the submission that the appointment of the petitioner by the first Vice-Chancellor must be deemed to be an appointment made by the Board. The contention that the Board was his appointing authority must, therefore, be rejected. We, accordingly, hold that the Vice-Chancellor was the appointing authority vis-a-vis the petitioner. The appointment of the petitioner made by the first Vice-Chancellor during the period of 18 months, however, continued to take effect after that period had elapsed by reason of section 48 (2) until it was set aside by the appropriate authority. The question is whether the Vice-Chancellor was the authority competent to set it aside, and we have no hesitation in saying that he was. Under section 16 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957, the power to make an appointment, includes a power to suspend or dismiss the employee. If that be so, then within the ambit of that power, the appointing authority also has a power to terminate his services. The section reads as follows:- Where, by any enactment, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unlew a different intention appears, the authority for the time being having power to make the appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power. It is urged that the initial appointment having been made with the sanction of the Chancellor under section 48 (1) (d), the Vice-Chancellor could not terminate the services without obtaining like sanction for effecting termination.
It is urged that the initial appointment having been made with the sanction of the Chancellor under section 48 (1) (d), the Vice-Chancellor could not terminate the services without obtaining like sanction for effecting termination. Emphasis is laid on the words "unless a different intention appears", and it is: urged that section 48 (I) (d) postulates that the exercise of the power thereunder shall be subject to the sanction of the Chancellor. That being so, it is said that the power of termination is also conditioned likewise, and the Vice-Chancellor could not take recourse to the power of termination, if any, without obtaining sanction of the Chancellor clearly. We are of the view that while section 48 (I) (d) makes the power for initial appointment subject to sanction of the Chancellor, there was no necessity for the Vice-Chancellor to secure the prior concurrence of the Chancellor, before serving the order of termination on the petitioner. Nothing would have been easier for the Legislature to provide in section 48 (2) chat the setting aside of an order passed under section 48 (1), which is subject to the approval of the Chancellor, shall not be modified or set aside, unless approval of the Chancellor is first obtained. It appears to us, on the terms of section 48 (2), that "a different intention appears", within the meaning of section 16 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act. The power of termination not being subject to' any restrictions, the Vice-Chancellor was competent to terminate the services of the petitioner, without obtaining the sanction of the Chancellor for the action proposed to be taken against him. We have no hesitation in holding that the Vice-Chancellor was the authority competent to terminate the services of the petitioner. The Board, by its order dated 1st June 1966, Annexure R-3, delegated some of its administrative powers. Among the powers delegated is the power to order appointments of servants to posts, other than posts of statutory officers. The contention that the order could not be treated as a Regulation framed under section 38 cannot be accepted. Section 38 only provides that the Board may frame a Regulation consistent with the Act and the Statutes, but the manner of framing such regulations is not prescribed.
The contention that the order could not be treated as a Regulation framed under section 38 cannot be accepted. Section 38 only provides that the Board may frame a Regulation consistent with the Act and the Statutes, but the manner of framing such regulations is not prescribed. There is no magic in the word "Regulation", and we do not think that there is any reason for us to hold that the Board's order dated 1st June 1966 is not a "Regulation" within the meaning of section 27 (2) (xxviii) providing for a delegation of the power enumerated therein, as it expressly delegates the power of appointment of officers to certain posts. The question is whether the petitioner falls within the category of officers brought within the purview of the Regulation. The expression "statutory officers" has not been defined in the Act, but there is no difficulty in under standing the class of officers who are statutory officers. Section 12 of the Act names certain officers of the University to be statutory officers, and apart from those enumerated, also directs that such other officers in the service of the University, as may be declared by the Statute to be officers of the University, shall be treated as such. We are, therefore, of the view that the expression ''statutory officer" must be understood to mean that statutory officers are those who are named in the Statute or declared to be so. The Statutes provide the class of "Other Officers" falling within the meaning of section 12, and an Assistant Registrar is not one of them. That being so, the petitioner was an officer holding a post, which was other than those of statutory officers, and he must, therefore, be held to fall within the ambit of the delegation of powers to the vice-Chancellor and in relation to him, the Vice-Chancellor is the appointing authority. The order of termination was passed on 6th May 1967 i.e. after the Vice-Chancellor had become his appointing authority. Under serial number 10 of the powers delegated, the Vice-Chancellor had the power to order his removal or dismissal from service. There is no reason why the word "removal" in the context in which it appears, should not be included in the power of termination of service of a person officiating temporarily until further orders. The discharge of such person from service must be treated as removal from 'service.
There is no reason why the word "removal" in the context in which it appears, should not be included in the power of termination of service of a person officiating temporarily until further orders. The discharge of such person from service must be treated as removal from 'service. Even if, in the context, the word 'removal' must mean termination of Service as a measure of punishment, we have no doubt that if the Vice-Chancellor had the power to take disciplinary action against the petitioner, he hail, by necessary implication, also the power to terminate his services. The result, therefore, is that the petition fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.