JUDGMENT : Kanhaiyaji, J. 1. This application has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by the Indian-Copper Corporation Ltd., herein referred to as "the Company", against an award dated August 22, 1969, given by respondent No. 2, the Presiding Officer. Labour Court, Ranchi, in Preference Case No. 10 of 1967. A copy of the award has been made Annexure 12 to this application and the petitioner's prayer is that the said award may be quashed by a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, ORDER :or direction. 2. The facts mentioned in the application under consideration are these. The petitioner is a public limited company and has a factory at Moubhandar, Ghatsila, for melting and refining copper. The company engages a number of workers whose service conditions are governed by a set of rules, known as Certified Standing ORDER :s, certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing ORDER :s) Act 1946, by the Certifying Officer empowered under the Act. The copies of the certified Standing ORDER :s and communications in Form 'G' and F. 11 are annexed to the application and marked as Annexures 1, 1(A) and 1(B). Sardar Khan (respondent No. 4) was employed as Converterman under the company at its Moubhandar establishment at the material time. The Government of Bihar declared the company's factory at Moubhandar as a "protected place" under Rule 7 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, by a notification dated September 6, 1963(?). In consequence of military action taken by Pakistan on India, the Government of India took certain actions to avoid Pakistani Nationals or persons of undefined status from working in such a protected place. The General Manager of the company in pursuance of the same was, directed to discharge from service several persons employed in the establishment of Moubhandar. In accordance with the said instruction from the Government, the company terminated the services of respondent No. 4 and two other persons. Respondent No. 4 filed an application before this Court, which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 476 of 1966 on July 22, 1966 for quashing the above ORDER :dated January 24, 1966, but the same was allowed to be withdrawn by an ORDER :of this Court dated July 26, 1966. Respondent No. 4 filed an application before this Court, which was numbered as C.W.J.C. No. 476 of 1966 on July 22, 1966 for quashing the above ORDER :dated January 24, 1966, but the same was allowed to be withdrawn by an ORDER :of this Court dated July 26, 1966. After the disposal of the said writ application, the vacancy caused by the termination of service of respondent No. 4 was finally filled up on August 1, 1966 by promotion of another employee Sri Singu Soren, who was officiating the post. Thereupon, respondent No. 4 made a representation to respondent No. 3, the Superintendent of Police of Singhbum of Chaibassa, who revised the appreciation the status of respondent No. 4 and addressed a communication to the petitioner stating that there was no objection to the reinstatement of respondent No. 4 on December 7, 1966. Thereupon the company informed the Superintendent of Police of Singhbum that the vacancy created by the discharge of respondent No. 4 had long since been filled up and his services were regularly terminated with payment in lieu of notice in accordance with the Standing ORDER :s and it was consequently not possible to take him back in service. It has also been stated that in January 1966, the company's rolling mills had to be stopped due to various restrictive measures and restrictions imposed by the Government of India with the result that most of the rolling mill employees numbering about 300 became surplus. The company received the representation from respondent No. 4 but he could not be taken back due to the circumstances explained above. 3. Respondent No. 4 raised an industrial dispute and the Government of Bihar by notification dated September 27, 1967, referred this industrial dispute for adjudication in respect of the matters specified in Annexure A which is as follows: Whether Sri Sardar Khan, ex-employee H. No. 667 converterman is entitled to reinstatementif not, to what relief and or compensation is he entitled to? After the receipt of the notification, the parties were notified to file their respective written statements, and they filed the same. 4. The case of the workman (respondent No. 4) was that he was a permanent workman of the company, having put in about twenty years of service with the company. He was working at the relevant time as a Senior Converter man, bearing badge No. 667. 4. The case of the workman (respondent No. 4) was that he was a permanent workman of the company, having put in about twenty years of service with the company. He was working at the relevant time as a Senior Converter man, bearing badge No. 667. His further contention was that he was the Vice-president of the Indian Copper Corporation Workers' Union which enjoyed the support of an overwhelming majority of the employees of the company, but it was not looked upon with favour by the company and was not recognised by the company. He received a letter from the company dated January 24, 1966 intimating to him that his services were terminated under the instructions, allegedly issued by the Government. On receipt of the letter, he sent a memorandum to the company requesting that the ORDER :of termination of his service was bad and that he should be reinstated. There was no response to his representations from the company in spite of the fact that the Superintendent of Police, Singhbhum in his memo dated December 7, 1966 informed him that there was no objection to his reinstatement on the part of the police at Chaibassa, and the management had informed accordingly. Thereafter respondent No. 4 wrote to the company praying for reinstatement, but no reply was received. When respondent No. 4 was informed by the Superintendent of Police, Chaibassa, by his letter dated December 17, 1966 that, according to the company, the vacancy created by the discharge of his service had long since been filled up and so he could not be reinstated, respondent No. 4 then raised the industrial dispute, and the same was referred to the Labour Court, Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi, as stated above. 5. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi, has come to the conclusion on evidence that respondent No. 4 is not a Pakistani national or a man of undefined status. Respondent No. 4 was not discharged for any misconduct. The company acted on the ORDER :of the police, who, anyhow, got the impression that respondent No. 4 was a man of undefined status. Subsequently, the police themselves wrote to the company that they had no objection if the workman concerned was reinstated. It is clear that police got the workman (respondent No. 4) removed from the service simply on the aforesaid suspicion that he is a man of undefined status. Subsequently, the police themselves wrote to the company that they had no objection if the workman concerned was reinstated. It is clear that police got the workman (respondent No. 4) removed from the service simply on the aforesaid suspicion that he is a man of undefined status. Therefore, the very basis on which the workman (respondent No. 4) concerned was discharged from the service was found to be incorrect and as such the termination of the service of the workman (respondent No. 4) was held to be improper and invalid. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi further held that respondent No. 4 was entitled to be reinstated with half wages from the date or the termination ORDER :up to the date on which he is reinstated. 6. The contentions raised before this Court by learned Counsel for the petitioner are that the Labour Court was wrong in concluding that the termination of respondent No. 4 was improper and invalid. It was argued that the Labour Court has committed an error apparent on the face of the record in considering the ORDER :of termination of service simplicities under the Standing ORDER :s as punishment. The Labour Court should have held that the company had acted on its bona fide belief on the report of the Superintendent of Police, Chaibassa, that the Government of Bihar had decided that respondent No. 4 was an unauthorised person and, therefore, his services could no longer be retained and as such in view of the specific provisions of the Standing ORDER :s under which action had been taken by the company, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to go behind it. Further, the Labour Court should have held that in view of the Standing ORDER :s the company was not required to assign any reason whatsoever for termination of the service of respondent No. 4. 7. The relevant Certified Standing ORDER :s are as follows: 9. SERVICE RULES: Service cards will be maintained for all employees, on which will be entered date of appointment, designation, pay, increases, leave, offences etc. Employees may inspect their Service Cards once a week on an appointed day. The services of a temporary employee may be terminated on giving one day's notice. SERVICE RULES: Service cards will be maintained for all employees, on which will be entered date of appointment, designation, pay, increases, leave, offences etc. Employees may inspect their Service Cards once a week on an appointed day. The services of a temporary employee may be terminated on giving one day's notice. The services of any permanent employee who is on a daily rate of pay may be terminated by the General Manager by giving him 14 days notice or 13 days pay in lieu of notice without assigning any reasons whatsoever. Permanent employees on monthly pay basis are entitled to receive a month's notice or a month's pay in lieu of notice. On the other hand, the company is entitled to receive 14 days of intention to resign in the case of daily paid permanent employees and a month's notice in case of permanent employees paid on a monthly basis. Discharge with notice, or wages in lieu of notice for permanent employees will ordinarily be made only in cases where a reduction in establishment renders it necessary or when an employee is considered to be incompetent to carry out the work on which he is employed. Clearly, it was not the case of the company even at the stage of the award or in this Court that the service of respondent No. 4 had been terminated for any misconduct. Therefore, the other provisions of the Standing ORDER :s are not necessary to be given at this stage. 8. In ORDER :to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to quote the letter dated January 24, 1966 which runs as follows: In accordance with instructions received from Government, we regret to advice that your services stand terminated as and from January 25, 1966. You will be allowed 13 days pay in lieu of notice in accordance with our Standing ORDER :s. Subject to the usual rules, your dues, if any, will be paid on your application to our Chief Accountant. 9. You will be allowed 13 days pay in lieu of notice in accordance with our Standing ORDER :s. Subject to the usual rules, your dues, if any, will be paid on your application to our Chief Accountant. 9. The grievance of the company is that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated, because it has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by not considering at all the contentions raised in paragraph 5 of the written statement filed on behalf of the company stating therein that the service of the workman were terminated in accordance with the certified Standing ORDER :s and there was no question of any mala fide or victimization on the part of the company In the rejoinder statement filed on behalf of the company before the Labour Court, it was further stated in paragraph 8 that the question of violation of principles of natural justice did not arise as the termination of the service was in accordance with the Standing ORDER :s. M.W. 1 P.A., to the General Manager of the company, before the Labour Court stated that the services of the workman concerned along with two others., were terminated in accordance with the Standing ORDER :s. However, he has admitted that about a week after the receipt of the letter of instruction dated January 17, 1966 for getting rid of this workman, the services of these workmen were terminated. 10. In my opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. A list of Pakistani Nationals of undefined status, according to the police, is attached to Annexure 4', the letter of the Superintendent of Police, Singhbhum, to D.I. Ghatsila. Sardar Khan, respondent No. 4, is shown to have been employed on November 21, 1946, and verification was required in his case. Therefore there can be no dispute in this case that respondent No. 4 was in the service of the company from before the partition between India and Pakistan, which took place in the year 1947. As against this, respondent No. 4 produced documents before the Labour Court showing that he was an Indian national and not a Pakistani national of undefined status. An affidavit filed by the workmen to the Chairman, Town Area Committee, Sherkot in the district of Binjor, dated June 30, 1966 (Ext. As against this, respondent No. 4 produced documents before the Labour Court showing that he was an Indian national and not a Pakistani national of undefined status. An affidavit filed by the workmen to the Chairman, Town Area Committee, Sherkot in the district of Binjor, dated June 30, 1966 (Ext. c) shows that respondent No. 4 was a permanent resident of Shtrkot, district Binjor. Respondent No. 4 also filed several oilier documents in support of his case that he was an Indian national. The company, on the other hand, produced no evidence to show that respondent No. 4 was a Pakistani national. Therefore, in this situation, the Labour Court rightly held that respondent No. 4 was an Indian national and not a Pakistani national. It is also admitted that even the police on verification came to the conclusion hat there was no objection to respondent No. 4 being reinstated by the company. This meant that the police on whose instruction respondent No. 4 was discharged on the ground of being a Pakistani national or of undefined status had no objection to the reinstatement of that man. 11. It was also not disputed before the Labour Court that, respondent No. 4 had been in the service of the company since 1946 and he had put in about twenty years of service. Hs was not discharged for any act of misconduct, tauter he was discharged on the suspicion that he was a man of undefined status or was a Pakistani national. At this stage, I refer once more to the termination ORDER :(Annexine 5). It clearly states that the service of respondent No. 4 had been terminated in accordance with the instructions received them the Government. Therefore, the termination was not in terms of the Standing ORDER :s, reviver, it is true that respondent No. 4 was allowed thirteen days' pay in lieu of notice in accordance with the Standing ORDER :s. In my opinion, on these materials, it can be safely held that the ORDER :of termination was due to the instructions received from the police who anyhow got the suspicion that respondent No. 4 was a man of undefined status. All these go to show that service of respondent No. 4 was not terminated according to the Standing ORDER :s, but the Police got him removed simply on the aforesaid suspicion. 12. All these go to show that service of respondent No. 4 was not terminated according to the Standing ORDER :s, but the Police got him removed simply on the aforesaid suspicion. 12. Annexure 5, the letter dated January 24, 1966, mentions that the petitioner's services stand terminated in accordance with the instructions received from the Government. No materials have been produced to show that any instruction had been received from the Government for terminating the petitioner's services. On the contrary, in the written statement filed on behalf of the company before the Labour Court, it was stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 thus;- 4. That the Divisional Inspector of Police, Ghatsila, personally came to the Corporation's office on January 24, 1966 and on a copy of the enclosure to the letter 59/PS dated 15th January, 1966 of the Superintendent of Police, wrote against the name of the second party (and another) 'To be discharged as they are of undefined status' and pressed for their immediate discharge. 5. That under the aforesaid circumstances, the Corporation had to terminate the services of the second party. The services of the second party were accordingly terminated in accordance with the Certified Standing ORDER :s under ORDER :No. GM/G-10. 14/2 dated January 24, 1966. There is no question of any mala fide or victimization on the part of the Corporation. It is clear, therefore, that no verification had been made by the employer on the suspicion raised by the police. In my opinion, the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Manage merit of U.B. Dutt and Co. (Private) Ltd. v Workman of U.B. Dutt (Private) Ltd (1962)ILLJ374SC : 1962 4 F.L.R. 247. applied to the facts of the instant case also. In that case Rule 18(a) of the Standing ORDER :s had provided that: When the management desires to determine the services of any permanent workman receiving 12 annas or more as daily wages, otherwise than under Rule 29, he shall be given 14 days notice or be paid 12 days wages. It had been contended by the employer that it was entitled under Rule 18(a) to dispense with the service of any employee as any time by just giving 14 days' notice or paying 12 days' wages. It had been contended by the employer that it was entitled under Rule 18(a) to dispense with the service of any employee as any time by just giving 14 days' notice or paying 12 days' wages. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the employer could not rest its case merely on Rule 18(a) and say that having acted under that rule that was nothing more to be said and that the Industrial Court could not inquire into the causes that led to termination of service under Rule 18(a).It was held that the Industrial Court had the right to inquire into the cause that might have led to termination of service even under a rule like 18(a) and if it was satisfied that the action taken under such a rule was a colourable exercise of power and was not bona fide or was result of victimization or unfair labour practice, it would have jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such termination. In the instant case, what has happened is that the petitioner company had terminated the services of respondent No. 4 under a colourable exercise of power, without any independent consideration of the matter. When the ORDER :of termination (Annexure 5) specifically stated that termination of service was in accordance with the instructions received from the Government, the petitioner can hardly rely on Standing ORDER :No. 9, when the Labour Court has gone into the entire history of the case as to how respondent No. 4's service came to be terminated. That the termination of the services of respondent No. 4 and some others was not a case of termination of service within the meaning of Standing ORDER :No. 9 is clear also from what was stated in paragraph 6 of the petitioner's written statement. It was mentioned therein that another employee of the company, namely, Abdul Aziz, whose services were terminated along with respondent No. 4 satisfied the police about his status and the Superintendent of Police had advised the Corporation by his memo dated April 29, 1965 that there was no objection to the reinstatement of Sri Abdul Aziz and, therefore, this employee was reinstated by the petitioner by ORDER :dated May 2, 1966. In these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that as no victimization or unfair labour practice on the part of the petitioner has been found by the Labour Court, the ORDER :of reinstatement of respondent No. 4 must be set aside. Apart from victimization or unfair labour practice, when the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the termination of service of respondent No. 4, merely on the suspicion of the police, was improper, it is difficult to interfere in this writ application, on the tegument that the termination of service was in accordance with some absolute right reserved to the employer by Standing ORDER :No. 9. It was also argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 4 should not have been ORDER :ed to be reinstated because there was no post available for him, as the vacancy caused by his termination of service had been filled up on August 1, 1966, by promotion of one Shri Singu Soren, as mentioned in paragraph 10 of the written statement filed by the company. This contention is also not valid, as the Labour Court was concerned only with the question of determining whether respondent No. 4 was entitled to reinstatement or not in accordance with the reference made to it. If it be held that the services of respondent No. 4 had not been validly terminated, there cannot be a bar to an ORDER :for his reinstatement, only because some one else had been engaged in his place. As a mailer of fact, the Labour Court took a very reasonable view, in giving relief to respondent No. 4, on his reinstatement, bORDER :ing on leniency towards the employer, is holding that it will be hard for the management to pay the full back wages to the workman concerned. 13. Upon a consideration of the materials on record and the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in this application, and it is, therefore, dismissed with costs. I assess the cost at Rs. 150/-(One hundred and fifty only) payable to respondent No. 4. U.N. Sinha, J. I agree.