JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - Plaintiffs has filed this second appeal from the reversing decision of Sri G. Panda, Additional Subordinate Judge, Puri, dated 4-3-1965, passed in title appeal No. 45/6 of 1004, dismissing the suit. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest and for recovery of possession of the suit-property which is sixty decimals appertaining to plot No. 546 in mouza. Odgaon which belongs to the deity, Raghunath Jew, Defendant-1. Plaintiff?s case is that he was granted temporary lease of the same for about ten years. The suit-land adjoins his house and was being used, during the duration of his temporary lease, as his Bari. On 19-4-1947, the Plaintiff applied for permanent lease to the Debottar Superintendent, who was the brother of the then Ruler of Nayagarh. Upon this, miscellaneous case No. 65 of 1947-1948 was started and by order dated 26.12.1947, the Debottar Superintendent directed permanent lease to be granted to the Plaintiff, and in anticipation of such grant, Nazarana was paid and accepted. Before this order was passed, there was a merger agreement entered into by the then Ruler of Ex. State of Nayagarh, with the Government of India. This agreement was dated 14-12.1947. Under this agreement the entire administration of the State was handed over to the Government of India with effect from 1st, of January, 1948. In due course an administrator was appointed under the Orissa States Administration Order who took over the charge of the administration on behalf of the Government of India with effect from 1-1-1948. Actual patta was granted by the administrator on 20-1-1948, and the rent was being paid by the Plaintiff till 1948. The villagers represented to the administrator against grant of permanent lease to the Plaintiff upon which the lease was cancelled by order of the administrator on 7-4-1948. The Plaintiff took up this matter in appeal to the Chief Administrator who confirmed the order of the administrator on 1-6-1948. 3. Under the Orissa States Administration Order, Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act had been extended to the Ex. State of Nayagarh. Under this Act, the Endowments Commissioner obtained jurisdiction over the institution of Raghunath view and its endowments. The Plaintiff took up this matter in appeal to the Chief Administrator who confirmed the order of the administrator on 1-6-1948. 3. Under the Orissa States Administration Order, Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act had been extended to the Ex. State of Nayagarh. Under this Act, the Endowments Commissioner obtained jurisdiction over the institution of Raghunath view and its endowments. After cancellation of the lease, a proceeding u/s 68 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act was initiated which was numbered as O.A. No. 103 of 1956-1957 and in pursuance thereof possession of the suit-land was taken from the Plaintiff and revisited with the deity. The order passed u/s 68 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act was confirmed by the Endowments Commissioner in revision case No. 50 of 1957-1958, by order dated 15-11-1951. The Plaintiff probably created disturbance in the possession of the deity in regard to the suit-land and a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure was started. This proceeding was numbered as Misc. Case No. 27/60 and ultimately this proceeding was referred to the civil Court u/s 146 and a finding with regard to possession was returned against the Plaintiff. Thereafter the present suit had been filed. 4. There are two Defendants, one is the deity, and the second is the Endowments Commissioner. The main defence was that the lease was not for legal necessity, and the Debottar Superintendent had no authority to grant such lease. The grant of such lease was, therefore, invalid and has been validly cancelled. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit on the ground that the brother of the Ruler was competent to grant the lease of the Debottar property. There was no loss occasioned to the deity on account of this lease and on those findings he decreed the suit. 6. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding with regard to legal necessity and held that there was no legal necessity for grant of the lease and no benefit was conferred on the estate of the deity thereby. The lease was, therefore, invalid. The trial Court?s decision was thereupon reversed and the suit was dismissed. 7. 6. The lower appellate Court reversed the finding with regard to legal necessity and held that there was no legal necessity for grant of the lease and no benefit was conferred on the estate of the deity thereby. The lease was, therefore, invalid. The trial Court?s decision was thereupon reversed and the suit was dismissed. 7. Three contentions have been raised in this second appeal: (i) The lower appellate Court was wrong in applying the law of endowments as prevalent in Orissa to the present endowment situated in Nayagarh Ex-State; (ii) At the time when the lease was directed to be granted, the Ruler was the sovereign in the Ex-State of Nayagarh. His order is paramount and sovereign. The Debottar Superintendent exercised the power of the Ruler by way of delegation and his order dated 26-12-1947 virtually amounts to an order of the Ruler to grant permanent lease. Thus, neither the authority of the Deputy Superintendent nor his order can therefore be challenged as In valid; and, (iii) That the patta having been granted and Nazarana and rent having been accepted by the State of Nayagarh, and therefore, by the State of Orissa acting on behalf of the Government of India, the same could not be cancelled. 8. Coming to the first contention, it must be noticed that by reason of the merger agreement dated 14-12-1947, followed by the extension of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act to the Ex-State of Nayagarh, the law that become applicable to that area was the statutory provisions of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939. The whole of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act came into force in the Ex-State of Nayagarh with effect from 1-1-1948. Naturally Section 68 of the Endowments Act governed all cases of lease of the Debottar property. In view of this section the lease in question evidenced by ext. 3, the patta, therefore, no substance in my opinion in this contention. 9. The second point may be taken up. The Ruler of Ex-State of Nayagarh may be a trustee of all the religious and charitable institutions in the State. He might have the authority for passing an order in his capacity as the sovereign of the State to grant lease of the Debottar property; but such right residing in the Ruler as a trustee could not be delegated to another person. He might have the authority for passing an order in his capacity as the sovereign of the State to grant lease of the Debottar property; but such right residing in the Ruler as a trustee could not be delegated to another person. It is a well-settled doctrine that a trustee cannot delegate his powers. There have been cases where leases granted by the agent of a trustee of a Debottar institution have been declared to be void on this account. The prohibition against such delegation is based upon the further principle that a trustee cannot delegate his power which requires exercise of discretion of the trustee in the matter of alienation of the trust property. In that view, the Deputy Superintendent of Endowments of Nayagarh cannot be held to be the delegatee of the sovereign power of the ruler in the matter of administration of trust-estates in the State. Therefore, his order dated 26-12-1947 directing grant of permanent lease cannot be construed as an order granting the lease and acceptance of Nazarana by him on behalf of the State must be regarded as tentative acceptance awaiting final decision of the trustee himself, viz., the Ruler. That apart, in view of the merger agreement dated 14-12-1947 by which the entire administration was agreed to be handed over to the Government of Orissa with effect from 1-1-1948, the Ruler obviously could not exercise his powers as a trustee of the Debottar estates after 14-12-1947. Though under the agreement the powers regarding administration of the State shall stand transferred with effect from 1-1-1948, they could not be exercised in view of the terms of the agreement so as to create rights in persons and impose obligations on the State of Orissa, under any transaction created or entered into subsequent to 14-12-1947. 10. That apart, the Defendants have proved a previous order of the Ruler dated 1-6-1944 as ext. A in this case. This order was deemed to be the law in the Ex-State at the time when the Deputy Superintendent passed his order dated 26-12-1947. This order of the Ruler directs that since 1-6-1944 no land of the Debottar Department unless really it is waste land, can be given on occupancy right to any tenant. The suit-land in the particular case at the time of grant of lease was admittedly agricultural land. This order of the Ruler directs that since 1-6-1944 no land of the Debottar Department unless really it is waste land, can be given on occupancy right to any tenant. The suit-land in the particular case at the time of grant of lease was admittedly agricultural land. Therefore, the order of the Deputy Superintendent runs counter to the order of the Ruler in Ext. A. 11. There can be no doubt that the Raja and Ruler of the then Nayagarh State was exercising the powers of a trustee of all Debottar lauds. This is clear from the Settlement Report and Attestation Rules of Nayagarh State, 1931-1932. The same is also reported in Ramadhyani?s report on Land Revenue and Land Tenures and Revenue System. Thus, the Ruler was not only the sovereign power of the Ex. State, but he was also the trustee of all Debottar institutions. It was legally impossible for him to delegate his powers of trusteeship to the Deputy Superintendent of Endowments. By the latter?s order date 26-12-1947, no valid lease can be created in favour of the Plaintiff. Under the ordinary Hindu Law relating to endowments, as well as under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act which became operative in the Ex State of Nayagarh since 1-1-1948, no Debottar property can be left out perpetually unless there is legal necessity. The finding is that there was no legal necessity for the impugned permanent lease. Grant of the lease was, therefore, in contravention of the law and must be treated as a nullity. Acceptance of Nazarana and rent in case of such transaction which is valid ab initio would not validate the transaction and would not create an estoppel against the deity or the State. In my view, therefore, none of the points urged can succeed. In the result, therefore, this appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed